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terest in working or in learning English, not responsible in his behavior, wishy-washy about assuming responsibility (139). After his retum, he was

sentenced to 12 years labor camp (140).

Oleg Tumanov, until February 1986, editor of the Russian desk at Radio

Liberty, formulated the reasons for his retum as follows:

"My road back home has been tortuous. [...] The road back to my homeland was for me the natural and logical one. At a difficult time, and the world is going through a difficult time now, every honest person should with his own people. This is why I am here." (141)

That a defection may carry in itself the seeds of redefection is not inthinkable. The psychological stress faced by a defector can be overwhelming to

the point of pushing him towards rerlefection. Following passage is very signif

icant and revealing and describes how Viktor Belenko had to cope with certain

stressful moments:

"[...] As it was early when he went back to his room, he switched on the
television and turned the knob from channel to channel until he saw some-
thing very familiar. How wonderful! In progress was a superb public tele-
vision performance of Ama Karenina.
Primordial impulses seized and held and pushed him, and he could not re-
sist them. He wanted to feel the mud of the streets, smell the stink in
which he had grown up, be among the desolate, cold huts, hear Russian, te
in the land of his birth, his people, his ancestors. He was hearing and
being drawn by not only the call of the Mother country, but the Call of
the Wild.
He left his flight jacket, his flight suit, and everything else in the
apartment and started north toward Washington -and the Soviet embassy.
Great stakes rode with him. His voluntary retum would prove to millions
upon millions within and without the Soviet Union that the Party was
right, that Soviet society was superior to American society, that it was
the beacon lighting the way to the future of man.
But in all other crises, he tried to be Spartacus, to summon forth the
best within himself, to think logically.
About 2:00 am north of Richmond the fever broke, ..."(142)

However good a treatment a defector may receive, return to the Motherland

is not excluded. This is what US in

lligence officials experienced with a KGB


colonel known under the cover-name, Rudolf Albert Herrmam.

Herrmam had been groomed by the KGB to become the illegal resident in the US whose role would have been to run and control Soviet espionage activities in

this country in case the official relations between the Soviet Union and the US would break off. In 1980, Herrmann agreed to cooperate with the FBI "because

he lacked diplomatic immity, had only one other choice: jail and, above all,

because he wanted to save his skin and that of his family." (143) Whatever the

real reasons were, Herrmann got a yearly FBI borus of $35,000 and managed to become a successful home builder and remodeler which would earn $300,000 in six

years (144).

However, in November 1986, Rudolf Herrmam explained in an interview to the

Los Angeles Times, that he wanted to retum to his native Czechoslovakia for

several reasons:

* life in America forced him into a "strait jacket"'; all the news in this

country was processed to reflect a single viewpoint; * the poor in this country are treated so shabbily that he could no longer

tolerate it; * living under a false name in a foreign culture left him with a sense of

gallows hunor but little sense of identity; * intense dislike of the US political climate.

The article ends saying that Herrmann expects to make it all the way to Czechos

lovakia ( See exhibit #6 for the LA Times article on Rudolf Herrmann ).

The Bitov and Yurchenko cases are morky at best. No wonder that the opinion are very much divided about the genuine character of their respective defections

Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this study to disentangle the riddles

and enignas surrounding both cases. The official Soviet version is that they

never intended to defect but were kidnapped, drugged and forced to make differen

statements slandering the Soviet Union. As soon as possible they escaped the sur

veillance of their captors and reported to the closest Soviet diplomatic post.


But it is obvious that whatever the real explanation of both cases is- the Soviet Union scored some impressive points, embarrassing at best for the West.

One major advantage such a high-level redefection entails is that is sows

confusion in the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the opponents,

not only concerning the particular redefector ("was he now real or not?") but

also because it enhances suspicions and mistrust regarding future defectors

("are they genuine or sent as a plant?"), adversely affecting their handling.

Another serious advantage for the defector-turned-redefector is that

during his interrogation he is able to deduce from the nature of the questions

he is asked what kind of information is not kwown or half known to his ques

tioners; and he can deduce from what he is not asked what sort of information

is already known by the opposite party. Back home the retuming defector can

tell how the CIA and the FBI are operating. He can tell East bloc intelligence officials about the interrogation techniques being used. This latter aspect is

vital in case Fast bloc intelligence services want to send other people to the

West as spies. Errors made by the Center in the past can be rectified and intel

ligence officers sent out on a specific mission can be better prepared and know

what to expect in case things would go wrong. In this context, the redefector -and certainly the fake defector who retums

must be considered as an very effective weapon that can paralyze the opponents'

services for a certain length of time and possibly can cripple their morale.

And last but not least, the simple fact that the redefection of Yurchenko

triggered off an in-depth analysis by Congress, the Executive branch and the

intelligence commity about how the US handles its defectors, will without any shadow of a doubt be used by the Soviet bloc countries to try to dissuade strong. ly its intelligence officers, diplomats and other high-level public officials

not to defect lest they will be treated like Yurchenko.


Cases about "strolling' defectors are not uncommon between the two Ger

manies. Mysteriously, several border guard officers and public officials of

the GDR recently decided to stay in hest Germany only to show up in East Ger

many after a short while with some bizarre or incredible explanations.

In June 1981, a lieutenant-colonel of the East German border troops,

Klaus Dieter Rauschenbach came over to West Germany, where he barely stayed

48 hours and returned of his "own volition". The West German ministry for

inter-German affairs had agreed to a meeting between Rauschenbach and his

wife. A West German public official accompanied him on his trip home. Later

Rauschenbach was shown to a Western television correspondent in Leipzig. It

has been said that Rauschenbach committed suicide afterwards (145).

Another colleague of Rauschenbach, Lt. Col. Dietmar Mann, also a border

guard officer, who ca...anded the 3rd battalion of communist Fast Germany's

24th Border Guard Regiment, went over to the West on August 31, 1986 (146).

Mam had transmitted confidential infornation on the East German surveillance

of the inter-German border and had given several lectures to West German offi

ce::s. Then Mann had withdrawn from sight with the help of the BND, the West

German intelligence service (147). In a December 1986 program on the West German television (ARD), Mann had declared that he expected every day to be kidnapped by the East German services and to be brought back to East Germany. Nevertheless, he accepted to live with

that risk. He further declared that he was convinced that they would do every

thing to get hold of him or to convince him to come back to East Germany. "When you act like I did", he added, "one must face the possibility in the East of

a life term in prison or capital punishment." (148).

On April 14, 1987, ADN, the official East German news agency, reported that

Lt.-Col. Dietmar Mann had returned to the GDR of his own free will on April 11,


escaping from the care of the West German intelligence service, taking with him "comprehensive documents."(149)

The case of Herbert Meissner, Deputy Secretary General of the GDR Academy

of Sciences and a noted economist, is still more theatrical and full of

question marks.

while in West Berlin, Meissner got arrested on July 9, 1986 for shoplifting.

The coveted object was a part of a bathroom shower hose whose price was around

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$12 - $14 (150). Only willing to talk to the West German intelligence authorities, he volunteered information about his spying activities for the GDR since

1978 (151).

But several days later Meissner apparently changed his mind and fled to the

East German diplomatic representation in Bom. Things got worse when the West

German prosecutor filed spying charges and launched a warrant for immediate

arrest. Meissner was suddenly unable to leave the East German mission.

Lothar Gliencke, acting head of the GDR's permanent mission in the FRG reacted very strongly saying that

"Herbert Meissner had been arrested under false charges while on a business trip to West Berlin, then taken forcibly to Mnich and held and interrogated there by the FRG's BND. The BND had confiscated his diplomatic passport and personal papers. Prof. Meissner was to be forced into betraying the GDR by means of pressure and blackmail measures. However, he was able to escape from his guards and went to the GDR permanent mission in Bonn in order to secure his personal safety. ..." (152)


Meissner stated also in the East German television that he had been kid

napped, drugged and blackmailed." He asserted that he had been abducted by the

West, drugged so that he would confess to spying and pressed to betray East Ger

many (153).

Eventually, the impasse was resolved because the federal prosecutor agreed

to cancel the legal proceedings against the economist on suspicion of espionage and dropped a warrant for his inmediate arrest (154). According to ADN, Meissner

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