Krasnov, "Soviet Defectors" 11

in the greatest need for help, also has the greatest potential of helping the United States in a number of crucial ways.

The usefulness of Soviet defectors to the United States must not be measured solely in terms of the contribution some of them are making to our intelligence-gathering apparatus. I can easily imagine that some Soviet defectors with the KGB or GRU connection have saved the United States billions of dollars by providing intelligence information on Soviet military planning, weapons technology, and spy operations. But the greatest contribution to U.S. national security should be sought in the insights into the nature and the mode of operation of the Soviet system that all defectors (of whom the KGB operatives are but a tiny minority)

can provide,

individually and collectively. Although their contribution to our knowledge of the USSR cannot be.measured in dollars, it is crucial to our survival as a free nation. 3

My concerns about U.S.inability to handle Soviet defectors were woefully justified by the Miroslav Medvid, Aleksandr Sukhanov, and Vitaly Yurchenko incidents in Fall 1985. All three cases showed signs of professional incompetence and insensitivity to the situation. A11 three cases demonstrated the lack of a coherent political will. As a result, they greatly embarrassed the United States and, conversely, saved a lot of problems for the Soviet Union. They happened at the time

would-be-defectors'

31 am leaving aside for the moment the importance of defectors in

undermining the image of societal unanimity projected by Soviet propaganda both at home and abroad. There is much room for improvement here in the work of such government sponsored outlets as Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, as well as in private media coverage.

Krasnov, "Soviet Defectors" 12

when my book was being printed, but in the book I warned that such incidents are bound to happen and called for a new policy toward Soviet defectors that would both assure their humạn rights and maximally satisfy U.S. national security needs. More specifically, I recommended that the United States should:

the

1. Proclaim and implement a genuine open-door policy [according to which Soviet defectors] would be exempt from regular immigration procedures and allowed an immediate entry, residence, and work permit in the United States;

2. Encourage our allies to do the same;

3. Champion defectors' rights in the U.N. Human Rights Commission and other international organizations;

4.

Make sure that every

defection is publicized,

whenever a defector does not have serious objections;

5. Provide free legal counsel to any would-be defector; 6. Encourage and facilitate contacts between a new defector and local emigre communities;

7. Encourage and stimulate the creation of a public [or private, I would now add

of facilitating practical

V.K.] agency with the aim

details

of resettlement and language training, and all national security

The need for a new approach to defectors was underscored by fact that while my

book was being written, a group of

Krasnov, "Soviet Defectors" 13

concerned Americans founded the Jamestown Foundation with the expressed goal of providing "a private support system to enable [defectors] to lead a productive life." The creation of The Jamestown Foundation was a very positive development, and I am glad to acknowledge its efforts. However, in as far as the Jamestown Foundation has chosen to limit its activities to the "cultivation and utilization of high-level defectors" and to refrain from questioning our present policy as a whole, it can be helpful only in alleviating the problem, not in solving it.

By restricting its assistance to "high-level" defectors, the Jamestown Foundation belies its own historical name. Never since its first settlement in Jamestown in 1607, was America meant to be a sanctuary "for big wigs only." I am afraid that by rejecting those whom it finds at lower levels, the Jamestown Foundation is sending the wrong message for present and future escapees from the USSR, namely, that even in America some are more equal than the others. One cannot help thinking that the course of history would have been quite different, had the ancient Egyptians turned Joseph and Mary away at the border for not being "high level" people.

But even if one were to accept the notion that, because of lack of funds, more important defectors should be given priority, I doubt whether the Jamestown Foundation can make such selection, simply because it is not familiar with the total pool of defectors. Therefore, the most urgent task is the task of taking stock of all Soviet defectors living in the free world. This is a task for which my book was but a beginning.

Krasnov, "Soviet Defectors" 14

Furthermore, we need to have more definitive answers to such questions as: How many Soviet defectors are there world-wide? How many are in the USA? (According to my data, by 1971 less than one-third were settled here, p.84). Where do they live and what do they do? Is there anything they know that we don't but ought to? What kinds of expertise each of them can possibly offer? What do they think about the way they were handled? What specific recommendations for improving our handling of defectors do they

have?

In order to answer these and other questions, a unified Data

Bank system,

that includes computerized files on all defectors,

ought to be created Secondly, all new defections should be monitored, a task which can be best carried out in cooperation with U.S. government and our allies. (Tracking down all newspaper accounts is not enough because there may be some defections that are unreported). After establishing the Data Bank and Monitoring systems, all defectors from the USSR, including those who do not wish to settle in the USA, should be interviewed in a systematic and scholarly fashion. Only on the basis of such interviews can their relative importance for U.S. national security needs--and not merely for our intelligence-gathering agencies--be properly assessed. Interview questions should be carefully selected by a team of sovietologists and government officials in close consultation with qualified former defectors. A11 interviews should be entered into a permanent public record and disseminated to scholars, government officials and the public at large. Even though some of these interviews may prove irrelevant to the

Krasnov, "Soviet Defectors" 15

immediate U.S. national security needs, collectively and over a longer period they will undoubtedly serve as an important source for understanding and predicting Soviet behavior. More than

anybody else, Soviet defectors can help us feel the pulsebeat of the Soviet system. At the same time, hearing them out wil1 certainly have a therapeutic effect on those who had been driven to defection by a desire to tell the truth but never had a chance to do it.

Since the events of Fall 1985 which caused the present hearing, there were over thirty Soviet defections world-wide, according to my admittedly incomplete tally. This number suggets a reversal of the previously observed trend toward a higher annual rate of defection. The reversal seems to be due chiefly to three factors. The first one has to do with the improvement of Soviet domestic climate under Mikhail Gorbachev in so far as the policy of glasnost' offers a hope for those would-be-defectors whose actions are impelled by a desire to express their thoughts and feelings on Soviet domestic problems. The second has to do with a more mature, more sophisticated, and more effective KGB approach to defection (and emigration, in general) which found its expression in such gestures as inviting Mikhail Baryshnikov and Natalia Makarova to perform in the USSR, as well as in the flirting with a number of prominent emigres. The third factor deterrent to the post-October 1985 defections is of our own making. It stems from the failure of U.S. government to match the above Soviet actions with a more sophisticated approach of its The U.S. handling of Medvid, Sukhanov, and Yurchenko has

own.