On July 11, 1974, Ambassador John R. Stevenson, Special Representative of the President, and U.S. Representative to the Law of the Sea Conference, made a statement on U.S. oceans policy before the plenary session of the Law of the Sea Conference at Caracas, Venezuela. The following are excerpts from his statement:

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Growing Consensus on Limits of National and International Jurisdiction. In the course of listening to and reading the statements made during the last two weeks, I have been struck by the very large measure of agreement on the general outlines of an overall settlement. Most delegations that have spoken have endorsed or indicated a willingness to accept, under certain conditions and as part of a package settlement, a maximum limit of 12 miles for the territorial sea and of 200 miles for an economic zone, and an international regime for the deep seabed in the area beyond national jurisdiction.

The United States has for a number of years indicated our flexibility on the limits of coastal state resources jurisdiction. We have stressed that the content of the legal regime within such coastal state jurisdiction is more important than the limits of such jurisdiction. Accordingly, we are prepared to accept, and indeed we would welcome general agreement on a 12-mile outer limit for the territorial sea and a 200-mile outer limit for the economic zone provided it is part of an acceptable comprehensive package, including a satisfactory regime within and beyond the economic zone and provision for unimpeded transit of straits used for international navigation....

Territorial Sea. With respect to the coastal states' right to establish a territorial sea of up to a maximum of 12 miles, it is the view of many delegations, including our own, that general recognition of this right must be accompanied by treaty provisions for unimpeded passage through, over and under straits used for international navigation. The formulation of treaty language which will

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maintain a nondiscriminatory right of unimpeded transit while meeting coastal state concerns with respect to navigational safety, pollution and security will be one of the second committee's most important tasks.

Economic Zone. Our willingness and that of many other delegations to accept a 200-mile outer limit for the economic zone depends on the concurrent negotiation and acceptance of correlative coastal state duties.

The coastal state rights we contemplate comprise full regulatory jurisdiction over exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, non-resource drilling, fishing for coastal and anadromous species, and installations constructed for economic purposes.

The rights of other states include freedom of navigation, overflight, and other non-resource uses.

With respect to the zone as a whole, we contemplate coastal state duties to prevent unjustifiable interference with navigation, overflight, and other non-resource uses, and to respect international environmental obligations. With regard to the seabeds and economic installations, this includes respect for international standards to prevent interference with other uses and to prevent pollution. With regard to fishing, this includes a duty to conserve living resources. For the seabeds, we also contemplate a coastal state duty to observe exploration and exploitation arrangements it enters into.

For fisheries, to the extent that the coastal state does not fully utilize a fishery resource, we contemplate a coastal state duty to permit foreign fishing under reasonable coastal state regulations. These regulations would include conservation measures and provision for harvesting by coastal state vessels up to their capacity and could include the payment of a reasonable license fee by foreign fishermen. We also contemplate a duty for the coastal state and all other fishing states to cooperate with each other in formulating equitable international and regional conservation and allocation regulations for highly migratory species, taking into account the unique migratory pattern of these species within and without the zones.

With respect to the related assertions by a number of states of coastal state plenary jurisdiction over scientific research and vesselsource pollution throughout the economic zone, the statements made clear that the willingness of many delegations, including my own, to negotiate on the basis of conditional acceptance of a 200-mile economic zone does not include acceptance of a requirement of coastal state consent for scientific research and coastal state control over vessel-source pollution within the zone.

For our part, we believe that, as an alternative to coastal state consent, a series of obligations should be imposed on the researcher and his flag state to respect coastal state resource interests in the zone. The obligations would include advance notification, participation, data sharing, assistance in scientific research technology and in interpretation of data, and compliance with applicable international environmental standards.

Vessel-source pollution presents a troublesome problem to the entire international community, including coastal states. At the same time, interference with freedom of navigation must be prevented. We believe international standards enforced by flag and port states, with provision for specific additional coastal state enforcement rights, can accommodate these legitimate interests. In this connection, we believe the coastal state may be authorized to take enforcement action in emergencies to prevent imminent danger of major harmful damage to its coast, or pursuant to a finding in dispute settlement that a flag state has unreasonably and persistently failed to enforce applicable international standards on its flag vessels. Of course, flag and port states would retain their right to set higher standards.

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International Seabed Regime Beyond National Jurisdiction. Just as coastal state rights within the zone must, if we are to reach agreement, be balanced by duties, the international authority's jurisdiction over the exploitation of the deep seabed's resources-the common heritage of mankind-must be balanced by duties that protect the rights of individual states and their nationals-most critically in our view their right to nondiscriminatory access under reasonable conditions to the seabed's resources on a basis that provides for the sharing of the benefits of their exploitation with other states.

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Interest of Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States. Most prior speakers have referred to the desirability, indeed the necessity, of providing special benefits in a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty for the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states. The most widely supported proposals are that landlocked states' right of access to the sea and special rights in the fisheries of adjacent coastal states be recognized.

Although these recommendations do not directly affect the United States, we applaud coastal states' willingness to provide these benefits as part of an overall equitable and widely acceptable settlement and, we will, of course, support such provisions.

Much more controversial is the proposal of some landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states that they participate in the benefits of the exploitation of non-renewable resources principally petroleum and natural gas-of the continental margin, either through a direct right of access to neighboring coastal states' continental margins or by the establishment of limits of coastal state jurisdiction that will keep some of the continental margin outside. of coastal state control and within the common heritage.

It is my delegation's view that, as part of a satisfactory and widely acceptable treaty, an equitable and perhaps the most practical accommodation in this area may well be to provide for coastal states' exclusive rights in the continental margin, but also to provide for international payments from mineral resources at a modest and uniform rate in the area beyond 12 miles or the 200 meter isobath, whichever is further seaward. These payments would be used

primarily for developing countries, including developing landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states. Landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states should not expect that sharing in the benefits from deep seabed hard minerals alone could make a significant contribution to their economies.

Compulsory Dispute Settlement. . . . my government believes that any law of the sea treaty is almost as easily susceptible of unreasonable unilateral interpretation as are the principles of customary international law. This is particularly true when we consider that the essential balance of critical portions of the treaty, such as the economic zone, must rest upon impartial interpretation of treaty provisions. One of the primary motivations of my government in supporting the negotiation of a new law of the sea treaty is that of making an enduring contribution to a new structure for peaceful relations among states. Accordingly, we must reiterate our view that a system of peaceful and compulsory third-party settlement of disputes is in the end perhaps the most significant justification for the accommodations we are all being asked to make.

Dept. of State Press Release, No. 301, July 11, 1974, pp. 2-6; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1832, Aug. 5, 1974, pp. 232–236.

U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea

On September 5, 1974, Ambassador Stevenson made a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations evaluating the progress made at the first substantive session of the Conference. The following are excerpts from the statement:

I want to emphasize at the outset that, while the results of the Caracas session were not all we hoped for, the session was not a failure.

A most significant result was the apparent agreement of most nations represented there that the interests of all will be best served by an acceptable and timely treaty.

To that end, the Conference has scheduled not only the next session in the spring in Geneva, but a return to Caracas for the signing of this agreement in the expectation that this will take place in accordance with the United Nations timetable. That timetable provides for conclusion of the treaty in 1975.

Further evidence of this desire to achieve promptly a widelyacceptable treaty was reflected in the adoption by consensus of the rules of procedure early in the session. These rules make several changes in normal procedures that are designed to promote widespread agreement.

The tone of the general debate and the informal meetings was moderate and serious and reflected wide agreement on the broad outlines of a comprehensive general agreement.

Finally, I am sure the members of the Senate who were with us will agree that the delegates from all regions worked hard. Three or four simultaneous meetings were common and there were some night sessions. The number of papers worked on was enormous, but this time the object-largely achieved-was organizing and reducing the alternatives, not proliferating them.

Other accomplishments of the session were considerable. Among the most important are the following:

(a) The vast array of critical law of the sea issues and proposals within the mandate of Committee II-including among others the territorial sea, economic zone, straits, fisheries and the continental margin-was organized by the Committee into a comprehensive set of working papers containing precise treaty texts reflecting main trends on each precise issue. All states can now focus on each issue, and the alternative solutions, with relative ease.

A similar development occurred with respect to marine scientific research in Committee III. Committee I, dealing with the novel subject of a legal regime for exploiting the deep seabed, had previously agreed to alternative treaty texts in the preparatory Committee and further refined these texts at the Caracas session.

(b) The transition from a preparatory Committee of about 90 to a Conference of almost 150, including many newly independent states, was achieved without major new stumbling blocks and a minimum of delay.

(c) The inclusion in the treaty of a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile economic zone was all but formally agreed, subject of course to acceptable resolution of other issues, including unimpeded transit of straits. Accordingly, expanded coastal state jurisdiction over living and non-living resources appears assured as part of the comprehensive treaty.

(d) With respect to the deep seabeds, the first steps have been taken into real negotiation of the basic questions of the system of exploitation and the conditions of exploitation.

(e) Traditional regional and political alignments of states are being replaced by informal groups whose membership is based on similarities of interest on a particular issue. This has greatly facilitated clarification of issues and is necessary for finding effective accommodations.

(f) The number and tempo of private meetings has increased considerably and moved beyond formal positions. This is essential to a successful negotiation. Of course, by their very nature, the results of such meetings cannot be discussed publicly.

With few exceptions, the Conference papers now make it clear what the structure and general content of the treaty will be. The alternatives to choose from, and the blanks to be filled in, and even the relative importance attached to different issues, are well known. What was missing in Caracas was sufficient political will to make hard negotiating choices. A principal reason for this was the conviction that this would not be the last session. The absence prior to the completion of this session of organized alternate treaty texts on many issues also inhibited such decision making.

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