2 of 2 tropical forests around the world. `(2) Tropical forests provide a wide range of benefits to humankind by- (A) harboring a major share of the Earth's biological and terrestrial resources, `(B) playing a critical role as carbon sinks in reducing greenhouse gases in the (C) regulating hydrological cycles on which far-flung agricultural and coastal `(3) International negotiations and assistance programs to conserve forest resources have (4) Developing countries with urgent needs for investment and capital for development (5) Poverty and economic pressures on the populations of developing countries have, over `(6) Debt reduction can reduce economic pressures on developing countries and result in (b) PURPOSES- The purposes of this part are- (1) to recognize the values received by United States citizens from protection of tropical (2) to facilitate greater protection of tropical forests (and to give priority to protecting the most severe threat) by providing for the alleviation of debt in countries where tropical forests are `(3) to ensure that resources freed from debt in such countries are targeted to protection of `(4) to rechannel existing resources to facilitate the protection of tropical forests. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS To all Members of the United States Congress, Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, We all agree that China's problems should be primarily resolved by the Chinese people. Only then can it achieve success. Since the Chinese authorities also know this, what they most fear is not secret dialogues and empty deals between China and foreign leaders, but the determination and self-confidence of the Chinese people to resist oppression and exploitation by their leaders. The Chinese Communists of course are not worried that these so-called "dialogues," might increase the confidence of the people to resist. But the Chinese people do see and feel the pressure and condemnation of the international commmity. This pressure increases the confidence and the strength of the Chinese people to resist their leaders. The Chinese people desperately need the unwavering support of the international community. Let me cite an example, because it represents the most valuable help given at the time of the war of independence, the American people deeply respect the Statue of Liberty, a gift of the French people. The Chinese people need your help today. Nowadays, to convey such a message does not need such an elaborate statue. The place where most countries of the world meet is itself a symbol of the times and community in which we live. Therefore, many Chinese people regard the Human Rights Commission in Geneva as a barometer to measure the support given by the international community to the Chinese people in their struggle for human rights and freedom. Because of that, the Chinese government continuously regards the fights at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva as an extremely important issue. This is why they have worked to divide the Western countries in Geneva by using all means available, including buying votes. This success of the Chinese Government to silence the world community has serious consequences. First, it is a massive blow to the Chinese people's determination to struggle for human rights and democracy. They are left with a feeling that they have been betrayed. Most people inside China no longer praise the democratic, Western countries if they think of the Human Rights Commission. This is the best proof of the depth of the disappointment of the Chinese people. Secondly, it sends a wrong signal to the Chinese authorities. After the split of the Western nations and defeat of the resolution last year, the Chinese government immediately increased their oppression of the democracy movement, including the organised maltreatment of political prisoners. This year, even some false democratic organisations created by individuals who would not previously have made their views known are now starting to spy for the Communist leadership without fear. It appears that they have seen something from the standpoint of the Western democratic countries. What have they seen? They have scen many in the West crassly abandon their own values in the face of money. I urge my friends in the United States Congress to clearly show the Chinese people the basic values of the American people. I urge my friends to pass a clear resolution calling on your representatives in the Commission for Human Rights in Geneva to hold fast in their position. It is not only for the sake of the American people, but for the whole human-kind. The values of democracy, freedom and human rights far exceed the value of money! 485 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10017-6104 TEL (212) 972-8400 FAX (212) 972-0905 E-mail: hrwnyc@hrw.org 1522 K St., NW, #910, Washington, DC 20005-1202 TEL (202) 371-6592 FAX (202) 371-0124 E-mail: hrwdc@hrw.org 10951 West Pico Blvd., #203, Los Angeles, CA 90064-2126 TEL (310) 475-3070 FAX (310) 475-5612 E-mail: hrwatchla@igc.apc.org 33 Islington High St., N1 9LH London, UK TEL (4471) 713-1995 FAX (4471) 713-1800 E-mail: hrwatchuk@gn.apc.org 15 Rue Van Campenhout, 1040 Brussels, Belgium TEL (322) 732-2009 FAX (322) 732-0471 E-mail: hrwatcheu@gn.apc.org Flat D, 16th Floor, 57 Spring Garden Lane, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, TEL (852) 574-6275, FAX (852) 572-8910, E-mail: rmunro@igc.apc.org A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA REPORT, COPYRIGHT © HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ISSN 1079-2309 I. SUMMARY China appears to be on the verge of ensuring that no attempt is made ever again to censure its human righ practices at the United Nations. It is an extraordinary feat of diplomacy and an equally extraordinary capitulation on t part of governments, particularly the United States and the countries of the European Union, that claim to favc multilateral initiatives as a way of exerting human rights pressure. One of the few remaining international fora to exer such pressure is the annual meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva- - in session this year from March 10 to April 18 where countries with particularly egregious human rights records can become the subject of resolutions. Every year save one since 1990, the U.S. and the E.U. have taken the lead, with support from Japan and other governments, in sponsoring a resolution on China, and every year save one, China has successfully blocked even debate on the subject. The threat of a resolution, however, has itself been an effective form of pressure, as illustrated by the time and resources China has spent in trying to counter it. This report is an analysis of China's diplomatic efforts with respect to key members of the commission over the last three years. It describes a pattern of aggressive lobbying by Chinese officials, using economic and political blandishments, that has worked to undermine the political will in both developed and developing countries to hold Beijing accountable in Geneva, coupled with procrastination and passivity on the part of China's critics, the same governments that have been such vocal proponents of multilateralism. The report suggests that countries concerned about human rights in China should put more, not less effort into a carefully constructed resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission; that the process of fashioning a resolution and lobbying for its passage is important, whether it ultimately reaches the floor of the commission for debate or not; and that ending all efforts on China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, as the U.S. and Europe seem to be considering, will be seen in China as a triumph over the West's dominance of international institutions and one that it may want to follow up in fields other than human rights. As this report went to press, the U.S. and the E.U. were involved in diplomatic negotiations with China on a possible package of limited steps or promises in exchange for dropping a resolution this year and in subsequent years. The U.S. in particular, seemed poised to accept any last-minute gestures that China might make during Vice President Albert Gore's trip to China in late March, midway through the commission's deliberations. But the prospect of obtaining truly meaningful improvements from Beijing on human rights would have been far higher had there been a real threat of a coordinated, high-level lobbying effort behind a resolution in Geneva, the work on which would have had to have begun in September or October 1996 For the U.S. and EU. to suggest at this late date that a resolution cannot pass is a prophecy they have done their utmost to make self-fulfilling. Background A resolution on China at the commission is a curiously potent tool for raising human rights issues, given that it is an unenforceable statement that carries no penalues or obligations. But as the product of the U.N., it has major implications for a country's international image, and even to table a resolution for discussion is considered by many countries, China among them, as a major loss of face. But China considers the U.N. Human Rights Commission an important forum for other reasons as well, including as a vehicle for countering Western “hegemonism,” particularly through alliances with governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the 1996 session of the commission, Chinese diplomats made clear that they saw an attempt to seek a resolution on China as an example of this hegemonism, arguing that the North used the commission as a one-way forum through which to confront, judge, and interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries while ignoring abuses in the U.S. and Europe, and that the commission paid too much attention to political and civil rights while neglecting economic, social, and cultural rights and the right to Human Rights Watch/Asia 2 March 1997, Vol. 9, No. 3 (C) development. In addition to its value to China as a forum to challenge the West, the commission has also become a useful vehicle to play the U.S. off against its erstwhile European allies. Interest in using the U.N. Human Rights Commission as a forum for criticizing China only emerged after the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Beginning in 1990, the annual Geneva meetings were marked by efforts to table mildly worded resolutions urging China to improve its human rights practices and criticizing ongoing violations of international standards. These efforts were defeated before the resolutions could come up for debate by "no-action" motions brought by one of China's friends on the commission -- Pakistan could be counted on in this regard. A "noaction" motion, if passed, meant that the resolution died a quick death before ever coming to debate and vote. In March 1995, however, the "no-action" motion failed for the first time. China's human rights record was debated, and a resolution sponsored by the U.S. and the European Union lost by only one vote when Russia unexpectedly cast its vote in opposition. It was the closest China had ever come to defeat. In April 1996, by contrast, China again successfully blocked a resolution through the "no-action" procedure, by a vote of twenty-seven to twenty with six abstentions. In the year that elapsed between the two meetings, China's human rights record had worsened, but its lobbying had improved and the political will of its critics had weakened. Visits between China and commission members between April 1996 and March 1997 resulted in more aid packages, new and expanded trade contracts including foreign investment and joint ventures, and promises of improved bilateral cooperation on projects ranging from agriculture to nuclear technology. While it is impossible to definitively document the direct relationship between each visit or aid package and the votes of individual commission members, an overall pattern emerged that may help to explain China's success at muzzling the commission. Clearly, in many countries, much more was at stake than a Geneva vote, as Beijing sought to boost its long-term political and economic relationships and to weaken Taiwan's ties with some capitals. But a major objective during this period was also to defeat the annual Geneva effort. In 1995 and in 1996, the importance of the outcome in Geneva was clearly reflected in official statements. At the conclusion of the 1995 voting, a foreign ministry spokesman speaking on state radio "expressed its [the Chinese government's] admiration and gratitude to those countries that supported China," and China's ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva said the resolution was "entirely a product of political confrontation practiced by the West with ulterior motives." After the 1996 vote, an article by the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, entitled “Failure' of Human Rights Resolution Hailed," gloated that the commission "has again shot down a draft resolution against China, marking another failure by the West to use human rights to interfere in China's internal affairs....” 4 From China's perspective, there were two relatively balanced voting blocs on the commission, and a number of crucial swing votes. One bloc consisted of Asian and African states. The second was composed of western Europe and North and Central America. The swing votes were to be found among some of the new democracies of central Europe, the former Soviet republics, large Latin American countries and a handful of African and Asian nations. China courted them all and pursued its efforts to divide Europe and the United States. 'See, for example, the statements of Chinese diplomats in press releases issued by the U.N. Commission for Human Rights during its 1996 session: Wu Jianmin in Press Release HR/CN/96/03, March 19, 1996, p. 4 and Zhang Jun in Press Release HR/CN/96/13, March 26, 1996, p. 4. * Washington Post, "U.N. Rights Panel Votes Down Measure Censuring China," March 9, 1995. *Commission members serve for three-year terms, but may serve more than one term. Human Rights Watch/Asia 3 March 1997, Vol. 9, No. 3 (C) |