Puerto Rico as in the United States.. ." 48 U.S.C. § 734. Respondent does not claim that the National Labor Relations Act is "locally inapplicable" or that any exception to applicability to Puerto Rico has been provided. As was said in United States v. DeJesus, 289 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1961), “it was not necessary for the Congress to alter specifically all outstanding statutes theretofore previously applicable in order to continue their effectiveness in Puerto Rico after it became a commonwealth in 1952."

Respondent contends that since Puerto Rico is not a "state" the Commerce Clause does not apply to it, and that since it is not a "territory" the Territorial Clause, Art. IV, section 3, clause 2, does not apply. From this premise it is further contended that since neither of these Constitutional grants of power to Congress applies to a "Commonwealth," that Congress has no power to legislate concerning Puerto Rico. We think this argument places too much emphasis on labels and not enough on logic. What is determinative, as we say analogously in Carbitow, is that application of the National Labor Relations Act to Puerto Rico is consonant with the "compact." One or both of these constitutional provisions clearly underlies such congressional action and thus clearly supports application of the Act to this case. (at pp. 337-338; footnotes omitted.)

In United States v. Vargas, 370 F. Supp. 908 (1974), decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on Jan. 29, 1974, it was held, inter alia, that the United Nations did not have the power, in terms of international law and "strict morals" to intervene in the political relation of Puerto Rico and the United States which had been approved democratically by the people of Puerto Rico. The Court would not invalidate the conscription of Puerto Rican citizens of the United States under Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, held to be an ambiguous and broad section of the Charter which was not binding in the absence of implementing legislation. The Court also held that Puerto Rico is not an oc cupied territory of the armed forces of the United States.

Canal Zone

In Government of the Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d 566 (1974), decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on October 4, 1974, the Court was confronted with the question of the extension of the protections of the Bill of Rights to territories governed by the United States.

Appellant was a U.S. citizen charged in the Canal Zone with knowingly or intentionally distributing cocaine. He had been convicted after a jury trial in the U.S. District Court at Balboa. He appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that he had been deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment in that the Government initiated his prosecution by information rather than indictment, and that he had been denied due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the presiding judge was not invested

with tenure of office for good behavior. The Court found no merit to these contentions and affirmed his conviction.

With respect to a grand jury indictment, the Court of Appeals said: Scott recognizes that the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment right to presentment or indictment by a grand jury is inapplicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Hudgens v. Clark, 1964, D.Or., 218 F. Supp. 95, 96. Hurtado v. California, 1884, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232. He argues, however, that a citizen of the United States charged with a violation of a Federal law in a United States court is constitutionally entitled to the benefit of grand jury. This argument disregards the territorial status of the Canal Zone, as well as the special character of the United States courts sitting in the Canal Zone.

The Constitution does not require the extension of all protections of the Bill of Rights to territories governed by the United States. In Soto v. United States, 3 Cir. 1921, 273 F. 628, 633, the Court held that indictment by a grand jury is "not among the fundamental rights which Congress in legislating for a territory not incorporated into the United States must secure to its inhabitants." Moreover, non-citizens and citizens of the United States resident in such territories are treated alike, since it is the territorial nature of the Canal Zone and not the citizenship of the defendant that is dispositive (at pp. 567-568; citations omitted.)

As for the appellant's contention that he had been denied due process and equal protection in that his trial was presided over by a nontenured judge sitting as a so-called "legislative" court rather than a "constitutional" (Article III) court, the Court of Appeals said that the argument was one that "Congress might well consider." The Court quoted Wright, Law of Federal Courts (1970), p. 34: "If judicial independence is of vital importance in the states, it is hard to see why it is not equally valuable in the territories." However, that was not the law. The Court said: "Congress decides the appropriate system of justice for territories. A system suitable for a territory that is a candidate for statehood may be inappropriate for an area under the jurisdiction of the United States by virtue of a treaty between this country and the Republic of Panama, a treaty that is at this point being renegotiated. . . . Scott's argument runs against the tide of a long line of authority beginning with Chief Justice Marshall's analysis in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828). It must therefore be rejected."

Berlin

The 1972 edition of the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, at page 225 in a section on population of cities, lists the Eastern sector of Berlin as the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The

Western sector of Berlin is listed as part of the Federal Republic of Germany, but at the end of a list of West German cities otherwise placed alphabetically on the page. A notation at the bottom of page 225 states that "Designations and data for Berlin appearing on this page were supplied by the competent authorities pursuant to the relevant agreements of the Four Powers."

On May 1, 1974, shortly after receipt of the 1972 U.N. Yearbook, the Permanent Representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States addressed a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General with respect to the Berlin designations. The letter said, in relevant part:

We have received the 1972 edition of the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and we wish to express some observations of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on certain points concerning the designations used in relation to Berlin, and the presentation of statistics for Berlin, in that edition of the Yearbook. There is, in the view of these governments, no justification for the treatment of the Eastern sector of Berlin in a way which might imply acknowledgement of the claim that it is the capital or part of the territory of the German Democratic Republic, a claim which they do not accept. We must also record the view of our governments that the difference in treatment accorded to the Eastern sector of Berlin, on the one hand, and the Western sectors of the city, on the other, is not warranted: certainly, no such warrant is provided by the notation at the bottom of the page, the phraseology of which fails to reflect the correct legal position with sufficient clarity and unambiguity. We wish to affirm that the right of the Federal Republic of Germany to represent the Western sectors of Berlin, and their permanent residents, in international organizations and international conferences derives from rights long granted by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States on the basis of their authority in the Western sectors of Berlin. The letter sent to you on December 7, 1973 (A/9431-S/11150), sets forth the views of our governments on that matter. Accordingly, we are obliged formally to reserve the positions of our governments. It goes without saying that the notation referred to above cannot be taken as an expression of legal or political views or conclusions and that no rights are or can be created or asserted on the basis of any data, statement or assertion in the Yearbook.

We wish to state that our three governments have no objection to the German Democratic Republic supplying statistics for the Eastern sector of Berlin.

*

U.N. Doc. A/9599, May 3, 1974. For the letter of Dec. 7, 1973, mentioned in the text above, see the 1973 Digest, Ch. 6, § 1, pp. 194–195.

On July 25, 1974, the Federal Republic of Germany formally announced the establishment of the Federal Environmental Agency (FEA) in West Berlin. The Government of the German Democratic Republic then immediately began a slowdown on some of the access routes to West Berlin, the procedure involving stopping and spotchecking identifications ostensibly to discover whether the persons being checked were employed by the FEA. The Soviet Union, in a statement published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 20 in Pravda, argued that the forthcoming establishment of the FEA in West Berlin was contrary to the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement provision "to the effect that the Western sectors of Berlin are not part of the Federal Republic of Germany and will not be governed by the Federal Republic of Germany in the future." The Soviet statement also said that the establishment of the FEA was "at variance with the basic meaning of the provisions of the Agreement on curtailing the activities of the Federal Republic of Germany state organs in Berlin as well as the commitment not to change unilaterally the status quo." The Soviet statement said that should the FEA be established, "there will arise a necessity to take appropriate measures to counteract attempts at violating the Four-Power Agreement and to protect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic which is friendly to it."

On July 25, 1974, the Bonn Group (the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany) sent to the Soviet Union a statement defending the establishment of the FEA in West Berlin and protesting the slowdown on some of the access routes. The text of the statement is as follows:

The governments of the three powers are firmly of the view that no civilian persons should be subject to exclusion from transit routes to Berlin simply because they are employees of the Federal Environmental Agency. The Quadripartite Agreement expressly provides that, except in clearly defined special cases, travelers are not subject to exclusion from the transit routes between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, and such special cases relate only to misuse by travelers of the transit routes themselves. Any other purported grounds for excluding travelers from the transit routes would, accordingly, have no legal basis. It is the position of the three powers that establishment of the FEA in the Western sectors of Berlin does not contravene the Quadripartite Agreement. The Quadripartite Agreement expressly provides for the maintenance and development of the ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin; in approving the establishment of the Federal Environmental

Agency the three Allies naturally took into account, as stated by them in the Quadripartite Agreement, that the Western sectors of Berlin continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it.

The Soviet Government is responsible for ensuring that transit traffic between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany of civilian persons and goods remains unimpeded.

These Allied views were communicated to the Soviet Government on various occasions.

See Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 130, July 29, 1974, p. B-8. The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement is at TIAS 7551; 24 UST 285. It entered into force June 3, 1972. See also the 1973 Digest, Ch. 6, § 1, pp. 194–196.

Foreign States

In Battery Steamship Corp. v. Republic of Viet-Nam, No. C-72– 1440, RFP U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the Corporation sought to institute a suit against the Republic of Viet-Nam for demurrage charges allegedly owed by the Republic of Viet-Nam to the plaintiff with respect to a shipment of rice under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480). For further details, see the 1973 Digest, Ch. 6, § 7, pp. 227230; for the aspect of the case concerning immunity from jurisdiction of Viet-Nam's consulate staff, see this volume, Ch. 4, § 2, supra, pp. 181-182.

Subsequent to the letter of Acting Legal Adviser Charles N. Brower dated July 24, 1973, to Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson, setting forth the Department of State's views on certain aspects of the possible bases for in personam jurisdiction in the case (see the 1973 Digest, Ch. 6, § 7, pp. 228–230), both plaintiff and defendant filed memoranda and other documents with the Court concerning the Motion to Quash Service of Summons filed by the Republic of Viet-Nam. Service for in personam jurisdiction had been made by sending copies of the Summons and Complaint by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in Saigon, and to the Minister of Economy of the Republic of Viet-Nam, also in Saigon. Notice was sent as well to the Ambassador of Viet-Nam in Washington, to the Viet-Nam Consul General in San Francisco, and to the attorneys of record for Viet-Nam in this action. Plaintiff argued that the sole issue before the Court was "whether the defendant's contacts with California make it reasonable and in accordance with the due process concepts of fair play and substantial justice for the defendant to be required to defend this law suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California." Plaintiff