that the unusual meaning may be, one who confirms, or ratifies a covenant; that is, the victim that was slain to ratify it?

Secondly, if the Apostle used the word dan in the sense of a covenant in this passage, in accordance with the uniform usage of that word, and the word n every where else, as I have endeavored to prove, then nothing is more natural than to suppose that he used the corresponding word diabéμsvos in a similar sense. Since an unusual signification was to be attached to the word, it is to be presumed that he would give to the word this signification. He wished to express the idea that the covenant between God and man was always ratified by the death of a victim sacrificed on such an occasion, and for such a purpose. Yet there was no single word which would convey that idea. Neither the Greek nor the Hebrew furnished such a word in common use, and there was a necessity for expressing the thought by circumvention, or by using a word in a sense that differed slightly from the usual signification. Professor Stuart is not to learn how the Apostle would meet such an exigency, nor how common in his writings ära ɛyouέva occur, nor how often words are used by him in a sense which occurs nowhere else. The instance before us, is at all events, such an instance, for even on the interpretation proposed by Professor Stuart, it is necessary to suppose just such an usage.

Thirdly, the usage by the Apostle, in this sense, is not a departure from the fair and proper meaning of the word. The word diarionu properly means to place apart, to set in order, to arrange. It is rendered appoint in Luke xxii: 29; made, and make, with reference to a covenant. Acts iii: 25; Heb. viii: 10: x: 16. It does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament except in the case before us. The idea of placing, disposing, arranging, enters always into the word, as to place wares, merchandize, &c., for sale; to arrange a contract, &c. Passow. The fair meaning of the word here may be, whatever goes to arrange, dispose, or settle the covenant, or to make it secure and firm. If the word relate to a compact, the word cannot refer to one of the contracting parties, because the death of neither is necessary to confirm it. But if it was a well understood fact that a sacrifice was needful to confirm such an arrangement with God, then the word would naturally refer to such a victim as that by which it was confirmed. And though it be admitted that the word

is not elsewhere found in this sense, the only material question is, whether the Apostle would use a word in a single instance in a sense different from the usual signification, where the sense would be easily understood. On either interpretation, this must be admitted, for Professor Stuart admits that the word does not occur in the Scriptures elsewhere in the sense in which he uses it here. If these remarks are well founded, then the word may be properly regarded as referring to the victim that was slain, in order to ratify a covenant with God. In the old "arrangement," this was the animal offered in sacrifice; in the new, it was the Lamb of God. It may be added here, that the authority of Michaelis, Macknight, Doddridge, Bloomfield, Steudel, and the late Dr. James P. Wilson, all of whom assign this meaning to the word, is a sufficient proof that such an interpretation cannot be a very serious departure from the proper use of a Greek word.

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(3.) The third objection of Professor Stuart to this interpretation is this:- "Nexgois means only dead men, but men surely were not sacrificed by the Jews, as a mediating sacrifice in order to confirm a covenant." Of the fact here affirmed, that " men were not sacrificed by the Jews to confirm a covenant," there will be no difference of opinion. The only question is, whether the other point of the affirmation be equally clear-that "vexgois means only dead men." Of this fact, Professor Stuart has adduced no proof, nor has he referred to any sources from which the evidence is derived. It is evident, therefore, that he regarded it as so settled in classical and Scripture usage that vexgo meant only dead men, that it was not even a matter of question among the learned. Yet it is not improper to ask what is the evidence that the word vexgós involves of necessity the conclusion that that which is affirmed to be dead was a man? It cannot be that nothing else died so far as the knowledge of the Greeks extended, for it is to be presumed that they were not ignorant of the fact that vegetables and animals were subject to death as well as men. In no other language, so far as known, is the idea necessarily incorporated into a word that refers to death, that it is the death of a man, nor is one word used to denote such a death, and another to express the death of a vegetable or animal. No one can deny that language might be so philosophically constructed as to express with entire

accuracy these shades of thought, but in the languages in common use in the world, it has not been deemed necessary to mark this distinction by the use of different words, and what is the evidence that even the subtle and philosophic Greeks did it? What gave rise to the distinction, if it did exist among them? On these points, Professor Stuart has given us no information, and it is not unfair, therefore, to enquire respectfully whether it is an undisputed and unequivocal matter of fact that the Greeks made this distinction, and that the word "vsxgois means only dead men." There are some considerations, however, which may lead us to doubt whether this remark respecting the meaning of the word vexgós is as universally true as is affirmed by Professor Stuart, or whether the word may not be used here in reference to the bodies of victims slain in sacrifice. It is true, that the signification usually given in the Lexicons is one that confines it to the bodies of dead men. Thus Passow defines it as meaning der todte Leib, der Leichnam, die Leiche, and remarks that it is used by Homer exclusively of the bodies of dead men-vom menschlichen Leichnam. The same definition is given substantially by Robinson Lex. N. T. This limitation of meaning is not, however, marked by Bretschneider, or by Schleusner. In regard to its use here, we may remark (1.) that it is scarcely necessary to observe that the word men is not in the original, unless it be supposed to be involved of necessity in the word vexgos. It is simply "upon" or "over the dead"-mi vexgõis. (2.) It is to be presumed, unless there is positive proof to the contrary, that the Hebrews and Greeks used the word dead as it is used by other people, as applicable to any thing when the life was extinct. A sacrifice that had been slain was dead; a tree that had fallen was dead; an animal that had been slain by other wild animals was dead. It would be desirable to be able to express the condition of such objects when life was extinct, and there was doubtless some word that would convey such an idea. It is possible, indeed, as has been suggested, to conceive that a language may be so subtle in its distinctions as to have one term to denote a dead oak, another a dead cypress, another a dead lion, another a dead elephant, another a dead man, and so on through the whole range of objects where there has been organic or animal life. But what is the evidence that the Hebrews or the Greeks had

such separate terms? What term was used in Greek besides vexgós to denote that an animal was dead? (3.) What is the meaning of this word vexgóg in such passages as the following where it is applied to works, if it never refers to any thing but dead men? Heb. vi: 1; ix: 14. And what is its meaning in James ii: 17, 20, 26, where it is applied to faith, and in Eph. ii: 1,5; and Rev. iii: 1, where it is applied to those who are spiritually dead? (4.) In Eccl. ix: 4, an instance occurs where the word cannot be applied to dead men-for it is applied expressly to a dead lion-rov λέοντα τὸν νεκρόν. In Isa. xiv: 19, it is a translation of

a branch, a broken, rejected, dead limb. These instances show, at least, that there are cases where the word is used to denote something else than dead men.

or

To these considerations respecting the use of the word vɛxgós we may add that the translation of í vexgos by "after men are dead," can be arrived at only by a much forced use of language. Independently of all the difficulties suggested by the connexion, it may be observed that it is impossible to reach this signification without giving to the word vsxgõis the force of a participle, in the sense of "when men are dead” they having died." This idea is not properly in the Greek. It is that of a dead body, a carcase, a corpse, without special reference to the fact of its having died. The attention is confined by the word simply to the fact that it is dead, without having the mind turned particularly to the fact that it was once alive, or that the thing to be done or secured depends on that fact. The dead body is in the eye; not the fact that it was once living. To this it may be added, also, that the proper use of rí is not after, but upon, or over, and it may be doubted whether an unequivocal instance can be found in which the word is used in the sense of after.

If the suggestion contained, therefore, in this article be well-founded, the following paraphrase will express the true sense of the passage: "For where an arrangement subsists between God and men, there must of necessity be the death of the victim by which it is ratified and confirmed. For such an arrangement is ratified over dead sacrifices, seeing it is never of force, while the victim set apart for its ratification is still living. Whence it was (sv) that the first covenant was not ratified without blood, for when Moses had spoken all the commandments to the people, according to the law, he

took the blood of calves, and of goats, with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled the book and all the people, saying, 'This is the blood of the covenant which God hath enjoined unto you.'

ARTICLE IV.

THE TRAINING OF THE PREACHER.

By Rev. Henry N. Day, Prof. of Sac. Rhet. Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio,

THE ambassador of God occupies the loftiest station of dignity and responsibility on earth. The source of his commission, the nature of his duties, and the infinite consequences connected with his labors, unite to show how exalted are his character and functions, how responsible is his trust. Clothed with the authority of the Sovereign of the universe, representing his divine person and acting in his name; engaged in the prosecution of an enterprise in which God has enlisted his brightest attributes, in which infinite power, and wisdom, and love shine in their divinest forms, in which too, the dearest interests of his boundless kingdom are vitally concerned; sent upon a mission on the success of which are hanging the destinies of immortality to deathless spirits, where on earth can he find a competitor in momentousness of trust or sacredness of function?

Vast as are the responsibilities which attach to every part of the Christian minister's office, however, it is in the attitude of a preacher of the gospel of salvation, that he appears transcendently interesting. It is when he is speaking in the name of the majesty of heaven, and proclaiming the messages of infinite authority and grace, that he is peculiarly "a savor of life unto life, or of death unto death." However important and sacred, however engaging and delightful may be the other duties of his ministry, yet "his pulpit is," emphatically, "his joy and his throne." There is the seat of his authority, the place of his power and dignity, and there, if he be true and faithful to his high calling, will he find the