mits. Israel argued that the United States should automatically accept them in the United States as citizens since international law required that loss of nationality be dependent on the acquisition of another nationality-i.e., on the avoidance of statelessness.

The United States brief disagreed with the Israeli views on loss of nationality and statelessness. The U.S. brief argued that questions of nationality have always been regarded as questions of domestic law and that there "are no universally recognized principles of international law which prevent the individual from effecting his own expatriation in accordance with United States nationality laws." The brief noted that the United States "has been a leading proponent of the right of the peoples of the world to expatriate themselves if they so desire" and that this principle explained the refusal of the United States to sign conventions such as the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws (179 LNTS 89) and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (A/CONF. 9/15, 1961). The U.S. argued that "[t]raditional United States principles will not permit recognition of a limitation on the right of an individual to expatriate himself."

The brief stated further that U.S. law permits a U.S. citizen to expatriate himself by making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, and that nothing more is required. Thus the 44 former U.S. nationals in Israel would be regarded as aliens.

The brief stated further:

Undoubtedly, differences in the nationality laws of states which lead to statelessness can be undesirable in terms of the relations between such states. All cases of statelessness are to this extent regrettable since they may produce frictions between states. However, the Congress of the United States has determined that the right of an individual to leave the country and renounce all ties thereto is at least as important as any consideration of the international friction which infrequently occurs due to renunciation of citizenship.

The United States Government continues its efforts today to persuade other states to allow their citizens to leave their territories and break all ties with what they consider to be intolerable circumstances. Undoubtedly, the Government of Israel appreciates the efforts of the United States in this regard. It would be a total contradiction of this posture for Israel to expect the United States to be a party to any effort to return a person to a country with which he has broken all ties, including citizenship, and to which he does not wish to return.

*

The U.S. brief also quoted at length from a statement made in March 1930 by David Hunter Miller, the United States Delegate to the Conference for the Codification of International Law held at The Hague:

For a century past, it has been the policy of my country that the right of expatriation is an inherent and natural right of all persons. It is true that allegiance is a duty, but it is not a chain that holds a person in bondage and that he carries with him to a new life in a new land. It is a duty and an obligation that a freeman casts off when he voluntarily assumes allegiance to the country of his new nome, and takes over the duties and the rights of a national there. When he accepts the new tie, the old one is loosed and gone.

. . It is a principle of the rights of man and of the liberty of the human race. We stand on it and we shall continue to do so. Under our laws of naturalization, the individual who receives the honor and the dignity of citizenship in the United States of America is obliged by the most solemn oath not only to support the Constitution of the United States, but also, by a like solemn oath, to renounce, and forever, all allegiance that he owes to any foreign state, prince or sovereign. . . .

We regard that oath and its result, taken as it is after the conditions of residence and other qualifications which are prescribed in our laws, as a finality and we shall always so regard it.

My government stands on that declaration of policy [joint resolution of July 27, 1868, Rev. Stat., secs. 1999, 2000]. My government equally and fully recognizes the right of American citizens, if they so desire, to deprive themselves of American nationality by taking an oath of allegiance in another country.

Accordingly, I declare in the name of my government, and in the most formal manner that the Delegates of the United States of America cannot and will not sign any convention in which there is any clause whatever which could be construed to qualify or limit this declared policy of the United States of America, regarding the right of expatriation.

The U.S. brief stated that the United States "does not believe that recent attempts to solve the problem of statelessness have proceeded to a point where there is a customary rule of international law which is violated by United States law and policy regarding renunciation of citzenship."

Dept. of State File No. P74 0032-1684. David Hunter Miller's statements may be found at Conference for the Codification of International Law, Aots, Vol. II, Minutes of the First Committee (League of Nations pub. C.351(a).M. 145(a).1930 (V)), pp. 44, 69–70, 78, 80-81, and 275–276.

Dual Nationality

The Government of Australia, in a letter dated March 1, 1974, to the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, raised the question of the possible applicability of Article 3 of the 1930 Protocol Relating to Certain Cases of Double Nationality, signed at The Hague for the United States on December 30, 1930 (50 Stat. 1317; TS 913; 2 Bevans 1049; entered into force May 25, 1937), to the cases of two former U.S. citizens. Both were under indictment in the United States for selective service violations and the Australian Government wished to determine whether the charges should be dropped on the basis of Article 3 of the Protocol in view of the fact that both acquired Australian citizenship subsequent to the indictment. Article 3 provides that "A person who has lost the nationality of a state under the law of that state and has acquired another nationality, shall be exempt from military obligations in the state of which he has lost the nationality."

Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State, wrote a letter on May 28, 1974, in reply to an inquiry on the matter, to John L. Murphy, Chief of the Government Regulations Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, stating the view that Article 3 was inapplicable. Mr. Bevans wrote, inter alia, that he had been "unable to perceive any intention [in the wording of Article 3] that those provisions would be applicable to a situation such as that of [the defendants] where they are charged with a violation of the law of the state of their former nationality which took place before they acquired their new nationality."

Dept. of State File No. P74 0072-1717.

§2

Passports and Other Travel Documents; Travel

Passports

Effective February 14, 1974, the Department of State amended Section 51.71 of Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations so as to reduce the categories of passports which may be revoked, restricted, or limited. Deleted from Section 51.71 was paragraph (c), which provides that a passport may be revoked, restricted or limited where

"The national's activities abroad are in violation of the laws of the United States." The Department noted that paragraph (c) had never been invoked and served "no useful purpose.

The Fed. Reg., Vol. 39, No. 37, Feb. 22, 1974, p. 6696. Prior to the deletion of para. (c), Section 51.71 read as follows:

A passport may be revoked, restricted or limited where:

(a) The national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under § 51.70; or

(b) The passport has been obtained by fraud, or has been fraudulently altered, or has been fraudulently misused; or

(c) The national's activities abroad are in violation of the laws of the United States.

Effective September 19, 1974, the Department of State extended prior restrictions on the use of U.S. passports for travel into or through Cuba, North Korea and North Viet-Nam until March 19, 1975.

See the Fed. Reg., Vol 39, No. 183, Sept. 19, 1974, p. 33714; the 1973 Digest, Ch. 3, § 2, pp. 80-81.

Nonimmigrant Visas

Visas

The United States and Mexico agreed, effective June 28, 1974, to terminate the provisions of the 1953 Agreement on documentation for nonimmigrants travelling between the United States and Mexico (TIAS 2912; 5 UST 174; entered into force November 12, 1953) under which the nonimmigrant visa requirement was waived for officials and employees of the national, state and local governments of the respective countries. From the date of the termination, citizens of either country formerly entitled to a waiver of the nonimmigrant documentary requirements on this basis were required to be in possession of appropriate nonimmigrant documentation when seeking to enter the other country for temporary purposes.

This modification of the 1953 Agreement does not affect the waiver of nonimmigrant documentary requirements provided for personnel employed directly or indirectly on the construction, operation or maintenance of works in either country undertaken in accordance with the 1944 treaty on Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (59 Stat. 1219; TS 994; 9 Bevans 1166; entered into force November 8, 1945) regarding the functions of the International Boundary and Water Commission. Such personnel remain entitled to a waiver of the nonimmigrant documentary requirements pursuant to the provisions of the treaty when they are seeking to enter the other country temporarily in connection with such employment.

See Dept. of State Press Release, No. 304, July 15, 1974. The 1953 Agreement was effected by an exchange of notes between the United States and Mexico dated Oct. 28, Nov. 10 and 12, 1953. For the waiver provisions mentioned above, see Art. 1 of the U.S. note, dated Oct. 28, and Art. 1 of the Mexican note, dated Nov. 10. For the waiver provision of the 1944 treaty, see Art. 20 thereof.

The amended implementing regulations are at 22 CFR 41.6 (c). See the Fed. Reg., Vol. 39, No. 143, July 24, 1974, pp. 26891-26892, 26895; Id., No. 147, July 30, 1974, p. 27555.

On June 25, 1974, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, in Pedroza-Sandoval v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 498 F. 2d 899 (1974), that the Court could not interfere with a policy decision of Congress to exclude Western Hemisphere natives from a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act permitting the Attorney General to adjust the status of an alien admitted to the United States to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

Section 1255 of Title 8 of the Act provides that the Attorney General in his discretion may adjust the status of an alien admitted into the United States to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if certain requirements are met. Section 1255 (c) states that "The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any alien who is a native of any country of the Western Hemisphere. . . .”

Petitioner, a native of Mexico, had entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on July 9, 1971, and was authorized to remain in the country until August 9, 1971. On April 4, 1973, she was apprehended by INS officers for failing to depart in August 1971. At a deportation hearing she sought "adjustment of status" as an immediate relative of a U.S. resident alien. This was denied, and the petitioner argued that the Act's provisions excluding Western Hemisphere natives from the benefits of § 1255 was a denial of equal protection of the law. The Court said:

Although aliens enjoy certain fundamental constitutional rights while in the United States, it is long established doctrine that Congress has broad powers, subject only to very limited judicial review, in legislating on the matter of immigration laws and naturalization policies.

.. courts have held in cases involving varied factual circumstances that it is within the power and authority of Congress in legislating on immigration and naturalization to distinguish between natives of countries in the Western Hemisphere and natives of nations in the Eastern Hemisphere or even natives of dependent regions in this hemisphere.

The legislative history indicates that § 1255 was amended in 1965 to disable Western Hemisphere natives from using the section to adjust their immigration status because Congress perceived a “re