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gram. Somehow existing support for the American professional community should be visibly held harmless.

It would be a mistake to duplicate existing forms of aid available from a multitude of private, State, Federal, or municipal programs. On the contrary, it should rely maximally on existing American instruments, organizations and dynamics of assimilation. That means it should be conducted in close coordination and collaboration with resettlement organizations. It should, however, have the capacity to steer confused and bewildered emigres to such sources of aid, and to provide direct temporary assistance where these are absent.

The doors to the program should initially be very wide, but the selection process should be rigorous and highly selective. The awards should be tailored individually and followed up. It should be a prestigious program and, as a consequence, would probably be very labor intensive.

Women emigres from the USSR may have an especially difficult time for three reasons: We have found, generally speaking, that they have a lesser role in the decision to leave the USSR. Indeed, sometimes they take no part in this decision at all. The Soviet pattern of a double burden, of employment and housework, is often carried forward to this country, and they frequently take the first job available, usually very menial and may stay in it, whereas the men tend more to seek work closer to their former profession. A possible program would need to be especially sensitive to women's potential and needs.

One of the scarcest skills in our country is genuine bilingual fluency in Russian and English. It is a sore need in a number of professions, including government service and the academic profession of Soviet studies. This pool of emigres is a prime source of such bilingual fluency.

There has already been testimony on the need for some sort of a clearinghouse. I think the basis for a clearinghouse already exists in resettlement agency records. We are dealing with a very, very large number of people. Indeed, it is something on the order of over 100,000, with something between 5,000 and 8,000 new arrivals every year. We are speaking not of a clearinghouse just for technically defined “defectors." It is a much larger task, and a much larger problem. I think that if a program like this got underway, a clearinghouse, or the basic data for a clearinghouse could fairly rapidly be accumulated, and this is a real need.

Finally, as an experimental or pilot program, it is not too much to hope that in some fashion, we would evolve and discover, and gradually design, a very legitimate Federal role that would apply not just to Soviets or East Europeans, but to emigres to this society as a whole.

Thank you.

Senator Nunn. We thank both of you very much.
I have just a few questions.

I wanted to ask you, Dr. Menning, about the Army program. How many people do you have involved in that program?

Dr. MENNING. Do you mean within my own organization, Senator?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Dr. MENNING. In all, I have 13 people. In addition to these 13 people, which are my regular staff, I have a provision to add, provided we have the funding available, at least two resident fellows. We just completed the tenure of one resident fellow, Natasha Gross. She left, after doing several superb studies with us, including one on Glasnost and the military. She left us to do work in the RAND-UCLA program in California. We have the potential to carry at least two visiting fellows with us for extended periods of time.

Senator Nunn. You are conducting a lot of discussions with these various people on the subject of conventional war, are you not?

Dr. MENNING. Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn. Has that been upgraded in recent years, the whole effort to know more about what the Soviet tactic and doctrine is in conventional warfare?

Dr. MENNING. Yes, sir. If you look at us as a reflection of the concerns of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, our own existence serves as a kind of barometer for the growth of interest in that area. In addition to that, I would say, insofar as I can tell, that is, insofar as that interest is reflected in the growth of the Army's own fighting doctrine, yes, those interests go back, indeed, in their more prominent version, to the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with the gradual evolution of Air-Land Battle doctrine.

Senator NUNN. How much have the Soviets changed in their own approach to conventional warfare, if any, in the last 17 or 18 years?

Dr. MENNING. Well, sir, we like to look at evolving Soviet attitudes as reflected in their own literature toward conventional warfare. Over a period of about 20 to 25 years, if we look back in retrospect at the amount of open-source literature that has come out, it seems to us that you start with a period, roughly in the early 1960s, when the Soviets went very far over in the direction of simply accepting as most likely the idea that there would be a nuclear battlefield within the theater. Consequently, they shaped their forces and their ground force military art, and supporting tactical air military art around that conception.

Then what we see is a breaking point, and one might argue exactly when it occurs-Michael MccĞwire, for instance, in his book on military objectives in Soviet foreign policy, is fairly precise. He says December, 1966, but our reading is a bit more ambiguous than that. What we see beginning, let's say, 1964 or 1965 or 1966, is a rethinking and a re-emphasis on the importance of conventional operations, and then over the period of the last 20 years, the subsequent debate that occurs within the open press.

Finally, I would say, within the last four or five years, especially since the time when you see Marshal Ogarkov's writing appearing prominently, you see a stress on the importance of conventional operations within theater, but operating with the understanding that conventional operations can become nuclear at any moment. We call that the dual-track approach. You hope that everything stays conventional, but you understand that the nuclear hammer hangs over your head.

So we see this, really, as a 20 or 25 year process that you can track in the Soviet open-source literature, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Menning.
Senator Cohen.
Senator COHEN. A couple of questions.

Dr. Menning, how do you go about screening defectors or emigres for their utility in military analysis?

We heard before, from the first panel, that there is no data bank among the agencies to draw upon. They sort of drop between the cracks. If they go into the private sector and get a job, they are separated from the system as such. How do you go about determining which individuals might have some information which would provide the kind of analysis that would be helpful to us?

Dr. MENNING. Right now, sir, it is really haphazard and almost by word-of-mouth. For example, our first fellow, Natasha Gross, who proved herself to be an extraordinarily effective researcher and writer, also was herself a source of information.

I lived for maybe six months or so at a time at Moscow University, for example, and I never realized until I talked with her that an entire complex of military training areas, to include rifle ranges, and so on, exists below the university in the sub-basement, and so on. So you get these surprising sources of information even from what one might call the most casual Soviet emigre/defector.

If you look at the larger picture, by and large it is haphazard and word-of-mouth, so we find out from the Europeans and the English that So-and-So had useful military knowledge, and it might be worthwhile for us to talk with them.

For example, a couple of months ago, we sat down and interviewed a Pole who had been chief of staff of a Polish division, and then later on chief of staff of a military district, which would become the Polish front in the event of a war in Central Europe.

We found out that not only had we missed him, but so also had the Israelis. He had been around for eight or ten years, and this was the first time that anybody had ever talked to him about things military.

Senator Cohen. What do you recommend we do to correct the obvious problem?

Dr. MENNING. Sir, the idea of the clearinghouse, however it could be worked out so we could find out exactly who is out there and what kinds of information they have, but with the caveat that this is where it should involve people who are familiar and, indeed, even sympathetic to the emigre/defector plight.

You go to an emigre or a defector and you say: Do you have military service?

Yes, everybody has military service.
What division did you serve in?
I can't remember.
What did you do?
Nothing important.

They are used to living in a society in which one really does not talk openly, or even with fairly close friends, about that sort of thing. So it requires a very special approach and one which says that you may not get all of that information and insight the first time.

I can remember, ten years or so ago, when the Army was doing some interviewing of defectors. They had a young man who had been commander of a tank company. They sent a couple of military intelligence types to interview him. He said, no, I don't want to have any memories of the Soviet Union. I can't have anything to do with military intelligence.

Later on, a friend of mine, whose name I will leave unmentioned, had the occasion to travel out to California, and he looked this former tank company commander up. They had a couple of drinks in a bar, and he said: Gee, if I could talk with a guy like you, I would really be able to tell the United States a whole lot more about the way that we did our tank training, exercises, and so on, in the Soviet Union. But so often, you don't get somebody who comes to you as sympathetically as you do.

This is one of the problems that we face. They have to be trained people, and they have to be very sensitive and aware of what all of the difficulties are.

Senator COHEN. Is the issue of citizenship important to the people that you deal with as well?

Dr. MENNING. Yes, sir. In fact, one of the reasons why we had Natasha Gross with us for six months was that, if you will pardon the expression, we were helping her punch her ticket, so that she could get at least six months of her time for the green card.

Then she went on to the graduate program at RAND-UCLA where she will continue to be a terribly important asset to the school, I think, as a student, and then, hopefuly, later on, something else will develop for her where she will be a terribly important asset not only to them but to us.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Toumanoff, I was terribly interested in your comment about Professor Zimmerman's analysis that the Soviet military is just as inefficient as the civilian sector. I was wondering if Napoleon and Hitler had also read that particular study.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I assume Bill is pretty familiar with the previous military history of attempts and experiences with the Soviet military.

Senator COHEN. One thing, I suppose, you have to draw the distinction between inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and it is something that we ought to keep in mind.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I can tell you a fair amount about the finding and what it is based on, if you would like me to, but it will take a little time.

Senator COHEN. Perhaps, you could either submit it to us, or we could talk to you. With Senator Nunn and I serving on the Armed Services Committee, we would probably have a greater interest than the other members of the committee.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I have a copy of Bill Zimmerman's paper.

Senator Nunn. Could you submit that to us, I think we would find that very interesting. We would like to have it.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Surely, I will be glad to.

[Professor Zimmerman's paper was marked Exhibit No. 29 and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nunn. Thank you, Senator Cohen.
Senator Sasser.

Senator SASSER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Toumanoff, I also have an interest in the statement that you made with regard to the Soviet Army functions being no better than the civilian sector. Quite frankly, I am not surprised to hear that.

I think that anybody who has spent some time in the Soviet Union has seen how inefficient and ineffective the civilian sector is just to the casual observer. Then you realize that the vast bulk of the Soviet Army is made of draftees coming in from this same civilian sector, I assume bringing the same inefficient ways and being reluctant to serve to begin with that you would have some inefficiency or ineffectiveness.

[At this point, Senator Nunn departed from the hearing room.]

Senator SASSER. I have been mystified, and I have never gotten a satisfactory answer, as to why Western intelligence estimates seem to put a higher degree of effectiveness and efficiency on Soviet military capability than would seem to be the case when you look at where the Soviet military comes from.

Could you comment a little further on that?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I think I should really defer to Bruce Menning on that question.

I suppose, to put it in very broad terms, the fact is that the Soviet military has gotten the job done, and has gotten the job done against extraordinary odds and very, very difficult circumstances.

[At this point Senator Nunn returned to the hearing room.]

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Perhaps in the field of high technology, military high technology, the fact that they launched that first Sputnik has left us with the impression that in some fashion, both through the military controls of economic production, through quality controls imposed by the military for military production, and through the recruitment of the best and the ablest, in some way the priority ascribed to the military by the Soviet Government produces better results than in the civilian economy. But let me defer to Bruce Menning.

Dr. MENNING. I was struck by Mr. Toumanoff's assertions of the study, too, because I haven't had a chance to read it yet. I must say that what popped into my mind were two questions: At what level, and where? Because, certainly, you have certain conceptions, from our point of view, of the relative inefficiency of what the Soviets do militarily.

For example, historically, a weakness of the Imperial Russian Army that has carried over into the Soviet Army is the whole problem of the regimental economy. The fact is that there simply isn't always enough commissary wherewithall to support a unit, so what you do, you regularly detach members of the unit to raise cattle, to have gardens, and so on. It is extraordinarily inefficient, and possibly ineffective, from our point of view, but it is an extraordinary continuity in both Russian and Soviet military history and affairs.

What you have to do, you have to sit down and look at that whole system in context, and see what it means. For example, if someone would talk about effectiveness and efficiency, what I would do would be to look at the Soviet General Staff, and look at

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