hearings is not on how they escape, but on what happens to Dr. Ushakov and others like him once they arrive in the United States. The subcommittee will examine the opportunities, in this case, the lack thereof, for these individuals to fulfill their expectations here in the United States as well as to significantly contribute to our society.

We will look at the substantial difficulties they routinely face in their adjustment to the new and very different culture that they encounter in the West. Finally, we are determined to find out whether we as a society are mining the most of their valuable talents and their unique insights into what otherwise remains to us a closed society.

Specifically, our subcommittee will try to answer the following questions: How can we as a country better utilize the unique talents, skills and insights of East Bloc defectors? And also: Is the government's current resettlement program for such defectors adequate and, if not, how can it be improved?

We will also be looking at non-governmental efforts, and there are considerable non-governmental efforts, helping to take on this challenge and opportunity for our country.

It is important to note that the defector offers our country a rare insight into the Soviet Union and other communist regimes. Unlike other countries, the communist bloc closely guards even some of the most innocuous facts and figures behind an all-encompassing veil of its state security apparatus.

Defectors offer us a tool to pierce that veil. Some have held important positions in the military, in government, and in the party apparatus. Almost all of them have spent their entire lives in these closed societies.

Moreover, they come to us of their own volition; in order to learn what they have to teach, we need not launch a satellite or devise some complex covert operation. We need only listen and afford them opportunities to lead productive and hospitable lives.

The major conclusion of the subcommittee's exhaustive staff study, which will be presented here this morning, is that our society is not fully and productively integrating these individuals into the mainstream of American life. Nor, as a result, are we fully utilizing their talents and analytical skills.

It is a case of "lost opportunities." Unfortunately, the West, and particularly the United States, has not shown enough interest in much of the non-intelligence knowledge concerning the Soviet system which these individuals offers us. Outside of the intelligence community, which, obviously, has its own unique and specialized priorities, I believe the testimony will show that the defectors' knowledge of Soviet and East European foreign and domestic policy, political-military doctrine and strategy, as well as their instinctive anticipation of future communist behavior, have been, to a large extend, ignored.

The subcommittee will hear from a number of witnesses, including Director Webster and General Odom today, on the importance of the information and analysis these defectors possess and how we as a society could better utilize them. We also expect to hear from military and academic witnesses on the last day of the hearings

concerning several programs that have been successfully adapted to benefit from their talents.

Equally troubling is the absence of a comprehensive program to address the variety of resettlement programs faced by defectors. Fleeing from a totalitarian culture, sometimes with little more than the shirt on their backs, these newcomers to our country face a myriad of problems adjusting to the freedom of the West.

Most people fail to recognize that when we deal with the defectors, we are dealing with individuals who have spent their entire lives under a dictatorial regime, a regime which told them from birth what to do, where to work and how to live. By contrast, they suddenly arrive in a free and open society where individuals routinely make decision after decision every day of their lives, from finding a job or buying a house to opening a bank account or choosing a credit card. To a defector, the transition between these two cultures is obviously going to be a very painful one.

Given all these difficulties, it is surprising that defectors are able to cope with resettlement as well as many of them do. I expect we will hear during these hearings of many individuals who have overcome these transitional hurdles to achieve success and prosperity in the West. Others have not been so lucky. And, in the latter cases, our society has been equally unlucky: we have been deprived of the insights they could have given us, had they been given the chance.

In these hearings, we will have the opportunity to listen to some of those who have risked their lives to reach our shores. At the same time, I hope that those behind the Iron Curtain will also somehow have the opportunity to hear their former comrades who have made that great leap of faith to the West. It is important that they know that life is different here, that it is hard to make it. But most importantly, they should also know that they can and will make it if they try. Most defectors do, as attested to by the defectors who will testify over the next three days.

Moreover, those listening to us in Communist countries should realize that these hearings are the start of making a good system work much better. I expect that as a result of the subcommittee's work, needed reforms of the resettlement process will come about that will make the life of these freedom seekers much better than it has been in the past.

In closing, I want to thank Senator Roth and the minority staff for their cooperation and support during the course of this investigation. With his full support, I initiated this investigation when Senator Roth was chairman. It is another example of the bipartisan nature of this issue. Defector handling and resettlement is not a Republican problem nor a Democratic problem; it is an American problem that affects our Nation's security.

Senator Cohen.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Senator Roth, who will be here shortly, I would like to express my appreciation to you and to the subcommittee staff, as well. Senator Boren and I serve along with you on the Intelligence Commit

tee. I want to say on behalf of the Intelligence Committee that we particularly appreciate the sensitivity with which the subcommittee has dealt with us. We are bordering on classified information, and the subcommittee has handled it with great sensitivity. On behalf of Senator Boren and myself, I would like to express that appreciation.

Senator NUNN. We are going to be very careful in questions raised during this hearing, too, and we are going to tell our witnesses beginning with Director Webster and General Odom that if any questions in any way get beyond what should be answered in public session that they inform us and we can have a private session later, and we have enjoyed the complete support of the Intelligence Committee, and we thank you and Senator Boren for that. Senator COHEN. Last fall, the Intelligence Committee issued a public report concerning the handling of Soviet defectors, and I quoted from portions of that in my opening statement, which I ask that you include in the record. Without repeating it right now, I would like to point out that Vitaly Yurchenko perhaps was the force that galvanized the Commitee's attention to look into how the United States handled the defector problem.

The Yurchenko case was, to say the least, an embarrassment to the United States. But it also had a positive effect, because it forced us to look at how we handle Soviet defectors, in this case, or emigres who come here fulfilled with expectations that are perhaps too high. Perhaps they are false expectations, but nonetheless, I think that we have been very deficient in how we have looked at the psychological traumas, the needs that have to be extended to those who come from a country such as the Soviet Union or East Bloc countries. I think we have been totally deficient in that regard.

The Yurchenko case has been positive in the sense that we have now made some significant changes which I think that the Director will testify to here later today. General Odom will also offer that in testimony, so I look forward to seeing what steps can be taken, what amenities can be extended, what psychological assistance can be provided to make the lives of those who come to this country fulfilling.

There may be some, no matter what we do, who will still be dissatisfied with life in the United States, and who will want to return to the Soviet Union, but I think that we can take significant steps to provide a better way of life and to fulfill some of those expectations by making important changes.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Cohen. Your full statement will be part of the record without objection.

Senator Glenn also would like to have a statement submitted for the record. It will be submitted and entered without objection. And also, Senator Humphrey will have a statement which will be admitted without objection, although he is going to testify before us later on today.

[The statements of Senators Cohen and Glenn follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, Senator Roth, and the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for your close cooperation with the Senate Intelligence Committee in planning these public hearings on the subject of defectors. Senator Boren and I, as chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, appreciate the care with which this subcommittee has handled a sensitive matter that borders on classified U.S. Government activities.

This was, of course, made easier by the fact that both of you are both senior members of the Intelligence Committee and thus appreciate the sensitivities in this area. I am also pleased that the Director of Central Intelligence, Judge Webster, and the Director of the National Security Agency, General Odom, have been given this opportunity to testify at the hearing today.

Last fall, the Intelligence Committee issued a public report on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs that discussed our committee's concerns growing out of the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, the Soviet KGB officer who defected to this country and then returned to the Soviet Union. The Yurchenko case was, at the very least, a serious embarrassment. But it had the positive effect of focusing the attention of senior policymakers and the Congress on some broader issues. It forced us to look at our treatment, as a nation, of those who escape from Soviet bloc countries and bring their talents and experience to our society.

In light of the Yurchenko re-defection, the Intelligence Committee has examined carefully the Government's classified program for debriefing and resettling defectors who provide unique information that directly benefits U.S. national security. Improvements have been made in that program, and the Intelligence Committee continues to monitor it closely. I would like to offer for the record the section from the Intelligence Committee's 1986 report, “Meeting the Espionage Challenge," that discusses the CIA's actions to upgrade the classified program and respond to the lessons of the Yurchenko case.

The Intelligence Committee's report emphasizes the importance of going beyond narrowly defined national security interests and praises this subcommittee's initiative. Let me quote:

"The [Intelligence] Committee considers it of the utmost importance that our Nation's goals in welcoming and assisting defectors be more clearly enunciated and boldly implemented.

"The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has begun a major study of the U.S. Government's handling of defectors and other refugees from the Soviet bloc. This study will focus particular attention on the contributions that defectors can and do make to American society and on the need to encourage that process. The Intelligence Committee supports this PSI study and is cooperating with the subcommittee in its effort to inform the public regarding the needs of defectors and of the agencies that assist them."

One of the main lessons both this subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee have learned is the limit on what can be done by a classified program. Public Law 110, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, provides for the admission into the United States without regard to the immigration laws of up to 100 aliens per year whose admission is determined by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration to be "in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission." This is the statutory basis for the classified program. The effective administration of that program is vital to our national security, but it may not be enough.

I am pleased, therefore, that these hearings will look at the need to supplement the Classified Defector Program with an overt program to deal with those persons who do not fit within the narrow limits of Public Law 110. These hearings should also remind the public of the importance of helping Soviet bloc defectors, refugees, and emigres cope with the adjustment to life in this country.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN

Mr. Chairman, first of all I wish to commend you for taking the initiative to explore the treatment and resettlement problems of defectors from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

Soviet bloc defectors face unique problems in resettlement. Essentially they are leaving behind all of their worldly possessions, not to mention their families and friends, pursuing the dream of a better way of life, not knowing for sure if it truly exists.

Past redefections among defectors our Government considers so important that they are deemed "essential aliens", have caused Congress and the responsible Government agencies to question and review the Government's resettlement practices. The redefection of former KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko pointed out the need for improvement in the treatment of key defectors.

In addition there are other defectors who, though they are not deemed to be "essential aliens", have been allowed to defect but whose utility has been virtually untapped. Within this group of defectors exists a wealth of information which could provide useful insights into the closed Soviet system. We must question why this information is being ignored.

We as a Nation must ask ourselves what are the consequences of not improving our current practices for handling defectors. Granted there are certain risks involved, but we must weigh those risks with the possibility of losing valuable information or creating additional hardships which lead to redefecting. Without taking some action, new defections are less likely to occur.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony and your recommendations.

Senator NUNN. Our first witness this morning is going to be John Sopko. He has been our staff lead on this investigation, and we will hear from him before we hear from Director Webster this morning.

I understand Director Webster will be here in a few minutes. We will hear from him as our second witness.

Mr. Sopko, we swear all our witnesses before the subcommittee. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SOPKO. I do

Senator NUNN. We have your whole statement, and I know it is a very long and detailed statement, and I know it is difficult to summarize, but in the interest of time, we will ask you to summarize and start by giving us your background, length of time with the subcommittee, what you have done before that, and make that part of the record here.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SOPKO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 1

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1

My name is John F. Sopko. I am the Deputy Chief Counsel of the subcommittee. Since 1982, I have been employed as counsel for the subcommittee. Prior to 1982, I was a Special Attorney with the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. I have been assigned to conduct this subcommittee investigation since its inception.

As previously alluded to by Senator Cohen, on the evening of Saturday, November 2, 1985 KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko walked out of the Georgetown Restaurant "Au Pied De Cochon" and into the annals of defector history.

The publicity surrounding Mr. Yurchenko's last supper in Georgetown continues to this day both in the controlled Soviet press as well as in the Western media. Particularly in the Soviet Union and behind the Iron Curtain, the events surrounding his alleged escape and handling have been expounded to illustrate the treatment that can be expected of any fugitive to the West.

1 See p. 161 for Mr. Sopko's prepared statement.