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to be executed. The forms of assistance covered by the agreement include the services of advisory experts and consultants, the services of operational experts and of members of the U.N. Volunteers, equipment and supplies not readily available in the Trust Territory, seminars, training programs, demonstration projects, expert working groups, scholarships, fellowships, and other training programs, and any other form of assistance which may be agreed upon by the Trust Territory Government and the UNDP.

The agreement provides the fundamental arrangements and details with respect to forms of assistance, execution of projects, and information pertaining thereto, the participation and contribution of the Trust Territory Government in the execution of projects, program costs, financing, facilities, privileges and immunities, and dispute settlement (see Ch. 13, § 2, infra, pp. 664-665).

§ 7

Other Subjects of International Law

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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, in the case of In Re Petition of Battle, 379 F.Supp. 334 (1974), decided on March 28, 1974, granted the petition for naturalization not withstanding that the applicant, by reason of her religious beliefs, intended not to vote, to hold political office, to serve on a jury, to pledge allegiance to the flag, or to bear arms on behalf of the United States.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service opposed the petition on the ground that the applicant, a member and ordained minister of Jehovah's Witnesses, had failed to establish "that she is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. . ." as required by section 316(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1427, and was unable to accept in full the oath of allegiance as required by section 337 (a), 8 U.S.C. 1448 (a). Section 337 (a) provides:

A person who has petitioned for naturalization shall, in order to be and before being admitted to citizenship, take in open court an oath (1) to support the Constitution of the United States; (2) to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the petitioner was before a subject or citizen; (3) to support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) to bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and (5) (A) to bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law, or (B) to perform non-combatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law, or (C) to perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law.

Petitioner stated her willingness to take the oath of allegiance eliminating the requirement to bear arms.

The Court said, in relevant part:

Dissent or rejection of some of our concepts of democracy is not a bar to citizenship. Only if the applicant's beliefs would deny others civil and constitutionally protected rights or if the applicant believes in a change of our form of government through violence should citizenship be denied.

The petitioner has demonstrated an awareness and an appreciation of the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and speech and has rejected a political society which would deny these rights. She testified that she believed in the Constitution and form of government of the United States, and that she would submit to the authority of the Government. Petitioner's belief in a Kingdom of God free of all political ideologies in which temporal power would be exercised in a free society by a world government goes beyond the principles of the United Nations Charter; nowhere does petitioner suggest that the change should be accomplished by other than existing constitutional procedures. Her intended refusal to vote, hold political office, serve on a jury, or pledge allegiance to the flag is based on her religious belief in a "Kingdom of God," in which God is the "government and ruler," and on her belief that only God can judge men.

Petitioner has established that she is "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States" and that she would "bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the laws of the United States."

(p. 337; footnotes omitted.)

The Court also said that petitioner, having shown by clear and convincing evidence that she is opposed to any type of service in the U.S. Armed Forces by reason of religious training and belief, may take the oath of renunciation and allegiance containing the substance of clauses (1) to (4) and (5) (B) of section 337 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In Assi v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1064 (1974), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, on August 19, 1974, that an alien was precluded from obtaining citizenship by reason of his request for, and receipt of, relief from military service as a neutral alien, despite his contention that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights to U.S. citizenship. The denial of appellant's petition for naturalization was affirmed.

The Court cited section 315 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. 1426 (a), which provides:

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b) of this Act, any alien who applies or has applied for exemption or dis

charge from training or service in the Armed Forces or in the National Security Training Corps of the United States on the ground that he is an alien, and is or was relieved or discharged from such training or service on such ground, shall be permanently ineligible to become a citizen of the United States.

The Court, citing Kahook v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1960), held that it was immaterial whether the petitioner-appellant fully apprehended the legal result flowing from his request. So long as he knew that he would acquire an exemption from military duty, it was not necessary for him to know that by obtaining such exemption he was thereafter subjecting himself to the disability of a permanent bar to U.S. citizenship. The Court stated further that it was also immaterial whether the petitioner in fact would have been called to service had he not made such a request.

In Trujillo-Hernandez v. Farrell, 503 F. 2d 954 (1974), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, on November 13, 1974, that a direct attack on the congressional exercise of naturalization power was foreclosed as nonjusticiable in view of the foreign relations powers of Congress.

Plaintiff in this case, acting both as an affected individual and as a class representative, challenged the English language requirement of the naturalization law, 8 U.S.C. 1423 (1), and its associated regulations. The District Court denied the petition for naturalization and dismissed the class action without granting the application for a threejudge court. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision, stated:

The question for decision is nonjusticiable. The naturalization power is conferred on Congress in Article I, Section 8, along with the war power, the power over foreign commerce, and the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, all of which are indicative of the foreign relations responsibilities committed to the Congress. It has never been supposed that there are any judicially manageable standards for reviewing the conduct of our nation's foreign relations by the other two branches of the Federal Government.

The Court-emphasized that its holding of nonjusticiability applied only to the power of Congress to establish conditions precedent to naturalization. It did not extend to other governmental powers constrained by the due process and equal protection clauses. For example, plaintiff was entitled to procedural due process in the processing of his petition for naturalization, as a guard against administrative arbitrariness.

Senator Hiram L. Fong of Hawaii, on July 23, 1973, introduced in the Senate S.J. Res. 137, proposing an amendment to the Constitution with respect to eligibility for the Office of President and Vice

President. Senator Fong proposed the following: "Notwithstanding the provision of clause 5 of section 1 of Article II of the Constitution relating to citizenship, any person who is a citizen of the United States shall be eligible to the Office of President if he has been a resident of the United States for a total of at least fourteen years at any time preceding the date on which commences the term of office for which he is elected, and if he is otherwise eligible to such office." On April 30, 1974, Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, spoke in favor of a constitutional amendment along the lines of S.J. Res. 137 in a statement before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Below are excerpts from Mr. Chapman's statement:

a chief source of difficulty in the present constitutional provision is its reference to "natural born" citizens. This language apparently was carried over from the traditional usage of the mother country, whose statutes had commonly referred to "natural born" British subjects. However, this usage has not survived in the United States and no statute since 1790 has referred to "natural born" citizens. The accepted present practice, in statutes, court decisions, and scholarly discussions, is to designate citizens as native-born, naturalized, or citizens at birth. Also of interest is the declaration in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment does not aid in the interpretation of the Presidential qualification clause since it does not refer to "natural born" citizens and because of the general agreement that the Fourteenth Amendment is not an all-inclusive definition of the methods for acquiring American citizenship.

It thus appears that the constitutional reference to "natural born" citizens is archaic. This designation has caused uncertainty in regard to the eligibility for the Presidency of American citizens who acquired their citizenship at birth abroad to American citizen parents who were then residing or sojourning in foreign countries. Some have contended that these are not "natural born" citizens. The better view, in my estimation, appears to be that the "natural born" designation was intended to apply to all citizens who acquired their citizenship status at birth. But no court decision has ever considered this issue, and it has continued to provoke uncertainties. . . .

In my view there is no justification for denying the opportunity to aspire for the Presidency to American citizens who acquired their citizenship through birth abroad to American parents. Our nation has widespread interests throughout the world and millions of Americans necessarily live abroad in the service of the government or of American institutions or business concerns. Other Americans live abroad for reasons of study, health, recreation, or for various other personal reasons. I cannot conceive of any sound rea

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