future kingdom. Why, then, make it an essential part of Christianity, and prevent the acceptance of this religion by all who revolt against the thought of handing over the majority of mankind to perdition? It is difficult to see how that which is opposed to the infinite goodness of God can be coeternal with it. All evil casts a dark shadow over God's creation, and his kingdom cannot be consummated without its annihilation. There is no conceivable object in eternizing evil; for it is impossible to suppose that God wills a revelation of righteousness, truth, power, and love to be tarnished by it. Can the moral government of an almighty Ruler need the existence of beings doomed to eternal punishment; or is such warning example necessary? We think not. The final impenitence of rational creatures were a blot upon the aspect of a universe in which God is all in all. A ghastly hell is a kind of limit to His infinite goodness. As to the impossibility of "not telling how

many wise designs God may serve thereby," of which Dr. Samuel Clarke speaks, we can only express inability to discover one.1

1 "Ratio evidentissime docet nil bonitati veræque beatitudini ex diametro contrarium perpetuo esse posse. Bonitas enim circumscribit malitiam penitusque consumit, similiter vita mortem, beatitudo miseriam, virtus vitia mortuorumque causas cœteraque id genus."—Scotus Erigena, De Divisione Naturæ, v. 27, p. 259.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

THE perfectibility of human nature is a probable thing. Man's highest hopes and anticipations, the purest longings of his spirit, favour perpetual progress toward completeness, when he shall be filled with all that the finite can hold of the infinite. If a provision be not made in revelation for a change of moral character after death, it is made in reason. Philosophical considerations must not be set aside even by Scripture, or by the platitudes of those who think they settle the question with the words, "As the tree falleth, so it lies." Originally there were two distinct representations,

viz. the setting up of the Messianic kingdom with a participation of the risen saints in it; and the consummation or end of the world with the general resurrection and judgment. These constituents of primitive Christian eschatology either go together side by side, or appear in combination. Wherever the resurrection of the just is mentioned, reference is also found to the return of Christ, with whom appear the saints in "a spiritual body." Where a general resurrection of the dead is spoken of, it is brought into connection with the judgment of all—a judgment pronounced by God himself.2 The two representations are combined most readily where the second advent, the resurrection of the dead, the general judgment, and the end of the world make up a picture in which Christ is the principal figure. Another combination is effected

1 Comp. I Thess. iv. 16; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Rom. viii. 11. 2 Acts xxiv. 15; John v. 29; Matt. vi. 4, 6, 14, 18; Rev. xx. II, etc.; Rom. ii. 5, etc., iii. 6.

when there is a twofold resurrection as in the Revelation, where the return of Christ and the end of all things are separated by the earthly reign of the Messiah, at the beginning of which the saints are raised to be sharers in it, and afterwards all the other dead are judged. At the final winding up, when a new heaven and a new earth appear, God is the Ruler.1 The same view appears in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, with this variation, that the Messianic kingdom is characterized by the opposition of enemies, till all are subdued and the end comes. In both cases, that kingdom is interposed between the advent of Christ and the consummation; but the external aspect of it is different.

2

The eschatological picture, as well in its early as its late ecclesiastical forms, rests upon an antiquated conception of the mundane system, which makes earth the centre, so that heaven 1 xx.-xxii. 2 XV. 20-28.