immigrant status as a marketing executive under section 203 (a) (6) of the Act, as amended. The District Director denied the instant petition on the ground that the petitioning firm seeks the services of the beneficiary on a permanent basis and, therefore, the latter cannot be regarded as coming to the United States temporarily for the purpose of classification under section 101 (a) (15) (L) of the Act. On appeal, the petitioner has asserted in pertinent part: In Item No. 7 on our petition form, we put in the word "permanent" as the "period required to completed services or training". This was done, actually, to conform the "L" petition to the 6th preference petition previously submitted by us (File No. A18 694 173). Ironically, we had originally filed a 6th preference petition for Mr. Bocris only because under the law existing at that time there was no "L" petition; and we had been informed that even though Mr. Bocris might not be coming to fill our position permanently, the law required us to proceed via 6th preference petition, since the position itself was not of a "temporary” nature (and thus did not come within Section 101(a) (15) (H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act). Our firm structure is, in fact, a somewhat mobile one with respect to talented managerial and executive employees, and it would surprise us if Mr. Bocris were still after four years only the Manager of Marketing for our Far Eastern operations. The petitioner has further stated that the alien's previous experience has been national, rather than international in scope; that he is being brought to the United States for orientation with regard to the firm's international operations, particularly their Far Eastern market; that it is anticipated such orientation program would take approximately six months. The entire record in this case has been very carefully considered in the light of the representations made on appeal. Section 101 (a) (15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by Public Law 91-225 dated April 7, 1970, provides in part for the following additional nonimmigrant category: (L) an alien who, immediately preceding the time of his application for admission into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge, and the alien spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or following to join him. The legislative history of such amendment discloses that the above provision was intended to help eliminate problems faced by American companies having offices abroad in transferring key personnel freely within the organization; that, previously, international executives coming for temporary assignments have been forced to apply for immigrant visas and qualify as permanent resident aliens; that the class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas has been narrowly drawn and it is anticipated that their number will not be very large; that the stay under an "L" visa should not exceed three years, although bona fide requests for extension beyond such time as well as applications for adjustment for permanent residence would be considered. (House Report (Committee on the Judiciary), No. 91-351, February 24, 1970 (To accompany S.2593)). In the matter at hand, it has been satisfactorily established that the beneficiary immediately preceding the filing of this petition has been employed for more than one year abroad as an executive of the petitioner's French affiliate, whose transfer to the United States is being sought, for employment as an executive, on a temporary basis. We find, therefore, that he meets the requirements for classification as an intra-company transferee under section 101 (a) (15) (L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. Accordingly, this appeal will be sustained. It is ordered that the decision of the District Director be reversed and that the petition be approved. MATTER OF GOUVEIA In Visa Petition Proceedings A-17869843 Decided by Board August 7, 1970 Under the law of Guyana, acknowledgment or recognition alone of an illegitimate child by the putative father does not result in legitimation of such child; legitimation of a child born out of wedlock requires the marriage of the natural parents. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER Norman D. Archer, Esquire The petitioner appeals the decision of the District Director denying this petition filed to accord the beneficiary immediate relative status as the child of a United States citizen. The District Director concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that he married the beneficiary's mother or otherwise legitimated the beneficiary in accordance with the provisions of section 101 (b) (1) (C). We concur with that determination. The petitioner, a native of British Guiana, asserts that the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Guyana was born on September 9, 1960 in Georgetown, Guyana. The petitioner concedes he never married the beneficiary's mother. In the beneficiary's birth certificate presented in support of this petition, the petitioner is registered as the beneficiary's father. The petitioner contends on appeal that, under the laws and Special Executive Regulations of Guyana, a child once given the father's name and taken care of by the father is considered a legitimate child. We disagree. Section 3 (1) of the Legitimacy Ordinance of British Guiana,1 provides in pertinent part: 1 Volume IV, The Laws of British Guiana, Chapter 165 (May 14, 1932). Under the Guyana Independence Act of 1966, all laws in force as part of the law of British Guiana shall continue to have effect as part of the law of Guyana. Subject to the provisions of this section where the parents of an illegitimate person marry or have married one another, whether before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, the marriage did or shall, if the father of the illegitimate person was or is at the date of the marriage domiciled in British Guiana, render that person, if he is or was living, legitimate from the date of marriage. We have reviewed the Registration of Births and Deaths Ordinance 2 and find no section providing for the legitimation of a child by the mere registration of the father's name. Section 31 of that ordinance relating to the entry of the name of the person as father of the illegitimate child provides; No registrar who receives information of the birth of an illegitimate child shall enter in the register of births the name of anyone as the father of that child except at the joint request of the mother, and of the person who acknowledges himself to be the father, and the person shall in that case sign the register together with the mother. The above, while dealing with the acknowledgment of a child by the putative father, does not confer legitimate status of a child born out of wedlock. The mere fact that the petitioner's name appears on the beneficiary's birth certificate is not legitimation. We conclude that, under the laws of Guyana, the legitimation of the beneficiary required the marriage of the petitioner and the beneficiary's mother, Matter of J—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 246 (1961). We therefore affirm the District Director's order. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 1 Registration of Births and Deaths Ordinance of October 1, 1968, IV Laws of British Guiana, C. 162, Section 31. MATTER OF ORTEGA In Exclusion Proceedings A-19173112 Decided by Board August 19, 1970 Notwithstanding presentation of a third preference immigrant visa supported by a labor certification based upon a B.S. degree in animal husbandry, an alien who upon arrival in the United States had no intention of working in the field of animal husbandry, or reasonable prospects of doing so, is excludable under section 212 (a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, for lack of a valid labor certification. EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952-Section 212(a) (14) [8 U.S.C. 1182]-Immigrant, no valid labor certification. ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: Gerald L. McVey, Esquire 30 Hotaling Place ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: San Francisco, California 94111 (Brief submitted) Trial Attorney The record relates to a 30-year-old single male alien, a native and national of the Republic of the Philippines, who applied for admission into the United States for permanent residence on April 5, 1969. He presented an immigrant visa supported by a certification from the Secretary of Labor. The latter document showed that the applicant was destined to the United States for employment as an animal scientist; that there were not sufficient such United States workers available; and that his employment in said field would not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. The applicant told the examining immigration officer that he had no intention of working in the field of animal husbandry, but intended to work as a real estate salesman. Accordingly, his case was referred for an exclusion hearing before a special inquiry officer who, on April 16, 1969, ordered him excluded and deported from the United States on the above-stated ground. |