This seems absurd to me that a judge would say the passage of a resolution, which says nothing other than, unless you pass another resolution authorizing it, something comes out is different than a law which says, unless you pass something, the troops must come out.

If that is Judge Greene's decision, I cannot understand for the basis for it. I can't understand why passing this resolution is any different than simply re-enacting the War Powers Act in terms of getting this before the court, Question 1.

Question 2, why would things stand on something which seems sort of crazy to me as a basis for such a fundamental question of whether you contest the constitutionality of the law?

Second, Chadha, I know you think this is not Chadha, but I don't know why you think it is not Chadha. It is a concurrent resolution. It is not a joint resolution. It is an effort to circumvent the President-well, without describing its motive-it circumvents the President in this process. Why, given Chadha, do you think this could work?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I need someone to yield to me and the amber light is on.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman still has a minute left.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Hamilton has not yielded to me.

Mr. HAMILTON. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

On the first point, and I may not have time to get to Chadha, so, please, somebody else yield to me. I want to get to Chadha.

On the first point, you are right. That is why I think Judge Greene was wrong. He should have allowed the case to go ahead straight under the Constitution. But in that he has said it is not ripe for one Member of Congress to bring the case, you need a majority of the Congress to be with you, I am stuck.

I agree with you it is a very difficult position for Judge Greene to have held. Logically, I would not have agreed with it. I criticize it. So does Professor Ely, on whose work I have been relying heavily. But I cannot change it, and I know fairly likely, given how much we have squirmed to get around the difficulty of having to declare war, so courts have squirmed to get around having to make a decision.

Give me the means to force the court to decide.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be happy to yield to you a minute after I have finished my questions. But let me note that there is no more distinguished and no more honorable a gentleman than you, Mr. Campbell, but I agree with what you are trying to do today, as well as express those sentiments.

I not only support the amendment, Mr. Chairman, but I support the resolution.

Mr. Campbell, is not your purpose to try to remove the troops in Bosnia as soon as possible? Is that your end goal here?

Mr. CAMPBELL. If the gentleman will yield.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. My goal is to have a vote in Congress to determine whether our troops should be there. That is my goal.

My secondary goal is to find out whether, and to what extent, the War Powers Act is constitutional. If you wish my view on the policy, I would be happy to share with you that I do think————

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is what I am asking you.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not hide my position on the policy. I do not think our troops should be there. But I am trying my best to abstract from that. It is not in the resolution.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So someone who wants to get the troops out of Bosnia would support this resolution and this amendment; is that correct?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would hope so. I think it is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But even if you don't support that, those people would like our fundamental policy of the United States in the post-cold war era to be that the President of the United States is not able to put troops into hostilities for long periods of time without congressional support. If they support Bosnia, but still would like that position, they still might support your amendment. Mr. CAMPBELL. Indeed. If the gentleman would yield.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I do.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The very best way to support the policy in Bosnia is to have Congress ratify it. President Bush took this position in the Persian Gulf buildup of 1990, and I voted in favor. I know my colleague did as well.

So that is the answer. Whether you support it or not, let's get Congress on record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we just went through a meeting among all of the Republicans, and we were briefed about the terrible crisis that we have in our military; that we are billions of dollars short, that we are developing a hollow military, where planes are not going to be able to take off and our troops are not going to be able to defend themselves because weapon systems have not been maintained.

This was given to us in great detail, and what it indicates to me is not that we should be voting for supplementals as what the purpose of our conference was, but instead it indicates to me that we should be supporting some fundamental change in the way we do things around here to make sure that our troops are not put in jeopardy.

What we have in Bosnia is a situation where we are overextended. The United States is overextended throughout the world. Bosnia is not vital to our national security, and we are spending billions of dollars. The reason we have been put in this situation is that the fundamental law of the land is not being heeded.

Mr. Campbell is right on target to try to make sure that that law is defined and goes through the legislative and judicial process as well, so that we don't get entangled in any more Bosnias. So I am 100 percent behind what Mr. Campbell is doing, and if you would like to answer the last question, go right ahead.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
Mr. Chairman, if I might have Mr. Berman's attention.

It is difficult and it is going to take longer than the time now, but let me at least begin. Do you know Professor Ely, former dean at Stanford, professor at Harvard, and professor at Yale? This is

his book "War and Responsibility. Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath."

I am quoting from-yes, put the whole book in the record. [Laughter.]

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am quoting from page 119.

"My personal opinion is that Section 5(c) is not unconstitutional. Even assuming that Chadha makes sense..." he drops a footnote "...it seems distinguishable"

Mr. BERMAN. Wait, wait, wait. You can't say even assuming Chadha makes sense when you say Judge Greene doesn't make sense, but I am following him. Chadha makes sense for this purpose.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am quoting, right? So what can I do but quote? I will do a running commentary if you would like.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. BERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman, Mr. Rohrabacher, have an additional minute.

Chairman GILMAN. An additional minute is agreed to.

Mr. CAMPBELL. So quoting Ely, and then I will give you my view if you would like, but I think Ely is pretty "dang" impressive, and he has written at length and studied the issue.

"So even assuming Chadha makes sense, it seems distinguishable. Section 5(c) does not fit the profile of the standard legislative veto, wherein Congress has delegated certain powers to the executive branch and then attempted to pull them back by reserving a right to veto executive exercises of the delegation. Instead, it should be read in the context of Sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) as part of a package attempting to approximate in concrete terms the accommodation reached by the founders that the President could act militarily in an emergency, but was obligated to cease and desist in the event Congress did not approve as soon as it had a reasonable opportunity to do so."

End quote, but it goes on for two more paragraphs. So that I have got at least a minute or some time to tell you what I think it means.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Blunt. Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Campbell, I would like a minute or so left at the end of my time, but I would like to hear your explanation of what that means at the front part of my time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. The problem with Chadha is where you have an expansive delegation and then an executive agency really legislates and Congress looks at and says we don't like that legislation, and we are vetoing it by a single House or by a concurrent resolution, by two Houses.

The infirmity, the legal infirmity is that it is not given to the President for his signature. That is the presentment clause that was the basis of Chadha.

What John Ely says, and he is right, in my view, is that declaration of war is very different from a piece of delegated authority to an executive agency, and the reason why it is different is that the Constitution requires Congress to approve war, and so it isn't, "here we will give you this general area of authority. You do what

is right. We will sit back, look at it, and pick this one and not pick that one by a single house," which was Chadha.

It was a single House, the House of Representatives, that vetoed the delegated authority to the Attorney General regarding one poor immigrant who was being deported.

War is very different, as Ely points out. You do not just delegate broad authority. Rather, what you have is a reality that the Congress must approve it in advance. But in the modern world, there are going to be emergencies. So the War Powers Resolution says 60 days, Mr. President, handle the emergency, but then the original intent of the Constitution resumes. There has to be an approval by Congress. It is not a delegated authority. It is always our obligation, but we recognize the emergencies of the modern world for 60 days, and that is very different than the situation in Chadha and the reasoning in Chadha.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hamilton, no one has higher regard for the two of you on this Committee than I do, but I intend to vote for the resolution, for the amendment. I think this discussion has been good for this Committee. I think this discussion will be good for the Congress. I really don't see the negative policy implications of the Congress having this discussion about the Congress' responsibility.

Is it negative to our European allies to say you need to be thinking about your portion of the burden being shared here? Is it negative to the people in Bosnia saying that the Congress is asserting its right to consider the President's policy of committing troops?

Just a month ago, we were rushing toward another military commitment that clearly did not involve the nuclear precipice. It did not involve the need of someone in our country to be able to respond overnight to a nuclear threat. It involved the committing of American resources and American lives to advance a world posi

tion.

I think the Congress has that constitutional responsibility. The War Powers Act may or may not be the right way to assert that, but having that decided, I think would be a helpful thing, and I yield back my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman be willing to yield for one moment just for a question?

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Berman, I would.

Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate that.

Then why not offer a resolution pursuant to the War Powers Act authorizing or opposing the placement of troops in Bosnia, and let's have that debate on the merits?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. BERMAN. You can do whatever you want. I would just like to add to that. You can have it one way or the other, but I think it is wrong to say, this is not a debate about Bosnia policy. It is a debate about our institutional power. I happen to be offering a resolution which serves my policy purposes, but we aren't debating the policy, and then to say we have to pass this so that the American people can have a debate about our Bosnia policy.

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Berman, I really would see that as a debate on the principle, not the policy, and then I think the policy debate follows, but I am certainly not the legal strategist of how we advance the War Powers Act.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you.

Mr. Campbell, don't you think to be consistent you ought to add Korea, Haiti, and every other place that American forces are in danger?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. In each case you would have to establish whether hostilities exist, and the definition to which I have been constantly referring, refers to either the presence of shots at troops under fire or the clear and present danger thereof.

I think that the case in Bosnia is stronger than in the other two instances you have given. Why? Because we have hostile fire pay. Yesterday I pointed out

Mr. ACKERMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am almost—well, fine. If you want me to finish. Mr. ACKERMAN. For the record, I believe that there are more people killed in Korea, where we have 37,000 troops, than in Bosnia, in any given week, in any given year for the past 39 years and more people are dying of heart attacks, and more people are dying of accidents, and more people are killed.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me reclaim my time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure. Thanks.

My burden is to establish that there are hostilities in Bosnia. Whether there are in other places is for another resolution. I don't think it is my burden to say one way or the other.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I am reclaiming my time. I think that we have a responsibility here that is beyond simply academically reviewing the current decisions. If we are going to create this kind of turmoil, particularly in an area where so many people have died, I can remember people on both sides of this aisle in torment on the floor of the House and this Committee after village after village of people was raped, burned, and murdered, and I think you have got to make a decision here.

If you want to get the troops out of there and you think they are going to be better off and we are going to be better off without the troops there, then maybe you ought to support this resolution.

But if you think that this is simply just a discussion, it seems to me, there is a danger you will encourage those, as we have seen this week, that have brought death back into that community.

Now, none of us like to see American troops in harms way, but I don't know anybody in this chamber who can honestly believe that the people in that region will be better off if we pull American troops out of there or believes that the Europeans will handle it on their own.

So what we have here is a debate, frankly, that Congress, as Mr. Berman pointed out, could take action on immediately. If you think