(Requisites of indictment for illegal voting.) him to prepare his defence. It charges, indeed, that the defendant was not duly qualified to vote; but that is tattamount to charging that he labors under one or more of the numerous disabilities imposed by the constitution and the law. Under what disability does he labor? Th specific charge the state must establish upon the trial: tt charge the defendant may repel by his evidence; and that, by every principle of good pleading, the defendant is entitled to know from the face of the indictment itself. But how can he know, from this indictment, the particular charge upon which the state means to rely, or the evidence necessary to make good his defence? Under this indictment, the state may prove that the defendant is not white, or that he is not a citizen of the United States, or not a resident of this state one year, or of the county in which his vote was cast five months before the election, or that he was a pauper or a convict, or any other constitutional or legal disqualification. The defendant must come prepared to prove his color, his age, his citizenship, his residence, to rebut evidence of his being a pauper or a convict, or, if convicted, to prove a pardon. A charge so general and so indefinite is inconsistent with the wellsettled rules of criminal pleading, and must, of necessity, embarrass, if not fatally prejudice, the defendant in making his defence. But, aside from the general rules of criminal pleading, it is clear, that the statute itself indicates, and by implication, at least, requires a more specific charge. It does not enact generally that, if a person votes, not being duly qualified, he is guilty of a misdemeanor; but the provision is, that if a person laboring under one of diverse disabilities, some of which are particularly enumerated, votes, knowing of such disability, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Thus, if a person votes who, at the time of the election, is not twenty-one years of age, knowing that he is not twenty-one years of age, or who is not a citizen of the United States, knowing that he is not such (Requisites of indictment for illegal voting.) citizen, or who, by reason of any other disability which disqualifies him from voting, knowing that he is not duly qualified, that is, knowing of such disability, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. The provision of the statute is tantamount to an enactment, that if any person laboring under any disability which disqualifies him from voting, and knowing of such disability, shall vote, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; the indictment must specify what the disability is, under which the defendant labors. In an information or indictment under the game laws of England, it has been uniformly held, that it is not sufficient to aver that the person charged was not "duly qualified," or that he had not the legal qualifications for killing game; but every legal qualification must be specifically traversed. Thus, under the 22 & 23 Car. II., ch. 25, § 2, it must be averred, that the party complained of had not an estate of inheritance of £100 per annum, nor a leasehold estate for ninety-nine years of the yearly value of £150, nor was the son and heir-apparent of an esquire or person of higher degree, nor the owner and keeper of a park, &c. Rex v. Hill, 2 Ld. Raym. 1415; Rex v. Jarvis, 1 Burr. 148, 154; Rex v. Wheatman, 1 Dougl. 331; Crown C. C. 400. The necessity for a specification under our statute is much greater; for if a defendant, in an indictment under the game laws, shows that he possesses any one qualification, the existence of which must be within his own knowledge, his defence is complete, though he be destitute of every other qualification; he is able, therefore, to prepare his defence, however general may be the averment of disqualification. But under the election law, if it be proved, that the defendant labors under any one legal disability, he is guilty, though he possess every other qualification; unless, therefore, the particular disability, intended to be relied on, be specified, the indictment furnishes the defendant no guide to the preparation of his defence. The precedent in Wharton, from which the present (Requisites of indictment for illegal voting.) indictment has been framed, affords no support to its validity. That indictment was framed upon the peculiar phraseology and adopts the language of the Massachusetts statute, which is totally dissimilar to our own; nor does it seem certain that it would be regarded as a valid indictment by the courts of that state. Wharton's Precedents § 1019; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 7 Met. 52; Commonwealth v. Bradford, 9 Ibid. 268; Davis's Justice 226. However that may be, it is perfectly clear that, under our statute, the indictment is fatally defective. The court of oyer and terminer should be advised accordingly. The doctrine of the principal case equally applies to an indictment for unlawfully counselling and advising a disqualified person to vote; in such indictment the particular disability must be specified. State v. Tweed, 3 Dutch. 111. The law is held to be the same in Tennessee, where it has been determined, that an indictment that the defendant unlawfully and knowingly voted, not being a qualified voter in and for the county, is bad, though in the words of the statute; being a "qualified voter," is a legal result; there are various disqualifications, and the indictment must show which of them existed. Pearce v. State, 1 Sneed 637. But directly the contrary has been decided by the supreme court of Iowa; it is there held, that an indictment for voting at a legal election, the party knowing that he was not qualified, need not show how the defendant was disqualified; and that, under it, any disability may be shown, or the state may prove from the admissions of the defendant, or otherwise, that he knew he was disqualified, and that he was in fact disqualified, without proving in what the disqualification consisted. State v. Douglass, 7 Clarke 413. So, in United States v. Quinn, 12 Int. R. Rec. 151, it was held by the circuit court for the southern district of New York, that an indictment charging a fraudulent registration under the act of congress of the 31st May 1870, is sufficient, if it charge the offence in the words of the statute. And see United States v. Ballard, 13 Int. R. Rec. 195. Being a local offence, it is necessary that an indictment for illegal voting should state with precision where the illegal vote was cast. State v. Fitzpatrick, 4 Rhode Island 269. But in Tennessee, it is unnecessary (Indictments against election officers.) to aver that the offence was committed knowingly; the party is chargeable with knowledge of the facts which render his vote illegal. State v. Haynorth, 3 Sneed 64. And see State v. Sheeley, 15 Iowa 404. It is sufficient to state that the defendant voted at an election which was duly holden, without showing how, or by what authority, it was called. State v. Marshall, 45 N. H. 281. So, an allegation that certain persons were judges of the election, is a sufficient averment that they were duly made and appointed judges. State v. Randles, 7 Humph. 9. And see Commonwealth v. Shaw, 7 Met. 52; State v. Douglass, 7 Clarke 413; State . Bailey, 8 Shep. 62. It is enough, that they were officers de facto. People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 69. In Iowa, in such indictment it is unnecessary to aver that candidates for any particular office were voted for, or the names of the persons voted for. State v. Minnick, 15 Iowa 123. COMMONWEALTH V. MILLER. In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia. JUNE SESSIONS 1849. (REPORTED 2 Parsons 480.) [Indictments against election officers.] An indictment charging, generally, that the election officers "did commit wilful fraud in the discharge of their duties," is fatally defective; the particular acts must be specifically set forth. The inspectors, judges and clerks cannot be joined as defendants in one indictment, their offices being different, and their duties distinct and separate. These were two indictments against the election officers of the district of Penn, for a violation of their duties, at the general and presidential elections of 1848. To each of the indictments there was a general demurrer; the case was argued before the four judges, in banc, and the opinion, in which the pleadings are fully stated, was the unanimous one of the court. H. M. Phillips and Read, for the defendants. (Indictments against election officers.) PARSONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is an indictment against five defendants, the officers of the election in Penn district, charging them with a violation of the election law of 1839, in the discharge of their various and respective duties as inspectors, judges and clerks of the election held last fall. There are two bills charging the same offences as having been committed at the general and presidential elections; in each there are six counts. 1. The first count charges that John Miller, being and acting as judge of said election, John C. Senderling and George W. Morrison, being and acting as inspectors thereof, and John R. Hyneman and Thomas H. Palmer, being and acting as clerks thereof, having each been duly qualified to act as such officers, yet, being persons of evildisposed minds, and wholly regardless of their duties as such, did commit wilful fraud in the discharge of their duties. 2. The second count charges that, being officers of said election as aforesaid, they did commit wilful fraud in the discharge of their duties in this, that they (naming them) did wilfully, fraudulently and unlawfully procure and cause to be written on the list of voters kept at such election, a large number, to wit, one hundred and fifty names of persons as having lawfully voted at such election, whereas, in truth and in fact, no such persons voted at the same, &c. 3. The third count charges, in the same way, that being officers, they did commit wilful fraud in the discharge of their duties, in this, that they did wilfully, fraudulently and unlawfully procure and cause to be counted. and enumerated and marked on the tally-papers of said election, a large number, to wit, one hundred and fifty votes, as having been polled and received at such election, whereas, in truth and in fact, no such votes were polled and received. 4. The fourth count charges that, being officers of said |