ities. Following our adverse decision on the appeal, respondent, through her counsel, filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On July 21, 1968, respondent's plea of guilty was changed to that of not guilty and the information was dismissed pursuant to section 176.225 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The purpose of the instant motion to reconsider is to raise the issue of whether the court order removes the conviction of respondent as the basis of deportation. The Service has filed a reply brief in which it states that the Petition and Order for Honorable Discharge from Probation attached to the motion is evidence of an expungement and does not wipe out respondent's conviction for the possession of marijuana. The Service characterizes the Nevada statute cited above as being similar to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code providing for expungements.1 The sole question we are called upon to decide is whether or not the action of the Nevada Court dismissing the information against the respondent has the effect of removing the basis of her deportation under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. A review of the Nevada law and examination of the evidence presented in connection with the motion to reconsider compels us to conclude that the basis of deportation is not removed. 1 Section 176.225 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, reads as follows: 1. Every defendant who: (a) Has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof; or (b) Is recommended for earlier discharge by the chief parole and probation officer; or (c) Has demonstrated his fitness for honorable discharge but because of economic hardship, verified by a parole and probation officer, has been unable to make restitution as ordered by the court, may at any time thereafter be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court may set aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case, the court shall thereupon dismiss the indictment or information against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted. 2. The probationer shall be informed of this privilege in his probation papers. 3. The probationer may make such application and change of plea in person or by attorney authorized in writing, or by a parole and probation officer authorized in writing; but in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant for any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the indictment or information had not been dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.) We have previously held in Matter A-F—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (1959), that expungement under the California Penal Code of a narcotics conviction did eliminate the ground of deportation under section 241 (a) (11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Attorney General reversed our conclusion, stating that expungement has no effect on deportability arising under section 241(a) (11). The Attorney General restated his position again in Matter of G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 159 (1961) and more recently in Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I. & N. Dec. 576. We have reviewed the Nevada statute cited herein and find that it conforms to the California Penal Statute on expungements. Consequently, our above rulings stating that an expungement of a narcotics conviction does not remove the basis for deportation are applicable to the instant matter and we affirm our prior holding that the respondent is deportable on the charge contained in the order to show cause. ORDER: It is ordered that the decision finding the respondent deportable to France under section 241 (a) (11) be hereby affirmed. MATTER OF ALBANO In Deportation Proceedings A-17457739 Decided by Board Nevember 15, 1968 Since under 8 CFR 244.1 and 244.2 the authority of a special inquiry officer to specify a voluntary departure date exists only "when first authorizing voluntary departure," the special inquiry officer's denial of a motion to reopen to fix a new voluntary departure date for respondent was proper, a voluntary departure date having been specified by him when he initially granted respondent voluntary departure. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241 (a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2)]—Nonimmigrant visitor, remained longer. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Julian Soshnick, Esquire 185 Devonshire Street Boston, Mass. 02110 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Respondent is a native and citizen of Portugal who entered the United States on March 18, 1966, as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. She was authorized to remain until April 30, 1967. Subsequently, deportation proceedings arose under section 241 (a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. At the hearing on April 25, 1968, the respondent was granted voluntary departure, in lieu of deportation. The order granting her voluntary departure was to be effective on May 25, 1968. Subsequently, the respondent contracted tuberculosis and became hospitalized, making it impossible for her to depart on the day designated. Respondent's counsel then presented a motion to the special inquiry officer requesting that he vacate and set aside his previous order and reopen proceedings to set October 24, 1968, as the new voluntary departure date. The special inquiry officer denied the motion on the ground that under 8 CFR 244.1 and 244.2, he was prohibited from extending the date of voluntary departure initially set. On appeal counsel for respondent argues that the special inquiry officer made an erroneous interpretation of the regulations and that vacating an original order and substituting a new one does not constitute extending a departure date within the meaning of 8 CFR 244.2. As cited by the special inquiry officer, 8 CFR 244.1 authorizes a special inquiry officer to specify a departure date only "when first authorizing voluntary depatrure." Counsel's request to vacate the special inquiry officer's original order relates only to the departure date and not to the original grant of voluntary departure. Since the special inquiry officer is restricted to authorizing a date of departure only when he initially grants voluntary departure, counsel's motion, if granted, would in effect give the special inquiry officer a power that was not given to him in the cited regulations. Finally, we do not see what purpose would be served in reopening proceedings to permit the introduction of medical evidence concerning the respondent. This would not have any bearing on the issue of voluntary departure, which in our opinion is the maximum relief to which the respondent is entitled. ORDER: The appeal from the decision of the special inquiry officer is dismissed. MATTER OF CRUZ In Visa Petition Proceedings A-18499217 Decided by Regional Commissioner November 26, 1968 Since a Master's degree, obtained upon successful completion of two years of specialized study and supervised field work, is required for entry in most fields of social work, petitioner/beneficiary, who has only a Bachelor of Science degree in social work awarded in 1967 and whose only employment thereafter has been as a temporary worker of a tuberculosis society with duties involving delivery of fund solicitation letters and follow up of same, has not established that she possesses the high level of training and experience required to qualify as a member of the professions as a social worker within the meaning of sections 101(a)(32) and 203(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.* This case comes forward on appeal from the decision of the District Director, who on October 17, 1968 denied the petition in that the petitioner has failed to establish that she is a qualified member of the professions. The petitioner is a 21-year-old unmarried citizen and resident of the Philippines. She was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in social work in 1967 by the University of Santo Tomas and thereafter worked in that country as a temporary liaison worker for a private institution. She now seeks in her own behalf classification as a member of the professions under section 203 (a) (3) of the Act, as amended, based upon her stated profession or occupation as a social worker. Section 101 (a) (32) of the Act, as amended, defines the term "profession" as including but not being limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons and teachers. An examination of the occupations listed in section 101 (a) (32) of the Act indicates that in a general a person may be considered a member of the professions if, as a minimum, he has been awarded a baccalaureate degree following the successful comple * See Matter of Reyes, Interim Decision No. 2009. |