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election to be held. An election was held accordingly, at which James Ronaldson, Robert Thornton and Samuel Parker were declared duly elected; the other party not participating in the election. The four old commissioners received the returns of this last election, and admitted the persons returned as members of the board. The question. before the court was, the right of the defendants to act as commissioners.

J. Randall and P. A. Browne, for the relator.

Dallas and Binney, for the defendants.

ROGERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. On the 20th of March 1829, the respondents were elected to serve for three years, as commissioners of the township of Moyamensing. It appearing, at the close of the polls, that they had the highest number of votes, and the judges having given them notice of their election, on the 2d of April 1829, they took the oath of office. The judges, in pursuance of the second section of the act of incorporation, returned the respondents as duly elected. Before the meeting of the commissioners, which is directed to be on the first Monday in April, a memorial, respectful in its terms, was prepared and signed by a number of the legal voters of the township, alleging that sundry abuses were practised, and many votes taken of persons who were not citizens qualified to vote for members of the general assembly, and praying that the abuses might be inquired into, according to law; and they annexed to their memorial evidence of the illegality of three votes.

At the time appointed for the meeting of the commissioners, viz., the first Monday of April (present Edward Smith, Jacob Thomas, Robert McAffee, Samuel Bell, George Kirkpatrick, commissioners, and the defendants, John Paisley, David Farrell and James McCloskey, commissioners elect), Edward Smith stated, he wished to lay

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before the board a remonstrance contesting the election. The remonstrance was not suffered to be read, nor was any vote taken on it, but it was ordered to lie on the table, by George Kirkpatrick, who had been elected president pro tempore. The returns of the election were then read, whereby it appeared that John Paisley had 217 votes, James McCloskey had 155 votes, and David Farrell had 150 votes. There is then this entry on the minutes, "adopted by the majority of the board," which, though informal, amounts, in substance, to an approval of the election of the respondents. Edward Smith, Jacob Thomas and Robert McAffee were opposed to the approval. The oath of office of the commissioners elect was then read, together with a notice of their election. The board, namely, the commissioners elect, and two of the commissioners of the old board, went into an election for president and other officers, Jacob Thomas, Edward Smith and Robert McAffee refusing to take any part in the proceedings.

The 10th of April 1829, at a special meeting of the commissioners (present, Edward Smith, Jacob Thomas, Thomas Query and Robert McAffee), Mr. Query presented the memorial of sundry inhabitants, complaining of certain abuses practised at the election held on the 20th of March, which being read, on motion, it was resolved, that on the 13th inst., they would inquire into the abuses complained of in the memorial. And on the 13th inst. (having previously given notice to the respondents, who did not attend), they did inquire, set aside the election, and ordered a new election to be held on the 23d of April inst., which resulted in the choice of James Ronaldson, Robert Thornton and Samuel Parker, whose election was approved by the four commissioners above stated.

This is an application, in the case of a public corporation, for a rule to show cause by what authority the respondents claim to exercise the duties of commissioners of the township of Moyamensing. The question arises on the 3d and 5th sections of the act of assembly of the 24th of March

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1812, entitled "an act to incorporate the township of Moyamensing in the county of Philadelphia.”

From the facts which have been disclosed, it is apparent, that the approval of the election of respondents, depends altogether on their own vote, and that independently of that vote, there had not been that confirmation of the election, which is required by the act of incorporation. The inquiry then will be, to which all others are subordinate in some measure, whether the act of assembly authorizes this proceeding on the part of the commissioners elect; whether each of them who has been returned elected, is entitled to judge of his own election, with full power and authority to approve thereof.

It will be conceded, that where it can be avoided, no man should be permitted to decide his own cause; nor can I perceive much difference, where he is called on to determine his right to an office of profit, or one of trust, accompanied as this is, with extensive patronage. The temptation to an abuse of the trust, is as great in the one case, as the other; and is such, that no prudent legislature would entrust such a power to any person, unless in cases of necessity; and where such necessity exists, the legisla tive grant would, we should be led to suppose, be in such clear, unequivocal terms, as to leave room for neither doubt nor cavil. In England, it is said, that even an act of parliament, made against natural equity, as, to make a man a judge in his own cause, is void, in itself; for, as it is expressed, jura naturæ sunt immutabilia; they are leges legum. Davy v. Savadge, Hobart 87. And in 12 Mod. 687, if an act of parliament should ordain, that the same person should be party and judge, or, which is the same thing, judge in his own cause, it would be a void act of parliament; for, it is impossible, says the court, that one should be judge and party; for the judge is to determine between party and party, or between the government and a party.

And our own courts appear equally averse to the intro

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duction of such a principle. An act of the legislature, says Judge Chase, in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, contrary to the first great principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power on which it is founded; a law that punishes a citizen for an innocent action, or in other words, for an act which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.; it is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a legislature with such powers, and, therefore, it cannot be presumed they have done it. The genius, the nature and the spirit of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. To maintain, that our federal or state legislatures possessed such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained, would be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in a republican government. To these high and imposing authorities, I may add the opinion of the present chief justice (Gibson) in Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 S. & R. 43; which it is a mistake to suppose was overruled or contradicted by the other members of the court.

In this view, the right claimed by the respondents, struck the judicial mind in England, and in this country, and particularly the powerful intellect of Justice Chase. Although I fully accede to the general principle of that distinguished jurist, yet, I should pause, before I would carry it to the extent he seems willing to go. If the legislature should pass a law in plain, unequivocal and explicit terms, within the general scope of their constitutional authority, I know of no authority in this government to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opinion.

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of the judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice; for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian authority which might be abused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and judicial departments, dangerous to the wellbeing of society, or, at least, not in harmony with the structure of our ideas of rational government. Justice is regulated by no certain or fixed standard, so that the ablest and purest minds might sometimes differ with respect to it. Besides, necessity dispenses with those general principles, and the legislature must be the judges when the necessity exists-when the exigencies of society require the investment of such extraordinary powers. It must, undoubtedly, rest in their wisdom, to determine when the public welfare, to which all else must be subservient, requires the assertion of such principles. Whilst I, then, in some measure, disclaim the doctrines of that eminent man, yet, the relator has a right to claim the benefit of another rule of construction. Unless the words of the act be plain and explicit, the court is bound, in decency, to conclude, that the legislature had no intention to violate the principles of equity, or, without necessity, to contravene the first principles of the social compact; that as it is against reason and justice, and the fruitful source of faction, corruption and abuse, that a party interested should judge his own case, it is not to be presumed, but directly the contrary, that the legislature have invested the respondents with such extraordinary powers.

I have looked, in vain, into the 3d section, which has been mainly relied on by the respondents, for any express words or necessary implication, authorizing the commissioners elect, each in his own case, to examine and judge of the election. The legislature had in view the original organization of the corporation, and its continuance, by the election of three members each year, to supply vacancies occasioned by the rotary principle provided by the act. Hence, an ambiguity has arisen in the phraseology