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merit; it has been tried partially in Denmark, and has received elaborate vindication from authors of distinction in England, in Switzerland and in France; but it may be put aside from the present discussion, because it is comparatively intricate in plan and cumbrous in detail, because it assails party organization, and because some of its most important effects cannot be distinctly foreseen; it is so radical in character, so revolutionary in its probable effects, that prudence would dictate, it should be very deliberately considered, and subjected to local experiment and trial, before it be proposed for adoption, upon a grand scale, by the government of the United States.

But why will the cumulative or unrestricted vote check corruption? It will have this effect-it will operate efficiently to this end-because it will render any ordinary effort of corruption useless and unavailing. The corruption of voters will not change the result of an election; it will elect no candidate and defeat none in contested states or districts, unless, indeed, it be carried on and carried out upon a gigantic scale, beyond any ordinary experience of the past or probable occurrence of the future. An average or common ratio of votes for a representative in congress, taking the whole country together, is now 25,000, and it will be much greater in future times. Assume then, that 600,000 votes are to be cast in Pennsylvania, at an election, of which each party has one-half, and that twenty-four representatives are to be chosen; this is a supposition very nearly conformed to actual numbers in that state; now, it is evident, that either political party, by resorting to the cumulative vote, can elect twelve representatives, and thus secure to itself exact and just representation, and no art nor effort can prevent it. But suppose further, that corruption shall assail the electors, and that some thousands of votes shall be changed thereby, or that, in the interest of one of the parties, so many as 10,000 or 20,000 voters shall be imported into the state, or

(Cumulative voting.)

be fraudulently created or personated within it, in either case, no effect will be produced; the result will be unchanged; in short, in the case supposed, a fraudulent increase of its vote (and of the total vote) by a party, to the extent of 20,000, will not give to it any advantage, nor will its corrupt acquisition of 5000 or 10,000 votes from the opposite party. It follows, that corruption will, in no ordinary case, be resorted to; it will be effectually discouraged and prevented, and even in the extreme case of the corruption of a large number of voters in a state, the resulting evil will be reduced to its minimum.

What has been said concerning the choice of representatives, will apply with equal if not greater force, to the choice of presidential electors. If the representative presidential electors were chosen in the several states (save those which have but one), upon the plan of the cumulative vote, there would be, as to them, due representation of the people in the electoral colleges, and the elections for choosing them would receive a much needed purification; millions, now expended upon those elections, would be kept out of the hands of political agents, and be applied to better and nobler uses.

That freedom of the vote will have the effect claimed for it, will more clearly appear from considering the manner in which the present plan of elections operates to invite or produce corruption; by considering the evil which exists, we will be better able to judge the merits of the remedy proposed. Popular elections in the states for federal or national purposes, are, either by a general ticket for the whole state, or by a single ticket in district divisions; as before stated, the former obtains in the choice of presidential electors, the latter, in the choice of representatives to congress; but to both is applied the plurality rule, and a struggle invited between candidates and parties for preponderance of vote. Whichever can be made to outnumber an opposition upon the return, will win the whole result, and wield the entire power of the

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constituency in an electoral college, or in congress; antagonism is thus made an essential element of the proceeding, and the result presents to us the spectacle of victor and vanquished, the former crowned with power and exultant in its strength, the latter humiliated and powerless. And it is important to observe, that the successful party does not obtain merely a power proportioned to its vote, but obtains the whole power of the constituency; the whole vote cast against it or withheld from it, is virtually counted to it and added to its true vote. An issue thus made up for popular elections, must be one portentous of evil; and so far as it is unnecessary to secure popular representation, must be denounced, as plainly unjust as well as injurious.

The free vote will be a guarantee of peace to our country, because it will exclude many causes of discord and complaint, and will always secure to the friends of peace and union, a just measure of political power. The absence of this vote in the states of the south, when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break up the union, was unfortunate, for it would have held the union men of those states together, and have given them voice in the electoral colleges and in congress. But they were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of elections, and were swept onward by the course of events into impotency or open hostility to our cause; by that rule, they were largely deprived of representation in congress; by that rule, they were shut out from the electoral colleges; dispersed, disorganized, unrepresented, without due voice or power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and civil war; their leaders were struck down at unjust elections, and could not speak nor act for them in their own states nor in the capitol of the nation. By facts well known to us, we are assured, that the leaders of revolt, with much difficulty, carried their states with them; even in Georgia, the empire state of the south, the scale was almost bal

In firme same state, the free vote will now L tagonien of race, and will bwtitute therefor the m of parties formed with reference to the polley of the gene ra govemment. The tendency of parties is to form m national lanes and not upon state ones, and this tendency will operate more strongly, if causes of offence between the races shall be removed or lessened. And what can acerplish this more perfectly than the free vote? for, under in one race cannot vote down and disfranchise the other: each can obtain its due share of power, without injustice to the other, and there will be no strong and constant motive, as now, to struggle for the mastery. This fact (the importance of which cannot be over-estimated, will allay animosity and prevent conflict; and because the free vote will have this certain effect, it will nationalize parties in the south, and will be to the whole country an invaluable guarantee of order and peace. In extending suffrage largely, in extending it to include many hundreds of thousands of voters of another race than our own, it becomes us to look to our electoral machinery, and to amend it in those parts which have been found defective, or which do not seem well adapted to the new strain to be put upon it. Unquestionably, there is a large mass of honest opinion in the country, opposed to negro suffrage, and many of those who support it in congress and out of congress, put their support on the ground of necessity upon the ground that, in order to secure the fruits of emancipation, it is necessary, that the emancipated be armed with the power of self-defence. But all must agree, that this great experiment of extended suffrage, being once determined upon, should have a fair trial; that all the conditions proper to its success should, as far as

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possible, be established by the government; and those who sincerely believe that the experiment will have bad results, must approve a plan of voting which will certainly mitigate its possible evils. But the salutary effects of the free vote, as a guarantee of peace, though well illustrated by the southern states, will not be confined to them; everywhere it will decrease the violence of party contests, and create more amicable relations than now exist among our people.

The unrestricted or free vote will secure men of ability and experience in the house of representatives. It is believed, that changes are now too frequent in that house, and that the public interests suffer detriment from this cause. The constitution very properly assigns short terms of service to the members of the house; but frequency of election does not involve rapidity of change; popular power may be retained over the house, and yet the greater part of its members be continued, by re-election, for a considerable period of time; in other words, frequent elections and permanent membership are not incompatible. But in point of fact, the members of the house are frequently changed, so that members of less than four years' service always constitute a large majority, and it is a rare case that a member continues beyond a third term. Under such a system or practice of rapid change, the average character of the house for ability cannot be high; two and four year men can know but little of the business of government, can be but imperfectly qualified to curb abuses in the executive department, and to expose or comprehend the true character of most questions of domestic and foreign policy.

There are several reasons which account for frequent change in the membership of the house, of which the single-district system is chief; the fluctuation of party power is next in importance,.but is intimately connected with the former. The single-district system has carried the idea of local representation to excess, and has produced