have the duty to support and to assist their parents. Neither the parents nor the children shall maltreat or desert one another. The foregoing provision also applies to Foster-parents and Foster-children. Infanticide by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly prohibited. Petitioner urges us to accept the term "adoption" as within the meaning of "foster parents" and "foster children." Assuming arguendo that the provision quoted above recognizes that the institution of adoption, standing alone, it does not serve to detail a procedure regarding the manner in which adoptions may be effected. The absence of any specific procedure bears upon the kind of proof required under our immigration laws to establish a valid adoption. Under 8 CFR 204.2 (c) (7), to support a visa petition on behalf of an adopted child, a certified copy of the adoption decree must accompany the petition." The only evidence before us bearing on adoption is petitioner's own word that the child was adopted by her. Whether this "adoption" was or is recognized by the Chinese authorities on the mainland of China as creating rights and obligations between petitioner and the beneficiary analogous to those between a natural parent and its child has not been demonstrated. Furthermore, while Article 13 of the Marriage Law refers to "foster children," we are not persuaded that "adopted children" are included within that term. The term "foster" as it refers to parent-child relationship has been defined to mean affording, receiving or sharing nourishment or sustenance although not related by blood or ties of nature or the like. In re Norman's Estate, 209 Minn. 19, 295 N.W. 63 (1940). The mere taking of a child into a family and treating it as a natural offspring without complying with formal procedures as prescribed by law is not an adoption. Succession of D'Asaro, 167 So. 2d 391 (1964); Stellmah v. Henderdon Coop G.L.F. Service, 47 N.J. 163, 219 A. 2d 616 (1966). In Steelmah v. Henderdon Coop, supra, the court discussed the meaning of adoption in a proceeding to obtain workman's compensation death benefits for a child who was allegedly adopted in Quebec, Canada. The court in interpreting the New Jersey Adop 3 Concerning adoptions effected under the Chinese Civil Code, this Board has required, in accordance with Article 1079 of that Code, a writing as proof of adoption unless the person adopted has been brought up as a child of the adopter since infancy. The adoptive parents must have brought up the child intending to adopt it. The mere fact of bringing up the child is not sufficient. Matter of Chan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 219 (BIA, 1965). tion Act as it applied to workman's compensation cases observed at page 621: Adoption was unknown to the common law although it was commonly practiced and regulated under the Civil Law of both ancient Greece and Rome. The first total regulation of the process was found in the Justinian Code from which our modern legislation derives its principles. Under this code, once the prescribed formalities were met, the adopted person was entitled to inherit from the adopted father both testate and intestate and there was created the relation of paternity and filiation not before legally recognized. . . . Our Adoption Act [N.J.S.A. 9:3-17] seeks to accomplish these same goals of succession, paternity and filiation by prescribing certain procedures to be met before the relationship of parent and child can be established. ** The full meaning of the concept is conveyed by the term "adopted" alone, for the mere taking of a child into a family and treating it as a natural offspring without complying with formal procedures prescribed by law, is not an adoption. In our opinion Article 13 merely imposes on foster parents and foster children certain obligations which parents and their children have, but it does not thereby create a relationship equivalent to adoption. We conclude that the petitioner has not borne the burden of establishing that a legal adoption within the meaning of section 101 (b) (1) (E) has been effected, and we dismiss this appeal. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. MATTER OF YIU In Visa Petition Proceedings A-19182846 Decided by Board November 19, 1970 Beneficiary, who was born in Hong Kong in 1940 (the daughter of a female servant who resided in petitioner's household), and whose care and custody were vested in petitioner in Hong Kong upon the death of beneficiary's mother in 1949, was not validly adopted by petitioner since the governing Chinese law and custom permits adoption only for purposes of family succession and is limited to males; further, adoption of strangers is allowed only when a person has exhausted all his kindred, and even then the adopted child must be of the same surname. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Arlin W. Hargreaves, Esquire San Francisco, California 94111 Petitioner appeals from a decision of the District Director denying this petition filed to accord the beneficiary status as the adopted daughter of a United States citizen. For reasons to be mentioned herein, we order this appeal dismissed. Petitioner, a native of Hong Kong, claims that in 1949 she adopted the beneficiary, who was born in Hong Kong on February 15, 1940. The beneficiary was the daughter of a female servant who resided in petitioner's household and when the servant died in 1949, petitioner commenced carrying for the child. The record discloses that, following her mother's decease in 1949, the beneficiary, under section 31(2) of the Hong Kong Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, became a ward of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Care and custody of the beneficiary were vested in the petitioner. In denying the visa petition, the District Director concluded that this was not a valid adoption under Article 1079 of the Chinese Civil Code inasmuch as the adoption was not in writing. He further stated that "Chinese customary law and Article 1079 of the Chinese Civil Code require that an adopted person assume the surname of the adopter. None of these conditions have been met." Petitioner argues on appeal that Article 1079 of the Chinese Civil Code does not govern here since it is not the personal law of Chinese domiciled in Hong Kong. She has presnted a memorandum on Chinese law and custom written by a barrister, Anthony Dicks, dated February 14, 1967 concerning the adoption of one Cyril Noel Bagalawis in Hong Kong. Therein the writer states that Chinese law and custom prevail in Hong Kong to Chinese domiciled there. We agree. The Chinese Civil Code which was in force on the Chinese mainland from 1930 to 1950 cannot be considered the personal law of the petitioner or of the beneficiary, for they were not born in China and were not domiciled in China. Therefore, Chinese customary law as it applies in Hong Kong governs here, Matter of Wong, Interim Decision No. 1982 (BIA, 1969).1 In that connection we note that under Chinese customary law the adoption of the beneficiary, a female, would be impossible. Chinese customary law permits adoption only for purposes of succession to the family and is limited to males. Additionally, the adoption of strangers is prohibited and allowed only when a person has exhausted all his kindred. However, the adopted chld must be of the same surname. Since the beneficiary is a female and a stranger to petitioner's household, it is clear that she cannot be considered to be validly adopted under Chinese law and custom. 3 ORDER It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. 1 Another reason, indicated in the record, for the application of Chinese custom law to adoptions effected in Hong Kong stems from the fact that, in 1949, no statute governing adoptions had been enacted by the Hong Kong authorities. See Report of the Governor's Committee on Chinese Law and Custom in Hong Kong, p. 49 (Hong Kong 1948). 2 Id. at p. 200. 3 Report of the Governor's Committee on Chinese Law and Custom in Hong Kong (Extract from Report on Child Adoption and Domestic Service Among Chinese), p. 194 (Hong Kong 1948). See also Jamison, Chinese Family and Commercial Law, pp. 17-31 (China 1921). MATTER OF ZEDKOVA In Section 203 (a) (7) Proceedings A-18049736 Decided by Regional Commissioner November 23, 1970 Since the term "fled" as used in section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, may reasonably be construed to include one who has avoided, abandoned or forsaken a danger or evil, it is immaterial whether the circumstances creating refugee status occurred prior or subsequent to departure from the designated country or area. Hence, an alien who departed temporarily from Czechoslovakia prior to the Communist upheaval there in August 1968, but who because of political opinion now fears to return in view of the changed conditions in that country, is eligible for refugee classification under section 203 (a) (7) of the Act, as amended. ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: Harold G. Grimes, Representative New York, New York 10016 This matter is before the Regional Commissioner on certification for review of the District Director's determination that the applicant is eligible for refugee classification under section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. It was further concluded that she is entitled to adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, as amended. The alien is an unmarried twenty-two-year-old native and citizen of Czechoslovakia who was last admitted to the United States on April 2, 1968 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure until September 30, 1968. She was granted an extension of her temporary stay until March 30, 1969. Her request for a further extension was denied and she was given until May 23, 1969 to leave this country. In view of her refusal to return to Czechoslovakia, she was subsequently granted until May 23, 1970 to depart voluntarily from the United States. On July 7, 1970 she filed the instant application for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resi |