MATTER OF CAMPBELL In Visa Petition Proceedings A-17642157 Decided by Board April 17, 1970 Petition to accord beneficiary fifth preference classification as the stepsister of petitioner is denied, since petitioner and beneficiary, who do not have a natural parent in common, are not sisters of the whole or half blood and, therefore, do not come within the purview of section 203 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Pro se ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: This matter presents an appeal from a decision of the District Director denying a visa petition filed by petitioner to accord the beneficiary status as a stepsister under section 203 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the ground that petitioner and beneficiary do not have a common parent. The question raised in this appeal is whether, in the absence of any definition of the term "brother and sister" for purposes of section 203 (a) (5), Congress intended to grant fifth preference classification in cases, such as the instant, where a petitioner and beneficiary do not have a parent in common. Our study of this issue persuades us that stepbrothers and stepsisters cannot be included within the term "brothers and sisters" as it applies in section. 203 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and we therefore affirm the District Director's decision. The petitioner, native of England, born October 11, 1926, is a naturalized citizen of the United States. Petitioner's birth certificate shows that she was born to one Eileen Wallace and R. Wallace. The beneficiary is a native of Dublin, Ireland and her birth certificate shows that she was born to Kathleen Mary Campbell and Alfred William Stewart Campbell on May 18, 1935. A marriage certificate presented by petitioner shows that petitioner's father, a widower, and beneficiary's mother, a widow, were married on May 19, 1945. We agree with the District Director that the term "brother and sister" for purposes of section 203 (a) (5) does not include relationships such as the instant, where there is no parent common to both petitioner and the beneficiary. While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not specifically define the term "brother and sister," we find ample illustration for our holding that the term applies only to consanguineous relationships. The term "brother and sister" under the provision of National Service Life Insurance Act designating permissible beneficiaries has been construed in its plain, ordinary and popular sense as including only brothers and sisters by the whole blood and by the half blood, Woodward v. United States, 167 F.2d 774 (8 Cir., 1948); Strunk v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Ky., 1948); Beach v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Ohio, 1946); Droney v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 154 (D.C., 1945). The term "step" when used as a prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, such as a stepchild or stepsister, usually denotes a relationship by affinity, one repugnant to a blood relationship.2 We have traditionally held that for purposes of preference classification the term "brother and sister" includes relationships by the whole blood and by the half blood, where the parties have one natural parent in common, Matter of De F—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 325 (BIA, 1954); Matter of C—, 6 I & N. Dec. 786 (BIA, 1955). In an unreported decision (Matter of Lewandowski, A-1214417 (June 15, 1961)), we held that the term "brother and sister" did not extend to relationships where the parties did not have a natural parent in common. In that case, the petitioner's father married the beneficiary's mother and the relationship was created through marriage only. Since Congress has not defined the term "brother and sister" for purposes of section 203 (a) (5) of the 1 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. at p. 1557, defines sister as: "A woman who has the same father and mother with another, or has one of them only; in the second, half sister." The term brother is defined therein at page 242: "One person is a brother of the whole blood to another, the former being a male, when both are born from the same father and mother. He is a brother of the 'half blood' to that other (or half brother) when the two are born to the same father by different mothers or by the same mother to different fathers." 2 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. at p. 1584: "The term 'children' has been generally held not to include 'stepchildren' where the former appears in devises or bequests, 95 C.J.S. 2d Wills, Section 654; the term 'stepchildren' has not been included within the meaning of 'children' in wrongful death statutes, 25 C.J.S. 2d Death, Section 34 (2)." Immigration and Nationality Act, we hold that the terms must be applied in their plain and ordinary meaning. The provisions of section 101 (b) (1) (B) of the Act, which define the term "child" as including a "step-child" under the conditions specified therein, obviously have no applicability here. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner and the beneficiary, related by affinity, are not sisters of the whole or half blood, and therefore do not come within the scope of section 203 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. MATTER OF THE STUYVESANT INSURANCE COMPANY In Bond Cancellation Proceedings A-18323023 Decided by Acting Regional Commissioner April 9, 1970 A maintenance of status and departure bond posted in behalf of a nonimmigrant visitor was properly breached when the alien violated the conditions of his nonimmigrant status by accepting employment during the period of his authorized admission even though he was subsequently granted adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident based on an application under section 245, Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, filed after he had violated his status. ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: Czeslaw L. Rawski, Esquire This case is before the Regional Commissioner on appeal from the District Director's decision of March 16, 1970 breaching the bond on which the appellant was the obligor. The bond in the amount of $2500 was posted on June 21, 1968 as a condition to the issuance of a nonimmigrant visitor's visa to the alien and of his admission to the United States in that status. The alien was admitted to the United States as a visitor for pleasure on October 21, 1968 until February 16, 1969. On February 4, 1969 his application for an extension of stay was approved until August 16, 1969. It is noted that he made no response to item 9 on the application concerning employment in the United States. On December 5, 1969 a petition to accord the alien sixth preference immigrant classification was approved. On February 2, 1970 he was accorded permanent resident status pursuant to section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, based on an application filed April 30, 1969. By the terms of the bond in question the alien was required to comply with two specific conditions: that he depart from the United States on or before the date to which admitted or the date to which his stay was extended and that he accept no employment while in the United States. Upon failure of the alien to comply with either or both of these conditions, the bond became due and payable immediately. The record contains evidence the alien accepted unauthorized employment with Clermont Tool Specialties, Franklin Park, Illinois as a jig bore and jig grinder operator on December 14, 1968 and he was still so employed on August 16, 1969. It is apparent he was aware that by so doing he violated the nonimmigrant status under which he was admitted to the United States. There can be no other reason for his failure to disclose this employment on the application for extension of stay he filed more than a month after he began working. On appeal counsel argues that the loss by forfeiture of the bond will ultimately fall on the alien and will be a great financial burden to him as his life savings are in Poland and he is starting a new life in the United States from scratch. In violating the terms of his nonimmigrant status, the alien rendered himself subject to deportation pursuant to section 241 (a) (9) of the Act. That the Service did not choose to enforce his departure, but instead granted him the privilege of remaining here permanently, speaks well for the fair and considerate treatment accorded aliens by the government of the United States. However, under the express and unambiguous terms of the bond in question, the appellant became liable, as surety, and the security was to be forfeited "in the case of any default in the performance of any of the conditions." Although we are sympathetic to counsel's plea in the alien's behalf, we find proper the District Director's decision to breach the bond. The appeal will be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. |