Did you have anything to do with the decision made on Thursday not to use police force? Mr. ROBERTSON. I functioned before the arrival of the Trail of Broken Treaties caravan and after, including their departure from the buildings, in an advisory and supportive capacity. Mr. ASPINALL. Will you make a brief statement as to your activities during that time? Mr. ROBERTSON. Yes, sir. I think the chronology that the Department of Interior has submitted for the record speaks for itself. I will not be repetitive. Mr. ASPINALL. I also ask that this chronology that has been handed to us by Secretary Morton-and this is done with his permission-be Inade a part of the record. Mr. HALEY. Are there any objections? The Chair hears none. It is so ordered. (The document will be found on page 11.) Mr. ROBERTSON. In a number of meetings prior to the arrival of the caravan unit from the South and the North, myself, along with Assistant Secretary Loesch and others from Federal agencies, met with the advance men, Mr. Ware and Mr. Burnette, to lay the groundwork for the arrival of the main body of these people. As Secretary Loesch has indicated a number of times, at none of those meetings were there any requests for logistical support on the part of these advance people. Rather, they were looking for, if you will, an open door policy, to allow them to meet with key Federal officials to discuss substantive issues. I did attend the meeting that was supposed to start at 8 p.m., on the evening of the 2d of November, which meeting did not start until about 8:15 and lasted until about 11 o'clock. I was called from the committee-from the meeting with the Trail of Broken Treaties people, about 30 in number, on two occasions. The first occasion was into an office adjoining Assistant Secretary Loesch's, where I was asked for my advice vis-a-vis the removal of the people from the building. My advice was to remove them. I went back into the meeting. Mr. ASPINALL. Let me ask you a question. At that time you and Secretary Loesch were in favor of eviction at that time. As I understand it, Commissioner Bruce and Mr. Patterson were not in favor; is that correct? Mr. ROBERTSON. I think that is a fair representation. Mr. ASPINALL. The decision was made later on otherwise? Mr. ROBERTSON. Yes, sir. Mr. ASPINALL. All right. Pardon me for interrupting you. Go ahead. Mr. ROBERTSON. After being recalled from the meeting, from which, as you will recall, Assistant Secretary Loesch was excluded or requested not to be in attendance by the Indian leaders, Mr. Patterson and myself went back in to meet again with the assembled Indian people. At one point in the discussions with them, in the Assistant Secretary's conference room, Mr. Patterson was called from the meeting and I carried on. Then subsequently, I was called back out again and then at that point I was informed that a decision had been made not to remove the people that evening. Mr. ASPINALL. Were there any further negotiations with the Indians or with the Department? Mr. ROBERTSON. Not with the Trail of Broken Treaties caravan people, but, yes, sir, throughout the entire affair I held myself in readiness, as I indicated priorly, in an advisory and supportive role. Mr. ASPINALL. For the record, Mr. Robertson, what is the purpose and how do you proceed to administer that purpose, of the National Council on Indian Opportunity, and to whom do you answer for your immediate supervisor? Mr. ROBERTSON. I answer to the Vice President of the United States. The duties of the National Council on Indian Opportunity are spelled out in the Presidential Executive order promulgated by President Johnson in March of 1968, which charges are to coordinate Federal activities across-the-broad base for Indian people, for their benefit, to evaluate programs, to innovate in the programmatic approach to the meeting of the problems of Indian people, all done in consultation with the eight Indian members of the Council who are Presidentially appointed. Mr. ASPINALL. Have you received any criticism from your supervisor or anybody in the administration for your position of being desirous of having eviction take place the evening of the 2d? Mr. ROBERTSON. No, sir. Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, this is all. Mr. HALEY. No further questions. Thank you, Mr. Robertson. The next witness is Mr. William E. Casselman II, General Counsel of the GSA. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Casselman had the understanding he is to be present tomorrow. Mr. HALEY. Is Mr. Herman W. Barth here? Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, then I move we adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9:45 a.m. Mr. HALEY. The Chair has an announcement he would like to make. We will meet at 9:45 tomorrow in room 2123, Rayburn Building, for further consideration of this matter. With that, we stand adjourned. (Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:45 a.m., Tuesday, December 5, 1972.) SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS HEADQUARTERS BUILDING TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1972 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Haley (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. HALEY. The committee will be in order. The first witness this morning, because he is pressed for time, is Mr. Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget. You may proceed, Mr. Carlucci. Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the statement of Mr. Carlucci on my desk. I understand that he has given them out to some of the people around here, but I think if he is going to read from a statement we have a right to see it at the time he reads from it. Mr. HALEY. Do you have a prepared statement? Mr. CARLUCCI. I have a prepared statement and it has been made available to the staff. Mr. HALEY. You may proceed. Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. STATEMENT OF FRANK CARLUCCI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET Mr. CARLUCCI. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before this committee to help develop a comprehensive picture for the Congress and the general public of the events which surrounded the seizure of the BIA Building by a group of Indians known as the Trail of Broken Treaties. First, let me delineate the events about which I am competent to speak, since I know this committee is interested in obtaining accurate firsthand information in contrast to hearsay reports. I had no association with the events prior to the evening of Monday, November 6. At that time, I was informed that a potentially bloody confrontation had been avoided and that my name, along with Len Garment's, had been mentioned as someone with whom the Indians would like to discuss their grievances. Although there were time pressures on me in the midst of budget season, I agreed to try to be helpful. I was advised that there were both hardline and moderate elements among the Indians, with the former fully prepared to turn the BIA Building into a funeral pyre at midnight, November 6, 3 hours after our first scheduled meeting with the Trail of Broken Treaties representatives. Such a prediction seemed to me to be overdrawn at first, but it became increasingly likely as I learned more of the facts. It was obvious access to the White House alone would not be sufficient to defuse the inflamed situation in which we found ourselves. If the relatively more moderate group that had asked to consult with us was to be persuaded to forestall extreme action, they had to be able to convey some sort of tangible response from us. At the same time, we were mindful of the need not to mollycoddle lawbreakers. Concessions given under the conditions in which we found ourselves could be extremely undesirable precedents which could disrupt our entire effort to make progress in the field of Indian affairs, as well as in other areas. Our choices at the 11th hour were severely constrained; we had to chart a course between intransigence versus almost certain violence, between substantive concessions versus encouragement to militants. Negotiation could lead to either violence or unwarranted concession, but would give us some chance to reduce passions and create a more reasonable atmosphere. In choosing this course, we decided on a set of limited goals: WHAT WE WANTED TO ACCOMPLISH We wanted the TBT people out of the building. We wanted them removed without violence-without risk of death or injury to men, women, children, and law enforcement officers. We wanted, once TBT was removed, the episode to be terminated and the protesters to disband; they had long since made their grievances known. WHAT WE WANTED TO AVOID We would not agree to any substantive change in Indian programs to result from tactics such as TBT's. We would not agree to any administrative reorganization. We would not excuse removal of property or criminal vandalism in the building. We would not agree to consider budget questions. We would not, in accomplishing the above, give excuse through our actions for violence to begin. We would not agree to the Government's underwriting or otherwise financing perpetuation of the situation by the TBT remaining in Washington. In sum, we would agree only to look into their complaints. We accomplished our goals. By any reasonable account of discussions, we avoided almost every concession or result we intended to avoid. There are those who have chided us for not taking "firm and immediate action"-for not removing the Indians "by force if necessary." The TBT people were overwrought. Some were emotional to the apparent point of irrationality. Leaders talked of martyrdom, while outside others talked of tough action and removal by force. On both |