You have been a very good witness. I think our committee has obtained its objective in this matter. I will be glad to yield to my friend from North Carolina, if he has any questions.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carlucci, in your statement you say: "Our choices at the 11th hour were severely constrained; we had to chart a course between intransigence versus almost certain violence, between substantive concessions versus encouragement to militants." What is the meaning of that sentence?

Mr. CARLUCCI. In my judgment, for example, had we agreed to some or all of the nine demands or, indeed, the 20 demands that had been put forth by the Indian groups, we would have encouraged extremist action. I assume that the committee is familiar with those nine demands. Perhaps I could read them.

Mr. TAYLOR. You summarized them pretty much in your state

ment.

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, I did not summarize the demands on the part of the TBT group.

Mr. TAYLOR. You stated the points that you would not give in on.

Mr. CARLUCCI. I indicated the points I would not give in on, but I don't think the committee has yet been made aware of the extreme position that had been taken in the negotiations by the TBT group. I would like the opportunity to read briefly these nine demands.

Mr. TAYLOR. Go ahead.

Mr. CARLUCCI (reading):

We demand that we get executive and legislative action on our 20 point solution papers.

We demand that John Crow be relieved of his duty as Deputy Commissioner. We demand that Harrison Loesch be relieved of his duty as Assistant Secretary.

We demand that Louis Bruce be given back his authority as Commissioner until executive and legislative actions can be implemented on our twenty point position papers.

We demand proper housing and facilities during our stay in the District of Columbia.

We demand the commitments made to Indian people over the Johnson-O'Malley issue in Oklahoma be honored and written to the people.

We demand that urban and landless Indians be given proper services entitled to them the same as Treaty Indians.

We demand that all bones and artifacts of our ancestors be restored to our people for reburial.

We demand that Bob Robertson be relieved of his duty as Director of the National Council on Indian Opportunity and to be replaced by an Indian.

Then there are an additional 20 demands, the first of which, for example, is restoration of constitutional treaty-making authority.1 Mr. Taylor, you can see that the demands were fairly extreme and that we were not prepared to make those kinds of substantive concessions.

Mr. TAYLOR. You agree then that making such concessions would amount to encouragement of militants?

Mr. CARLUCCI. I think it would have, yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. What about paying money to the Indians? Did not that amount to encouragement to future militants?

1 See 20 demands, on p. 162.

Mr. CARLUCCI. In that case we went through a little cost-benefit analysis, as I indicated. We concluded that it would cost us approximately $13,000 a day to implement the court order and to house the Indians in the Departmental Auditorium. Having done that, we would still have a potential for violence and property damage in the Departmental Auditorium.

The Indians were destitute, by and large. They would continue to be destitute and we might end up having to pay their way home in any

event.

Furthermore, it became obvious during the negotiations that the facilitation of travel would aid substantially in defusing the situation and getting the Indians out of the building and putting an end to the entire episode rather than perpetuating it here at Government

expense.

Mr. TAYLOR. How many Indians occupied the building? How did you determine the figure?"

Mr. CARLUCCI. It was very difficult, quite frankly. We had varying estimates some from the GSA security people, some from the Indians themselves, others from various other observers. An appropriate figure. for those in the building seemed to be in the neighborhood of 800. There were some additional 150, maybe 200, housed at YMCA and various others scattered throughout town. Quite frankly we were unable to make an accurate head count. We had to accept estimates. We asked the Indians to break down the funds that they would need by caravan. They broke it down accordingly in the following way: Caravan 1 for Los Angeles, 2,633 miles at 10 cents a mile times 50 cars, with five persons per car at $6 a day times 4 days, total cost was $19,165, and so on-Caravan 2, Caravan 3, Caravan 4, Caravan 5-and came up with a total figure of $66,650. Initially we had made some rough estimates of $60 thousand. Their calculation was not far off from what we had initially estimated.

Mr. TAYLOR. You mentioned women and children in the building. How many of those do you estimate were in the group?

Mr. CARLUCCI. That would be very difficult for me to estimate, Mr. Taylor. If I had to make a personal judgment based on those that I saw, maybe 30 percent were women and children. But I would not care to be held to that kind of figure.

Mr. TAYLOR. In your negotiations, you did not make any promises that prosecution would not follow for destruction of property, did you?

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, sir; we did not.

Mr. TAYLOR. Just what promises were made that there would be no prosecution?

Mr. CARLUCCI. Prosecution for the seizure. We made a promise that we would recommend that there not be prosecution for the seizure and occupation of the BIA building. We went no further and, indeed, we were very explicit in saying that this would not cover damage or theft. I can remember myself using the term, half facetiously but with very serious intent, "Normal wear and tear on the building" pursuant to the seizure and occupancy, and anything above that would certainly result in prosecution.

(The letter dated November 8, 1972 follows:)

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, D.C., November 8, 1972. We will recommend that there be no prosecution for the seizure and occupation of the BIA building.

LEONARD GARMENT,

Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget.
FRANK CARLUCCI,
Special Assistant to the President.

Mr. ASPINALL. I yield to the gentleman from Montana, a member of the subcommittee.

Mr. MELCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carlucci, involved here in the whole escapade is the responsibility of the various parts of our Government. The committee chairman had requested a number of witnesses to appear who do not appear because of the executive privilege. What is the difference, as you understand it, between their refusal to appear and your consent to appear before us today?

Mr. CARLUCCI. I cannot speak for them. I have a copy of John Dean's letter in which he simply states, "It is a matter of well-established principle and precedent that members of the President's staff do not appear before congressional committees to testify in respect to the performance of their duties on behalf of the President."

On the other hand, during the time of the congressional debate surrounding Reorganization Plan No. 2, it was specifically agreed that OMB would testify on its functions. In this case, I made a personal decision that I would testify.

Mr. MELCHER. Have you in your experience been a part of the President's group, a part of the White House staff?

Mr. CARLUCCI. You mean am I formally a part of the President's White House staff?

Mr. MELCHER. Yes.

Mr. CARLUCCI. I don't think I am. We are part of the Executive Office of the President. I would have to get the lawyers to clarify that particular point.

Mr. MELCHER. To what extent do you think that executive privilege should be used?

Mr. CARLUCCI. I don't consider myself qualified to comment on executive privilege. That is not my field.

Mr. MELCHER. You have had quite an experience in this administration. I thought perhaps you could help explain to me where the line should be drawn.

I am glad you are here. I am glad that executive privilege doesn't extend farther than it does. I think it extends too far right now.

We have heard, and I believe it's true, that during the past decade or two Congress has lost a lot of its power and a lot of its authority. Regardless of whose fault that is, it seems to me that it is something that should be corrected. If we are attempting to reestablish congressional authority, the prompt calling of these hearings perhaps is one small step toward that goal.

I think it's tragic-it's a deeper tragedy than just this incident— that seemingly the executive branch will take unto itself an excessive responsibility and then, having taken the excessive responsibility, not want to account for having done so.

Mr. CARLUCCI. I was not present yesterday, but I understand that Secretary Morton did indicate that he was fully involved in all of the decisions that were made and supported them.

Mr. MELCHER. It became clear from the testimony yesterday that, while Secretary Morton was out of town on a particular key day when the events started, the decision to clear the building on November 2, the first day, as should have been done, would have avoided any of the dangers that you have described on November 6 and thereafter.

Then the decision was made by somebody in the White House to hold back prompt action and followed a route that Secretary Morton says that he approved of. That is seeking a restraining order from

the court.

Here we have a situation where the executive branch is not fulfilling its obligation and not following the direction that was laid out by statute by Congress. It takes unto itself to buttress such a situation by going to the judicial and asking for the restraining order.

I am not belaboring the point with you. From your testimony it is clear that you were not involved until November 6. I merely take the time of the committee this morning to make these comments on the basis of whether or not congressional authority is as strong as it should be and whether, having that authority, we are acting responsibly. I think that the hearings demonstrate that we are trying to dramatize to the people of this country that the Congress had delegated the authority to maintain law and order in a building to the particular Federal agency. That was not done in this case, and it apparently was prevented by direct action from the White House during this current administration, which claims to be very heavy and forthright on law and order.

Nevertheless, I appreciate your appearance here. I appreciate your comments. I accept the thrust of your testimony that you were called in to help participate in the discussions with the Indians because a number of them, or perhaps most of them, had a great deal of respect for you. I think it was helpful that you were present and that you did assist.

I thank you for coming to the committee.

Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you.

Mr. ASPINALL. I recognize the gentleman from South Dakota, a member of the subcommittee.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carlucci, you made one statement-I don't know whether it was in your opening remarks or colloquy after that-that you had no intention of penalizing the majority of the Indian people for the few who caused the damage in the BIA Building. Have you started working on the Indian part of the budget yet?

Mr. CARLUCCI. We are presently reviewing the entire budget and are in the process of obtaining Presidential decisions now.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Do you have any intention at all of making cuts in the Indian part of the budget?

Mr. CARLUCCI. Congressman, I am not able to comment on that. As you are aware, the budget is the President's budget. He makes the decisions, and we do not comment on them until it is submitted to the Congress.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Can you comment on your own intentions as to whether you intend to recommend a cut?

Mr. CARLUCCI. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to comment on what recommendations I as a staff member would be making to the President.

Mr. ABOUREZK. When Assistant Secretary Loesch testified yesterday, he talked about Thursday, November 2, of your using force, using 150 riot-trained police to force out the inhabitants of the building. Then there was testimony about his decision being overruled by the White House. Do you know anything at all about that change of plans? Mr. CARLUCCI. No, I am not acquainted with that period. As a matter of fact, if my memory serves me correctly, I was in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.,

at the time.

Mr. ABOUREZK. During that period of time that you were involved in this, did you ever talk to John Crow, the Assistant Commissioner? Mr. CARLUCCI. No, I did not.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Thank you. I have no more questions.

Mr. ASPINALL. I have three quick questions, and then I will yield to our member of the full committee.

Did the OEO furnish any money that you know of, Mr. Carlucci, to finance the planning and the bringing of the Trail of Broken Treaties to Washington?

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, they did not to my knowledge.

Let me indicate-and OEO, I understand, will be up later and they can testify on this-that there was an OEO grant of $113 thousand to something called the Upper Midwest Indian Center.

Mr. ASPINALL. If you don't know where it went to, I won't ask you to explain it. If you know where it went, all right.

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, I do not. That whole matter is under investigation right now.

Mr. ASPINALL. What was the Indians' first request? What was the amount that the Indians first requested in order to get them out of the building?

Mr. CARLUCCI. I would be glad to submit this for the record. They came up with a request for $66,650. As I indicated earlier, we had estimated that the amount would be approximately $60,000, and OEO had already processed a grant action for $60,000. Hence their estimate was about $6,650 over what we had estimated.

Mr. ASPINALL. The only figure that you have had anything to do with then was $60.000 to begin with and $65,000-plus.

Mr. CARLUCCI. $66,650.

Mr. ASPINALL. Those are the only figures? If there were any other offers by the Indians, they were made previous to your intervention, is that correct?

Mr. CARLUCCI. That is correct. Those are the only figures I am acquainted with.

Mr. ASPINALL. Were these requests made by the Indians themselves first, as some have suggested, or were they made by you and Mr. Garment in your respective capacities in order to get them out of town in order to save money providing they stayed here longer than another 40 days or so?

Mr. CARLUCCI. The way this was handled, Mr. Aspinall, was to set up a subgroup which discussed the figures separately while Mr. Garment and I continued our discussions with the so-called Indian ne