of unimpeded transit through and over straits used for international navigation. Indeed, for states bordering as well as states whose ships and aircraft transit such straits, there could not be a successful Law of the Sea Conference unless this question is satisfactorily resolved. The inadequacies of the traditional doctrine of innocent passage-a concept developed not for transit through straits but for passage through a narrow belt of territorial sea-are well known.

We are appreciative of the strong trend in the debates as well as several proposals recently introduced in this Committee which reflect an understanding of the importance of navigation and overflight through straits for the global flow of trade and communications and for a stable and peaceful world order. These proposals also reflect that there need be no conflict between the interests of states transiting and states bordering straits. While unimpeded transit of straits used for international navigation is vital to achieving a successful treaty, we can and must also protect the interests of states bordering straits.

The proposals made reflect the fact that three categories of concern have been most frequently expressed by states bordering straits. They are security, safety of navigation, and prevention of pollution.

With respect to the first of these concerns, the security of states bordering straits, we should remember that unimpeded transit is a right of transit, not a right to engage in activities inimical to the security of these states. It is solely a right of the transiting ship or aircraft to transit the strait. That is, to enter the strait, pass through or over in the normal mode using customary navigational routes and applicable traffic separation schemes, and then to exit the strait. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the right of unimpeded transit is a substantial restriction on present high seas freedoms. To make this clear, we agree that the Chapter on passage of straits used for international navigation might specify that the right of unimpeded transit is solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait.

To ensure that unimpeded transit will be consistent with the security interests of states bordering straits, the treaty should require that ships and aircraft in transit refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state bordering the strait. Situations of actual hostilities are, of course, like all conflict settings, governed by the overriding norms of the United Nations Charter.

It should also be noted with respect to security concerns that straits are confined waters, and prudent seamen will want to pass through them as quickly as circumstances permit. As a practical matter, a strait is a most unlikely place for any threats to security against a state bordering the strait.

The second category of concern is safety of navigation. Here, too, it is possible to achieve a balance which will fully protect the interests of states whose ships and aircraft transit a strait and the interests of states bordering the strait.

The first need is to ensure that transiting vessels and aircraft comply with applicable international safety regulations. The pro

posal contained in articles recently introduced by the United Kingdom meets this need. It provides that "ships in transit shall comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the safety of navigation at sea, including the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea." We support this proposal.

With respect to aircraft, we believe that civil aircraft in transit should comply with the high seas standards, recommended practices and procedures established by ICAO under the Chicago Convention. State aircraft, which are not governed by these rules, should normally respect them and should at all times operate with due regard for the safety of navigation.

Because of the importance of traffic separation schemes for safety of navigation in crowded straits it would seem useful to encourage states bordering straits to propose traffic separation schemes where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships. Such schemes could then go into effect after approval by the competent international organization.

The third category of concern is prevention of pollution. All states recognize the importance of fully protecting the marine environment.

In this connection, the proposal made by the United Kingdom to require that ships in transit comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention and control of pollution from ships is an important one. It should also be noted that the new international discharge standards for areas close to the coast are very strict.

The United States is of the view that subject to appropriate safeguards and the usual exemption for ships and aircraft entitled to Sovereign immunity, states bordering straits should be able to enforce against violations occurring within the strait for deviation from internationally approved traffic separation schemes. Such deviations may seriously threaten the marine environment within straits.

With respect to both safety and pollution concerns in straits, it is also important to make adequate provisions for compensation should damage result despite the most rigorous prevention requirements. The recent Liability and Fund Conventions for compensation for damage caused by pollution from oil are a great step forward in this regard. And the provisions concerning liability in the United Kingdom articles and in L.11 jointly prepared by a number of Eastern European States also seem worthy of study.

Similarly, with respect to both safety and pollution concerns in straits, some straits, because of depth or other navigational or environmental limitations, will require special standards in addition to those universally adopted. To meet this need, we would welcome states bordering a strait recommending to the appropriate international organization for approval any special safety or pollution standards which they feel are required. In this way, states bordering the strait have the predominant role in formulating such special standards but at the same time the international community interest is also fully protected.

my delegation is also pleased that most of the recently introduced proposals concerning transit of straits include the essential element of transit by aircraft as well as ships. There have, however, been suggestions that questions of overflight of aircraft are not matters of oceans law and need not be dealt with in the Law of the Sea Conference. It should be recalled that the question of overflight was inseparably linked with the Law of the Sea in the 1958 Conventions on the High Seas and on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.

Moreover, since the breadth of the territorial sea will be decided by the Conference, the question of overflight cannot be avoided unless those states making this suggestion are willing to forgo sovereignty over the airspace above the territoial sea. The subject is clearly before the Law of the Sea Conference as the List of Subject and Issues approved by the Seabed Committee specifically refers in items 2.5 and 6.3 to the freedom of overflight.

All aircraft, civil as well as state, now have a right of overflight within high seas areas, including high seas within straits used for international navigation. The Chicago Convention reflects this right by differentiating between flights over territory which are subject to the consent of the state in question and flights over the high seas which are not. An extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles by a new Law of the Sea Treaty would, unless accompanied by adequate provision for overflight of straits, alter this basic right of overflight through a large number of straits used for international navigation which would be overlapped by a twelve-mile territorial

sea.

It is insufficient in this regard to rely on the Chicago Convention for the protection of this vital overflight right of straits overlapped by a territorial sea. For one thing, not all states have become parties to the Convention. Secondly, with respect to overflight of territorial waters by civil aircraft the Convention permits states in certain circumstances to restrict or suspend overflight. Finally, the provisions of the Convention do not apply to overflight by state aircraft. These state aircraft include a wide variety of aircraft important to the effective functioning of states, including aircraft specialized for weather, diplomatic, customs and immigration, search and rescue and military uses.

unimpeded transit of straits used for international navigation, and the interests of states bordering straits in security, safety of navigation, and prevention of pollution are complimentary. All states share an interest in ensuring each of these goals. It is fortunate, then, that as proposals recently introduced before this Committee make clear, the Conference need not make a choice between them. Rather, the task is to prepare articles which will fully protect the interests of all states.

*

Dept. of State Press Release, No. 326, Aug. 8, 1974. The text of the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage may be found at Senate Exec. G, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., May 20, 1970, pp. 19-27. It was transmitted to the Senate on May 20, 1970, but the Senate has not yet taken action on

the Convention. The 1969 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage is at Senate Exec. K, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., May 5, 1972, pp. 1-20. It was submitted to the Senate on May 5, 1972, and to date there has been no Senate action thereon.

The United States and the Arab Republic of Egypt, through an exchange of notes dated April 13 and 25, 1974, agreed to an arrangement on assistance by the United States to Egypt in the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance from the Suez Canal (TIAS 7882; 25 UST 1474; entered into force April 25, 1974).

The United States, in its note of April 13, 1974, agreed that a special U.S. Force, in cooperation with the appropriate authorities of Egypt and, as agreed, with the Armed Force of the United Kingdom, would carry out minesweeping operations in the Suez Canal. It was further agreed that the Force would also provide training and advisory assistance to Egyptian personnel in order to enable the latter to carry out detection and disposal of unexploded ordnance situated in or adjacent to the Canal. The Force itself was not to carry out such operations.

The United States agreed to make every effort to ensure that the activities of the Force were carried out in such a manner as to render the Canal and its environs safe for further clearance activities and subsequent operation; however, the United States noted that it could not guarantee that all hazardous objects would be located and removed or rendered harmless. The Government of Egypt waived any and all claims against the United States, and agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the U.S. Government against all claims by others, whether made by governments or by private parties, arising out of any acts or omissions of the U.S. Government, the Force or its members in the conduct of Canal clearance activities.

The U.S. note also included provisions under which vessels and aircraft assigned to or supporting the Force would be able freely to enter and depart territorial waters, ports and airfields of Egypt without payment of fees or charges. It was provided further that members of the Force would be allowed freedom of movement within Egypt, other than in areas the Egyptian Government might designate as restricted areas, and freedom of entry to and egress from Egypt.

Members of the Force were to respect the laws, customs and traditions of Egypt, and to abstain from activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Agreement. The U.S. Government agreed to take necessary measures to that end. Force members were also to be immune from

Egyptian criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction unless, in a particular case, the U.S. Government elected in writing to waive such immunity. The Force and its members, and property belonging to either, were to be exempt from all forms of taxation, customs, and other regulations, except as agreed upon pursuant to any supplementary arrangements concluded by the appropriate authorities of the two governments.

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in its note of April 25, 1974, presented its understanding, accepted by the United States, of several points raised in the U.S. note of April 13.

The Government of Egypt said that it would spare no effort, as far as possible, in providing assistance for the safety of the Force in conformity with regulations issued by the Egyptian authorities.

The Egyptian note provided that the two governments waived any and all claims against each other for damage to property, or for death or injury to any member of either party in the course of his official activities, or for any other act or omission for which either of the parties was legally responsible. Claims (other than contractual claims and those waived by Egypt) arising out of acts or omissions of a member of the Force or of the U.S. Government done in the performance of his official duty, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which the Force or the U.S. Government was legally responsible, would be dealt with by the Egyptian Government, and all settled cases would be at the cost of that government. Claims arising otherwise than in the course of duty in Egypt might, at the discretion of the U.S. authorities, be dealt with and settled by the U.S. Government.

With respect to freedom of entry and departure, the Egyptian note stressed that prior authorization was necessary for entry of aircraft and vessels assigned to or supporting the Force to the ports, airfields and territorial waters of Egypt, and for the departure of such aircraft from Egyptian airfields. Reasonable notification was to be given prior to departure of vessels supporting the Force from ports or territorial waters. As for the members of the Force, freedom of entry and departure was recognized, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed upon with the Egyptian authorities.

Egypt agreed to grant immunity from criminal jurisdiction to the members of the Force. However, the Egyptian note also provided that in the event of violation of Egyptian laws or regulations by a Force member, Egyptian authorities might take him into custody without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest. In such cases, the Egyptian authorities were obligated to deliver the offender immediately to the nearest authority representing the Force. However, those authorities, were permitted to undertake a preliminary interrogation