CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:07 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order. In July 1973 the Foreign Ministers of 33 European countries and the United States opened the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in Helsinki. Since then the participants have made slow but steady progress on a broad range of security, political, economic and other issues of mutual concern. As the conference reaches what appears to be a conclusive stage interest in its eventual outcome has mounted both in Congress and throughout the Nation. Special concern has been expressed over the implications the Conference may have for such issues as human rights in Eastern Europe, the division of Germany, U.S. force levels in Europe, and the future of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. To discuss with us these and other issues we are pleased to welcome to the International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee, Hon. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Mr. Hartman is accompanied by Mr. Robert Frowick, Chief of the Political Section, Office of NATO and European Regional Political Military Affairs, and Mr. Harold Russell, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State. Mr. Hartman, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS Arthur A. Hartman of New Jersey, before becoming Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels since 1972. From 1967 to 1972 he served in the Department of State as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director of the Senior Inter-Departmental Group (1967-69) and from 1969-72 as Deputy Director for Coordination. He was born on March 12, 1926, in New York, N. Y. Mr. Hartman received his A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1944 and attended Harvard Law School during 1947-48. He served in the U.S. Army from 1944 to 1946. He entered Government service in 1948 and was assigned as Economic Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration, Paris. In 1952 he was Economic Officer, U.S. Delegation to European Army Conference, Paris, and in 1954 he was a PoliticoMilitary Officer, U.S. Mission to NATO in the European Regional Organization, Paris. From 1956 to 1958 he was Economic Officer in Saigon. From 1958 to 1961 Mr. Hartman was an International Affairs Officer, Economic Organization Affairs Section, Bureau of European Affairs. During 1961-62 he was Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and during 1962-63 Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State. From 1963 to 1967 he was Chief of the Economic Section in London. Mr. Hartman received the Presidential Management Improvement Award in 1970 and the Distinguished Honor Award in 1971. Mr. HARTMAN. Thank you very much. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a short statement which would put into the record where things stand. The substantive phase of negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe-the so-called stage II of this Conference has entered the final weeks of bargaining. Differences remain on some particularly sensitive questions relating to limited military security proposals or "confidence-building measures"-and the freer movement of people, ideas, and information. However, with a sufficient display of flexibility by all of the 35 participant states in this Conference, it may be possible to conclude the Geneva negotiations by late spring or summer. The way will then be open for convening the stage III final meeting of CSCE in Helsinki, depending on negotiating results at Geneva, though we and our allies have made no final commitments to conclude this conference at the summit level. CSCE IN PERSPECTIVE CSCE should be seen in perspective as but one aspect of our continuing efforts to move from confrontation to negotiation in strengthening East-West relations in Europe. The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference in 1954 and periodically reiterated the proposal over subsequent years, but the Western and neutral nations showed little enthusiasm for it. It appeared that Moscow's principal objective was to exploit such an event as a quasi-peace conference to produce a surrogate World War II peace treaty. In 1969, however, as nations of both East and West began to take increased bilateral initiatives toward détente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal for a European security conference elicited a cautiously positive reaction by the NATO allies, who took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose after concrete progress had been achieved on the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation; namely, Berlin. THE BERLIN PRECONDITION We and our allies specified in successive NATO documents, beginning in late 1969, that conclusion of a new Four Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to allied willingness to participate in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Berlin accord, signed September 3, 1971, took effect in June 1972. The CSCE multilateral preparatory talks thereupon opened at Helsinki the following November, and it is noteworthy that Warsaw Pact countries agreed to commence exploratory talks on mutual and balanced-force reductions (MBFR) at Vienna shortly thereafter in January 1973. WESTERN PRIORITIES At CSCE, the emphasis of the Western and neutral participant. states has been on improving, not freezing, the status quo in Europe. For our part, we have approached this Conference on the premise that if détente is to endure, all sides must benefit. At the same time, we have sought to guarantee that in our efforts to build a new relationship with the Soviet Union, there would be no devaluation of our traditional alliance relationships. We have sought to encourage realism by all participants with respect to what can and cannot be achieved in changing human conditions in the East. And finally, we have emphasized that the emergence of more normal relations with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense. STATUS OF CSCE RESULTS Conference participants view the emerging CSCE documents as statements of political resolve or declarations of intent, not agreements legally binding upon governments. The Conference will not produce a treaty. Rather, its final documents will resemble the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the U.N. Friendly Relations Declaration, neither of which required the advice and consent of the Senate. Any more formal treatment would, indeed, be criticized by other Western participants as inconsistent with their understanding of the nature of this Conference and would play into the hands of those who have sought to portray the results of this Conference as tantamount to a World War II peace treaty. We remain loyal to the letter and spirit of the Potsdam agreement of 1945, which states explicitly that the political and territorial problems affecting Germany since World War II must be resolved in a formal peace treaty. While we do not anticipate that CSCE will produce any legally binding texts, it is clear that they will be seen as having important political commitments behind them, since they will be signed by highlevel representatives of 35 nations. THE CSCE AGENDA The CSCE agenda includes four major items, known as "baskets," concerning respectively: Political and security questions; economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-CSCE followup arrangements. BASKET 1 Under the first agenda item, Conference negotiators are working on a declaration of 10 principles of interstate relations. Nine of those principles are now provisionally registered. Sovereign equality; that is, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; Refraining from the threat or use of force; Inviolability of frontiers; Territorial integrity of states; Peaceful settlement of disputes; Nonintervention in internal affairs; Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and The 10th principle deals with fulfillment of obligations. The Soviets have been especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers. Western participants have made clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. And the Federal Republic of Germany, with the support of its NATO allies, has insisted on a reference to the possibility of "peaceful border changes." The United States has taken an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful change. We and our allies also attach special importance to the principles concerned with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, peaceful settlement of disputes, self-determination and nonintervention in others affairs. With respect to human rights, we and our allies are working to insure that the CSCE results will supplement and add to, and not attenuate in any way, existing internationally accepted documents in this field. The seventh principle, dealing with human rights, is the longest and most detailed principle and is a remarkably strong reaffirmation of human rights considering the character of the participating states and the circumstances under which the principle was negotiated. It states specifically that the CSCE participants will act in conformity with the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights rather than simply respect them as a statement of goals. This principle is further supplemented and given practical effect by various texts under agenda item 3. We have been aware that a great many American citizens of Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian ethnic backgrounds have expressed concern that somehow CSCE results might represent a reversal of the long-standing U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the 1940 incorporation of the Baltic states in the U.S.S. R. We have repeatedly indicated in official correspondence with members of both Houses of Congress in recent weeks that the CSCE results will in no way alter the existing U.S. position on the Baltic question. Under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have also discussed some limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. While differences continue to separate East and West in this area, there are signs of flexibility that hopefully will make it possible to reach agreement on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures": prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers. An agreed text has already been registered on the latter topic. BASKET 2 Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have made progress on a series of draft declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. If the CSCE understandings on these topics are implemented, they should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, and increase scientific exchanges and cooperation on the environment. The U.S. delegation at the CSCE has sponsored a proposal on arbitration of East-West commercial disputes and has cosponsored proposals for expansion of business contacts and enhanced scientific and technological cooperation. BASKET 3 The third agenda item-the well-known "basket 3" of the Conference-deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational contacts. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our allies, and the neutral states. Here we are negotiating especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because the subject deals with "ideological coexistence," which has always been an anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, provisional agreement has already been reached on numerous key texts relating, for example, to family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, tourism, access to information, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation. Difficult negotiations continue on texts designed to provide greater opportunities for travel, improved working conditions for journalists, and some other issues. BASKET 4 Under the fourth agenda item, the CSCE negotiations will consider "followup" arrangements. The debate here has turned upon whether these activities should be institutionalized or essentially ad hoc. The Warsaw Pact countries continue to support a Czechoslovakian proposal for creation of a "consultative committee" with a permanent secretariat to carry forward the East-West dialog on all issues under discussion at CSCE meetings as well as prepare further high-level conferences. On behalf of the European Community, Denmark has tabled a proposal, endorsed by the United States, calling for a postCSCE probationary period until 1977 when a meeting of senior officials would review implementation of all CSCE decisions and consider whether additional followup activities would serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, neutral states have begun informally to put forward suggestions for a compromise. In general, negotiations on followup have not progressed very far since the Allies have insisted that they begin in earnest only after the final results of the stage II negotiations begin to come more clearly into view. POSSIBILITY OF SUMMIT-LEVEL CONCLUSION Our allies believe that if the final results of the Geneva negotiations prove satisfactory, a summit-level conclusion would be justified. 53-963-75-2 |