the United States adhered to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it was with the understanding that the treaty does not permit non-nuclear states party to the treaty to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices. We accordingly regard the Latin American nuclear-free zone as consistent with our objective of curbing the spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities.

Press release USUN-140(74), Oct. 21, 1974, pp. 4-5, 7; U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1998, Oct. 21, 1974, pp. 29–31, 34–36. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Feb. 14, 1967, for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is at TIAS 7137; 22 UST 754; entered into force for the United States May 12, 1971, subject to understandings and declarations.

On Dec. 9, 1974, the General Assembly, by a vote of 115 (U.S.)–3–12, adopted Res. 3261D, the operative portion of which is as follows:

1. Appeals to all states, in particular nuclear-weapon states, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue its studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects, and to report on these questions to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

3. Calls upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in submitting its report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and, in so doing, to take account of the views of the International Atomic Energy Agency as requested in paragraph 2 above;

4. Expresses the hope that the review conference of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Geneva in May 1975, will also give consideration to the role of peaceful nuclear explosions as provided for in that Treaty and will inform the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of the results of its deliberations;

5. Invites, in this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to provide the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with information concerning such steps as they have taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or intend to take, for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which is envisaged in article V of the Treaty ; 6. Invites the Secretary-General, should he deem it appropriate, to submit further comments on this matter, taking into account the reports referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

Public Law 93-373 (88 Stat. 445), approved August 14, 1974, amends the International Development Association Act, 22 U.S.C. 284 (1960), by, inter alia, adding a new Section 15 which provides that "The United States Governor is authorized and directed to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Association for the benefit of any country which develops any nuclear explosive device, unless the country is or becomes a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483)."

See also Ch. 10, § 1, supra, p. 441, and Ch. 12, § 1, supra, p. 640.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

On December 9, 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 128 (U.S.)-0-2, Resolution 3263 (XXIX) on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. On November 22, 1974, Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr., U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and Adviser to the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly, made a statement to the General Assembly's First Committee on this subject. He said:

The United States supports the concept of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and believes that it could make a considerable contribution to stability and nonproliferation in the area. We have therefore voted in favor of this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.700, as amended].

At the same time, we are dubious of the approach taken in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which urges states in the region to undertake immediate commitments with regard to the zone, in advance of actual negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement. Frankly, we do not believe this is an approach that will advance the purposes of the draft resolution.

Notwithstanding that reservation, we are prepared to lend our full cooperation to efforts to realize the aims of the draft resolution. We assume that in the further formulation of the zone it will be made clear that the prohibitions of the zone apply to the development of nuclear explosive capability for any purpose.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1856, Jan. 20, 1975, pp. 79–80. G.A. Res. 3263 (XXIX) provides:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by bolstering and expanding the existing regional and global structures for the prohibition and/or prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Realizing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones with an adequate system of safeguards could accelerate the process towards nuclear disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its sixty-second session, held in Cairo from September 1 to 4, 1974, on this subject,

Recalling the message sent by His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran on September 16, 1974, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Considering that the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the states situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery,

Mindful of political conditions particular to the region of the Middle East and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

Recalling the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1964,

Noting that establshment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would contribute effectively to the realization of aims enunciated in the above-mentioned Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa,

Recalling the notable achievement of the countries of Latin America in establishing a nuclear-free zone,

Also recalling resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, convened at Geneva on August 29, 1968, in which the Conference recommended that non-nuclear-weapon states not comprised in the Latin American nuclearfree zone should study the possibility and desirability of establishing military denuclearization of their respective zones,

Recalling the aims pursued by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in particular, the goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states,

1. Commends the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. Considers that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;

3. Calls upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. Expresses the hope that all states and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon states, will lend their full cooperation for the effective realization of the aims of this resolution;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation the present resolution, in particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East."

In Res. 3261F, adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1974, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was requested to make "a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects" and to submit the study in its report to the 30th session of the Assembly. See also G.A. Res. 3265 (XXIX) on the declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia; Res. 3262 (XXIX) on the implementation of G.A. Res. 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco); and Res. 3258 (XXIX) on the implementation of G.A. Res. 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. These resolutions were all adopted on Dec. 9, 1974. The United States abstained on Res. 3262 and 3265, and voted in favor of Res. 3258.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

A Joint Communiqué issued by the United States and the Soviet Union on July 3, 1974, contains, inter alia, the following paragraph on chemical weapons and warfare:

Both sides reaffirmed their interest in an effective international agreement which would exclude from the arsenals of states such dangerous instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons. Desiring to contribute to early progress in this direction, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international Convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1831, July 29, 1974, p. 187.

On August 5, 1974, the House of Representatives passed a resolution (H. Res. 1258) calling for ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and for a comprehensive review of United States policies with respect to chemical warfare. The resolution provides:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Geneva Protocol of 1925, banning the first use of gas and bacteriological warfare, should be ratified; and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that both the President and the Congress should resolve the position of the United States on the future status of herbicides and tear gas so that the Senate may move forward toward ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that reconsideration of the protocol would provide an opportunity for a comprehensive review of United States policies in the field of chemical warfare.

See the Cong. Rec., Vol. 120, No. 117, Aug. 5, 1974, p. H7651 and p. H7673. For the official texts (French and English) of the Geneva Protocol, see League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 94 (1929), p. 65.

On December 10, 1974, Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, made a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in support of the Geneva Protocol and of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Concerning the scope of the Protocol, and the status of herbicides and tear gas, Dr. Iklé said:

*

The President has authorized me to state on his behalf that he is prepared, in reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the Protocol, to renounce as a matter of national policy:

(1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters,

(2) first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control circumstances to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. This exception would permit use of riot control agents in riot situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control;

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. This use would be restricted to situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks;

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions. The use of riot control agents would be permissible in the recovery of remotely isolated personnel such as downed aircrews (and passengers).

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the combat zone to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

The President intends to conform U.S. policy to this position, assuming the Senate consents.

Finally, the President, under an earlier directive still in force, must approve in advance any use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war.

**

Among the questions posed by the Foreign Relations Committee to Dr. Iklé in connection with his statement was the following: "Assuming the Senate were to give its advice and consent to ratification on the grounds proposed by the Administration, what legal impediment would there be to subsequent Presidential decisions broadening the permissible uses of herbicides and riot control agents?" Dr. Iklé replied: "There would be no formal legal impediment to such a decision. However, the policy which was presented to the Committee will be inextricably linked with the history of Senate consent to ratification of the Protocol with its consent dependent upon its observance. If a future administration should change this policy without Senate consent whether in practice or by a formal policy change, it would be inconsistent with the history of the ratification, and could have extremely grave political repercussions and as a result is extremely unlikely to happen."

In its Report to the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee recommended advice and consent to ratification on "the basis of this and the other Executive Branch assurances and explanations reflected in the hearing record."

On December 16, 1974, the Senate agreed to a resolution of ratification subject to the following reservation: "That the said Protocol shall