these he calls "paganism": being "the mainly unconscious and partly conscious real pagan revival and revolt against God." The second of these systems is that embraced by himself, and called by him "civicism." It is based on a certain theory of his, concerning "the rights of conscience." It imports (if we at all rightly understand it) that no tenets concerning religion and morality can, without injustice, be permitted to entail any legally-imposed disqualification, on any one person who sincerely embraces them; any legally imposed inferiority in his position, as compared with that of other citizens. And since he has invented the term political "civicism" to express his own theory, we may be allowed on our side to invent a term for our own; which we will call therefore political "ethicism." According to our doctrine, not only is it consistent with justice, but it is essential to the well-being of a State, that a legislation shall exist, which imposes comparative disadvantage on those who sincerely hold this or that erroneous tenet on religion or morality. If we be asked indeed, what are those errors in particular which at any given time and place should involve their upholders in such comparative disadvantage, we reply that this is a question of detail, on which we shall speak in the sequel. But we may give an obvious illustration of what we intend, by referring to the position in which any Englishman is now placed, who sincerely thinks that God permits divorce for the mere reason of incompatibility of temper; or again, who sincerely thinks that he is bound, under certain circumstances, to fight a duel.

Dr. Mivart calls that theory "medievalism," which essentially conflicts with the two theories of "paganism" and "civicism." But we demur to this appellation, for more than one reason. In the first place, the mediæval period had two different characteristics. On one hand it is the epoch, no doubt, when (as we consider) the normal and divinely-appointed mutual relation of Church and State approached more nearly than at any other epoch, to being at least theoretically accepted. But on the other hand, it was an epoch of rude and savage lawlessness, of widely extended ignorance, of vehement and unrestrained passion: so that if we express preference for "mediævalism," we might be understood to express a preference for violence over gentleness, for rudeness over refinement, and for ignorance over knowledge. But we have a second and still stronger objection to our theory being called "medieval." Whatever be its merits, at all events it is broader than any theory concerning Church and State; because (as we venture to

maintain) it would hold good, even though God (as He was of course free to do) had founded no Church at all. Our doctrine in fact requires no other assumption, than that mankind have the means of certainly knowing certain given. verities concerning religion and morals. And the doctrine entirely holds good therefore as a principle in modern no less than in mediæval times, though its practical application of course must be widely different. As to that further doctrine, which concerns the due relation between Church and State,it may be regarded, we maintain, as an inference from our own. The Catholic doctrine (we say) on Church and State, even though it had not been directly taught by the Church, would result nevertheless by necessary consequence, from combining "ethicism" on the one hand, with the revealed truth concerning the Church's spiritual privileges on the other.

The chief purpose of our present article however, as we have said, is not so much to vindicate our own position (though we hope to say much incidentally which shall tend to do so) as to oppose Dr. Mivart's. This course is indeed required by the very nature of the case; because he bases his theory on the ground, not of expediency, but of absolute and indefeasible right. He dwells emphatically on "individual freedom reposing upon conscience" (p. 119); or "liberty of conscience" (p. 133); as being "the most fundamental and sacred of all liberties" (p. 32), "the greatest and the noblest of the rights of man" (p. 34). In his view, the "rights of conscience" are "supreme and indefeasible," consisting as they do in men's "liberty to adhere with undeviating fidelity in speech and action to what they believe to be truth." He lays down (p. 75) as an "indisputable" dictum of the Natural Law, that "no citizen has the right to deny to another a liberty which he, as a citizen, claims for himself"; by which Dr. Mivart evidently intends, the liberty of vigorously propagating what are his own sincere convictions on religion and morality. All believers in a Personal God, he adds (p. 77), "must assert that each man has a right freely to perform all such actions as God, through his conscience, has enjoined him to perform, provided" he does "not deprive other men of similar freedom to fulfil what they believe to be their duty." Moreover no Theist, he thinks (p. 78), "can logically deny to citizens freedom to declare their belief to those who ask them "; and "to exert such combined actions" for the propagation of that belief, "as do

*

;

* Dr. Mivart here adds the words, "revealed to them by their Creator" but we omit those words, because his whole drift shows them to be pleonastic.

not interfere with the analogous rights of combination of other citizens."

We shall presently point out, that the apparently legitimate consequences of this theory would be vast and (we must add) startling; and we at once, therefore, set ourselves to examine the arguments by which our author supports it. On doing so, we find that his reasoning has (we may say) no other foundation whatever, except only the Catholic doctrine concerning the sacredness of each individual's conscience. Whatever else therefore we may be obliged from want of space to omit, at all events we must thoroughly examine the sufficiency of this one foundation. To such a task then we at once address ourselves.

Here our first business of course is with this Catholic doctrine concerning the sacredness of conscience, on which Dr. Mivart lays so emphatic stress. On some former occasions we have pointed out what seems to us a possible confusion, between two different significations of the word "conscience"; and in our last number (pp. 483-6) we had occasion again to touch on the subject. The sense, we think, in which the word "conscience" is nowadays more commonly used, is to express man's natural sense of right and wrong; to express that innate power of human nature, whereby each man is enabled personally to apprehend certain portions of the Natural Law. But when Catholic theologians say that it is always a sin for me to act against my "conscience," they are using the word in an importantly different sense. According to their sense of the word-so far from conscience being my primary informant on the Natural Law, it does not come into play at all, until I am already acquainted with certain doctrines and principles, whether of the Natural Law or of whatever other law may be in question. With Catholic theologians, the word "conscience" (in such a context) does not express any mental habit or power, but a mental act; an act of inference. In preparing to elicit such an act, I contemplate the various laws by which I consider myself to be bound, so far as I know them to bear on the circumstances of the moment; and then my act of conscience consists in my inference, as to what hic et nunc it is obligatory, or again morally permissible, to do.*

Dr. Mivart has not entirely escaped the equivocation to which we have been referring; for at the top of p. 75 he

We a little overstated the matter however in April (p. 484), by implying that "conscience" has no more intimate relation with the Natural Law, than with any other law; because the obligation on me of any other law rests in last analysis (as is evident) on the dictates of the Natural Law.

evidently uses the word "conscience" to express men's power of apprehending right and wrong, as distinct from pleasurable and painful. But, so far as we can see, no part of his argument is vitiated by this confusion. Nor again, we think, is the force of his argument materially impaired, by another little oversight into which he has fallen. He cites (pp. 32-4) F. Newman's important theological citations, as to the obligation indefeasibly incumbent on all men of never transgressing the dictate of their conscience. But (if we rightly understand him) he has pressed the force of these citations a little too far. It is not quite universally permissible for me (p. 32) "to adhere with undeviating fidelity" to the dictate of my erroneous conscience; because the erroneousness of that conscience may possibly be "vincible." If such be the case, I cannot without sin act in accordance with my conscience, any more than I can without sin act in opposition to it.

On the supposed hypothesis, my only way to avoid sin is to conquer that erroneousness of conscience, which, by hypothesis, is vincible; and to change my existent conscience for a truer one. But this exception to the universal truth of Dr. Mivart's statement is far from being as important as might appear at first blush; because theologians do not call the erroneousness of a conscience "vincible," unless it be vincible hic et nunc.

Our important difference from Dr. Mivart begins at a later stage of his argument. We heartily concede to him, that every one is always bound to do those acts which his conscience dictates as of obligation; whether that dictate be objectively true, or again invincibly and inculpably erroneous. But then Dr. Mivart proceeds to assume, that the State's obligation of not interfering with such acts is co-extensive with the individual's obligation of performing them. This is precisely what we deny, and what we hardly think that on reflection Dr. Mivart will maintain. In no other passage does he express himself so emphatically on the matter, as in the following; which we may fairly take as our starting-point in the whole discussion. Every believer in a Personal God, he says

Must assert that all the citizens of a state combined together, save one, are morally incompetent, by their joint authority as citizens, to compel that one to perform an act against his conscience: such as would be an outward act of adoration to a Deity in whom he disbelieved, or of insult to Him whom he conceives to be his Creator and his Lord (p. 77).

Now we here desiderate greater clearness of expression. The supposition which Dr. Mivart makes, as he words it, is not less

than intrinsically repugnant; for no man, by metaphysical possibility, can "compel" any one "to perform an act against his conscience." I cannot, by metaphysical possibility, perform an act against my conscience, unless it be a free act; because my conscience condemns no other and no external authority can, by metaphysical possibility, "compel " me to perform a free act.

What is it then exactly, which Dr. Mivart intends to lay down as the basis of his argument? Perhaps the most obvious interpretation which can be given to his words -putting aside that sense which (as we have said) is necessarily out of the question-would be, that no civil Government can, without tyranny, prohibit any citizen from doing what he conscientiously believes to be of obligation. But on this extreme theory, the British Government acted tyrannically, when in India it put down the practices of infanticide and Suttee.* Nay, the Thugs themselves acted under a sense of religious obligation. "I particularly remember," says Lord Macaulay, "an altercation which took place between two of these wretches. One Thug reproached the other for having been so irreligious as to spare the life of a traveller, when the omens indicated that their patroness required a victim. 'How could you let him go? how can you expect the goddess to protect us, if you disobey her commands?"" But there is no need of appealing for illustration to these hideous superstitions. Archbishop Whately was not thinking of India but of England, when he pointed out in the midst of an energetic assault on "Romish" persecution that "there is not necessarily anything of the character of persecution, in doing violence to a man's conscience." "To admit at once and universally the plea of conscience," he adds, "would lead to the subversion of the whole fabric of society.' I sincerely believe that a certain estate is my property; and my conscience dictates, that I am bound to expend a portion of it in giving my son a higher education chan he could otherwise receive. A court of law however prohibits me from doing so, by deciding that the estate is not mine; though I am entirely unconvinced by the Judge's reasoning, and my conscience therefore remains unaltered. Some hundred law cases in every year involve such an element as this. Are all these judicial

"It is lamentable to think," says Lord Macaulay in his speech of March 9th, 1843, "how long we suffered the practices of infanticide and Suttee to remain unchecked." These practices, he had premised, “were enjoined by the Hindoo superstition."

"Errors of Romanism," p. 278.