2 3 mal adoption. Our study of the adoption laws of Guyana persuades us that her contention is without merit. Under the Adoption of Children Ordinance, an adopter is defined as a person who has adopted a child pursuant to an adoption order.1 The procedure is clearly detailed. Under the adoption ordinance, only a specially constituted authority, the Adoption Board, has the authority to make arrangements for the adoption of a child. It is the duty of the Board to receive applications from parents, guardians and adopters in respect of the adoption of children; to make investigations concerning the adoption of children; and act as guardian ad litem. Penalty provisions are provided where persons other than the Board make arrangements for the adoption of a child.5 An adoption order is issued, upon application, by the Supreme Court or any court of summary jurisdiction. These orders are thereafter entered in the Adopted Children Register.' The ordinance further provides": A certified copy of any entry in the Adopted Children Register, if purporting to be signed by the Registrar General shall, without any further or other proof of entry, be received as evidence of the adoption to which it relates and, where the entry contains a record of the date or the country of birth of the adopted person, shall also be received as aforesaid as evidence of that date or country in all respects as if the copy were a certified entry in the Register of births. From the foregoing we conclude that the Deed Poll is not an adoption order but the natural mother's declaration that her child's name was to be changed to that of the petitioner. We cannot accept that document as evidence that all requirements of the above adoption ordinance have been met. Accordingly we conclude that the petitioner has not established a valid adoption. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 1 Ordinance No. 12 of 1955, Adoption of Children Ordinance [1955] Section 2. 2 Id. Section 3. 3 Id. Section 4(1). 4 Id. Section 5. 5 Id. Section 4 (2). 6 Id. Section 16(1). 7 Id. Section 23(1). 8 Id. Section 23 (2). MATTER OF RAULIN In Visa Petition Proceedings NYC-N-30444 Decided by Regional Commissioner October 1, 1970 Beneficiary, who, during her employment for the past 2 years as Executive Secretary to the Vice President of a Paris subsidiary of the petitioner, maintained liaison with high government officials and presidents of companies doing business with the petitioning company, possesses "specialized knowledge" which qualifies her for classification as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee under section 101 (a) (15) (L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. This matter is before the Regional Commissioner on appeal from the decision of the District Director. The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, utilization, maintenance and repair of electrical equipment of many types throughout the world. Among the types of electrical equipment manufactured and sold in international trade are computer appliance products and systems. The prospective beneficiary has been the Executive Secretary to Mr. A. E. Peltosalo, Vice President, International Information Systems Division, General Electric Company and was located in Paris where the General Electric Company through thirty subsidiary organizations merchandised its products in international trade. The duties of the prospective beneficiary in her employment in Paris required that she maintain liaison with high government officials and the presidents of companies who are the customers of the General Electric Company in a great many locations. She also provided, through consultations with Mr. Peltosalo, information concerning protocol matters with foreign customers; implementation for his decisions through memorandum; status reports on activities of his office; independent communication with customers and government officials to resolve problems and to develop information for him; supervision for the Vice President's office and she also responded to correspondence and inquiries which did not require his attention. By a recent agreement between the General Electric Company and Honeywell, Inc., the General Electric Company sold, effective October 1, 1970, its subsidiary to which the prospective beneficiary has been assigned during the past two years. The General Electric Company, however, retained portions of the business activities and operations formally conducted by its Paris subsidiaries and in an announcement on September 24, 1970 advised that it intended to expand internationally its Information Processing Network Service which is now being developed in the United States. The many complicated international problems associated with these transitions are under the direct responsibility of Mr. H. W. Paige for whom the services of the beneficiary are desired. Prior to this time, such specialized knowledge as the beneficiary possesses was available through the General Electric Company's Paris subsidiary. Since this arrangement will no longer exist, it is essential to provide this same competence during the transition period by having the beneficiary work directly in support of the senior executive. The duties of the prospective beneficiary in the position identified in this petition, for which she will be paid an annual salary of $11,000, will require her involvement and participation in the actual transfer of the Information Systems which are the subject of this agreement between the General Electric Company and Honeywell, Inc. It is estimated that this activity may extend over a period of up to three years. The continued operations and corporate technological resources activities of the remaining domestic and international information systems will be the second field of activity in which the prospective beneficiary will be of service to the senior Vice President. She will, from the knowledge and experience acquired from her prior employment in th international activities of her Paris employer, provide background knowledge and liaison information to the new Vice President in the areas of activity in which he is not familiar. She will also perform many of the activities which she previously conducted from her former Paris employer. From all of the evidence on record including that submitted in connection with the appeal, it is concluded that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge which establishes her eligibility for the status requested by the petitioner. It is ordered that this appeal be and the same is hereby sustained. It is further ordered that this petition be and the same is hereby approved. MATTER OF YEE In Visa Petition Proceedings A-19169736 Decided by Board November 5, 1970 Petitioner's alleged adoption of beneficiary in China in 1952 when latter was 4 years of age has not been established for immigration purposes since no adoption papers were presented nor adoption procedure or formalities followed, all previous Chinese laws and decrees regarding adoption were abolished when the Chinese Communist Government seized control in 1950, and further, Article 13 of the Communist Chinese Marriage Law pertaining to foster parents and foster children does not create a relationship equivalent to adoption. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Joseph P. Fallon, Esquire 30 Hotaling Place San Francisco, California 94111 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Irving A. Appleman Petitioner, a native of China and a permanent resident of the United States, appeals the decision of the District Director denying this visa petition filed to accord the beneficiary classification as the unmarried adopted son of a permanent resident alien. The appeal will be dismissed. In her visa petition, petitioner states that the beneficiary, also a native and citizen of China, who was born on December 20, 1948 in Kwangtung Province, China, was adopted by her in 1952 with the consent of her husband, who was then residing in the Philippines. The record reflects that when petitioner applied for an immigrant visa in 1967 she indicated on her visa application that she had a daughter and an adopted son, the beneficiary. Petitioner, in an interview, stated she adopted the beneficiary in China when he was four years of age; that the beneficiary's natural parents came from a neighboring village; that no adoption paper was executed and no milk money was paid. The District Director noted, relying on an opinion from the Secretary for Home Affairs of the Colony of Hong Kong, that the Communist Chinese regime, in power at the time of the alleged adoption, had not promulgated any statute or regulation prescribing the formalities for adoptions. He concluded that in the absence of a legal statutory pronouncement regarding adoption on the mainland of China since May 1, 1950, it was impossible to fulfill the requirements for adoption as set forth in Matter of Fong, 10 I. & N. Dec. 497 (1964).1 Petitioner on appeal contends that, although no specific procedure exists under Communist law concerning adoptions, the institution of adoption has been preserved through Chinese customary law. We disagree. A memorandum from the Library of Congress, Far Eastern Law Division, of record, indicates that when the Chinese Communist Government seized the mainland of China in 1950, it decreed that: All laws, decrees and judicial systems of Kuomintang reactionary government which oppress the people shall be abolished. Laws and decrees protecting the people shall be enacted and the people's judicial system shall be set up.2 The memorandum observes that after almost 19 years of existence, Communist China has failed to promulgate a civil code, criminal code, or code of civil procedure and as a result, no code of adoption, normally included within the civil code, has been enacted. There is no indication from the source material before us that Communist China, in suspending the Civil Code, intended to revert to Chinese custom and practice. In any event petitioner, in discharging the burden imposed upon her under the immigration law, would be required to establish that Chinese customary law prevailed on the Chinese mainland at the time of the alleged adoption. She has not met that burden. Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the suspension of the Chinese Civil Code, the institution of adoption has been preserved. She relies on Article 13 of the Communist Chinese Marriage Law which provides: Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the children 1 In Matter of Fong, this Board observed: By statute, in most jurisdictions, but not at common law, a person may adopt a child; and in such a case, unless there are statutory provisions to the contrary, the rights, duties and obligations arising from the artificial relationship will be substantially the same as those arising from the natural relation of parent and child. Where the artificial relation of parent and child is created by adoption under the statute, the relationship will by the express provisions of the statute, and even independently of such provisions, give rise to substantially the same rights, duties, and liabilities as arise out of the national relationship. 2 Chung yang jen min cheng fu fa ling hui pien, 1949-1950 [Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Central People's Government, 1949-1950], Peking, 1952, p. 19. |