(Influencing elections.) the 20th of November; the plaintiff said, "he wished no ifs and ands about it, but wanted the money to be forthcoming for certain," and requested the defendant to give him his note; the defendant replied, that his "word was his bond," and said to the plaintiff, "I will pay you the $1000, out of my own pocket, on the 20th of November next;" the plaintiff then agreed to it, and "the log-cabin was kept open until after the election, and was used by the whig party, for political meetings, and was the whig headquarters, in a measure." It was kept open to promote the election of the electoral ticket in favor of Gen. Harrison, for president; and after the election it was removed. On this evidence, the plaintiff claimed to recover the $1000; the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that the contract was illegal, being a violation of the election law; the motion was denied, and an exception taken. The defendant then insisted, that the jury had a right to determine, from the whole evidence, whether the contract was or was not within the meaning of the statute; the court charged the jury that the contract was not within the statute, to which an exception was taken; and there was a verdict and judgment for $1000; whereupon the defendant sued out his writ of error. Stevens, for plaintiff in error. Sherwood, for defendant in error. BRONSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The first section of the act of 1829, "to preserve the purity of elections," is in these words: "It shall not be lawful for any candidate for an elective office, with intent to promote his election, or for any other person, with intent to promote the election of such candidate, either, 1st. To provide or furnish entertainment, at his expense, to any meeting of electors, previous to or during the election at which he shall be a candidate: or, 2d. To pay for, procure or (Influencing elections.) engage to pay for for any such entertainment: or, 3d. To furnish any money, or other property, to any person, for the purpose of being expended in procuring the attendance of voters at the polls: or, 4th. To engage to pay any money, or deliver any property, or otherwise compensate any person for procuring the attendance of voters at the polls: or, 5th. To contribute money for any other purpose intended to promote an election of any particular person or ticket, except for defraying the expenses of printing, and the circulation of votes, handbills and other papers, previous to any such election." The third section declares, that "every person offending against the provisions of this aet shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Stat. 1829, 565, ch. 373. If, at the time the promise was made, it would have been unlawful for the defendant "to contribute money," for the purpose of preserving and keeping open the logcabin, it is quite clear, that his promise to pay money for that purpose at a future day cannot be enforced. Now, to what end was the log-cabin to remain? The plaintiff tells us in the declaration, that the building, besides the sale of refreshments, was "intended and calculated for public and other meetings of a certain political party, known and designated by the name of the whig party;" and the consideration of the promise was, that the plaintiff would not tear down or remove the log-cabin, but would suffer the same to remain, and would keep or cause the same to be kept open, "for the benefit of the said whig party, until after the election" of members of congress, presidential electors, &c. The plaintiff then avers that he performed the agreement on his part; and so is the proof; the witness says, "the log-cabin was kept open until after the election, and was used by the whig party for political meetings, and it was whig headquarters, in a measure; it was kept open to promote the election of the electoral ticket in favor of Gen. Harrison for president." The statute, after forbidding several things, declares (Influencing elections.) that money shall not be contributed "for any other purpose, intended to promote an election of any particular person or ticket." It requires no argument, to prove that this money was to be paid to promote the election of particular persons, to wit, Gen. Harrison, and the whig candidates for congress, &c.; and a particular ticket, to wit, the electoral ticket in favor of Gen. Harrison for president, and the ticket for whig members of congress, &c. The parties intended to accomplish the very thing which the statute declares to be illegal; no one can wink so hard as not to see it. Every contribution of money "intended to promote an election of any particular person or ticket," is forbidden, except "for defraying the expenses of printing, and the circulation of votes, handbills and other papers, previous to any such election;" there can be little doubt that large sums of money are expended upon elections for other purposes; but the statute says "it shall not be lawful" to do so, and the enactment should either be enforced or repealed. It is said, that the statute only forbids the contribution of money for corrupt purposes. But the statute says nothing about corruption; it declares that the thing shall not be done; with two specified exceptions, it provides, that money "intended to promote an election," shall not be contributed. The legislature evidently thought, that the most effectual way "to preserve the purity of elections," was, to keep them free from the contaminating influence of money; they said, you may contribute money to pay for printing and circulating votes and information, but not for any other purpose. If this contract be void, it is said that money cannot be contributed to hire a room. for holding political meetings. That is undoubtedly true, if the object be "to promote an election of any particular person or ticket." I will not discuss the policy of the law; the legislature have said that the thing shall not be done, and that is enough. Judgment reversed. (Influencing elections.) Under the Pennsylvania statute forbidding non-voters from appearing at the election for the purpose of distributing tickets, and of influencing the citizens qualified to vote, it has been determined, that the word “influence," means using the party's endeavors, and that it is not necessary, in order to incur the penalty of the law, that such effort should have been successful; for, said the court, in such case, the law would be a dead letter, and no conviction could ever take place, inasmuch as no citizen is compellable to declare how he has given his suffrage. Respublica . Ray, 3 Yeates 65. In Tennessee, the treating of electors, with a view of obtaining their votes, is an indictable offence. State v. Rutledge, 8 Humph. 32. In Delaware, the statutes make a distinction between offering and promising a reward to an elector. State v. Harker, 4 Harrington 559. In England, the treating of a voter, with a view of influencing the election, renders it void; and in a recent case it was said by Willis, J., that a thimbleful given with that intent, will avoid the election, but such intent, to have that effect, must be clearly shown. 1 Chicago Leg. News 203. It has been held that, to vacate an election on the ground of intimidation and violence at the polls, if the election were not in fact arrested, there must be such a display of force as ought to have intimidated men of ordinary firmness. Harrison . Davis, 2 Cong. Elect. Cas. 341. And see Bruce v. Loan, Ibid. 482. Under the act of congress of the 31st May 1870, § 19, it has been held, that an indictment for "unlawfully preventing certain qualified voters from freely exercising the right of suffrage" could be sustained, by proof that the defendant and others attacked a number of voters, waiting in line for their turn to east their ballots, and expelled them from the room, though they afterwards returned and actually voted; the offence was complete by the expulsion of the voters from the polls. United States v. Souders, 2 Abbott U. S. Rep. 456. 617 LAWRENCE v. KNIGHT. In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. SEPTEMBER TERM 1861. (REPORTED 1 Brewster 67.) [Injunctions.] A court of equity will not restrain, by injunction, a prothonotary from certifying to the board of return judges, election returns which are regular on their face, though averred, and admitted in argument, to be forgeries. This was a bill in equity praying for an injunction to restrain the prothonotary from certifying to the board of return judges certain election returns, purporting to be the returns of votes cast by soldiers in actual service, at a general election held on the second Tuesday of October 1861, for clerk of the orphans' court of Philadelphia, on the ground that they were mere forgeries. Hirst, for the plaintiff. Thayer, for the defendant. LUDLOW, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The supreme court of Pennsylvania having to-day decided, at Pittsburgh, to grant the injunction prayed for by the bill filed by Robert Ewing, we cannot do otherwise than grant so much of the prayer of this bill as affects the right of the prothonotary to certify, and return judges to enumerate, the vote contained in a paper, purporting to be a regimental return, with the forged signature of William Schimpfiller appended thereto. We are bound by what we consider to be the decision of the supreme court in banc upon this subject, and to that extent (without expressing any opinion as to that portion of the bill) the prayer |