eventually to stop this advance of American technology and American economic progress, because the Soviets have very, very serious problems inside. They want the Americans to stop this new technological revolution, or at least to put brakes on it as much as they can, and they need about ten years to catch up because their infrastructure has been neglected and is in very bad shape.

I repeat, the goal is not military, it is political. From this point of view, they have made no concessions and no compromises whatsoever so far.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Mr. Sakharov, how much change do you see under Gorbachev's leadership, observing it from your present position? How would you describe the leadership change?

Mr. SAKHAROV. The leadership change is very serious. It is not only the leadership change, it is how the change affects the Soviet people. Right now, I am probably not going to be wrong in saying that the Soviet people have a new sense of might, of national pride which they see in Gorbachev's leadership. There is a great deal of consensus, disregarding the trans-Breshnev people. There is a great deal of change that is occurring in the U.S.S.R.

Senator NUNN. How should the United States react to that, in your opinion?

Mr. SAKHAROV. In my opinion, we have to take advantage right now of a number of opportunities that the new avenues for business, for cooperation, are there. I think that it is time now to finally realize and drop that evil empire syndrome.

The Soviets have problems just like any other super power has problems. They have problems with terrorism. They have problems with their monetary system. They are going probably to go into the international market with a convertible second ruble. Most likely, the Soviets are going to develop a second ruble which will be convertible currency.

There are so many mind blowing things occurring in the positive sense that can be utilized for cooperation and economics with the USSR.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Demchenko, would you comment on Mr. Sakharov's statement. I want to see if you all agree or disagree, and then I will ask Mr. Mikheyev to comment.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I essentially agree with Mr. Sakharov's assessment that there is a major change brewing in the Soviet Union. I think I see, so far, after I have done some careful analysis of the change within the Soviet Union, more of a change in the international posture of the Soviet Union. It is an issue that you, I guess, deal with.

The Soviet Union really has grown today much more flexible in the foreign policy arena. Today, the Soviet Union is more of a moving target than a stationary one. As you experience in the "Capital-to-Capital": the first question during that discussion was asked of the Soviets: What do you think of today's capture of the Iranian ship in the Gulf, and all that?

In the past, a Soviet Union representative would be climbing the walls, or taking his shoes and banging them, which was a very predictable response. Instead, what we heard from Mr. Toklunov was a very sophisticated response, very carefully crafted not to offend

Iran, but also catering to the United States position, saying, if the facts are what you are stating them to be, then, I guess, we applaud this action, and so forth.

I think that for this type of sophistication, we shouldn't pay much attention to Gorbachev in this respect, because I think the mastermind behind this major change-a much greater change internationally than domestically-is really Andrei Gromyko. I think that he was able to assemble, at the Politburo today, a formidable intellectual and functional knowledge that has never been present there before. You have out of ten members Gromyko, Arbatov, Dobrynin and Shevrenadze. I am not surprised that you realize that you have your hands full with this type of team on the other side. This is really remarkable.

As far as the domestic reform is concerned, I think there is a new spirit of openness in the sense that the public discussions that in the past were confined to a few newspapers such as Literaturnay Gazeta and Izvesta now have been broadened and include a wide range of newspapers, magazines, and so forth.

As far as the actual reforms, specifically was mentioned the transferable currency, and all that, I think there is really very little progress. They are still running in circles at this point.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Mikheyev.

Mr. MIKHEYEV. To be very brief, and perhaps even primitive, I would say that so far they didn't do any institutional changes. The institutional structure is still the same. The maneuvering within the existing structure and all the changes are taking place on the intellectual level, the discussions and so on.

In this regard, there were very significant changes within the last six months or so. You can see incredible publications in the Soviet press, which indicate, and this is what I want to stress, very serious discussion, almost a split within the leadership, on two parts-reformers and conservatives.

Our policy should be to promote that split. We really don't want one of the factions to take over and to come back to one leadership policy. We want to have that split. We want this split to be promoted and to develop into legal opposition, because as long as two factions in the enemy camp are talking to each other, we feel much more comfortable. If one of those factions will take over, it will be the end of discussions, and we will go back to this closed society, very dangerous and so on.

We want to have those two factions talking to each other, and we want to promote it. I am not advocating any concessions to the Soviet Union dealing with Soviet concerns, but any possibility that we have to keep those factions alive, talking to each other and developing two political parties, some kind of beginning of pluralism, should be explored and used.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Let me ask Ms. Thorne one question, and then I have to leave. Mr. DEMCHENKO. I am concerned, Mr. Chairman. Just one comment on this. It is related to your participation in "Capital-to-Capital," a very brief one.

I am sure that before meeting, you were briefed by various people, but I hope that you also had utilized a defector, because that would also have been beneficial. You made certain statements

during that "Capital-to-Capital," broadcast and if sometime you would like to discuss that

I am sure that he would have phrased it a little bit differently if you were briefed by a defector.

Senator NUNN. What subject was it?

Mr. DEMCHENKO. You made a statement that the United States fears the Soviet tank armies and it produced a big grin on the face of Deputy Zhukov. Along those lines again, I am just trying to broaden the market.

Senator NUNN. How would you have worded that?

Senator COHEN. First, we have to find out whether Senator Nunn is interested in hiring a Soviet defector for his staff.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I am trying to broaden the market to see how we would be better utilized. I think that almost any defector here would have pointed out that one of the restraining forces upon the Soviet Union has been their fear of United States technology, and also of the way_the United States sometimes acts unpredictably in certain areas. To suggest to the Soviets that we fear their tank armies was a little bit playing against that restraining force that has been always there in the past.

Senator NUNN. If you did fear their tank army, how would you word it?

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I would not have used the word "fear," it is as simple as that. It may be a minor thing, but when many, many millions are watching, and a lot of analysts are sitting and analyzing every single word and comma, it may be a minor thing, but it is a very, very important one.

Senator NUNN. How would you have worded that?

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I would have worded it that it represents con

cern.

Senator NUNN. You would have stayed away from the word "fear."

Mr. DEMCHENKO. Yes, because it is a very shocking word for the Soviet ears to hear that Americans fear anything in the Soviet Union.

Senator NUNN. That is interesting. Thank you.

Senator COHEN. Would it be equally shocking if we said that we envied anything in the Soviet Union?

Mr. DEMCHENKO. No. I think that the Soviet propaganda has done a lot of that.

Senator NUNN. Let me thank you very much, I will keep that in mind.

Ms. Thorne, let me ask you a question. I believe Senator Humphrey told me, or it came to my attention at some point that you were going to meet with President Reagan about the subject that you have been so concerned about, and I think that you made a very strong case on it here today. Have you had a chance to talk with President Reagan?

MS. THORNE. No, sir, I have not, but last Friday I had a meeting with the National Security Council, and I walked out of that meeting where half of me wanted to cry, and half of me wanted to punch those people, frankly.

I was told things that were truly unacceptable. I brought them a beautifully worded letter from a Soviet soldier who is now inside

Afghanistan, Valdimir Romchuk. I brought it to them on July 7th. I again, showed them the letter last week. Nothing was done about my plea that the letter be given to the President. Of course, I have never met with the President personally.

I pleaded to bring out not only this one boy, whose letter to the President says, among other things, "Sir, the reason I defected is not because I wanted a pair of American blue jeans, I had them while I was living inside the Soviet Union. The reason I defected is because I didn't want people to call me a Russian fascist." A letter like that was never even given to the President.

Also, I pleaded for the other 17 boys, and I was told again how difficult it is because of the third countries, et cetera. I was also told, "By God, if we bring out these 17 guys, a whole stream of Red Army defectors may come out, and what are we going to do?"

I said, "It may just help end this dreadful war. It just may act as another lever on the Kremlin leadership to pull the forces out of Afghanistan. The Kremlin leadership is going to realize that their stuffing the Soviet soldiers into one end like cannon fodder and their coming out of the other end, it may just help end the war." They were aghast at the idea.

I was rather disappointed, but Senator Humphrey, since that time, has given the letter to the President, and I do have high hopes that something good will happen, sir.

Senator NUNN. We are going to try to follow up as best we can on this, too, and we hope that you will stay in touch with us.

I thank all of you for being here. I regret, but I am running 40 minutes late for a meeting which started at 12:30, so I am going to have to run. But I am going to turn it over to Senator Cohen to close the hearing.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a few questions. I think, Mr. Demchenko, your statement about words is terribly important, because words are important in literature, in diplomacy, and, indeed, in politics, as we all live by the word, as we find out how we use them.

I would like to ask, Mr. Sakharov, you have an interesting statement in your prepared testimony about "Jazz now, treason later." I was wondering what is the impact of music in the Soviet Union?

For example, we have seen Billy Joel have a concert. I think George Will would like to have Bruce Springsteen go to the Soviet Union as the rock symbol of the United States, perhaps, or the blue-collar rock musician of the decade.

What is the impact, in your experience, of music upon young people? Is it as treasonous or decadent as the older established officials view it?

Mr. SAKHAROV. I think the Russian soul is akin to the sole of a black man in Watts. There is that kind of Russian soulful expression in music. Russians, over the centuries, expressed their inner feelings through music, through opera, through Tchaikovsky, Prokofief, everything, in the legal fashion.

I will go back a little bit. What is happening under Gorbachev right now, the rock and roll in the Soviet Union now is permissible. There are rock concerts and everything. There is a top-ten list. What was illegal four years ago is legal now.

There is a feeling about American music especially in the Soviet Union as music that represents the country that the Soviets admire and all the things that they will never have. Let me give just one graphic example.

The older generation, we are talking about people 40, 50, 60 years old, who were born after World War II, and the younger generation. If you can imagine yourself sitting somewhere in the Soviet society, in some dreary town, and you know that you are going to have the same work, and you are going to have to be going at 6:00 o'clock in the morning to that work for the rest of your life, no chance, no nothing, boring extremely boring.

Then you turn on the Voice of America, and you can receive shortwave there, and the voice of god comes in. The god in the Soviet Union is called "Willis Conover." He is the Voice of America disk jockey. You turn it on and you listen to "April in Paris" by Count Basie through that. In the atmosphere of this environment, if you are a Russian, your hair is going to stand up. There is that incredible impact.

I do believe that one American musician, in the Soviet Union, traveling, can subvert or corrupt, in the good sense, more than any CIA disinformation operation, or whatever you want to put there. Senator COHEN. That we should send musicians and not missiles, is that the message?

Mr. SAKHAROV. That is why I always support exchange. One American in Moscow will do more good, because Russians, in addition to being music lovers, are lovers of American music, particularly-they don't like Italian Technorock, they don't like all that stuff, like songs about hydroelectric plants-but American music, and being also touch and feel people.

One of the peculiarities of the Russian character is that they have to touch and feel. So when they see that American in Moscow, they can actually touch him, and he is a musician. Then the Russian goes and he tells: You know, I saw Billy Joel. There is a network, everybody distributes records, and Americans become just idols. This is such a powerful weapon that it is incredibile.

Senator COHEN. You mentioned several things. During your direct testimony, you talked about the word "zip." You've picked up the idiom very well since you have been here.

Mr. SAKHAROV. I lived in Watts too long.

Senator COHEN. You also recommend a golden parachute for defectors-Mr. Demchenko will know what that word is as well-or at least a silver parachute, that defectors be given roughly the equivalent standard of living to which they were accustomed in the Soviet Union. But then you said something to the effect that "The debriefers assume that the defectors know nothing about the United States, and that is a false impression."

The question I had is: Maybe it is not quite as false as you believe now or then, that some of the defectors tend to have a sort, if I can use the phrase, Potemkin Village perception of the United States. You looked, and you saw Cadillacs, and you saw the beautiful women in the chorus lines, and so forth, and you saw Beverly Hills, but all of the United States is not like that. What you saw was a Potemkin Village perception of the United States.