lowing that from which the quotation is taken. The child labor law, adjudged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and afterwards re-enacted under the very thin disguise of a revenue act, is a notable example. We think the author's description of the commission form of government for cities leaves something to be desired. For the uninstructed reader might easily fall into the mistake of supposing that it had been a universal and unqualified success, whereas it is still on trial, and has occasionally been rejected, after experiment, as unsatisfactory. The sub-title "Bankruptcy and Monopolies" is misleading. One would expect a summary of the Sherman Act and a description of the activities of the Department of Justice in the prosecution of the trusts. But it turns out that the "monopolies" referred to are those created under the patent and copyright laws. The account of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts (page 68) is seriously defective in dwelling exclusively on the diverse citizenship of the parties as a ground of federal jurisdiction, and omitting to mention the right of those courts to take cognizance of cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. But these and some other inadvertences and omissions could easily be corrected if the volume were reprinted, as it should be. They should not be allowed to detract from its real merits. What the author has to say in criticism of the direct primary and in favor of the short ballot is sound and commendable. And we can indorse without qualification his reference to the ominous growth of executive power in the United States, though patronage and the threat of the veto do not (as he seems to think) account for the whole of the motive force which propels the presidential steam roller. There is some exaggeration, but a good deal of truth also, in the observation that "the idea running through the Constitution was that the individual should be protected from the abuse of government; the problem of government has developed in the opposite direction-protecting the people from each other." The National Association for Constitutional Government was formed for the purpose of preserving the representative institutions established by the founders of the Republic and of maintaining the guarantees embodied in the Constitution of the United States. The specific objects of the Association are: 1. To oppose the tendency towards class legislation, the unnecessary extension of public functions, the costly and dangerous multiplication of public offices, the exploitation of private wealth by political agencies, and its distribution for class or sectional advantage. 2. To condemn the oppression of business enterprise, the vitalizing energy without which national prosperity is impossible; the introduction into our legal system of ideas which past experience has tested and repudiated, such as the Initiative, the Compulsory Referendum, and the Recall, in place of the constitutional system; the frequent and radical alteration of the fundamental law, especially by mere majorities; and schemes of governmental change in general subversive of our republican form of political organization. 3. To assist in the dissemination of knowledge regarding theories of government and their practical effects; in extending a comprehension of the distinctive principles upon which our political institutions are founded; and in creating a higher type of American patriotism through loyalty to those principles. 4. To study the defects in the administration of law and the means by which social justice and efficiency may be more promptly and certainly realized in harmony with the distinctive principles upon which our government is based. 5. To preserve the integrity and authority of our courts; respect for and obedience to the law, as the only security for life, liberty, and property; and above all, the permanence of the principle that this Republic is "a government of laws and not of men." Nominating Conventions1 By William D. Guthrie The privilege of nominating elective state officers by means of delegate conventions, now denied by the election law of the State of New York, ought in my judgment to be recognized as essentially a constitutional right, which the legislature should not be at liberty to abridge. The right to assemble peaceably for the purpose of nominating candidates is certainly a political right of permanent importance and vital concern to all citizens, and it should be guaranteed by constitutional provision and not left to abridgment or denial by the legislature. The present state constitution regulates the qualifications of voters, the registration of citizens entitled to vote, and the creation of registration and election boards. But it does not contain a single provision in regard to nominations for office, even for the office of governor, although nominations for state officers are of far greater importance to the body politic than many of the matters now regulated by constitutional provision or recited in the Bill of Rights. I desire to urge upon your careful consideration the value of nominating conventions as a constitutional right. The constantly increasing functions of the modern state have made the executive and administrative departments the most important and powerful branches of government, and the increasing complexity of governmental machinery has rendered it absolutely essential that competent and trained public officials should be chosen. Government has become an extremely difficult and scientific business, and special capacity, training, and expert knowledge are more and more required in executive and administrative office. The test of a good government is more than ever its ability to produce good administration. If we are to have efficient and avoid wasteful administration, the greatest care must be exercised in selecting candidates. As Governor Throop said nearly a century ago, "there is perhaps no part of the duties of citizenship which requires more sound judgment and honesty and singleness of purpose than those relating to the nomination and election of executive and administrative officers." Indeed, good government depends in final results much more on the ability and character of the men who administer it than upon laws or institutions. The maxim, constantly on the lips of so many, that a government of laws. and not of men is the controlling desideratum, may be grossly misleading, for the best system of laws in the hands of incompetent, inefficient, and dishonest administrators will produce far worse results than an inferior system in the hands of competent, efficient, and honest public officials. The most difficult task and the highest duty that our electorate are ever called upon to perform is, therefore, the selection of candidates for elective state office. In order to perform that duty, it is im 'Address before the Committee on Suffrage of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York at Albany, June 16, 1915. Reprinted by the permission of the author. perative that there should be adequate and reliable means of information, full opportunity for conference, exchange of views, debate and criticism as to the capacity and character of candidates, and effective methods of co-operation and organization in support of qualified candidates. The selection of a governor for the great state of New York, containing more than 10,250,000 inhabitants and comprising a political constituency larger than any other in this country, is certainly a matter of vital and profound concern to the whole body politic, to every citizen, to every community, to every party, to every class, to every interest. If the short ballot be now adopted, the successful administration of the whole state government will practically be staked upon the selection of qualified candidates for gov ernor. All hope of governmental reform, efficiency, and economy will then necessarily depend upon the statesmanship and character of one man, who will be vested with full executive and administrative powers over a population and a territory larger than some of the nations of the world. A wise and safe choice will be infinitely more essential and more difficult than in the past. In fact, if the views of certain advocates of the short ballot prevail, we are to vest all this power in the governor for a term of four years, without restraint of any kind except his sense of responsibility to the people, and without any effective check upon his will or caprice. We should have to trust him absolutely. We should, in truth, have precisely the definition of an elective despotism and tyrannybeneficent if we are so fortunate and blessed as to secure an exceptionally able and high-minded statesman for governor, baneful if an incompetent, untrained, or scheming politician or demagogue should be elected. The governor would then have it immedi ately within his power to become an absolute state boss through the use of an enormous and constantly increasing patronage, directly or indirectly reaching and touching every election district in the state. He would be able to break party lines asunder, to promote the interests of any group or faction, to punish adversaries, to cater to any class, to sacrifice the rights of minorities, to substitute his will or caprice for the policy of his party, to permit waste and extravagance, to dictate who should be his successor. A competent candidate for governor who would be so well known and tested as to be safely relied upon to resist this temptation would indeed be a phenomenon. If history teaches us that there is anything certain in human nature, if experience, which is of far more value than any mere reasoning or theorizing, has again and again demonstrated any practical and eternal truth in politics. it is that unrestrained power inevitably leads sooner or later to abuse and tyranny, and that no one official, be he emperor, king, president, or governor, can safely be entrusted with any such power. We should bear in mind that the extreme advocates of the short ballot, by eliminating all requirements for the approval and consent of the senate in |