tional and class interests, to say nothing of faddists, fanatics, and other oneidead men, to get the convention pledged in advance to the adoption of their favorite measures. It has been stated that the Independent Labor Party has announced its intention to "control the state constitutional convention." On this the Chicago Herald remarks: "Such an avowal at this time from any source is to say the least unfortunate. If the labor party means that it will fight to prevent predatory wealth, or bolshevism, or the farmers, or professional politicians, or college professors, or women's clubs, or any one other element, from controlling the constitutional convention, well and good. But if the constitutional convention is to be 'controlled' by any class or party, it would be better for the people of Illinois that no constitutional convention be held. Labor has a right. to be protected in the convention. So has every other element of the population. But 'control' is a harsh-sounding word. It is well to remember that any effort to control the convention probably would result in cheating the state out of any new constitution at all. The new constitution will not become the law of the state until the people have ratified it. Any document devised by human beings will have some opposition. Everybody who fails to get his pet ideas incorporated in the new constitution will be out to ambush it at the polls. And no better weapon could be placed in the hands of an opposition. than the opportunity to show that the convention had been 'controlled' by some man or set of men. The Holy Bible couldn't survive that sort of an attack in a state containing so many divergent interests as Illinois." Book Reviews FEDERAL POWER; Its Growth and Necessity. By Henry Litchfield West, Former Commissioner of the District of Columbia. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918. From the formation of the Articles of Confederation to the war with Germany, Mr. West reviews the history of centralization in the United States. The story is one of a gradual but unceasing extension of the power and grasp of the federal government over an ever wider range of subjects and of the gradual decline of the influence and control of the states over the affairs of their people, until, as he says, the component commonwealths of the Union are being rapidly reduced to "mere nonetities." More than that, it is a record of the progressive subjection of the individual to the executive and legislative commands of the federal government which marks a far departure from the early principles of the Republic. The first settlers in America, says Mr. West, were galled by the yoke of surveillance, but "today the American people accept without protest under a centralized government a regulation of their private conduct which makes the conditions which induced the first immigration to this country seem trivial by comparison.' As between the Union and the states, the shifting of the balance of power was due, in the author's opinion, to an almost incalculable degree, to the character and the views of John Marshall, whose great constitutional decisions are reviewed in some detail. After the Se death of the great Chief Justice, there were reactions. At times the current seemed to set backward. State rights were insisted on with vehemence. ceding states claimed the dissolution of the Union as their absolute privilege. Yet there could be no balanced equality between the nation and its political integers. There must be somewhere a supremacy, and it was established for all time by the issues of the Civil War. From this period dates the beginning of the "doctrine of paramount necessity," namely, that if a reform is to be effected, or a piece of constructive legislation enacted, which cannot be adequately (or at all) effected by the separate action of the states, then the United States may and must accomplish it, though the effort may strain the Constitution to the utmost limit of its elasticity. It is not necessary here to recount the various bad examples of "covert legislation" which have resulted from this doctrine, nor to point out how the commerce clause of the Constitution, the post-office clause, and some others have been distorted past recognition under the plea of necessity. Some of the most important instances are discussed by the author. Though the regulation of the railroads through the Interstate Commerce Commission may be clearly within the lawful powers of Congress, nevertheless it was the doctrine of paramount necessity which gave birth to the act of 1887. And this is true also of the Sherman act and its congeners. Mr. West seems to have no doubt of the excellence of these laws, though the lessons growing out of this war, and the processes of com bination and consolidation which it has made necessary may prove the Sherman act to have been an economic folly. That the Supreme Court should almost invariably have found a way to sustain the validity of laws extending federal control and federal activities shows, according to the author, a progressive and enlightened desire on the part of the judges that the people's will should be done. And this is very sig nificant. For it is evidently his thesis that the whole process of centralization and super-government is one of growth and not of usurpation. In passing, he is no doubt right in thinking that an obstructive attitude on the part of the Supreme Court would have given a dangerous impetus to the absurd theory of the recall of judicial decisions and to the far more deadly demand for frequent and easy amendments of the Constitution. Matters appropriate to the very serious reflection of rightminded citizens will be found in the chapter on the power of the President as the embodiment of federalization, the arbiter of legislation, and the dispenser of patronage, correlated with the very obvious willingness of Congress to place the burdens of government upon his shoulders-and in that on federal power as a political issue. It is in this connection that he observes: "The relation of federal power to politics is certain to be complicated in the future by the fact that the federalism of today is carrying us steadily towards socialism—not the anarchistic, revolutionary, radical socialism that disregards the inherent rights of property and demands equality at the sacrifice of individuality, but But if, in the prosperous and careless days of peace, the growth of federal power went on apace, both at the expense of the prerogatives of the states and at the expense of individual liberty, how shall we measure its gigantic increase under the spur of a national war? The United States has closed its unrelaxing grasp upon the man-power, the industries, the resources, the manufactures, the commerce, the wealth, the stock in trade, and the means of transportation and communication of the entire country. Truly, as Mr. West says, the word "dictator" would seem to have no place in a republic, and yet the word is already accepted as a part of our national vocabulary. All this was justified, of course, by the imperative necessity of winning the war. Not otherwise than by such a co-ordination of effort, by such commandeering of the national resources, could the mighty task have been achieved. But, as Mr. West asks, "what of the Constitution while these laws were being enacted? It has not been seriously considered. Men in Congress have not hesitated to openly assert in debate that the Constitution is to be consulted only in time of peace. The doctrine of constitutionality has been forgotten and the doctrine of paramount necessity obtains with more force than ever before. When a normal period returns, we may recur to the once-revered document. In the meantime, we see little that has not been swept into the all-embracing arm of the government by war legislation." How much of the old-time freedom will emerge from that embrace upon the full return of peace? It is a grave question. Shall we have a paternal government, a benevolent despotism, or shall we return to the regime of individual freedom and initiative? All who read Mr. West's timely and suggestive essay will probably agree with him that "the development of the federal power, persistent from the very beginning of our national history, will not only continue unchecked, but will more and more be made manifest. The river is sweeping onward to the sea." Most will also agree that if we would avoid an oligarchy or autocracy, the inordinate power of the executive must be curbed. But there are those, perhaps, who will withhold assent from his proposition that the solution of the question is the establishment of a cabinet or parliamentary system of government, modeled chiefly upon that of Canada. THE RESPONSIBLE STATE. A Re-ex amination of Fundamental Political Doctrines in the Light of World War and the Menace of Anarchism. By Franklin Henry Giddings, LL.D. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918. Pp. 108. $1.00 net. This slender volume, which is a reprint of certain lectures delivered at Brown University last year, contains much excellent meat. It is, as the author states, "a product of long reflection checked up by a varied experience." His views upon the responsible state, as the creation of human aspiration and the guardian of civilization, are sound and wholesome, most obviously the ripe fruit of long study, set forth in language both vigorous and felicitous, at once convincing and illuminating. To Professor Giddings, the irresponsible state is the arbitrary state. It recognizes no law but its own will. It exists not for the common welfare, but for the glory of a dynasty. It is, in short, the "demoniac" Prussian conception of the state as a portly beast successful in its ravenings. The responsible state, on the other hand, knows and fulfills its obligations both internally and externally. It is "trustee for the community and the individual." It is established to secure peace and safety, to administer just government, and to enhance civilization. Likewise it obeys the laws of reason and morality as towards its neighbors and the world. It is "accountable to the conscience of mankind." "The responsible state is a living population engaged in political experimentation. Its origins are discovered in human behavior. Its evolution is historical. Its powers are finite. Its duties are practical." But it is not and cannot be absolute, either in the sense of metaphysics or of law. "The state, the might iest creation of the human mind, is also the noblest expression of human purpose. Were it, however, absolute, it would defeat all purpose. Finite and relative it is, of necessity. To fulfill its destiny it must hold itself responsible." Thus conceived and defined, the responsible state is discussed by the author, in four divisions or chapters, in respect to its origins, powers, rights, and duties. Being one of our most eminent sociologists, his viewpoint is naturally not that of the politician nor yet of the abstract theorist. His method is genetic and historical, rather method is genetic and historical, rather than analytic. Not despising the wisdom of the philosophers (he stresses our debt to Aristotle and Plato), it is less the preconceived theory than the resultant fact that engages his attention. The state is not regarded as a congeries of political institutions, to be dissected and compared, but as a product of evolution. The disquisition is not upon the anatomy of the state, but its biology. If space permitted we should like to quote many details of Professor Giddings' admirable argument and wise conclusions. But one illustration must suffice. Approaching the vexed question of "sovereignty," not as a metaphysician nor as a mere legalist, but with a clear vision of actual facts, he has no trouble in disposing of the thesis that sovereignty is "an original, unconditioned, universal, and irresistible power to compel obedience." On the contrary, he says: “Never in practice, never in the concrete world of living men, does sovereignty become that absolute power and authority which metaphysical theorizing has conceived it to be. Taking words at their face value, nothing corresponding to the textbook definitions of sovereignty exists or ever has existed in the world. The state itself is not absolute. Only Treitschkes and Kaisers so think of it. Like every thing else concrete and actual, it is a phenomenon of relativity. It is conditioned by realities beyond and wider than itself. It is subject to cosmic limitations, and sovereignty cannot transcend the laws of an orderly and ordering universe. Nor can it transcend the limitations imposed by the circumstance than mankind is politically organized in many nations, and that no nation can safely run amuck among its neighbors. Sovereignty, therefore, is subject, as the signers of our Declaration acknowledge, to 'a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.' Moreover, it is subject further to limitations imposed by the human nature of its own subjects. Not only in democracies, but everywhere and always, rulers and ruling groups exist by the consent of the many. Finally, like every intellectual being, the sovereign is subject, as Greek and Roman saw, to the rule of reason; and like every ethical being, it is morally responsible to the intelligent conscience of all mankind, now living and hereafter to live." |