It has therefore been the practice of the Department of State to issue passports to persons who were citizens of the Republic of Panama and residents of the Canal Zone on the date of the treaty between the United States and that Republic, but not to issue passports to persons born in the Zone of alien parents subsequent to the date of the treaty. Thus, the Department of State, in connection with the case of one Adeline Eugenie Sewell (instruction of March 17, 1927, to consul at Kingston, Jamaica) expressed the opinion that a person who was born in the Canal Zone of British parents January 29, 1911, that is, after the date of the treaty, was not entitled to a passport as an American national. The Department, without denying that the United States is sovereign in the Canal Zone, did not regard the provision of the fourteenth article of the amendments to the Constitution as applicable to the cases of persons born in the Zone of alien parents after its acquisition by the United States. While, as indicated above, the principle of jus soli does not obtain in the outlying possessions of the United States, and while it does not seem expedient to change the law in such a way as to make it applicable therein, it does seem desirable to adopt the provision found in subsection (a) quoted above. In most of the cases to which this provision would be applicable, the parent who is a national of the United States would also be a native of the outlying possession in which the child is born, and the family would have a residence of a permanent character therein. Some cases might possibly arise in which the parent who is a national, but not a citizen, of the United States would not be a native of the particular possession in which the child was born. However, such cases would be probably quite rare, and there seems to be no practical reason why the provision of subsection (a) should not be applicable to them.

It may be well to note that, under the above provision, a child who is born abroad of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States but has not resided in the United States or in one of its outlying possessions and the other of whom is a national who has resided in the United States or in one of its outlying possessions, would not acquire citizenship of the United States at birth.

With reference to the above discussion, it is important to note that the Department of State has heretofore held that children born in the outlying possessions of the United States whose fathers were citizens of the United States and had previously resided in the continental United States or one of the incorporated territories thereof, acquired citizenship of the United States at birth, jure sanguinis, under the provision of section 1993 of the Revised Statutes. In reaching this conclusion the Department of State bore in mind the fact that, when the phraseology of section 1993 of the Re

vised Statutes was adopted the various unincorp outlying possessions had not been acquired, ar words "born out of the limits and jurisdiction United States" applied to children born anywher side of the United States proper. In other wor provision of section 1993 of the Revised Statutes ▾ garded as supplementary to the common-law rule. firmed by the fourteenth amendment to the Cors tion, under which citizenship of the United States acquired through the fact of birth in the United S itself, and subject to its jurisdiction. It was bel that the words "and jurisdiction" in section 1993 of Revised Statutes related only to jurisdiction exerc by the United States within the continental Un States and the incorporated territories. According the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray in United Stat Wong Kim Ark (supra), the words in the fourte amendment to the Constitution, "and subject to jurisdiction thereof," were meant to except "childre foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on for public ships, or of enemies within and during a hos occupation of part of our territory, and the single ad tional exception of children of members of the Ind tribes owing direct allegiance to their several trib (p. 693).

The view expressed above as to the scope and relatio ship of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment' the Constitution and section 1993 of the Revised St utes, and the application of the latter to persons b in the unincorporated territories of American fatl finds support in the following passage in the opinion Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim A (supra):

The words "in the United States, and subject to the jurisd tion thereof," in the first sentence of the fourteenth amendme of the Constitution, must be presumed to have been understo and intended by the Congress which proposed the amendmer and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense which the like words have been used by Chief Justice Marsha in the well known case of The Exchange; and as the equivale of the words "within the limits and under the jurisdiction the United States," and the converse of the words, "out of th limits and jurisdiction of the United States," as habitually use in the naturalization acts. This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word "jurisdiction" in the last clause of the same section of the fourteenth amendment, which forbids any Statt to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pre tection of the laws" (p. 687).

(b) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, and have resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the birth of such person;

This subsection seems to require little explanation. It is intended to supply a deficiency which, as indicated above, exists in the laws now in effect. It

may

e observed that section 4 of the act of July 1, 1902 32 Stat. 692), which provided that "all inhabitants of he Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th of April 1899, nd then resided in said islands" should "be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and s such entitled to the protection of the United States," xcept such as should have elected to retain their forner nationality, also included "their children born ubsequent thereto." The statute does not provide that, n order to acquire nationality of the United States, uch children must be born in the Philippine Islands or other territory belonging to the United States. Peraps it is applicable to children born in foreign counries to parents who acquired nationality of the United States under the statute. Whether the words "their hildren born subsequent thereto" are applicable to he second generation of children born abroad, that is, o grandchildren of those inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were collectively naturalized under the provision of the act of July 1, 1902, is not clear. Contrued literally, the statute does not seem to cover them. The same may be said of the similar words in section 7 of the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 79), concerning the nationality of Puerto Ricans and section 1 of the act of February 25, 1927 (44 Stat. 1234), concerning the nationality of the inhabitants of the Virgin Islands.

(c) A child of unknown parentage found in an outlying possession of the United States, until shown not to have been born in such outlying possession.

The meaning of this provision concerning the nationality of foundlings first discovered in outlying possessions of the United States seems clear enough, and its reasonableness will hardly be questioned. Its object is to prevent unfortunate persons of the class mentioned from being stateless.

With reference to all of the above provisions of section 203, it may be well to call attention to the fact that, while they define the nationality status of the persons to whom they relate, with reference to the United States, they do not purport to define the precise status of such persons with reference to particular outlying possessions. They merely provide that the persons to whom they relate have the status of nationals of the United States. For example, under subsection (a), a person born in Guam of parents either of whom was a Spanish subject residing in Guam on April 11, 1899, or of parents one of whom is a citizen of the Philippine Islands owing allegiance to the United States would acquire at birth the status of a ational (but not ctizen) of the United States. Again, inder subsection (b) a person born in a EuroDean country of parents both of whom are natives of American Samoa of the indigenous stock and one of whom has resided in the United States or in Samoa or

some other outlying possession would be born a national of the United States. The code does not define his precise relationship to Samoa, that is, whether he should be regarded as a "citizen of American Samoa owing allegiance to the United States" or a "Samoan national of the United States" or a "national of the United States of Samoan parentage" or whether he should have some other special designation. If it seems necessary or desirable to specify in this code the citizenship status of nationals with reference to particular outlying possessions, this might be made a subject of a separate section, but it will probably be preferable to leave this matter for special legislation relating to the several territories, conditions in which differ widely. In such legislation it is necessary to take into account special considerations, political, social, economic, etc., peculiar to each territory.

Sec. 204. The provisions of section 201, subsections (c), (d), (e), and (g), and section 203, subsections (a) and (b), hereof apply, as of the date of birth, to a child born out of wedlock, provided the paternity is established during minority, by legitimation, or adjudication of a competent court.

In the absence of such legitimation or adjudication, the child, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of the child's birth, and had previously resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, shall be held to have acquired at birth her nationality status.

For many years the Department of State has, in practice, applied the rule stated in the first paragraph of this section, holding that a child born out of wedlock which, by the laws of its father's domicile, has been legitimated, is a citizen of the United States within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section 1993. The Attorney General sustained this construction of the Statute in an opinion of April 7, 1920 (32 Op. Atty. Gen. 162). In this opinion it is pointed out that, while at common law an illegitimate child was nullius filius, this rule means merely that for some purposes the law, from considerations of public policy, refuses to recognize any relationship between the child and its parents, the common law recognizing the blood relationship when public policy required it. After adverting to the fact that the rights of illegitimate children have been greatly enlarged by statute in this country, and observing that, "in practically every State, it is provided that such a child may inherit from its mother and in many it may inherit from its father, where it has been legitimated through the marriage of its parents or acknowledgment by its father as his own," the opinion concludes:

When, by the law of the State where the father of an illegitimate child, at the time of his marriage with its mother, or his acknowledgment of the child as his own, is domiciled, the child is legitimated, it will be regarded as legitimate everywhere,

even in the States whose laws do not recognize subsequent legitimation (Fowler v. Fowler, 131 N. C. 169; Miller v. Miller, 91 N. Y. 315; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243; Story Conflict of Laws, sec. 93b). Since the recognition of the relationship of an illegitimate child to a father whose identity has been established in the manner provided by statute is no longer against public policy even where the right to inherit from its father is involved, that relationship should be recognized as existing from the date of the child's birth. The State Department has for many years held that a child born out of wedlock which, by the laws of its father's domicile has been legitimated is a citizen of the United States within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section 1993. There appear to be no considerations of public policy which require a different decision (pp. 164-165).

The laws of 16 foreign states have adopted this rule (Albania, Austria, China, Costa Rica, Free City of Danzig, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Yugoslavia). In a few states (Belgian Congo, Bulgaria, France, Greater Lebanon, Syria, Japan, Monaco) the law provides that, in case of legitimation, recognition, or judicial declaration, the nationality of the parent whose relationship is first legally established prevails unless that of both is established by the same instrument or simultaneously, in which case the nationality of the father takes precedence (Flournoy and Hudson, Collection of Nationality Laws; Sandifer, D. V., "A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of Nationality," 29 Amer. Journal of International Law (1935), pp. 258, 259).

With regard to the provision contained in the second paragraph of this section, it may be said that the Department of State has, at least since 1912, uniformly held that an illegitimate child born abroad of an American mother acquires at birth the nationality of the mother, in the absence of legitimation or adjudication

establishing the paternity of the child. This r based upon section 1993 of the Revised Statute section being construed to apply to an illeg child born abroad of an American mother, ground that the mother in such a case stands place of the father. While there appears to hav some doubt whether, under the common law of land, the mother's right to the custody of a gitimate child was in all cases paramount to th the father (Schouler, "Marriage, Divorce, Separ and Domestic Relations," 6th ed., vol. 1, PP. 740-* under American law the mother "has a right to custody and control of such a child as against the tive father, and is bound to maintain it as its nat guardian" (Kent's Commentaries on American L 11th ed., vol. 2, p. 231). This rule seems to be in: cord with the old Roman law and with the laws Spain and France (Schouler, op. cit., vol. 1, p. iSo, in Corpus Juris, it is said: "The mother, as g ian by nurture, has the right to the custody and trol of her bastard child until it attains an age w it can, in contemplation of the law, make an elect between father and mother" (7 C. J. 953-954).

It may be observed finally that the laws of s thirty foreign countries contain provisions for the tionality of illegitimate children, in the absence acknowledgment or legitimation, and in all but T key such children follow the mother's nationality in t absence of any act legally establishing filiat (Flournoy and Hudson, op. cit.; Sandifer, D. V., cit., pp. 258, 259). Under Turkish law, illegitim children born abroad of either a Turkish father Turkish mother acquire Turkish nationality (Law May 28, 1928, art. 2 (c); Flournoy and Hudson, of cit., p. 570).

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

As its title indicates, chapter III of the proposed de deals with nationality through naturalization. he authority to prescribe laws upon this subject is ontained in article I, section 8, clause 4, of the Constiition of the United States, which provides that "The ongress shall have power

"To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, **" The fourteenth amendment to the Constituon contains as a part of section 1 the following efinitions of United States and State citizenship:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subct to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States nd of the State wherein they reside.

The ideal sought by the framers of the Constitution as a naturalization law which would operate uniormly throughout the United States. This goal has ever been achieved, although a great improvement in his respect resulted when Congress in 1906 for the rst time placed the administration of the naturalizaon laws under the supervision of the Federal Govrnment. It is believed that the proposed code more early approximates the required uniformity.

From the first statute upon the subject of naturaliation, that of March 26, 1790 (1 Stat. 103), it has een technically a judicial process in form, although ince 1906 it actually has been largely administrative n fact. The courts have never had machinery with which to make inquiry concerning the eligibility or ualifications of applicants for naturalization. Since 906 this important function has been performed by aturalization officers. The Immigration and Naturalzation Service, Department of Labor, ascertains the acts and assists the courts in determining the appliable law in the naturalization cases presented.

Both the courts and the administrative authorities ealing with naturalization have been prevented from chieving the most satisfactory results through the iecemeal development through the years of naturalzation and citizenship laws. As a result the present ass of naturalization statutes lacks clarity, consistncy, and systematic order.

The foregoing defects have been borne in mind in he preparation by the advisory committee of this hapter. An effort has been made to provide a workble law by bringing together in orderly form those rovisions which seem to be desirable and necessary. his has been done with a view to facilitating the aturalization of worthy persons who appear to fall

The first division, under title (1) General provisions, is descriptive of the naturalization courts and the extent of their jurisdiction to naturalize.

(2) SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

Under the second subdivision, (2) Substantive provisions, the general groups of persons who are eligible to naturalization, as well as the groups who are excluded from that privilege, are described. The nature and extent of the proof required in the usual case as to residence and personal qualifications for naturalization are then detailed.

In addition a number of sections relate to various groups who, because of special reasons, are afforded certain exemptions from the usual naturalization requirements. These include persons married to citizens of the United States, children, former citizens of the United States, persons who have erroneously exercised citizenship rights, nationals who are not citizens, Puerto Ricans, and persons serving in the armed forces or on vessels of the United States. This material is followed by that relating to alien enemies.

(3) PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Because of the inherent nature of the naturalization process, the next subdivision, (3) Procedural and administrative provisions, recites with necessary particularity of detail the manner in which naturalization is to be conferred. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the necessity for the relatively rigid requirements of the present basic Naturalization Act of 1906, which placed the

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administration of the naturalization laws under Federal supervision, said:

Experience and investigation had taught that the widespread frauds in naturalization, which led to the passage of the act of June 29, 1906, were in large measure, due to the great diversities in local practice, the carelessness of those charged with duties in this connection, and the prevalence of perjured testimony in cases of this character. A "uniform rule of naturalization" embodied in a simple and comprehensive code under Federal supervision was believed to be the only effective remedy for then existing abuses. And, in view of the large number of courts to which naturalization of aliens was entrusted and the multitude of applicants, uniformity and strict enforcement of the law could not be attained unless the code prescribed also the exact character of proof to be adduced (U. S. v. Ness (1917), 245 U. S. 324). The Supreme Court called attention to the estimate of approximately 100,000 aliens who had been naturalized annually for several years preceding 1906. As indicating that the volume has not decreased since that year, the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service show that during the 28 fiscal years from 1907 to 1934, inclusive, 3,935,987 petitions for naturalization were filed, of which 3,521,022 were granted by the courts, an average of over 125,000 annually.

Subdivision (3) of this chapter contains provisions placing responsibility for the administration of the naturalization laws, including necessary administrative details, followed by statements as to the requirements for the registry of aliens, the certificate of arrival, the declaration of intention, the petition for naturalization, and the hearing thereon, including the oath of renunciation and allegiance, the certificate of naturalization, identifying photographs, functions and duties of clerks of courts, judicial revocation of naturalization because of fraud or illegality, the issuance of certificates of derivative citizenship and copies of documents and records, and the cancelation of naturalization papers procured illegally or fraudulently from the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(4) FISCAL PROVISIONS

There are included under (4) Fiscal provisions, the various requirements of the proposed code in relation to the amounts of and accounting for fees in the various proceedings described. There also appear related provisions concerning the transmittal of naturalization papers as "official business," and authorization for the citizenship textbook for applicants for naturalization.

(5) COMPILATION OF NATURALIZATION STATISTICS

As subtitle (5) Compilation of naturalization statistics indicates, it deals with the compilation of statistical data in relation to the foreign born in the United States.

(6) PENAL PROVISIONS

Because the status of citizenship is so importan! carries with it so many rights and privileges which not be exercised by the unnaturalized, there have for a great many years attempts, sometimes upon a scale, to become naturalized without compliance the statutory requirements. In subdivision (6), F provisions, therefore, appropriate penalties have prescribed for various violations of the laws in re to naturalization and citizenship.

As already stated, the prevalence of naturaliza frauds resulted in Congress placing the administra of naturalization in the executive branch of the Fed Government. A striking account of the stupend character of these frauds and of the wide area o which they were spread is contained in extracts from report dated June 14, 1905, of C. V. A. Van Deus special examiner of the Department of Justice wh form appendix E of the Report to the President of Commission on Naturalization, appointed by Execut. Order of March 1, 1905 (Document No. 46, House Representatives, 59th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, G ernment Printing Office, 1905, pp. 79–92).

(7) SAVING CLAUSES

There are included under (7) Saving clauses, pro sions for maintaining the status quo as to pend proceedings.

COMMENT UPON THE NATURALIZATION PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED CODE

There follow hereafter, section by section, in ser order, quoted provisions of the proposed Chapter II Nationality Through Naturalization, with comme: stating briefly the relationship between the proposa and present law, and the reasons for the suggest modifications.

Sec. 301.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
JURISDICTION TO NATURALIZE

(a) Exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize per sons as citizens of the United States is hereby conferred upon the following specified courts: District Courts of the United States now exist ing, or which may hereafter be established by Congress in any State, District Courts of the United States for the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska, and for the District of Columbia and for Puerto Rico; and the District Court of the Virgin Islands of the United States; also all courts of record in any State or Territory now existing, or which may hereafter be created, having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in controversy is unlimited. The jurisdiction of all the courts herein speci