cease to be binding on the Government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol."

See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release, No. 74-10, Dec. 10, 1974, pp. 2-5; Senate Exec. J, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 19, 1970, and Senate Exec. Rept. No. 93-35, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 13, 1974.

With respect to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, Dr. Iklé said, in part:

As the title suggests, this Convention completely prohibits biological and toxin weapons. Since it provides for the elimination of existing weapons, it is a true disarmament measure.

The Convention is entirely consistent with U.S. policy concerning biological and toxin weapons, since the U.S. had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the Convention was negotiated. In fact, our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has already been destroyed. Our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.

Since opening the Convention for signature in April 1972, 110 nations have become signatories. This includes all members of the Warsaw Pact and all members of NATO except France. In order for this Treaty to come into force, it must be ratified by the three depositaries-the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.-and at least 19 other countries. Enough countries have now ratified, some 36, so that only ratification by depositaries is still required. The British have completed all the parliamentary procedures for ratification and the Soviet Union has announced that it intends to ratify before the end of 1974. It is particularly important that U.S. ratification be accomplished in the near future so that we will not be the ones who prevent this treaty from coming into force.

There is one aspect of the Convention to which I would like to give particular attention: the question of verification. Verification of compliance with this Convention in countries with relatively closed societies is difficult, particularly for the prohibition of the development of these weapons.

Nevertheless, in our judgment it is in the net interest of the United States to enter into this Convention, basically for three

reasons:

-First, the military utility of these weapons is dubious at best: the effects are unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable, and there exists no military experience concerning them. Hence, the prohibitions of this Convention do not deny us a militarily viable option and verifiability is therefore less important.

-Second, biological weapons are particularly repugnant from a moral point of view.

-Third, widespread adherence to the Convention can help discourage some misguided competition in biological weapons.

It is to be feared that without such a prohibition, new developments in the biological sciences might give rise to concern because they could be abused for weapons purposes. Such anxieties could foster secretive military competition in a field of science that would otherwise remain open to international cooperation and be used solely for the benefit of mankind.

It is important, however, that the limited verifiability of this Convention should not be misconstrued as a precedent for other arms limitation agreements where these special conditions would not obtain.

the Administration believes that the Biological Weapons Convention represents a useful arms control measure. We hope the United States will not prevent the treaty from entering into force through its failure to ratify. By failing to ratify, we would deny ourselves the benefit of having other countries legally committed not to produce weapons that we have already given up. And we would deny 109 other countries the benefit of a treaty that they have already signed.

See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release, No. 74–10, Dec. 10, 1974, pp. 2-5; see also Senate Exec. Q, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 10, 1972, and Senate Exec. Rept. No. 93-36, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 13, 1974.

On December 16, 1974, the Senate agreed to a resolution of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons.

Conventional Arms Trade

Section 51 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559; approved December 30, 1974) sets forth the sense of the Congress with respect to the conventional arms trade. Section 51 provides:

Sec. 51. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the recent growth in international transfers of conventional arms to developing

nations

(1) is a cause for grave concern for the United States and other nations in that in particular areas of the world it increases the danger of potential violence among nations, and diverts scarce world resources from more peaceful uses; and

(2) could be controlled progressively through negotiations and agreements among supplier and recipient nations.

(b) Therefore, the President is urged to propose to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that it consider as a high priority agenda item discussions among participating nations of that Conference for the purposes of—

(1) agreeing to workable limitations on conventional arms transfers; and

(2) establishing a mechanism through which such limitations could be effectively monitored.

(c) The President shall transmit to the Congress not later than six months after the enactment of this Act a report setting forth. the steps he has taken to carry out this section.

Environmental Modification

The United States and the Soviet Union, on July 3, 1974, issued a Joint Statement on environmental modification techniques for military purposes. The text of the statement is as follows:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Desiring to limit the potential danger to mankind from possible new means of warfare;

Taking into consideration that scientific and technical advances in environmental fields, including climate modification, may open possibilities for using environmental modification techniques for military purposes;

Recognizing that such use could have widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare;

Recognizing also that proper utilization of scientific and technical advances could improve the interrelationship of man and nature; 1. Advocate the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

2. Have decided to hold a meeting of United States and Soviet representatives this year for the purpose of exploring this problem. 3. Have decided to discuss also what steps might be taken to bring about the measures referred to in paragraph 1.

Dept. of State Press Release, No. 279, July 3, 1974; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXII, No. 1831, July 29, 1974, p. 185.

On Dec. 9, 1974, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Res. 3264 (XXIX), operative portion of which is as follows:

the

1. Considers it necessary to adopt, through the conclusion of an appropriate international convention, effective measures to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health;

2. Takes note of the draft international convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as other points of view and suggestions put forward during the discussion of this question;

3. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text of such a convention and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session of the item entitled "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health;"

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session an item entitled "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health."

The draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union is attached as an annex to the resolution.

§ 8

War Powers of the President and the Congress

$9

Military Assistance and Sales

Military Assistance Program

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93–559; approved December 30, 1974), in section 17, calls for the reduction and eventual termination of the current United States military assistance program. Section 17 provides:

(a) It is the sense of Congress that the policies and purposes of the military assistance program conducted under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 should be reexamined in light of changes in world conditions and the economic position of the United States in relation to countries receiving such assistance; and that the program, except for military education and training activities, should be reduced and terminated as rapidly as feasible consistent with the security and foreign policy requirements of the United States.

(b) In order to give effect to the sense of Congress expressed in subsection (a), the President is directed to submit to the first session of the 94th Congress a detailed plan for the reduction and eventual elimination of the present military assistance program.

Transfers by Recipient Nations

On May 13, 1974, James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, wrote a reply to Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in response to questions raised by Representative Hamilton with respect to U.S. policy on the transfer by recipient nations of U.S. military equipment to third nations. The questions were asked in the context of the use by Iranian forces in Oman of military equipment purchased from the United States. Mr. Noyes wrote, in pertinent part:

You ask, first of all, whether military equipment sold under the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA), as amended, to a friendly foreign country may be used by its armed forces beyond the frontiers

of that country without United States permission. There is, of course, no territorial limitation contained in section 4 FMSA relative to the purposes for which military sales by the United States are authorized. Any such limitation would be unrealistic. For example, FMS transactions are authorized for the purpose of legitimate selfdefense. Few purchasers, if any, would likely be prepared to accept a commitment not to use U.S.G.-sold military items which they own and control, if attacked, against the attacker's forces in the attacker's own territory, nor does the concept of self-defense itself prohibit such use. Section 4 FMSA likewise authorizes FMS transactions for the purpose of permitting the purchaser to participate in regional measures consistent with the U.N. Charter. Any proposed statutory limitation with regard to the purchaser's territory would be equally inconsistent with that purpose. You also ask whether such purchasers seek tacit or official United States permission for extraterritorial use of U.S.G.-sold military equipment by the purchasing armed forces. While no rule can be established for all instances, you can be assured that such uses would normally come to the attention of our representatives both within and outside of the context of continuing consultations at various intergovernmental levels and that foreign governments do generally desire U.S. support for their own actions and policies.

Secondly, you ask whether third-country transfer provisions contained in the final paragraph of section 3 (a) FMSA are limited to instances in which the title to U.S.G.-sold military items passes from the purchasing government to another foreign government. The third-country transfer provision must be read in the context of section 3(a) (2) FMSA which requires the purchaser to agree not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article sold under the FMSA to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the purchaser and not to use or permit the use of such article for purposes other than those for which furnished without prior U.S. consent. In that context it is clear that a transfer of possession but not of title to the personnel or agents of a third government or other entity (by loan, lease, or other form of temporary custody without a right of further disposition) is subject to the restrictions of the final paragraph of section 3(a) FMSA as well as an outright transfer of title to the subject articles by the purchasing government. On the other hand, that paragraph refers to transfers to another country where the United States itself would transfer the article to that country. "Transfer" in this context certainly means more than mere physical deployment in foreign territory by the government involved, else the test would amount to nothing more than one of whether the United States Armed Forces would be deployed, equipped with the subject article, in the third country's territory. Rather, the test is whether the United States itself would transfer title or possession of the article in question to the third government, its personnel, or agents. The final paragraph of section 3 (a) FMSA refers to transfers to a proposed recipient foreign country; countries are not usually considered to be "recipients" of property simply because the property is present in its territory. In short, a purchaser of military items under the FMSA from the U.S. Govern