7

Response to Sputnik: The Creation of NASA

How brightly the Red Star shone before all the world in October of 1957! Streaking across the skies, steadily beeping its mysterious radio message to those on the ground, Sputnik was a source of amazement and wonder to people around the globe, most of whom had had no inkling of what was about to happen. To one nation in particular the Russian star loomed as a threat and a challenge.

In the United States many were taken aback by the intensity of the reaction. Hysteria was the term used by some writers, although that was doubtless too strong a word. Concern and apprehension were better descriptions. Especially in the matter of possible military applications there was concern, and many judged it unthinkable that the United States should allow any other power to get into a position to deny America the benefits and protection that a space capability might afford. A strong and quick response was deemed essential.

Actually, as has been seen in chapters 3 to 5, the United States was not far behind. A full decade of pioneering work had brought into being a respectable stable of rockets and missiles and still more powerful ones were under development, some of them nearing completion. Tracking and telemetering stations were operating, and a number of missile test ranges were functioning. Sizable teams of persons with capabilities pertinent to space research and engineering were available in both government and industry. And more than 10 years of sounding rocket research combined with open publication of results had given the United States a definite edge over the USSR in space science, in spite of its priority in the satellite program. Without question the United States was competitive in space even as the country deplored its loss of leadership.

Leadership was the key word. To be competitive was not enough. In an age when technology was vital to national defense, essential for solving problems of food, transportation, and health, and important to the national economy, technological leadership was an invaluable national resource not to be relinquished without a struggle. It was technological leadership that would generate a favorable balance of trade for the United

States and afford strength in international negotiations. Moreover, the appearance of leadership—while in no way equivalent to genuine technological strength in importance-nevertheless had a strong bearing on the international benefits to be won. President Eisenhower was right when he asserted that the country's position in rockets and missiles was a strong one, which the launching of a small scientific satellite by Russia could not substantively weaken, but in the mood of the times people were not disposed to listen.

One heard of a race with Russia, a topic that would be debated often in the years to come. While many would deny the necessity to run a race—and some would even contend that no race existed-for most, competition with the Soviets was serious business. Even those in a position to appreciate the strength of the U.S. position did little to bring it out, most likely because they, too, were persuaded of the importance of recapturing leadership in space, especially in view of the military implications. National leaders were worried about the obvious great size and lifting capacity of the Soviet missiles. Also, insertion of a satellite into orbit proved that the USSR had mastered the final ingredient of a successful intercontinental ballistic missile, guidance. Moreover, all this had occurred while the U.S. Atlas missile was still under development, far from deployment.

During those formative months of late 1957 and the first half of 1958 the broad spectrum of forces impacting on space matters-at once synergistic and conflicting-began to become apparent. In the face of the Soviet challenge academic, industrial, and political forces merged in a common conviction that the country must put its space house in order. The mutually reinforcing effect of these disparate interests all pushing for a properly organized, unified national space program led eventually to the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; their continued cooperation during the ensuing years produced the broad spectrum of achievements in manned exploration, science, and applications in outer space with which the world has become familiar. But the individual motivations-political objectives, commercial goals, professional aspirations-and the differing philosophical backgrounds of the industrialist, academician, legislator, administrator, soldier, scientist, and engineer set up cross currents and conflicts of varying intensity that run through the early years of NASA's history.

During the months preceding the passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, space science and potential military applications were already established areas of space activity that contended to attract the various interest groups that had or might have a stake in the nation's future in space.1 Industry gravitated toward the military, with which it already had a close and profitable association. Professional societies, the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel, the Academy of Sciences, and the President's Science Advisory Committee naturally pursued the scientific

side of the matter. It was the military implications of space, the bearing that future space developments might have upon national defense and security, that imparted a sense of urgency to the deliberations in the executive and legislative branches. Communications satellites, weather satellites, and earth observations from space for intelligence were all important to the military, the last named being of special significance in the Cold War. These considerations caught and held the attention of the legislators. But, though the military implications were deemed the primary concern of the country, circumstances elevated the scientific aspects to a position of considerable influence.

A majority of those who would finally make the decision soon became convinced that the most effective way of proving U.S. leadership in space would be to demonstrate it openly.2 Moreover, a space program conducted under wraps of military secrecy would very likely be viewed by other nations as a sinister thing, a potential threat to the peace of the world. A cardinal point in the U.S. military posture had always been that the development and maintenance of U.S. military strength was peaceful, not intended for aggression, but for self-defense and to enable the country to help maintain stability in a world in which weakness too often provided the occasion for trouble. It was an important thesis for the U.S. public to continue to believe and to sell to the rest of the world and, in a matter as portentous as space seemed to be, special efforts were needed to present the proper image. It seemed important, therefore, that the U.S. space program be open, unclassified, visibly peaceful, and conducted so as to benefit, not harm, the peoples of the world.

A logical conclusion of this reasoning was that the program should be set up under civilian auspices. Thus, although the military had by far the greatest amount of experience pertinent to conducting a space program, it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the Pentagon would be assigned the principal responsibility. To be sure, the Army, Navy, and Air Force had been among the earliest to study the usefulness of space to support their missions.3 Military hardware afforded the only existing U.S. capabilities for space operations. Moreover, the services had provided the funding and much of the manpower for the rocket-sounding program of the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel, many of whose members were civilian employees in military research laboratories, as shown in appendix A. Yet so powerful was the conviction that the program must project an image of benevolence and beneficence that the otherwise overriding military factors were themselves outweighed.

Reinforcing these views were President Eisenhower's own convictions. Already distressed over the enormous power and unmanageability of what he later called the military-industrial complex, Eisenhower was not disposed to foster further growth by adding still another very large, very costly enterprise to the Pentagon's responsibilities. Moreover, at the time the Pen

tagon did not enjoy the best of relations with Capitol Hill. One heard talk of a "missile mess" and interservice rivalry in the Pentagon. Such concerns led, during the very period when the administration and Congress were deciding America's role in space, to the appointment of a new secretary of defense, the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and passage of the Defense Reorganization Act, which among other things set up the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Such considerations, plus Eisenhower's not seeing in Sputnik the crisis for national defense that others considered it to be, predisposed him to favor a space program with a strong scientific component under civilian management.

The scientists were united in their desire to have a strong scientific component in the space program. The greatly expanded federal funding of science in the years following World War II had declined. Members of the President's Science Advisory Committee and James Killian, special assistant to the president for science and technology, saw in the space program an opportunity to renew national support of science. Under the circumstances Killian and PSAC had a considerable influence in the creation of NASA, pressing for a space program under civilian management with a strong scientific flavor.5 In this they were supported by the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel; the National Academy of Sciences, where President Detlov Bronk took a personal interest and where the Space Science Board was set up; by the American Rocket Society; and by other groups of scientists who felt impelled to speak out on the issue.6

Against this background the debate on how precisely to respond to the Soviet challenge proceeded. A deluge of proposals descended upon various congressional committees. In the Department of Defense the administration had set up the Advanced Research Projects Agency, approved by Congress in February as a temporary holding operation.' But, as pointed out, there were cogent reasons for a space program under civilian auspices-in which case provision would also have to be made to meet the vitally important military needs. Among the civilian possibilities was the creation of a new agency-which some of the scientists had recommended-but to those who knew what was involved, that was a horrendous undertaking. Alternatively one could assign the responsibility to an existing agency, or build a new agency around an existing organization as nucleus. With the application of nuclear power to rocket propulsion in mind, the Atomic Energy Commission was interested in taking on the job, as both the commissioners and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Hill made plain to members of the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel when they called to enlist support for the creation of a National Space Establishment. But, for a number of reasons, the choice finally fell on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).

The NACA would not have been the choice of most scientists. As a highly ingrown activity, the agency did not enjoy a particularly great