1973 (cont.) November 8: November 10: November 14: December 13: An article which appeared in the Soviet weekly, Pravda published a message in which China told the The Soviet international affairs weekly, New Times, It was reported in the New York Times that Premier 1974 January 2: January 8: January 20: January 22: February 10: February 22: March 19: March 20: March 29: The Soviet foreign affairs monthly, Mezudunarodnaya The official Chinese news agency, Hsinhua, criticized China ordered the expulsion of five persons attached to the Soviet Embassy in Peking on espionage charges, the New China News Agency reported. The Soviet Foreign Ministry protested to Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsin-chuan over Peking's expulsion of five Soviet diplomats for alleged espionage. Tass reported that the diplomats were physically manhandled and threatened with execution during five days of detention before they were expelled. The Soviet Union accused a Chinese diplomat of spying and expelled him from the country in apparent retaliation. Pravda denounced China for "resorting to arms to impose According to the Washington Post, the Soviet periodical New Times described Chinese claims to the Paracel Islands as "political provocations." An article in the Washington Star-News reported that several European periodicals have "virtually predicted" the outbreak of war between China and the Soviet Union by the end of summer. The Soviet Union reported that a Soviet military The Soviet Union demanded the PRC return its helicopter ARTICLE FROM THE FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL, SUMMER 1971, ENTITLED "THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE," BY GERALD C. COLEMAN* I. INTRODUCTION You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question for equals in power; the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.1 Conceived in revolutionary chaos, nurtured in a hostile environment inimical to its existence, and reaching its maturation stage while locked in a death struggle with Fascist National Socialism, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has tended to view international relations as a continuation of the Marxist concept of class struggle. Functioning within this ideological framework but desirous of demonstrating its adherence to the progressive development of international law, so as to win support for its role in international relations, the Soviet Union in recent years has manifested a purported sensitivity to propriety and legality in its relations with the nations of the free world. Despite strenuous attempts at justification however, Soviet relations with her Eastern Bloc neighbors have been characterized by the use of force and the threat of force.' It was the invasion of Czechoslovakia which led the Soviet Union to attempted vindication of its action by the articulation of a unique concept of international law, i.e., limited sovereignty. This concept was promulgated by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev," in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, at Warsaw, Poland, on November 12, 1968, thus giving rise to "The Brezhnev Doctrine." Ideological in character and power oriented in application, the doctrine, in form and substance, is posited upon Marxist-Leninist principles and the Soviet interpretation of such principles." In the official justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia published in Pravda this approach is indicated by the author's statement that: "Laws and legal norms are subjected to the laws of the class struggle, the laws of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in Marxist-Leninist teaching, in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and Worker's parties." 8 On this basis, the ideological nexus between the Soviet view of international law and Soviet policy toward the Eastern Bloc nations can be clearly discerned. It might be considered that the advancement of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to justify what is basically power politics is mere affectation on the part of the leaders of the Soviet Union, much as Stalin developed theory ex post facto to justify actual practices, and is consequently unworthy of serious consideration *Major, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army, Chief, International Law, Headquarters. United States Army, Japan. This article was originally prepared as a thesis and submitted to the Judge Advocate General's School. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Judge Advocate General, the United States Army or any other governmental agency. 1 Thucydides. Peloponnesian War (400 B.C.). 2 Ramundo, The Soviet Approach to Peace and War, 6 Revue De Droit Penal Militair Et De Droit De La Guerre 77 (1967). 3 See, B. Ramundo, Peaceful Coexistence (1967). Disturbances occurred in East Berlin in 1953 which were suppressed by Soviet forces. The "Polish October" rising and the "Fight for Freedom" in Hungary which occurred in 1956 were also suppressed by the threat of force in the former example and the use of Soviet force in the latter example. In 1968, the Soviet led Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia and riots in Poland in December 1970 caused Red Army troops to deploy to the Polish border. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, 64. as General Secretary of the Communist Party rules the Soviet Union in a collegium consisting of himself, The Premiere, Aleksei Kosygin, and the President, Nikolai Podgorny. See, Pravda Article, Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries, Justifying Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 7 Int'l Leg. Materials 1323 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pravda Justification]. ? Pravda Justification, supra note 6, pp. 1324-1325. Pravda Justification, supra note 6, p. 1325. 10 as a theory of international law. However, this doctrinal approach must be viewed seriously and given a high degree of credence because it provides a coherent world view for the people of socialist societies and presents a means for maintaining cohesion among the various Communist parties of the world. This approach also sets a criterion for the settlement of disputes both within the bureaucracy of individual Communist countries and among the various Communist states with the attendant policy considerations such an approach connotes. As emphasized by Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, "However attenuated, Communist ideology is, in part, responsible for international tensions." "1 The importance of the future impact of the Brezhnev doctrine on international relations in general and the foreign policy of the United States in particular, has been consistently explained by our nation's leaders. The problems raised by this concept was succinctly stated by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk in an address to the United Nations General Assembly. He demanded to know of the Soviet Union whether the so-called "nonclass" laws of the United Nations Charter are mere abstract principles subordinate to whatever Moscow determines to be the laws of the "class struggle," whether the Charter's laws of sovereign equality of states and of national self-determination are powerless to shield smaller states within the Communist Bloc from invasion and domination by the Soviet Union, and whether the Brezhnev Doctrine means that the Soviet Union's doctrine of peaceful co-existence does not apply to its own allies or those with the same social system." The doctrine, in effect, has challenged one of the most important assumptions on which Western policy has been tacitly based, i.e., the evolution of Communist rule in Russia and its dependencies." It has caused the NATO alliance to reevaluate the question of European security 14 and provoked Secretary of State Rogers to comment on the question of a European security conference: "We would favor a negotiation that holds out realistic hope for a reduction of tensions in Europe. But we will not participate in a conference which has the effect of ratifying or acquiescing in the Brezhnev doctrine." 15 The doctrine has also produced a spate of commentary in the public media erroneously analogizing the Soviet position to that expressed by the United States in the famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823.1 The importance of the doctrine to Soviet policy is also apparent because Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and with Western Germany will help determine the success of the strategic arms limitation talks. These in turn will strongly influence these relations and relations with Red China, because any success registered in the SALT negotiations would enhance Soviet conventional capabilities. This in turn will offer Moscow greater maneuverability in dealing with 9 R. De George, The New Marxism, 135 (1968). 10 Kissinger. Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy, 270, reprinted from Conditions of World Order, 95 Daedalus 503 (1966). 11 Id. 12 See 59 Dep't State Bull. 407 (1968). 13 Shub, Lessons of Czechoslovakia, 47 Foreign Affairs 266 (1969). 14 Cleveland, NATO After the Invasion, 47 Foreign Affairs, 251, 252-257 (1969). 15 Speech of Secretary of State Rogers before Belgo-American Association at Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 6, 1969 (text at 61 Dep't State Bull. 624 (1969)). 16 An example of this sort of commentary is provided by the question of Joseph C. Harsch. A.B.C. News Commentator on the A.B.C. Radio and Television show Issues and Answers, November 17. 1968, when he asked Ambassador James Russell Wiggins. U.S. Representative to the United Nations, "to explain what difference there is between the Brezhnev Doctrine and our own Monroe Doctrine, between what they have done to Czechoslovakia and what we have done repeatedly in the Carribean?" Ambassador Wiggins replied that "I think essentially the difference is that the Monroe Doctrine had nothing to do with what kind of government any country within the Western Hemisphere selected. It had to do solely with the invasion of or overthrow of countries by European countries. It was invoked to protect the right of self-determination of the countries of the Western Hemisphere." Although it is beyond the purview of this paper to effect an analysis of the Monroe Doctrine, it is interesting to note that the Doctrine, enunciated in President Monroe's message to Congress on December 2, 1823. grew out of two diplomatic problems. The first was a minor clash with Russia concerning the northwest coast of North America, the result of which was an expression of principle by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams that the American continents were not to be considered any longer as a place for colonization by European powers. The second important issue giving rise to the Doctrine grew from the fear that a group of European governments would attempt to conquer and reduce to colonial status the Latin-American states that had recently revolted from Spain. The United States recognized the independence of those states and the presidential message therefore stated that the United States would not interfere in European affairs. but would view with displeasure any attempt by the European powers to subject the nations of the New World to their political systems. R. Nice, Treasury of Law, 539 (1964). the East European States and with Communist China." On this basis, the importance of the doctrine to those concerned with foreign policy and particularly lawyers engaged in matters with foreign policy implications, cannot be overemphasized.18 Based on the theory that the doctrine derives whatever validity it may have from Marxist-Leninist principles and further that such principles exercise a direct and cogent relationship on the actual Soviet practice of international relations, this article will attempt (1) to examine the origin of the Brezhnev doctrine and its ideological basis and (2) to analyze it from the viewpoint of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and relevant norms of international law. II. ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE A. LIBERALIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET LED INTERVENTION 19 Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe moved toward economic reform and political liberalization resulting in such improvements as dissolution of the Cominform, an attempted reconciliation with Tito, institution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and other measures designed to ease relations between the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations." Until 1961 and the open break with China, the nature of the change initiated by individual members of the bloc did not pose a threat to the integrity of the Socialist system. In that year, however, the process of change and accommodation began to deteriorate under the mounting pressures for internal reform." The result of this deterioration in Czechoslovakia was the fall in 1968 of Anton Novotny, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party and a dedicated Stalinist. 22 The removal of Novotny as First Secretary and his replacement by Alexander Dubcek was thought to clear the way for peaceful revolution in Czechoslovakia which would remove the accumulated evils of Stalinism and establish the foundations for "socialist democracy." The objective of liberalization and reform sought by Dubcek was to be achieved by means of "The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," adopted at the plenary session of the central committee of the Communist Party on April 5, 1968. The document pledged new guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religious observance; electoral laws to provide a broader choice of candidates and greater freedom for the four non-Communist parties within the National Front; ungrading of parliament and the government in relation to the power of the Communist party apparatus; broad economic reforms; and independent judiciary; federal status for Slovakia on an independent basis; and a new Constitution to be drafted by the close of 1969.23 The real motive force for change was provided by the intellectual community. It resulted in the publication of “2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Civil Servants, Scientists, Artists and Everyone," " by leading public figures in Czechoslovakia. This manifesto made an appeal for vigorous political action to remove all remnants of Communist orthodoxy in the country and called on the people to enforce the demand for the removal of discredited persons through strikes, boycotts, public criticism, resolutions and demonstrations. Although this manifesto was disavowed by the Dubcek government, the Warsaw meeting of the Communist Bloc parties on July 15, 1968, Czech severely criticized the that reforms and warned Czechoslovakia "never will we consent to allow these historic gains of socialism and the independence and security of all our peoples to be jeopardized." 20 The Czech 17 Clemens, Jr., The Soviet World Faces West, 46 International Affairs 484, 489 (1970). (1970). 18 For an interesting commentary on the role of the lawyer in nuclear-age foreign relations see Franck and Weisband, The Johnson and Brezhnev Doctrines: The Law You Make May Be Your Own, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 979 (1970). 19 For a fully documented account of the trend toward liberalization in Czechoslovakia see, Staff Report of Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Aspects of Intellectual Ferment and Dissent in Czechoslovakia (Comm. Print 1969). 20 Id., p. 15. 21 P. Ello. Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for Freedom, 13 (1968). 2 Id., pp. 81-178. Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra, note 19, pp. 67–68. 24 Id., p. 137. The document appears in full as Annex H. 25 Id., p. 71. Pravda Article, Warsaw Meeting of Communist Parties Criticizes Czechoslovakia Reforms, 7 Int'l Leg. Materials 1265 (1968). |