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done by government. It is a very intensely personal kind of a work. You get involved very deeply with the lives of these people.
Senator COHEN. Are you suggesting that government agencies don't get deeply involved in the lives of people?
Mr. GEIMER. Yes, they do, but not in the way that I am talking about.
Senator COHEN. I might differ with you on that.
Mr. GEIMER. The bulk of our work or the thrust of it is to produce books and articles, to sponsor lectures, and I don't think that we want the government in that business. I think, also, to the extent that the government is involved, the integrity of the output of the individual is probably brought into question. We don't want our people seen as spokesmen for this Administration or that Administration. We want seen as telling the truth as they understand it.
General WILLIAMS. I think, though, that there is definitely need for some kind of coordination as to who these people are, where they go, what kind of skills they possess, so that if someone in industry or in government wants to talk to them, or if there is a job opportunity that might be applicable. There is no mechanism to track that. It is beyond the private foundations and private assistance organizations' ability to do that.
Senator COHEN. As I understand it, there is no coordination between the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the INS, or any of the government agencies, in terms of maintaining either some sort of centralized record or bank which can be drawn upon or referred to.
Mr. JAMESON. There is or at least was an Interagency Defector Committee that had a CIA official as the chairman, and representatives from all of these other agencies, at least in my day, shall we say, that used to look after that reasonably well. General Williams says that it doesn't work that way any more.
General WILLIAMS. The most difficult thing to do is to find these people once they have been spoken to or if they enter the United States from a third country, and this has been my frustration with Jamestown. They defected to the West, not necessarily to the United States. They then enter the United States legally through INS channels, and most of the time nobody knows they are here unless they come to our attention as in dire need of assistance. I still call that person a defector because of the way they left the Soviet Union. But, yes, you are right, there is no data bank that exists to enable us to find those people.
Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nunn. Just wrapping up with this panel of people who are spending so much time in this area.
Mr. Jameson or General Williams, do you have any specific recommendations to this committee or to our government that you would like to make in this area that you haven't already alluded to?
Mr. JAMESON. I think that mine, essentially, are those that Bill mentioned before that have to do with helping this program of trying to place people in careers where they can radiate their information, where they can backstop it, where they can do research, where they can acquire the skills that will get them into the careers that will allow their information to be best exploited by the United States. I think that that is rather important.
The other thing that he mentioned as far as the immigration bill, beyond those I have no particular recommendations, because I know that you are going to mention one about what you have just been talking about, and I will leave that to you.
General WILLIAMS. I call it "marketing," Senator. We do not market the availability of these skills. Getting back to Senator Cohen's question, there is no mechanism for making people or industries or anybody else aware of the knowledge resident in individuals.
To my way of thinking, the United States society falls short, if we don't take advantage of it, and, therefore, we do a disservice to people who, in many cases, have risked their lives to come across. We may question their motivation, but they have risked a lot, they have left a lot behind, and yet we don't recognize that and we don't take advantage of it.
Senator Nunn. What would you have the Federal government do here as opposed to private foundations in this particular void area?
General WILLIAMS. I guess that is the place that I would like to a clearinghouse of some kind, not in the intelligence community, but some place where someone could say: These people are available. The organization should at least be required to tell the government some place that So-and-So is here, here is a résumé, here are the skills that that individual possesses.
Then industry can say: We need a physicist. We need an agricultural expert from Central Africa. We need a banker. We need somebody who has worked on aircraft structures. Is there anybody available? Then it is up to the questioner or the inquirer to make the contact. But someone has to do that.
Senator Nunn. One final question to both of you who have been in the intelligence community and spent a great deal of your time in that capacity.
How big a danger is the whole question of defectors who may continue to be loyal Soviet Union, who have been put here as plants?
Mr. JAMESON. There have been several cases of this sort. I remember several. In my opinion, this is not a critical danger. In the first place, none of the defectors, even the most significant and important high level have really deep access to U.S. Government secrets. The people who work as career agents for the CIA are compartmented to some degree at least.
I think also that it is very difficult for the Soviets to prepare an agent, alleging that he is in a high level position, because, frankly, in order to substantiate that allegation, he has to give away more than probably the game is worth.
I think that there has been continuing controversy that relates to intelligence officers in the 1960's, which in my mind was a mistaken assumption about who was an agent and who wasn't anyway. I think the other ones that have come out are people who are used to test the system to find out the Western powers coordinate their intelligence work, and these, I don't think, pose major dangers.
It is obvious that there is a potential for some kind of a threat, but I think that most of the time it has been exaggerated. The cases that I know of don't seem to be ones that too seriously threaten our society.
Senator NUNN. Thank you.
General WILLIAMS. I would only say that, beyond that, an occasional propaganda coup, a one-shot or two-shot appearance on television to testify how the individual was treated or allegedly mistreated in the United States, would be about what we could expect. As Mr. Jameson said, I don't see any long-term serious danger.
Senator Nunn. Thank you all for being here this morning. We look forward to continuing working with you. We congratulate you on your noble ventures. Thank you.
The subcommittee will now hear from two outstanding American Sovietologists who have worked with defectors and emigres, and who will share their insight on how they can be better integrated into our study of the Soviet world.
Dr. Bruce Menning is the Director of a new U.S. Army program that studies the Soviet military, its strategy, and its tactics. This organization, the Soviet Army Studies Office, relies upon many of the insights that many former Soviet educated and trained citizens possess.
Joining Dr. Menning will be Mr. Vladimir Toumanoff, the Executive Director for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. We are especially pleased to have Mr. Toumanoff with us today. Not only is he a product of the first wave of immigration from the Soviet Union, his father having been a Czarist officer who fought against the Bolsheviks, he is also a well-respected Sovietologist in his own right.
We are delighted to have both of you here today. If you would come forward, before you take your seat, we will give you the oath, as we do of our witnesses before this subcommittee.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?
Dr. MENNING. I do.
Senator NUNN. Dr. Menning, do you want to lead off this morning?
TESTIMONY OF BRUCE W. MENNING, PH.D. DIRECTOR, SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER 1 Dr. MENNING. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cohen, Chief Counsel Hill. It is an honor this morning to be here to offer testimony on behalf of my organization.
My organization is relatively new. We are less than two years old, although the conception goes back to 1984. The Soviet Army Studies Office belongs to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command; more specifically, within Training and Doc
See p. 327 for Dr. Menning's prepared statement.
trine Command, we belong to and report to the Commanding General, Lt. Gen. Gerald E. Bartlett, United States Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
What I thought I would do this morning would be to capsulize, insofar as possible, longer remarks that I have made in a formal white paper that I submitted earlier in the form of the draft questions and answers. What I want to do is to talk about the nature of my organization and explain why the kind of input that we can get from emigre/defectors is useful to my organization. Secondly, I want to address the issue of what kind of usage those emigre/defectors have.
Before I launch into a synopsis of those remarks, let me say that there are a couple of things that make us different from some of the previous organizations and people who have testified on behalf of their organizations. One is that the Soviet Army Studies Office or, as I will refer to it in shorthand, SASO, is not an intelligence organization. It is primarily a military-academic think-tank, which is charged to study the Soviet operational and tactical levels of war to see what that kind of study can teach us for the development of training and doctrine.
Secondly, we really don't get into the area of high level defectors. Indeed, the kind of emigre/defector usage that we are concerned with is, quite frankly, in terms of the more spectacular testimony that has gone on on other days, is relatively low level and mundane.
Anyway, we see defectors as being useful in three primary ways. One, they are sources of information; two, they are interpreters of information; and three, they are developers, that is, they help us develop strategies of investigation and methodology to bring forth still more interpretation and knowledge.
Because of the uniqueness of its mandate and method, the Soviet Army Studies Office is an important beneficiary of insight garnered from emigre/defector sources.
Founded in the beginning of 1986, SASO traces its origins to 1984, when General William R. Richardson, then Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, visited the Soviet Studies Research Center at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.
For more than a decade, Soviet Studies Research Center, as we call it, SSRC, had been engaged in highly effective, open-source research, teaching and publication on the Soviet military. In fact, its Director, Mr. Christopher Donnelly, has become very prominent as an interpretor of Soviet military affairs.
With the educational and training benefits of this effort in mind, General Richardson collaborated with then-Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono, who is now General and U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and then-Colonel William A. Stofft, who is now Brigadier General and U.S. Army Chief of Military History, to fashion an analogous U.S. organization, the Soviet Army Studies Office.
Directly subordinate to the Commander, U.S. Army Combined Armed Center, SASO's mission is to conduct, encourage and facilitate in-depth research, analysis, publication and lecturing from open source materials on the Russian and Soviet tactical and operational levels of war.
Developments in conventional war fighting capabilities over the last decade have made the examination of questions relating to Soviet operational art and theater strategic offensive major foci of SASO's studies.
As an institution dedicated to unclassified research, SASO exists to exploit the growing mass of open source material, which we estimate at somewhere in the neighborhood of about 4,000 pages of material per month, and the availability of other sources, including emigre/defectors. The intent is not only to extend and complement other research, but also to test ideas in open fora, to cut across traditional international and academic boundaries and to encourage immersion in Soviet material for perspective.
In many respects, Soviet Army Studies Office forms an ideal complement and partner for the educational effort at the older U.S. Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Federal Republic of Germany.
Now in looking at how emigre/defectors fit into the Soviet Army Studies Office picture, let me observe that they fit into our picture on several levels. On the most elementary level, they help us deal with the language. It is very simple, but something that often we take, probably wrongly, for granted.
That is to say, not all emigres are automatically language teachers, only that the influx of new linguistic blood, when properly trained and focused, helps all Russian and Soviet area scholars maintain linguistic currency. This is particularly important with reference to evolving military technical langauge, an area in which recent emigres can assist SASO in keeping abreast of changing terminology and usage.
Second, emigres can teach us what is unique about the culture itself so that we can avoid many of the worst pitfalls of mirror imaging, that is of seeing aspects of other cultures in terms of our own. As you well know, this is a constant threat to our proper understanding of Soviet things military. To be sure even immersion does not absolutely prevent mirror imaging but, of course, to the extent that emigres are living witnesses of their parent society, they also have a role to play in helping to immerse us in Soviet culture.
Now, more specifically, emigre/defectors can help us to understand the Soviet/East European military. Even what we would call ordinary defectors are important sources of first-hand information. For example, the average emigre/defector usually has had some kind of military experience.
It is useful to view Soviet military reality through the eyes of former Soviet soldiers who have much to say about training, equipment and military art. One need only look at a number of studies from RAND and other organizations to realize the enormous contributions which have been and are being made by emigre/defectors in the area of research.
More specifically, emigre/defectors are important sources of information not only on the military, but also about their parent societies themselves. In the case of Soviet and East European society, where we are still dealing with totalitarian control, that is, a systematic program for state security which reaches into every aspect