-4

In my reference to the Tolstoy Foundation, it is not my intention to denigrate them. With their help, I must say, I contacted an organization called the Program for Soviet Scholars Emigres in New York, which unfortunately closed its doors because of lack of financial resources. This organization helped me to participate in the Annual Convention of Slavists in the U.S. (AAASS), where I met Professor M. Montias from Yale University who recommended me to Delphic Associates Inc. in Falls Church, which offered me a contract to write a monograph, which I did. By the way, Delphic Associates is doing a tremendous work to help people coming from the Soviet Union to write about their experiences.

But because of the struggle of day to day living, my time has been very limited to search for the right organization to assist me in seeking work in my field.

As I now look back on my odyssey from the moment I stepped into the American Embassy in Belgrade until this moment when I have the opportunity to talk to the Honorable legislators as an American citizen, I would like to call your attention to the fact that, in the life of a defector such as I, we see three distinct periods: the first is the initial contact with the American representative, at which time such persons receive protection and status of political asylum; the second is the period of clearance and waiting for a visa to come to the United States; and the third is the initial period of the new life here in the United States.

Based on my experience, the first two segments (excluding the Belgrade episode) worked very well. I received protection and support immediately I stepped into the American House in Vienna and I received permission to move to West Germany after only approximately one week. The visa to come to the United States I received within six weeks or so.

The major difficulties started in the third period. However, taking into account the time constraints of the Honorable Permanent Subcommittee, I would like to omit the details of my adventures and troubles as I started my new life here and move forward respectfully to submit my proposal as to how the handling of defectors can be improved upon. I submit this proposal not only as a former defector, but as a citizen of the United States of America, which I became earlier this year.

- 5

The proposal is as follows:

1.

2.

To establish a year-long grant for the defectors who escape
from Soviet Bloc

countries and have no other Government,

Church or private supportive sponsorship;

5

To establish a Government Commission, composed of 3
members, representing such agencies as, for example, the
Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Defense, the CIA,
FBI, etc.

The functions of this Commission might include:

a.

b.

C.

d.

e.

the question of eligibility for a Government grant
(See 1 above);

formulation of a succinct questionnaire to be completed
by the defectors;

formulation of detailed instructions to all Government
agencies or organizations which could be potential
contacts for such defectors;

or

a monthly review of the dossiers of recent defectors to determine their eligibility for the Government grant and which Government agency will benefit from the knowledge, expertise, etc. of the particular defector, such agency then becoming the official sponsor of the defector for the one-year period;

issuing guidelines to Government agencies instructing them how to act as a defector's sponsor, including:

(i)

advising the defector on where and how to take
courses in the English language to the extent
required (I knew not a word of English before I
defected);

(ii) advising the defector on housing possibilities and
integration in his particular field, etc.; and
(iii) requiring a report by the grantee at the end of

the year specifying the manner in which the

grant was used and what the grantee foresees as future possibilities.

- 6

The Commission proposed above should have a minimum staff to

permit it to fulfil its goal and to program an agenda for monthly and annual meetings.

It is my belief that such kind of organized assistance to defectors will not run counter to the new orientation of relaxing the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Rather, it will help to establish a true, realistic and reciprocal basis for better knowledge and understanding of each other's goals. At the same time, such act will have a tremendous resonance in the hearts of potential defectors from Soviet Bloc countries.

EXHIBIT NO. 15

STATEMENT OF
THOMAS POLGAR
BEFORE THE

U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF

SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Until my retirement from the Central Intelligence Agency in December, 1981, I have served continuously as an intelligence officer in the Office of Strategic Services, the War Department, and the C.I.A. for 37 years. I have held a series of senior staff and command assignments and had the honor of receiving two Distinguished Intelligence Medals, the Intelligence Star and the Department of State's Award for Valor.

I first became exposed to the problems of defectors and defector handling in the early post-war period in Berlin, where the physical proximity between the Soviet and U.S. military forces permitted not only close observation of each other, but created a climate and opportunities for defections the like of which we have never seen since.

Later, in the early '50s, I served as staff officer to the then-Chief of the C.I.A.'s German Station, the late Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., whose responsibilities included an organized defector program and the establishment of a Defector Reception Center designed to combine optimum physical security, humane treatment, psychological conditioning, and effective interrogation. To the best of my knowledge, in the years during which I was associated with that effort, we have had no redefections. I recognize, of course, that we cannot recreate the past, nor could we reassemble today the facilities, experience, linguistic qualifications, and operational environment of those simpler days when our intelligence services could draw from the vast reservoir of manpower funneled into the armed services from the American melting pot by the draft.

Subsequently, as a C.I.A. Chief of Station, I served in several important capitals, where my official functions included the chairmanship of the Embassy's Defector Committee. While I have never seen duplicated the intensity and numbers of the defector experience of the early post-war years, throughout my long career in intelligence I had the opportunity to keep abreast of the problems of defectors and their handling. The record is clear, I believe, that there have been great successes; but there were also some, perhaps avoidable, accidents leading to loss of intelligence information, loss of prestige, and, much more

importantly, human suffering.

2

The process of obtaining information from defectors comes under the heading of Human Source Intelligence Collection, or HUMINT. We must never forget that a defector, regardless of his nationality, service, background, race, creed, or color, is first of all a human being who must be treated with consideration and respect if only because that is the best way to get the most useful contribution from him.

I do not doubt the good will in our handling of defectors, but the experience of the most recent years suggests that some of the difficulties which have crept into our intelligence collection and covert actions in recent years are perceivable also in the defector area. I refer in particular to the loss of linguistic qualifications and resulting lack of understanding of the psychological and cultural mechanisms affecting the perception, judgment, motivation, and action of foreigners.

Ten years ago, I had the honor of serving as Chief of Personnel Management for C.I.A.'s Operations Directorate. Problems of loss of linguistic qualifications and resulting consequences were casting their shadow even then. Most recently, as investigator of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, I was in a position to conclude that the lack of foreign area and linguistic expertise continues to represent obstacles to the achievement of our intelligence and covert action objectives. Since defector handling will never have the same priorities as the more pressing operational tasks--and this is so for perfectly understandable and logical reasons--it follows that personnel weaknesses in the operational program will be reflected and keenly felt also in the defector handling area. It is, however, easier to bring about immediate improvements in the latter, because many of the difficulties which inhibit foreign operations need not apply. Thus, there is room and opportunity to improve defector handling without any cost to the ongoing, essential, and higher priority operational programs.

Defectors--Well Worth the Trouble

There is a lot of loose talk about defectors--for example, at any international sports competition where teams from Eastern Europe or Cuba participate. A tennis player, a gymnast, or circus performer who changes his or her place of residence for personal convenience or in hope of greater professional opportunities or earning capacity is not a defector, even when such a person comes from Cuba or from the Soviet Union.

In more general terms, people who merely wish to emigrate to another country, even if they eventually do 80 illegally, are not necessarily defectors and in most cases they are not defectors in the intelligence meaning of the term.