simply called for "the expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space"27-the science program could be permitted to unfold in keeping with the scientific process. Relying on the nation's scientists, including the National Academy of Sciences, NASA proceeded to attack the scientific problems of the atmosphere and space that the scientists themselves deemed most important and most likely to produce significant new information. The organization of the space science program, the establishment of advisory committees, the agency's funding requests, and the means by which individual scientists, universities, and other research organizations were invited to participate-all were designed to make the space science program a creature of working scientists, in the conviction that such an approach would produce the best possible program for the country.

In many ways, although it didn't always seem so to the scientists, space science occupied a favored position. As a means of diverting attention from the military overtones of the Sputnik crisis, President Eisenhower had favored a national space program with a scientific complexion. During the months of discussion on the Hill, there never arose the slightest question but that space science would be an essential element of the national space program. Long lists of scientists were called as witnesses, or their opinions. sought by letter as to what to do. The importance of science to the program and the importance of a civilian arena for science, plus the international character of science, contributed to the argument for placing the space program in the hands of a civilian agency. Reinforcing such considerations in the minds of congressmen and senators was the image of success science had acquired in the International Geophysical Year that had brought forth the Sputnik challenge.

Of course, the freedom that the first administrator of NASA enjoyed in developing the civilian space program had also been accorded the military services in pursuing military interests in space. As already mentioned, it was the military potential of space that aroused the concern and held the attention of many legislators, and that virtually guaranteed a formally designated national space program. But the broad overlap of common interests that had stymied the legislators in their efforts to effect a satisfactory division between the civilian and the military in the first place was a potential source of conflict between the new agency and the military services. Such conflict the National Aeronautics and Space Council and especially the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, called for in the NASA Act, were intended to handle.

Another feature of the NASA Act that was of importance to space science was the provision of a single responsible head for the agency. Under the pressure of a national clamor to close the gap with the Russians in space a pressure continually reinforced by the urging of Congress to get on with the task-NASA had its best chance to break away from the con

servatism that had characterized its predecessor. To continue the old NACA structure, as NACA officials had urged, with an advisory board determining policy and shielding the director from many of these outside pressures, might well have had a greater impact on science than on other aspects of the space program. Boards and committees tend to be conservative. Paradoxically, scientists as a class are quite conservative. As a group they would doubtless have been content to move more slowly, more cautiously, less expensively, making the most of the tools already developed in preference to the creation of larger, more versatile—and more expensive-tools. Exposed directly to the outside pressures to match or surpass the Soviet achievements in space, NASA moved more rapidly with the development of observatory-class satellites and the larger deep-space probes than the scientists would have required (chap. 12). Some of the most intense conflicts between NASA and the scientific community arose later over the issue of the small and less costly projects versus the large and expensive ones—a conflict that NASA's vigorous development of manned spaceflight exacerbated.

Of course, the scientific community is not monolithic, and there were so many widely differing opinions on these matters as to make speaking of a single position of the scientific community nonsense. Nevertheless it seems clear that the new organizational structure prescribed for NASA not only helped NACA people drop much of their conservatism, but also had an impact on the space science program in effecting a faster development of more advanced space tools than many leading scientists would have called for.

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was a remarkable piece of legislation, and the process which produced it even more noteworthy. The thoroughness with which the subjects of space and its potentials and implications were investigated and studied, the thoughtfulness given to the issues raised, and the care taken in responding to the crisis. precipitated by Sputnik provide a model that could well be commended as a pattern for the handling of legislative matters. As a practical matter, however, it is not likely that the Congress could find the time and resources to devote such attention to more than a select few of the issues that come before it. Also, few other issues are so free of partisan concerns and vested interests.

At any rate, the act provided an effective framework for both the civilian and military components of the nation's space research and exploration. In the course of time, some changes were found desirable.28 Perhaps the most telling were those in coordination, the area in which Congress had displayed so much concern and on which so much time had been spent. President Eisenhower made little use of the Aeronautics and Space Council and did not provide a permanent staff for it, so it was left to NASA and the Bureau of the Budget to do the staff work. In April 1961 the NASA Act was amended to place the National Aeronautics and Space

Council in the Executive Office of the President, to replace the president with the vice president as chairman, to decrease the size of the council, and to broaden its functions to include cooperation "among all departments and agencies of the United States engaged in aeronautical and space activities."29 Also the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee proved ineffective from the start. In September 1960 NASA and the Department of Defense jointly established an Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, cochaired by the deputy administrator of NASA and the Defense Department's director of defense research and engineering. Because it worked, the AACB rapidly took over the functions of the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee. The new board succeeded because its cochairmen and members were in positions of authority in their respective agencies, where they could personally put into effect agreements arrived at in the board. No longer of any use, the liaison committee was abolished by reorganization in July 1965.30 There were some other changes, and additional authorities were acquired from related legislation-such as the authority to award grants in support of basic science.31 But, all in all, the strength and effectiveness of the NASA legislation lay in the original act of 1958.

Under its provisions NACA prepared to move out on its new career—as NASA. Dryden was not chosen as the first administrator. In retrospect it is easy to see why. The cautious and diffuse approach of the NACA with which Dryden was identified, and Dryden's conservative views on the budget needed by the new agency, did not jibe with the legislators' sense of urgency in space matters.32 Instead of Dryden, T. Keith Glennan-president of Case Institute of Technology, former head of the Navy's New London Underwater Sound Laboratories, and for two years a member of the Atomic Energy Commission-was chosen. In spite of the difficulties with Congress, Dryden had an undiminished reputation for technical and administrative competence which led Glennan to ask specifically for him as his deputy.

After a brief preparatory period, Glennan officially opened NASA's doors on 1 October 1958. Space science was one of the first of NASA's programs to flourish. Nevertheless it was not the Sputnik crisis that brought space science into being. What Sputnik did achieve was to break out much of the U.S. space program, including space science, from under the military wing where it had resided during the pioneering years. Had it not been for the shock generated by Sputnik, the American space program would probably have evolved into one largely devoted to military objectives-with space science as an adjunct. Under such circumstances, in spite of the commendably enlightened policies of the U.S. military establishment regarding support of basic research, the free play of the scientific process would have been difficult to maintain. Pressures would have been in the direction of supporting research with military applications and imposing security classification on some of the results. With the program in NASA,

the scientific community was in a stronger position to impress its brand on American space science and to work openly with foreign colleagues when that seemed appropriate.

Yet it is of interest that the members of the Academy of Sciences and of the President's Science Advisory Committee who had worked so hard to push the space program in the direction of science and toward the civilian arena were not those who proceeded to carry out the space science program. As leaders of the scientific establishment, they continued to be beset by the problems of maintaining adequate appreciation and support for science in general; and as soon as the space program was launched they returned to these broader matters. Rather, it was those who had already been engaged in rocket and satellite work, especially those working on projects connected with the International Geophysical Year, who began to develop the nation's space science program. These individuals, with years of experience behind them in industry, on the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel, and in the IGY program, naturally had proprietary feelings about space research; and it was easy for them to regard the space science program as very much their own creation. But the academy, from its association with IGY, and PSAC from its role in laying the legislative foundation for NASA, also had certain proprietary feelings about the program. There arose accordingly a tension-constructive for the most part-between NASA managers and advisers in the academy and on PSAC. The issues of what the space science program should be, how it should be carried out, and who should make the decisions arose early and recurred continually throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s.

8

NASA Gets under Way

None of the traditional conservatism of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was evident in the autumn of 1958 when the National Aeronautics and Space Administration got under way. Rather, the industry, care, and thoroughness that had earned for NACA the respect of Congress over the years could be sensed as the new agency geared up for the challenges ahead. A seemingly endless list of matters had to be taken care of in the first few months after NASA was formally opened by Administrator Glennan on 1 October 1958, and everyone had his hands full.

The agency showed no inclination to take its role in the nation's space program for granted. The debates during the previous year about the importance of the space program and the country's poor position relative to the Soviet Union demonstrated that Congress would take a deep interest in what NASA did. Also, the significance of the choice of a new man, T. Keith Glennan, as the first administrator, rather than Hugh Dryden, the director of NACA, was not lost upon former NACA employees. Even though the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 had given NASA extensive authority, the agency still felt the need to sell itself. As the staff prepared for NASA's first budget hearings, Abe Silverstein, director of spaceflight programs, admonished his people with words like the following: "Remember, it is not the program we have to sell. That has already been bought. What we have to prove is that we are the right ones to do it!"1 That was the mood of NASA as it bent to the tasks ahead. If anything stood out at the time, it was that everything seemed to be happening at once. In the white hot light of public interest, NASA had to establish its organization, expand its staff, acquire new facilities, find contractors for the work to be done, carry out Vanguard and the projects transferred from the Advanced Research Projects Agency, work out its relations with the military and other agencies, develop a budget, prepare for the first congressional hearings, and plan for the future-all while attempting to get a program immediately under way. Again it was Silverstein who put it into words: "Two years. It will take two years to get things really under control. After that you can begin to take it easy." As a prophet, Silverstein was half