EXHIBIT NO. 13 STATEMENT BY ANDREW W. MARSHALL OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE I welcome the opportunity to make a statement on the ways in which the US Government might improve its use of Soviet defectors and emigres. This is only a small part of the broader question that you are addressing but it is the one with which I have some experience. The Office of Net Assessment has developed assessments of the Military Balance in a variety of geographical and military mission areas. The assessments attempt to include all relevant dimensions of these military balances and of the major trends that affect the balance. As part of our efforts, we use contract study funds to supply us with inputs to current assessments or for studies designed to improve the state of the art of making such assessments. As part of this contract studies program we have used a number of emigres. We have considered using some of the defectors but have not in fact used them. The emigres we have used almost exclusively have academic backgrounds. The areas in which we have found them most useful are in studies of the Soviet economy and Soviet society. There are great uncertainties in our understanding of the Soviet economy, its size relative to that of the United States, its rate of growth, etc. The emigres have made an important contribution in improving analyses of the economy and in improving our understanding of the Soviet data. Also the emigres have been very important to me in calling attention to and assessing the credibility of recent writings by some of the economists within the Soviet Union that describes defects and deficits in the Soviet economy. The emigres also provide unique insights as to how various aspects of the Soviet government and economy work. In another case a Soviet emigre who was trained as a sociologist in the Soviet Union has supplied interesting and special insights into the changing social and political situation in the Soviet Union. He has a feel for the internal dynamics of developments there that make his insights and judgments of special value. These are the sorts of things that can come only from someone who has actually grown up and lived in a particular society. Indeed some of Despite the special competence of a number of these emigres I am struck by how difficult a time they have in establishing themselves and finding appropriate positions. them never seem to find an appropriate niche. On the whole they have not benefited very much from the recent increase in funding for Soviet and East European studies in the United States. Most of the programs are aimed at the support of existing US organizations and people in universities. The relations of a number of emigres with their academic counterparts are uneasy. Some American academics see these people in part as competitors, people they would like to use as sources of information but whom they do not really welcome in many cases as colleagues and collaborators in analyses. Most of the current US government funding of the field of Soviet studies is aimed at providing general support for the field and is only weakly targeted at areas of major governmental interest. When it is targeted on government interests its focus is often too short term to support longer term research on important areas in which prior analyses are deficient. Of course the small group of emigres that I am focusing attention on is only a limited set of the total group of emigres. They probably are the people with the greatest potential for improving our understanding of the Soviet Union by means of their own analytical work. The bulk of the emigres can provide interesting and important information. They have been increasingly used to do so by a variety of programs. The defectors are a different category. I have reviewed several times what they might contribute and have met with two of them to discuss possible projects. The problem from my perspective is that they are in the main not trained analysts and therefore not in a good position to undertake the kind of studies that I am primarily interested in. They are in general, however, of higher rank within the society they come from and clearly offer interesting insights in some cases. I am sure more could be done in particular to try to understand how Soviet organizations really function. I am not sure defectors are adequately exploited from this point of view--partly because people do not understand the value of the sorts of insight they might provide on the functioning of the decisionmaking processes. Current developments in the Soviet Union may in several ways increase the flow of people who could allow us to improve our understanding of the functioning of Soviet society. A future relaxation of tensions might allow an increased flow of emigres. The restructuring of the Soviet economy is likely to be a period of great stress within the Soviet system. There might be an increased flow of defectors. Now is the time to think about how we might improve the way in which we can make effective use of the talents of these people to improve our understanding of Soviet society. One measure that deserves consideration is the provision of designated funds for the use of the most qualified of these people. EXHIBIT NO. 14 STATEMENT OF PETER NICOLAE NICHOLSON before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations U.S. Government's Handling of Defectors Defection and defectors as itinerant agents in contemporary international social life constitute a relatively new phenomenon. The fact that this defection is essentially a one-way stream from the totalitarian countries to the democratic free countries - confirms the superiority of democracy as the inherent right of people to exercise freedom of expression and to be free of oppression. Therefore, defection is an expression of the struggle between the two main systems in the contemporary world. One of the questions arising in connection with this issue is: Does democracy take care of this stream of defectors? Does it encourage it or not? In my opinion, there would be at least two great advantages to be gained if this stream were to be stimulated: First, it would help the people in the totalitarian system to determine in their minds the real situation in the democratic system and thus to enable them better to counteract the noxious everyday propoganda. Secondly, an intelligent use of the presence of defectors will help the people of the democracies to understand the real goals, and face the real danger of the totalitarian system. Those persons coming to the West and known as defectors here are very different. They come from virtually all segments of society: diplomats, military men, scientists, scholars, bureaucrats, researchers, etc. Their advent here forms a large spectrum of interest and concern. However, notwithstanding this multiplicity of backgrounds, one common denominator is apparent: they all want to tell the free world about their experiences under the totalitarian system, what is the real situation there and so to neutralize the propaganda coming to the West in many different ways. At the same time, they want to use their - 2 expertise and knowledge to rebuild their lives here and to become decent, useful citizens of the country which has adopted them. But before saying something about all our troubles, may I be permitted to tell you, in my opinion, how the defectors can be categorized. There are at least two main categories: First, there are the intelligence defectors. These are the group who had contact with the American Government agencies before their defection. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to understand that here we have a typical contractual relationship between this group of defectors and the Government agencies. The question is whether or not the Government agencies keep their word in this respect. I respectfully suggest that criteria or standards be established by law to take care of such defectors. Secondly, there is the group of defectors which I will call the naive or neophyte defectors. That is to say, those people who, being deeply disappointed by the totalitarian system, have decided to come to the United States, albeit with no previous contacts with the American authorities. I am in the position of telling you about this second category of defectors, based on my personal experience. When, in August 1981, I stepped into the American Consulate in Belgrade, the Consul, a young lady, was so surprised and confused (more than I was) that she did not know what to do with me as a person asking for political asylum. After some tense moments, she introduced me to someone I supposed to be an intelligence man. He explained to me that, because Yugoslavia was also a Communist country, the American Embassy could not protect me, and the best way, in his opinion, was for me to go to Vienna, Austria, where somebody would meet me. But I knew that in the American Embassy in Moscow there was a group of pentecostals, Soviet citizens who were living there and were protected by the American Government, and I understood that the American Consulate in Belgrade did not want to have the same trouble with people asking for asylum. I had no choice but to go to Vienna. I knew that the Yugoslav administration's behavior was not constant. Sometimes they would permit Romanians to escape to the West and sometimes they would catch them and send them back. In the last 10-15 years a lot of Romanians have risked their lives by escaping through Yugoslav territory. In my situation, I used a stratagem: having diplomatic status and a permanent -3 visa for all the member countries of CMEA-COMECON as an international officer of the Secretariat of CMEA, where I worked for many years as a department deputy chief, I bought a train ticket to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, using the shorter route thru Vienna, Austria, where I stepped out of the train. It is true that in Vienna, at the American House, they knew of me and two very amiable gentlemen took care of me. I learned that, as promised to me, Belgrade had sent them information about me. But there was the real possibility that such information would have been useless if the Yugoslavs had caught me. Anyway, from Vienna a telex was sent to the Department of State for permission to protect me and to move me somewhere in the West, since I felt very unsafe in Austria. Permission was received to move me to West Germany, where I waited until November 10. In this period, those who took care of me did everything possible to make my life easier. They started to teach me English, to introduce me to the American way of life and at the same time to ask me some questions about the world from whence I had come. But I realized their interest was very narrow. As I now recall, two questions seemed of great importance to them: they asked me for a description of the personalities of the leaders in the Soviet Bloc countries and whether, on the roof of the CMEA building some intelligence equipment was installed. (This latter question was indeed legitimate since the CMEA building is located in the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy.) The question of how this man's experience could be of use to the United States was not included in their agenda. Within a month or so I received a visa and they formally introduced me to the Tolstoy Foundation branch in Frankfurt which became my official sponsor. My honest intention was, and continues to be, not to have come here and decry the Soviet type of government, since I can no longer be arrested and put in jail. I want to engage in scholarly debate on the two systems. But how is this possible if, after reading my Curriculum Vitae, an executive of my official sponsor, the Tolstoy Foundation, very candidly and seriously told me: Dr. Nicolae, I cannot understand why, when you had a very good position, you decided to come here. And later I was told by the case holder: I am so sorry, but if you were a carpenter, I could get you a job at once. I understand that at present there is nothing organized to assist such kind of defectors as I and temporarily at least, I have to forget about the possibility of using my knowledge for the benefit of the United States. |