66,

ated one just described- the Soviet leadership's decision to let émigrés return was part of a larger effort to make the point that emigration may not be the solution (panacea) for discontented Soviet citizens and an official attempt to justify on humane grounds the severe restrictions on emigration from the Soviet Union.

Of course this attitude forgets to mention that most discontented Soviets who choose to go abraod to look for a better life do also succeed in finding it, even if this means struggling in the beginning to survive and establish oneself. Secondly, one must point out that this reemigration wave was organized in such a way that the émigrés left 'en masse', in front of television cameras, just as the publicity about the "democratization in the USSR" was gathering steam (176). Those returns could have been easily spread in time as the requests were coming in, but of course the propaganda impact would have been small and not interesting for exploitation.

However enthusiastic the official Soviet reaction about the return of the émigrés was, the situation underscores a certain inescapable irony as was pointed out by Richard Schifter, US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights: "By calling attention to these cases, they demonstrate the freedom in the

West where people can leave at will as distinct from the situation they have in their country where people cannot leave at will." (177)

Finally, it is worthwhile to point out the "propaganda" atmosphere that purposefully surrounded the returning of the former Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union and to contrast it with the almost completely unnoticed return to the US of at least five families that had left for the USSR at the end of 1986: no flags. no band, almost no articles, no demand to be pardoned for their mistake to leave for the Soviet Union, not one ounce of propaganda exploitation, (See exhibit #8)

...

67.

With regard to defectors in general, Soviet bloc propaganda will of course picture life in the West as dismal, but more specifically the Western intelligence agencies will be held responsible for abominal treatment given to Soviet bloc defectors who returned. Drugs, sex, isolation, blackmail, beatings and starvation are, according to Soviet statements, only a few examples of flagrant violations of the elementary human rights Soviets bloc defectors will have to undergo at the hands of Western intelligence services.

The image of the victimized defector, hero of the Motherland, who resists every possible pressure by Western intelligence agencies to slander his homeland changes suddenly when the spectacle becomes too incredible and the interests of the Soviet Union might be tarnished by its own game.

From the moment on that it was obvious that Viktor Belenko, after having received political asylum in the US, was adamant about not returning to the Soviet Union, his image of "son of the working class, elite officer, patriot, loving father and husband and above all, prototype of the New Communist Man', changed dramatically into that of "a thief, a common criminal who obviously could not qualify for political asylum." (178)

...

A clear message for internal consumption is to dissuade potential defectors to make it to the other side lest they will be treated like subhumans by the Western intelliger a services (e.g. Bitov, Yurchenko, Ryhkov, Khlau, ). The importance of succeeding the dissuasion increases of course with the caliber of the defector: if high-level Soviet bloc officials or intelligence officers abandon their plans of defection because of "what happened to previous highlevel colleagues", a worthy result will have been achieved.

The publicity surrounding the Yurchenko case may successfully discourage other defectors from dealing with an "inept" agency. Beside the fact that such an incident can be in itself damaging to the morale of the host agency.

68.

Another public relations advantage of the Bitov and Yurchenko cases was to show that defectors can come back to the USSR without fearing of being prosecuted when returning. If it is not possible to prevent defections ahead of time, one can at least try the recuperation tactic.

And finally, as already pointed out earlier, other advantages of high-level redefections is that the returning defector will have produced a lot of confusion not only with regard to himself, but also concerning the handling of future defectors. The other sizable advantage is that those redefectors will also be capable of describing the interrogation methods, the level and quality of knowledge of the interrogating party about certain topics relating to their country and eventually will be able to describe what possibly went wrong in his case (e.g. KGB colonel Rudolf Herrmann) or other ones.

X. CONCLUSION.

69.

Many aspects of returning to the Motherland, either as defector or as an émigré, have been touched upon in this study. It should be clear by now that the phenomenon of returning to Soviet bloc countries is usually more complex than commonly accepted. This study has hopefully sufficiently made clear that this phenomenon must be seen in a longer-term perspective, which allows to discover some interesting constant elements in a broader picture. One of those elements that seems evident is that, from whatever perspective one looks at the process of returning, Soviet bloc influence or manipulation in or another form and in varying degrees is always at work. Nothing is let unplanned, every opportunity even if it has only a remote chance of materializing itself - will be seized upon and transformed, if possible and worthwile, into a result that will defend or enhance the interests of the Soviet bloc community or of a particular member of it.

This "functional" attitude displayed by the Soviet bloc countries towards returnees is based, as has been plentifully shown in the paper, on a quite constant negative philosophy that in the first place basically doesn't accept that Soviet bloc citizens leave their country: it is regarded as an unpatriotic, often a treasonous act, regardless whether it concerns an émigré or a defector.

This negative approach towards émigrés and defectors in general, but also towards returnees in particular, is fed by its own logic and above all, by the interest the communist system has to condemn those people. Another element that strengthens this philosophy is the unfortunate attitude of malaise developed over the past decades by the West when it comes to deal with refugees in general, Soviet bloc defectors and émigrés in particular. As demonstrated earlier in this study, such an uncertain and often restrictive attitude transforms itself quickly into grist on the Soviet bloc propaganda mill, which is able to skillfully and in

70.

a subtle way build up arguments against the West that are not necessarily and always false.

On the other hand, contrasting with this attitude of putting any return to

tance/taken

a "good use", is the stance taken by the West in general and the US in particular. Whether one considers the return of Svetlana Alliluyeva or the coming back to the US of at least 5 families who decided to return to the Soviet Union at the end of December 1986, one cannot avoid being stricken by the total absence of publicity around such events, stressing the value of individual freedom and the right to be wrong, to make mistakes. Even the American media was more active and interested ir being part of the "big hoopla" that the Soviets set up whenever a group of Soviet émigrés was put on the return track to the Soviet Union in the last 3 or 4 months of 1986. One barely noticed any media activity around the "quiet return" of those five families, who came back through the little back door.

As Alan Dershowitz put it in one of his articles quoted in this study, it is not even a question of one country or system being better or worse than the other, it is a question of choice for the individual to decide where he or she will feel best at home, where he or she wants to live. In fact, that nobody should be forced to remain in a country against his will. It is barely advertized as if that freedom of choice is given to everyone all over the world.

Another point that would merit a separate study and that goes beyond the concept of the individual to choose his or her place of living, is that certain returns seems to have their place in the global Soviet strategy to use every overt and covert means (political and others) to destabilize Westem societies in general and certain West European countries in the first place. To floo: West Berlin and the FRG with more than 150,000 refugees of 3rd World countries can under no circumstances be construed as an temporary event, an accident due to a sudden outburst of love on behalf of those refugees for West Germany and