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terest in working or in learning English, not responsible in his behavior, wishy-washy about assuming responsibility (139). After his retum, he was
sentenced to 12 years labor camp (140).
Oleg Tumanov, until February 1986, editor of the Russian desk at Radio
Liberty, formulated the reasons for his retum as follows:
"My road back home has been tortuous. [...] The road back to my homeland was for me the natural and logical one. At a difficult time, and the world is going through a difficult time now, every honest person should with his own people. This is why I am here." (141)
That a defection may carry in itself the seeds of redefection is not inthinkable. The psychological stress faced by a defector can be overwhelming to
the point of pushing him towards rerlefection. Following passage is very signif
icant and revealing and describes how Viktor Belenko had to cope with certain
"[...] As it was early when he went back to his room, he switched on the
However good a treatment a defector may receive, return to the Motherland
is not excluded. This is what US in
lligence officials experienced with a KGB
colonel known under the cover-name, Rudolf Albert Herrmam.
Herrmam had been groomed by the KGB to become the illegal resident in the US whose role would have been to run and control Soviet espionage activities in
this country in case the official relations between the Soviet Union and the US would break off. In 1980, Herrmann agreed to cooperate with the FBI "because
he lacked diplomatic immity, had only one other choice: jail and, above all,
because he wanted to save his skin and that of his family." (143) Whatever the
real reasons were, Herrmann got a yearly FBI borus of $35,000 and managed to become a successful home builder and remodeler which would earn $300,000 in six
However, in November 1986, Rudolf Herrmam explained in an interview to the
Los Angeles Times, that he wanted to retum to his native Czechoslovakia for
* life in America forced him into a "strait jacket"'; all the news in this
country was processed to reflect a single viewpoint; * the poor in this country are treated so shabbily that he could no longer
tolerate it; * living under a false name in a foreign culture left him with a sense of
gallows hunor but little sense of identity; * intense dislike of the US political climate.
The article ends saying that Herrmann expects to make it all the way to Czechos
lovakia ( See exhibit #6 for the LA Times article on Rudolf Herrmann ).
The Bitov and Yurchenko cases are morky at best. No wonder that the opinion are very much divided about the genuine character of their respective defections
Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this study to disentangle the riddles
and enignas surrounding both cases. The official Soviet version is that they
never intended to defect but were kidnapped, drugged and forced to make differen
statements slandering the Soviet Union. As soon as possible they escaped the sur
veillance of their captors and reported to the closest Soviet diplomatic post.
But it is obvious that whatever the real explanation of both cases is- the Soviet Union scored some impressive points, embarrassing at best for the West.
One major advantage such a high-level redefection entails is that is sows
confusion in the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the opponents,
not only concerning the particular redefector ("was he now real or not?") but
also because it enhances suspicions and mistrust regarding future defectors
("are they genuine or sent as a plant?"), adversely affecting their handling.
Another serious advantage for the defector-turned-redefector is that
during his interrogation he is able to deduce from the nature of the questions
he is asked what kind of information is not kwown or half known to his ques
tioners; and he can deduce from what he is not asked what sort of information
is already known by the opposite party. Back home the retuming defector can
tell how the CIA and the FBI are operating. He can tell East bloc intelligence officials about the interrogation techniques being used. This latter aspect is
vital in case Fast bloc intelligence services want to send other people to the
West as spies. Errors made by the Center in the past can be rectified and intel
ligence officers sent out on a specific mission can be better prepared and know
what to expect in case things would go wrong. In this context, the redefector -and certainly the fake defector who retums
must be considered as an very effective weapon that can paralyze the opponents'
services for a certain length of time and possibly can cripple their morale.
And last but not least, the simple fact that the redefection of Yurchenko
triggered off an in-depth analysis by Congress, the Executive branch and the
intelligence commity about how the US handles its defectors, will without any shadow of a doubt be used by the Soviet bloc countries to try to dissuade strong. ly its intelligence officers, diplomats and other high-level public officials
not to defect lest they will be treated like Yurchenko.
Cases about "strolling' defectors are not uncommon between the two Ger
manies. Mysteriously, several border guard officers and public officials of
the GDR recently decided to stay in hest Germany only to show up in East Ger
many after a short while with some bizarre or incredible explanations.
In June 1981, a lieutenant-colonel of the East German border troops,
Klaus Dieter Rauschenbach came over to West Germany, where he barely stayed
48 hours and returned of his "own volition". The West German ministry for
inter-German affairs had agreed to a meeting between Rauschenbach and his
wife. A West German public official accompanied him on his trip home. Later
Rauschenbach was shown to a Western television correspondent in Leipzig. It
has been said that Rauschenbach committed suicide afterwards (145).
Another colleague of Rauschenbach, Lt. Col. Dietmar Mann, also a border
guard officer, who ca...anded the 3rd battalion of communist Fast Germany's
24th Border Guard Regiment, went over to the West on August 31, 1986 (146).
Mam had transmitted confidential infornation on the East German surveillance
of the inter-German border and had given several lectures to West German offi
ce::s. Then Mann had withdrawn from sight with the help of the BND, the West
German intelligence service (147). In a December 1986 program on the West German television (ARD), Mann had declared that he expected every day to be kidnapped by the East German services and to be brought back to East Germany. Nevertheless, he accepted to live with
that risk. He further declared that he was convinced that they would do every
thing to get hold of him or to convince him to come back to East Germany. "When you act like I did", he added, "one must face the possibility in the East of
a life term in prison or capital punishment." (148).
On April 14, 1987, ADN, the official East German news agency, reported that
Lt.-Col. Dietmar Mann had returned to the GDR of his own free will on April 11,
escaping from the care of the West German intelligence service, taking with him "comprehensive documents."(149)
The case of Herbert Meissner, Deputy Secretary General of the GDR Academy
of Sciences and a noted economist, is still more theatrical and full of
while in West Berlin, Meissner got arrested on July 9, 1986 for shoplifting.
The coveted object was a part of a bathroom shower hose whose price was around
$12 - $14 (150). Only willing to talk to the West German intelligence authorities, he volunteered information about his spying activities for the GDR since
But several days later Meissner apparently changed his mind and fled to the
East German diplomatic representation in Bom. Things got worse when the West
German prosecutor filed spying charges and launched a warrant for immediate
arrest. Meissner was suddenly unable to leave the East German mission.
Lothar Gliencke, acting head of the GDR's permanent mission in the FRG reacted very strongly saying that
"Herbert Meissner had been arrested under false charges while on a business trip to West Berlin, then taken forcibly to Mnich and held and interrogated there by the FRG's BND. The BND had confiscated his diplomatic passport and personal papers. Prof. Meissner was to be forced into betraying the GDR by means of pressure and blackmail measures. However, he was able to escape from his guards and went to the GDR permanent mission in Bonn in order to secure his personal safety. ..." (152)
Meissner stated also in the East German television that he had been kid
napped, drugged and blackmailed." He asserted that he had been abducted by the
West, drugged so that he would confess to spying and pressed to betray East Ger
Eventually, the impasse was resolved because the federal prosecutor agreed
to cancel the legal proceedings against the economist on suspicion of espionage and dropped a warrant for his inmediate arrest (154). According to ADN, Meissner