of the Service investigator by cross-examining him with respect to promotions he had earned while in Government service from 1957 to 1971. When asked by the special inquiry officer whether he was insinuating that the investigator had received a promotion by reason of his actions in the respondent's case, counsel answered in the negative (Tr. p. 50). Counsel was evidently trying to impeach the investigator's testimony by showing the existence of certain factual propositions, the truth of which he wished to establish solely on the basis of the answers he sought to elicit from the witness on cross-examination. These propositions apparently were the following: (1) unacceptable methods of investigation are prevalent in the Service, (2) the investigator had received rapid advancement, (3) therefore, he must have completed a large number of investigations, and (4) he could only have done so by using such unacceptable methods of investigation..

The special inquiry officer sustained the trial attorney's objection to the relevancy of such questioning. As he said, "I think your insinuation is without foundation . . . an insult to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and an insult to honesty in government." We agree and approve the determination of the special inquiry officer to restrict cross-examination in this way. As the special inquiry officer stated, there was no foundation laid for such questioning. In addition, we accept the rule that the trier of fact may limit cross-examination by questions which assume facts not in evidence, Skogen v. Dow Chemical Company, 375 F.2d 692 (8 Cir., 1967). Also, cross-examination generally should be limited to matters embraced in the examination in chief, Young Ah Chor v. Dulles, 270 F.2d 338 (9 Cir., 1959). Finally, an irrelevant question with an opprobrious innuendo should not be asked a witness on cross-examination, Martin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. 193 F.2d 645 (5 Cir., 1952).

At oral argument the respondent's present counsel renewed the objection to the admission of her prehearing sworn statement. Even though the respondent was not permitted to testify at oral argument, as we mentioned above, her counsel made the following argument: "I know it from my own knowledge, they intimidate witnesses, they do illegal searches and seizures . . . they do not advise the alien of their rights to have an attorney." Counsel was, in effect, trying to pursue the line of inquiry which the previous counsel had been prevented from going into by the special inquiry officer's restriction of cross-examination. In addition, counsel referred to what he characterized as "a clique of Negro investiga

tors at the New York Office whom I have now called the Black Gestapo."

With these remarks counsel went beyond a mere attempt to impeach the testimony of one Service investigator in connection with one case, but he impugned the integrity of a large number of public servants. The charges leveled by counsel against the Service remind us of Matter of Geronimo, Interim Decision No. 2077 (BIA, 1971), wherein we said the following in connection with unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct appearing in the notice of appeal: "Grave charges such as these... based on matters outside the administrative record, should not be casually asserted in an unsworn allegation if they are seriously urged. The facts should be specified under oath, subject to the penalties of perjury. If not seriously urged, such charges should not be asserted at all." Just as we strongly disapproved of similar reckless charges in Matter of Geronimo, supra, we feel we must criticize counsel in the present case for making his blanket allegation of official misconduct at oral argument. If counsel believes the order before us on appeal is the product of official misconduct, he should be prepared to substantiate his claim by specifications under oath in support of a motion to reopen the proceedings.

The special inquiry officer denied the respondent voluntary departure as a matter of administrative discretion. We believe this determination also was sound. Hence, the appeal will be dismissed and the following order will be entered. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

MATTER OF CHEUNG

In Deportation Proceedings

A-15171770

Decided by Board November 30, 1971

Where respondent, after stating his name and that he understood the charge brought against him, refused to testify at his deportation hearing, deportability under section 241 (a) (2), Immigration and Nationality Act, is established by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence on the basis of (a) the identity of names of respondent and of the crewman who is the subject of documents which were in possession of the Service before respondent's apprehension (seaman's Identity Book, Arrival Manifest (Form I-418), and the carrier's report of the desertion of a crewman), and (b) the failure of respondent to show that the documents do not relate to him.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2)]—Nonimmigrant crewman-remained longer.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

Peter Zimmerman, Esquire

100 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:

Irving A. Appleman
Appellate Trial Attorney

Respondent appeals from the special inquiry officer's order requiring his deportation. The appeal will be dismissed. Voluntary departure will be granted.

The facts have been fully stated by the special inquiry officer. Respondent refused to testify on the advice of counsel. He did not claim his answers would incriminate him. He did state he is Cheung-Shui and that he understood the charge brought against him (pp. 1-3). Counsel contends that the order of deportation is based on documents the Service obtained by the illegal arrest and search of the respondent. In finding respondent deportable, we rely solely upon evidence which was in possession of the Service before the respondent's arrest which occurred on or about June 5, 1970.

At the deportation hearing, the Service introduced in evidence a certified copy of a page of an arrival manifest (Form I-418) showing the arrival of the carrier "Athelknight" at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on February 11, 1970. Listed among the crew of the vessel is one Cheung Shui, a Chinese national bearing passport No. 68774. He is shown to have been admitted as "D-1" (admitted with a conditional landing permit as an alien crewman). Part of the same exhibit is a report concerning the desertion of a crewman. The report, dated February 13, 1970, was made by the vessel's agent to the Service. This report shows the desertion of Cheung Shui, a native and national of China who had been issued Identity Book No. 68774. The report shows the book was in the possession of the Immigration Service at Philadelphia (Ex. 5).

The Service also produced Identity Book No. 68774 in the name of Cheung Shui. It bears a photograph which the special inquiry officer stated was a good likeness of the respondent. From it, the special inquiry officer read into the record information showing that Cheung Shui was born at Po On, Kwang Tung Province, China on September 4, 1914 (p. 4).

The evidence we have set forth comes from official and required Service records or is otherwise competent. The arrival manifest (Form I-418) must be submitted by the master or agent of the vessel to the immigration officer at the point of first arrival, 8 CFR 251.1(a). The immigration officer who examines the crewmen listed on the manifest must show what action he took on the applications for admission of the crewmen listed. To show that he granted an alien crewman a conditional landing permit as a crewman he must use the symbol "D-1", 8 CFR 251.1 (d). Such an authorization to land can be granted only if the crewman's passport is surrendered for safekeeping to the master of the arriving vessel, 8 CFR 252.1(d).1

As soon as the master or agent of the vessel discovers that an alien crewman has illegally landed or deserted he must write to the immigration officer in charge of the port where the act occurred, giving him "the name, nationality, passport number" and other details concerning the crewman and "any other information and documents which might aid in his apprenenshion, including any passports surrendered pursuant to" 8 CFR 252.1 (d), 8 CFR 251.2.

Thus, competent evidence in the possession of the Service before respondent's apprehension establishes that Cheung Shui, a

1 The crewman is admitted for a period not exceeding 29 days, 8 CFR 252.1(d).

Chinese native and national, was admitted to the United States as a crewman and deserted, Au Chiu Pang v. INS, 368 F.2d 637 (3 Cir., 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 1037 sustaining Matter of Pang, 12 I. & N. Dec. 489 (BIA, 1966); Valeros v. INS, 387 F.2d 921 (7 Cir., 1967); Williams v. Mulcahey, 250 F.2d 127 (6 Cir., 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 946 (1958), affirming Williams v. Butterfield, 145 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich., 1956); Vlisidis v. Holland, 245 F.2d 812 (3 Cir., 1957); Coelho v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir., 1957); Doto v. United States, 223 F.2d 309, 310 (D.C. Cir., 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 847 (1955); United States v. Klissas, 218 F. Supp. 880, 883-884 (D.C. Md., 1963); Da Silva Pereira v. Murff, 169 F. Supp. 81 (D.C. N.Y., 1958); and Goncalves-Rosa v. Shaughnessy, 151 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. N.Y., 1957).

Do these documents relate to respondent? We find they do. The identity of names of the respondent and the crewman who is the subject of the evidence we have discussed and the failure of respondent to show that the records do not relate to him, although he had the opportunity to do so, permit the inference that the records relate to him, Valeros v. INS, supra; Au Chiu Pang v. INS, supra; Vlisidis v. Holland, supra; Da Silva Pereira v. Murff, supra. Moreover, we note the special inquiry officer stated that the photograph in the passport surrendered by the deserting crewman is a good likeness of the respondent. Finally, although it is unnecessary to rely upon the fact, we point out that respondent's failure to testify without having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination is corroboration of the relation of the Service evidence, Valeros v. INS, supra; Au Chiu Pang v. INS, supra; Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183, 185 (3 Cir., 1956); U.S. ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33, 39 (7 Cir., 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 964 (1955). The documents set forth, all in the possession of the Government before the respondent was placed under proceedings, are clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence of the validity of the Service charge. Deportability is clearly established.

Since we have utilitzed only evidence already in the Service's possession before the apprehension of the respondent, and since that evidence is clearly competent and standing alone establishes deportability, we deem it unnecessary to discuss counsel's contentions that the Service illegally arrested respondent and illegally seized documents from him. Nor is it necessary to discuss counsel's contention, in his memorandum of November 5, 1971, as to where the burden of proof lies when a motion to suppress is filed, Valeros v. INS, supra; Au Chiu Pang v. INS, supra; Medeiros v.