in the deportation case that the organization was one which sought the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. There are several important distinctions: Title was a deportation case-one where the burden of proof was on the Service; the case before us is an exclusion case-one where the burden of establishing admissibility is on the applicant for admission. Title did not present evidence in his denaturalization case. The applicant did. Title was bottomed on the specific wording of a statutory provision (section 242 (b) of the Act) which is not involved in the instant case. Finally, as the court pointed out, after the denaturalization, the Supreme Court held the quality of membership in the organization was an important factor-this aspect had not previously been deemed of importance and the Service had not shown the existence of this factor in the denaturalization case.

Counsel's contention that applicant's presence in the United States is in violation of the diplomatic protocols of the United States and Canada and Article 2 of the United Nations Charter because he was brought here by force need not be discussed in view of the position we have stated in the previous paragraphs.2

Amicus curiae contends that the applicant was denied his right to counsel at the exclusion hearing. She states that the special inquiry officer, having knowledge of the applicant's desire to be represented and his financial inability to pay for counsel, should have advised him that it might be possible to obtain representation even though he had no funds and should have given applicant time for that purpose. She points out that there was no pressing need for an immediate hearing since the applicant was serving a sentence with many years to go. She cites Ka Cheung Ip v. INS, unreported (1 Cir., No. 7802, February 18, 1971). She states that if applicant had been represented, the involuntariness of his presence in the United States would have been established at the hearing. We agree with counsel that the special inquiry officer could well have informed the applicant about the possibility of obtaining free counsel and could well have given him the opportunity to explore the possibility if he so desired. However, we do not find that the special inquiry officer's failure prejudiced the

2 A person who presents himself at a port of entry, "whether voluntarily or otherwise" is amenable to the exclusionary proceedings prescribed in the Act, D'Agostino v. Sahli, 230 F.2d 668, 671 (5 Cir., 1956). Once an application for admission is made, the applicant cannot withdraw the application as a matter of right. Administrative authorities may permit a withdrawal as a discretionary matter, Matter of Vargas-Molina, Interim Decision No. 2069 (BIA, 1971).

alien because we do not see how counsel could have altered the results here. The applicant's conviction is a fact. It exists. The voluntariness of applicant's application for admission, as we have pointed out, is an issue foreclosed by decisions in the criminal matter. Moreover, applicant's general level of understanding is such that he clearly understood the purpose of the exclusion hearing and what was happening at it. Finally, there is no requirement that the Service provide counsel for the applicant at Government expense, Aalund v. Marshall, 323 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Tex., 1971). In view of these factors, we do not think that Ka Cheung Ip, supra, requires a reopened hearing at which applicant will be represented.

Amicus curiae contends that the applicant was denied his right to effectively present evidence on his own behalf because of the inadequacy of the interpreter. We have carefully examined the record in light of the contention. The record on a whole reveals that the applicant's answers were responsive, that they were specific, and that they consisted of more than categorical answers. The applicant has furnished no specific instance of a misunderstanding of a question or of an answer improperly set forth in the record.

Amicus curiae contends that this exclusion proceedings is premature because applicant's parole was not terminated in accordance with the regulations. She points out that the applicant was paroled into the United States, that 8 CFR 212.5 (a) requires that parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien when the purpose for which parole was authorized has been accomplished, and that there is no showing that the parole was so terminated. She contends that the parole status still continues and it is therefore premature to hold an exclusion hearing.

Even if applicant's parole has not been terminated, an adjudication of his admissibility in exclusion proceedings is proper. Parole is merely an alternative to detention at the border. It "is simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted," Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958). Parole bestows no additional rights upon an alien, Matter of Dabiran, Interim Decision No. 2051 (BIA, 1970). A person detained at the border can be given an exclusion hearing. A person who has been ordered excluded may be paroled while his appeal is being considered. We see no reason why a parolee cannot be given an exclusion hearing. In the instant case there is good reason to continue applicant in his status as a parolee. He is serving a prison sentence. He will be in

the United States for some time to come whatever the outcome of the exclusion case. The status of a parolee is the only one legally available.3

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

3 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), and Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), cited by counsel on the necessity of an administrative agency following its own regulations are inapposite. In the cited cases, the alleged deviations from the regulations were prejudicial. This is not the case here.

MATTER OF IREGBULEM

In Section 212 (e) Proceedings

A-14658134

Decided by Regional Commissioner December 1, 1971

Applicant is denied a waiver of the foreign residence requirement of section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for failure to establish, as claimed, that if she returned to Nigeria, the country of her nationality and last foreign residence, she would be subject to persecution because of her political activity in the United States on behalf of the Biafran cause during the recent civil war in that country, since a review of State Department reports and those of other independent sources, including the press, indicates there is no evidence of government persecution of former supporters of the Biafra regime.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

James N. Penrod, Esquire

556 Commercial Street

San Francisco, California 94111

This case comes before the Regional Commissioner on appeal from the decision of the District Director, San Francisco, who denied the application on September 20, 1971, in that the applicant had failed to establish that she would be subject to persecution within the meaning of section 212 (e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, if she returned to Nigeria, the country of her nationality and last foreign residence.

The applicant is a 29-year-old single female, a citizen of Nigeria, born in Port Harcourt (Biafra) of the Ibo tribe. She was admitted to the United States on August 9, 1964, as an exchange alien under section 101 (a) (15) (J) of the Act sponsored by A.I.D. under exchange programs G-II-100 and P-I-577 for study and research towards advanced degrees. She studied at the University of Arizona in Tucson and Ohio State University achieving a Bachelor of Arts and Master's degree in nutrition and home economics.

Her last extension of stay expired March 1969. Since January 1970 she has been employed as a nutritionist at Mount Zion Hospital and Medical Center in San Francisco, California, where she

now lives. She is the beneficiary of an approved visa petition as a member of the professions as a nutritionist, but since her admission as an exchange alien under programs sponsored by A.I.D. was financed by a government agency, she is subject to the twoyear foreign residence requirement of section 212 (e) of the Act. She desires to remain permanently in the United States and on June 22, 1971, filed an application for waiver of the two-year foreign residence requirement alleging that if she returned to Biafra, Nigeria, she would be subject to persecution because of her political activity in the United States in behalf of the Biafran cause during the recent civil war in Nigeria.

Section 212(e), in pertient part, states that upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of State, pursuant to the request of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, after he has determined that the alien cannot return to the country of his nationality or last residence because he would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion, the Attorney General may waive the requirement of such two-year foreign residence abroad in the case of an alien whose admission to the United States is found by the Attorney General to be in the public interest.

She alleges that while in school she participated in fund-raising campaigns in behalf of Biafra and spoke to church groups and school groups and appeared on television in behalf of the Biafran cause. She alleges that these activities are known to the present government in control of Nigeria and that if she returns she will be subject to persecution in that, as an Ibo who supported the Biafran revolt, she may be jailed as other Biafran supporters have been, she will be unable to obtain employment, will be denied medical aid, be not permitted to live in any large city, and forced to live in the "bush." She also alleges that the bank accounts of all Ibos have been frozen and that Ibos are forced to live in poverty. In support of these allegations, she has presented letters from relatives and friends claiming to have a knowledge of conditions in Nigeria..

The civil war in Nigeria ended in January 1970 and Biafra is again within the folds of the recognized Nigerian government. The State Department has advised that "In January, 1970, at the conclusion of the war, the Federal Military Government declared a general amnesty, invited Nigerians living abroad to return, and announced a policy of reconciliation and reintegration of Nigerians (mostly Ibos) who had supported the secession. This policy has the support of the State Governments as well. There has been