ent respondent, who never applied for and obtained an immigrant visa, cannot meet that test.* Respondent attempts to broaden the Errico decision by relying on several pre-Errico opinions of the Board which deal with aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who are returning to the United States after a temporary trip abroad. Such reliance is misplaced, since returning resident aliens are eligible for certain discretionary relief which is not available to an alien seeking to enter this country for the first time. Under section 211 (b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1181 (b), a returning resident alien who is otherwise admissible may be readmitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without the required documentation. Similarly, section 212 (c), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (c), provides that a returning resident alien may be readmitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to most of the grounds of exclusion specified by the Immigration and Nationality Act. In Matter of K-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 585 (1962), the Board considered the matter of a resident alien who took a two-hour trip to Canada and then reentered the United States by misrepresenting himself as a United States citizen. While the Board found that the alien was inadmissible on two separate grounds in addition to his fraud, it also found that he qualified for discretionary waivers of both of those grounds. Therefore, the Board regarded the alien as if he were applying for admission nunc pro tunc as of the time of reentry, and granted him the appropriate waivers. As a result, the Board viewed the alien as one who, apart from the inadmissibility derived from his misrepresentation as to citizenship, satisfied at the time of reentry all of our other immigration requirements for returning resident aliens. Since he was thus an "otherwise admissible" alien in the Board's view, it proceeded to invoke section 241 (f) to remove the effect of his fraud and allow his reentry.5 Such a rationale cannot be extended to cases like the instant one. An alien who has not even applied for an immigrant visa, much less been examined and granted such a visa, has satisfied none of our immigration requirements and cannot properly be treated as an "otherwise admissible" alien. Accordingly, the order of the Board dismissing the appeal of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is reversed. The case is remanded to the Board for disposition of respondent's application for suspension of deportation. 5 The Board reached a like result in Matter of Y-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 143 (1959). MATTER OF ESCALANTE In Deportation Proceedings A-18437984 A-11944377 Decided by Board April 18, 1969 In the absence of supporting evidence, as required by regulations (8 CFR 103.5), a motion to reopen deportation proceedings is denied. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(9) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (9)]—After adunder section mission as a nonimmigrant ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: 412 West Sixth Street Los Angeles, California 90014 (Brief filed) ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Sam I. Feldman Trial Attorney This is an appeal from the decision of the special inquiry officer, rendered on December 9, 1968, denying the respondents' motion to reopen proceedings. The respondents are man and wife, natives and citizens of Ecuador. The female respondent last entered the United States at Los Angeles, California on or about February 20, 1968, as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure authorized to remain until November 20, 1968. The male respondent entered the United States at Los Angeles, California on or about March 14, 1968, as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure authorized to remain until October 12, 1968. Both respondents were charged with accepting employment in the United States. Deportability is conceded and the respondents were granted the privilege of voluntary departure. Failing to depart as required, warrants of deportation were issued on December 4, 1968. The motion to reopen proceedings is grounded on the fact that the female respondent had previously entered the United States on July 20, 1959 as a permanent resident. New proceedings are requested for the purpose of applying for waivers under sections 211(b) and 212 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The motion recites that the female respondent resided in the United States from 1959 until she returned to Ecuador in 1964 to be with her ailing mother. While in Ecuador, the female respondent became ill and, as a result, her return to the United States was delayed beyond the period of time when her Form I-151 would have permitted her reentry. The Service brief in opposition to the motion to reopen concedes that the female respondent was admitted as a permanent resident on July 20, 1959. The Service brief states that the female respondent then returned to Ecuador in December 1963, and remained there until December 1966. On December 19, 1966, the American Consulate General at Guayaquil, Ecuador returned the female respondent's alien registration card (Form I-151) to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Los Angeles, California, after concluding that she had abandoned her residence. The Service argues that the female respondent, having subsequently entered the United States on December 20, 1966, and February 20, 1968 as a nonimmigrant visitor, is not entitled to the relief sought in her motion to reopen. We have reviewed the evidence of record including the briefs on appeal and conclude that the motion to reopen should be denied. As the Service notes, the regulations provide that a motion to reopen shall state new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, 8 CFR 103.5. There is no evidence to support the female respondent's motion showing that she qualifies for relief under section 211(b) or 212 (c). A mere assertion of a previous status as a permanent resident is insufficient to order these proceedings reopened for the purpose of applying for relief under sections 211(b) and 212 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The respondent is required to state additionally that she meets the statutory waiver requirement as to residence. Her motion fails to show this and, therefore, we affirm the decision of the special inquiry officer. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeals be and the same are hereby dismissed. MATTER OF LONGSWORTH In Deportation Proceedings A-12732521 Decided by Board April 24, 1969 Respondent, a native of British Honduras, is precluded by the provisions of section 244 (f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, from establishing statutory eligibility for suspension of deportation since British Honduras, a territory bordering the Caribbean Sea, is an "adjacent island" within the purview of that term as defined by section 101(b) (5) of the Act [Matter of Cadle, 10 I. & N. Dec. 40, overruled]. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241 (a) (2) [8 U.S.C. 1251 (a) (2) ]—Nonimmigrant visitor-student-remained longer. The respondent appeals from an order entered by the special inquiry officer on July 8, 1968 granting him voluntary departure in lieu of deportation as an alien who is deportable under the provisions of section 241 (a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Counsel on appeal seeks a remand of the case for consideration of the respondent's eligibility for suspension of deportation. The respondent is a native of British Honduras and a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. He arrived in the United States on November 14, 1961 as a refugee from a hurricane and was paroled. He was granted the status of a nonimmigrant visitor on December 8, 1961 at Boston, Massachusetts. His status was changed to that of a student (F-1) and on June 25, 1965, his temporary stay was extended to July 2, 1966. He has remained in the United States subsequent to July 2, 1966 and is deportable as charged in the order to show cause. Counsel, during oral argument, requested a remand of the case for consideration of the respondent's eligibility for suspension of deportation under the provisions of section 244 (a) (1). Counsel points to the fact that pursuant to the Board's decision in Matter of Cadle, 10 I. & N. Dec. 40 (1962), the respondent does not come within the proscription of section 244 (f) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We held in Cadle (supra) that British Honduras is not an "adjacent island" within the purview of section 101 (b) (5) of the Act because in fact it is not an island. As for that portion of section 101 (b) (5) which follows the 13 named countries and islands and reads "and other British, French and Netherlands territory or possessions in or bordering on the Caribbean Sea" (emphasis supplied), our decision in Cadle noted that British Honduras is surrounded by land with the exception of the northeastern and eastern boundaries which border on the Bay of Honduras or the Gulf of Honduras. Our decision in Cadle (supra) relied upon the fact that most maps show the Gulf of Honduras as the body of water on which British Honduras borders. We have before us an opinion of The Geographer, Office of Strategic and Functional Research, Department of State, dated April 3, 1969 which states, "British Honduras conforms to the geographical description of being a territory bordering the Caribbean Sea." He refers to the Gulf of Honduras as an "indefinitely labeled body of water" which "is an open embayment of the Caribbean Sea." Accordingly, we hereby overrule our decision in Matter of Cadle, 10 I. & N. Dec. 40, that British Honduras is not an "adjacent island" within the meaning of section 101 (b) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 101(b) (5)). The respondent, therefore, does come within the proscription of section 244 (f) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is ineligible for suspension of deportation as an alien who is a native of "an adjacent island named in section 101 (b) (5)" of the Act. Section 244 (f) of the Act also contains a proviso which states that the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend the deportation of an alien who is a native of an island, territory or possession in or bordering on the Caribbean Sea "if such alien establishers to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is ineligible to obtain a [special] immigrant visa." Counsel seeks a remand of the case to provide the respondent an opportunity to establish that he cannot obtain an immigration visa for the rea |