state on the presentation of a certain certificate the court said: "If there is anything in the constitution that is clear beyond controversy, it is that the legislature does not possess judicial powers. They are lodged exclusively in the judiciary as a co-ordinate department of the government. The executive and legislative departments can no more encroach upon the judicial department, than the latter can encroach upon them. Each department, in our beautiful system of government, has its own appropriate sphere, and so long as it confines itself to its own. orbit the machinery of government moves without friction. We have too much respect for the legislature to suppose it would ever intentionally step over the line which divides the different departments, but slight encroachments may sometimes occur through inadvertence. In such cases it is the province of the judiciary to correct them. It is our duty to see that the checks and balances provided by the constitution are preserved. We are clearly of opinion that the act of 1887, though probably not so intended, is an encroachment upon the judiciary department of the government." It is highly improbable that any of the questions here suggested will ever be raised. Certainly the interests of the profession do not require that they should be. The purpose of the present comment is not to criticise the action taken in this particular case, but to correct any impression that may grow up therefrom that an undoubted legislative power exists to admit individuals to the bar.

Exclusion of Newspapers from the Mails.

THE

HE power to exclude from the mails any seditious, obscene or otherwise objectionable matter is of course beyond doubt; none would question the power of the government to prevent its mail service from being made an instrumentality of crime. A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court (U. S. v. Burleson, 41 Sup. Ct. R. 352) goes beyond this elementary rule and holds that the second class mail privilege of a newspaper may be revoked so as to exclude unobjectionable issues if it has "come to be so edited" as to contain habitually matter properly excluded from the mails. The privilege of second class mail service, the cost of which is about one-sixth or one-seventh of the actual cost of carriage, is said to be "a frank extension of special favors to publishers because of the special contribution to the public welfare which Congress believes is derived from the newspaper and other periodical press." As such it is subject to revocation as to publications which have shown themselves not to merit such favor. Theoretically of course the exclusion should extend only to objectionable issues, but as the court well said: "Government is a practical institution, adapted to the practical conduct of public affairs. It would not be possible for the United States to maintain a reader in every newspaper office of the country, to approve in advance each issue before it should be allowed to enter the mails, and when, for more than five months, a paper had contained, almost daily, articles which, under the express terms of the statute, rendered it 'nonmailable,' it was reasonable to conclude that it would continue its disloyal publications."

The Dangers of the Ruling.

T is of course true, as was said by Mr. Justice Brandeis IT dissenting in the case referred to in the preceding

paragraph that "to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of the cost of the service, and to deny that service to one paper of the same general character, because to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in the past seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship and abridge seriously freedom of expression." There are

many subjects which should be open to full public discussion on which feeling runs so high that a Postmaster General holding one view may honestly believe that the presentation of the opposite contention is opposed to public policy. A thoroughgoing prohibitionist, for instance, would take such an attitude toward a publication advocating the repeal of the Volstead Act. But it is impossible to create a power which is not susceptible of abuse. The only alternative is to withhold the power, leaving the government powerless to prevent the dissemination of sedition, and with no remedy but to prosecute the offender after his publication has corrupted the minds of hundreds. Judicial review is open to any publisher deeming himself aggrieved. It was obtained in the case cited, the court holding that the paper in question was in fact seditious. It may be said of course that the court itself may be unfair and prejudiced, but with the granting of that argument there is an end of all government. There must be somewhere a power to make a decision by which all must abide. Government cannot be perfect; errors and abuses must always exist. The question must be resolved to a practical basis: is there a real need for the grant of a power whose exercise is not forbidden by the Constitution? If there is such need, the power should be given, with such safeguards as do not destroy its usefulness. The common sense of the American people may be relied on to stop, albeit tardily, the abuse of any power which their representatives

exercise.

The Literacy Test for Citizenship.

HE New York legislature has recently voted to submit. to the people a constitutional amendment requiring of applicants for naturalization the ability to read and write English. Of this measure a metropolitan journal well says:

Of course there can be no complete, inclusive, all-satisfactory test of political intelligence and capacity; but in a State inhabited by so many races, speaking so many foreign languages, a common language is the only common bond. Knowledge of the language in which the Constitution and the laws are written seems a just and elementary requirement of citizenship. It is true that one may be an accomplished English scholar and a bad citizen; but as a beginning of Americanization, as a common denominator of all racial and linguistic fractions, as a primary essential means of a general popular understanding of our political habits, traditions and institutions, acquaintance with the English language is not only desirable but necessary.

The requirement is a step in the right direction and it goes perhaps as far as it could at the present time without destroying its chance of adoption. It is to be hoped that it is but a first step, for it falls ludicrously short of what should be required. The compulsory education laws of most states require that children shall be given a common school education. That represents the consensus of opinion as to the minimum of education which is essential to good citizenship in the case of the native born, and certainly one of foreign birth should be subjected to no less stringent requirement. Ability to read and write our language means that the door through which knowledge

of our institutions may enter the mind of the alien has been slightly opened. Far beyond this, he should be required to show as a condition to citizenship that he has made use of his literacy to acquire a working knowledge of America and things American. The entire policy of naturalization is open to serious question; it is a tradition from the time when the United States was sparsely populated and its resources undeveloped. It belongs to the era of vast railroad land grants and similar incentives to the settlement of a new country. But if it is to be maintained it should be under restrictions of which the literacy test is but a beginning.

Judge Landis.

THE

HE proposition to impeach District Judge Kenesaw M. Landis for accepting the position of supreme arbiter of the national game while retaining his judicial office having fallen into obscurity, a bill is now pending to forbid federal judges to accept other remunerative employment. It may be that such a restriction should be applied to the holders of important federal offices, but why confine it to the judges? The memory of man still runneth to the time when the Secretary of State of the United States went out on the Chatauqua Circuit for the avowed purpose of making a little addition to his income. There are few Senators or Congressmen who do not keep up business connections or professional practice during their terms. The action of Judge Landis has been criticised on the floor of Congress because some baseball matter might come into litigation in his district. The possibility is remote and the remedy by calling in another judge is plain, but the possibility that the business of a Congressman or a Congressman's client may be affected by some legislation pending in Congress is far from remote and

the remedy is not so obvious. It is not suggested that any vote would be influenced by such considerations; but has any one the affrontery to suggest that any actual bias of the judicial acts of Judge Landis is to be apprehended? If it is the preservation of official dignity or the avoid ance of the appearance of evil that the Congressional critics of Judge Landis have in mind, they may well start in by purifying the legislative halls of any suspicion of influence by private interest and of whatever loss of dignity results from an honorable employment which does not detract from official efficiency. The truth seems to be that it is the novelty of the position which the Judge has accepted and the large salary derived therefrom which are responsible for most of the furor. The American people grow excited by a new thing in a manner out of all proportion to its importance. Witness the clamor a few years ago over the refusal of a Chicago surgeon to perform an operation to save the life of a child who would live only as a crippled idiot, while hundreds of healthy and intelligent children die every year from preventable disease or preventable accident without exciting any newspaper comment. Judge Landis should imitate Alcibiades who cut off the tail of his dog that the people of Athens, having that to talk of, should say nothing worse of him.

a recent instance of a Chicago man who thus made his will. The possible pun as to the "breaking" of the will is averted by the use in that instance of an indestructible material for the record. material for the record. Whether such a will would be deemed to be "written" or could be validly "subscribed" is, to say the least doubtful. But assuming these difficulties to be overcome by judicial construction or legislative enactment the advantages are not very apparent. So far as forgery is concerned, imitation of voice is at least as easy as imitation of handwriting, and a school of voice experts would have to be developed to detect the work of a trained mimic. An attorney who is said to have witnessed the Chicago will is quoted as saying: "The judge before whom a phonographic will is offered for probate can tell whether the testator was strong or weak from the tone of his voice, as reproduced by the record. He can also judge whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind, from the fluency or lack of fluency evidenced by the record." These advantages seem quite illusory, for loudness and clearness of tone in the reproduction of a phonograph record are varied by several purely mechanical conditions, while fluency and clearness of speech would signify little, since few testators would rely on improvised utterance but would speak from a prepared manuscript. On the whole it is not probable that this form of testamentary disposition will become popular. Mr. Arthur Train may make it the theme of one of his charming quasi legal stories, but the regular practitioner will be well advised to stick to the ancient method of execution, varied, if at all, in accordance with the suggestion of Mr. Osborn recently discussed in these columns.

Presidential Primaries.

Μι

MR. RODEY whose plan for Presidential primaries was recently commented on in LAW NOTES. writes calling attention to a feature of the plan which was not embodied in the outline thereof in hand at the time that comment was written, viz., that after the state primary whereby a resident of each state seeking to nominate is placed in nomination the voting for the candidates so nominated is to be in accordance with the Hare system of proportional representation. The opinion has already been expressed that the Hare system, as applied to Presidential elections, will not work any substantial improvement, and certainly Mr. Rodey's addition thereto of nominations by states will not make it more effective. One of the greatest advantages of the Hare system is that it combines in one vote the primary and election, giving a wide choice of candidates and the casting of the full vote as between them. It thus does away not only with the expense of the primary to both candidates and public, but it obviates the well-known defect of the primary that but a small fraction of the vote is habitually cast thereat. To institute, as a preliminary to an election. under the Hare system, an expensive primary contest between the "favorite sons" of the several states would seem worse than unnecessary. In any event, radical changes in the voting system should be tried out thoroughly in smaller governmental units before their adoption in national elections is urged. It is quite probable that the future will see some radical changes in the direction of a closer participation by the people in the conduct of the government. Our system of government, beginning with small self governing units which unite to form larger

ones, is admirably adopted to experiments on a small scale which will familiarize the people with new measures and reveal defects in those measures; and it is thus that reform should proceed.

An Aftermath of Federal Control.

A SUBSCRIBER Whose letter is published in this issue takes exception to several statements made in LAW NOTES for April under the above caption. He says, in the first place: "Referring to the provision in the Transportation Act that period of Federal control shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation, you say, 'Such is the legislative control over limitations that the general validity of this provision is clear.' If this clause is directed solely to cover all actions created by statutes, you may be correct, but it is submitted that it has no obligation where the bar arises not ex lege but ex contractu. Where the parties themselves have expressly stipulated, as is invariably done by the execution and acceptance of bills of lading, it would seem that a limitation in such contract is binding." So far as state legislation is concerned, the contract limitation may be binding but the inhibition on the impairment of the obligation of a contract is not. applicable to Congress. Louisville & R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467. Taking up Mr. Blackman's second point, space does not permit of a detailed review of the holding in the Decker Case (55 I. C. C. 453). It may be said, however, that a ruling that a limitation of time to sue is invalid under circumstances making it inequitable is not an overruling of the provision of the Cummins Amendment allowing such limitations generally. The books are full of cases where a qualification of reasonableness has been grafted judicially on the exercise of a general statutory permission with no suggestion that the statute was thereby overruled. Mr. Blackman further says: "I am not aware of any decision, which has precluded a shipper from recovering on a claim against a corporation carrier by reason of the fact of Federal control."

Of the many

cases which have so held, dismissing an action brought against a carrier, it will suffice to cite: Dahn v. McAdoo, 256 Fed. 549; Haubert v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 259 Fed. 361; Erie R. Co. v. Caldwell, C. C. A., 264 Fed. 947; Blevins v. Hines, 264 Fed. 1005; Mardis v. Hines,

Co.,

C. C. A., 267 Fed. 171, affirming 258 Fed. 945; McDougal v. Louisville & N. R. Co. - Ala. App. -, 85 So. 880; Robinson v. Central of Georgia R. Co., Ga. -, 102 S. E. 532; Groves v. Grand Trunk Western R. Mich., 178 N. W. 232; Rose v. Southern R. Co., S. C., 103 S. E. 476; Cravens v. Hines, Mo. App. 218 S. W. 912; Jackson-Tweed Lumber Co. v. Southern R. Co. 113 S. C. 236, 101 S. E. 924; Baker v. Bell, -Tex. Civ. App., 219 S. W. 245; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wurzbach, Tex. Civ. App. -, 219 S. W. 252; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Clevenger, Tex. Civ. App., 223 S. W. 1036; Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Wilkerson, Tex. Civ. App. Tex. Civ. App. —, 224 S. W. 574. These decisions may not be good law in Massachusetts, wherein there seems to have been no reported ruling on the point, but they govern the rights of shippers in a large part of the United States. As a matter of fact the original comment in LAW NOTES was based on a case in one of the southern states, the decision in which has not yet been reported, wherein the railroad, being sued within the time limited in the bill of lading, ob

tained a dismissal because of Federal Control, and on a second suit after the termination of that control pleaded the contract limitation in bar. It is to be hoped that the Transportation Act will be so construed as to prevent that kind of bare faced juggling with justice.

A Self Governing Bar.

Said

THE agitation for the delegation to the bar of the right to discipline its own members and uphold its professional ideals is rapidly taking form. The Journal of the American Society of Judicature for April contains the text of an act to that end approved by the Ohio Bar Association and introduced in the legislature and an act which has been unanimously accepted by the Florida State Bar Association and has doubtless ere this been introduced. The fact of similar action by the Idaho Bar Association is also noted. The Ohio Act provides for the election by all the members of the bar, balloting by mail, of a board of governors whose powers are stated as follows: "The board of governors by vote of a majority of all its members shall employ any and all means to advance the science of jurisprudence, to promote reform in the law, to facilitate and improve the administration of justice, to uphold integrity, honor and courtesy in the legal profession and to provide for the government of the state bar. board is further empowered to investigate all complaints that may be made concerning the unprofessional conduct or want of good moral character of any member of the state bar. All complaints must be in writing, supported by affidavit duly verified. In all cases involving alleged want of good moral character the board shall first determine by a vote of the majority of all its members whether it shall investigate such complaint. In all cases involving unprofessional conduct, in which the evidence in the opinion of the majority of the board justifies such a course, they shall take disciplinary action by public or private reprimand, suspension from the practice of the law, or exclusion or disbarment therefrom, as the case shall in their judgment warrant. In cases involving alleged want of good moral character, they shall have power only to recommend to the supreme court what action shall be taken by that court and to certify to it the record of the proceedings." Review by the Supreme Court of all disciplinary orders, and of course the power of the court to act on its own motion, is preserved. The powers given by the Florida act are somewhat less extensive. With respect to the constructive line of work contemplated the Journal quotes the President of the Ohio State Bar Association as saying: "It is proposed to keep the bar of the state informed on current public questions by securing eminent authorities to lecture to the various local associations. tions. Also, there will be a committee on legislation to which members will be asked to send suggestions at all times, as they occur, concerning changes in written law, either substantive or procedural. The committee will meet monthly to discuss and digest the proposals, and will then prepare for the Board of Governors a legislative program." The measures in question, notably that of Ohio, seem to be simple and flexible and mark an auspicious beginning of a momentous change in the status of the American Bar.

"No crime is greater than treason."-Per Bradley, J., in Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 347.

BLUE SKY LAWS.

THE Commercial development of the United States in the last thirty years has resulted in the flotation of an incalculable volume of corporate stocks and securities. Most of these have been legitimate, and their sale has resulted in a profitable investment for the buyer and at the same time supplied needful capital for productive industry. But a certain proportion, while offered in good faith, represented a too sanguine capitalization of hopes, while a swarm of unscrupulous promoters has put on the market securities which were fraudulent in their origin. The result has been widespread loss to investors and a resultant suspicion of all stock investments. To prevent fraud and to restore the confidence which will admit of the marketing of legitimate securities, there have been passed in many jurisdictions what are commonly known as "Blue Sky Laws." The general theory of the legislation is to forbid the flotation of stocks or corporate securities until evidence of the soundness of the investment has been submitted to a public officer or board and official permission to put the stock or securities on sale obtained.

The origin of the name applied to these statutes is not altogether clear. One suggested explanation is that such laws are designed to secure for dealings in stocks and securities the open light of day. Another theory was stated by a Canadian contemporary (36 Can. L. T. 37) as follows: "The state of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming products, has a large population of agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods. This state was the hunting ground of promoters of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that it was stated that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple. Metonymically they became known as blue sky merchants, and the legislation intended to prevent their frauds was called Blue Sky Law." The latter view finds some support in the following language of Mr. Justice McKenna in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217,' 61 U. S. (L. ed.) 480, Ann. Cas. 1917C 643, L. R. A. 1917F 514: "The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, to use the language of a cited case, 'speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of "blue sky.""" The general purpose of the legislation in question was well stated in William R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 Fed. 537, as follows: "It may safely be observed in this case, the purpose of the act under consideration as declared by the Attorney General of the state, namely, to protect the humble, honest citizens of the state, unlearned in the intricacy of business affairs as conducted at this day from being plundered and despoiled of their small earnings and property, acquired through years of patient toil, by the alluring machinations and the deceptive, misleading, and fraudulent devices which the unscrupulous, cunning, and deceitful 'Get-Rich-Quick-Wallingfords' of our day practice, is a most laudabie obligation and important duty of the state."

The legislation being novel, the earlier decisions were against its validity, Blue Sky Laws being declared to be invalid in Alabama, etc., Transp. Co. v. Doyle, 210 Fed. 173; William R. Compton Co. v. Allen, supra, and Bracey v. Darst, 218 Fed. 482, while in Standard Home Co. v. Davis, 217 Fed. 904 and Ex parte Taylor, 68 Fla. 61, 66

So. 292, Ann. Cas. 1916A 701, such laws were sustained only in so far as they regulated the doing of business by foreign corporations. The validity of the acts is now, however, established by three decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217, 61 U. S. (L. ed.) 480, Ann. Cas. 1917C 643, L. R. A. 1917F 514; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559, 37 S. Ct. 224, 61 U. S. (L. ed.) 493, and Merrick v. Halsey, 242 U. S. 568, 37 S. Ct. 227, 61 U. S. (L. ed.) 498, sustaining respectively the Blue Sky Laws of Ohio, South Dakota and Michigan, and holding that such legislation is a legitimate exercise of the state police power and not an interference with interstate commerce.

In view of the number of acts which have been passed and the number of applications thereunder which have been ruled on, it is rather surprising that in the five years since the validity of the acts was established so few cases involving their interpretation and application have come into the courts. This may doubtless be explained by the fact that fraudulent enterprises shun the courts, while those of doubtful solvency feel the futility of combating the decision of the commissioners. In but three cases thus far reported has the propriety of licensing the sale of particular securities been considered. In reversing the revocation of a license to sell investment certificates, issued under the Blue Sky Law of Minnesota, the court in the case of In re Investors' Syndicate, (Minn.) 179 N. W. 1001, said: "The installment certificate promises that upon the making of specified payments in advance for ten years the syndicate will pay the purchaser $1000. This is the amount of the payments made with interest. at 6 per cent. compounded annually. There is a surrender value after two annual payments. The surrender value for each of the first five years is less than the installments paid. From the sixth year on it exceeds the principal amounts paid. Experience shows that a large number of the certificate purchasers allow their certificates to lapse within a few years.

This means a loss to them. It means

a gain, measured by book values, to the syndicate. The objection of the commission is based upon the constant lapsing of the certificates. The commission licenses the sale of a ten-year single payment certificate producing the same interest return. The real objection to the installment certificate comes from the fact that the purchaser may not carry out his contract and therefore loses when he takes the surrender value. In short, to many of the investors the investment is an improvident one. This is not because of the fault of the syndicate. The commission says: 'No bad faith is imputed by the commission to the company or those in active management of its affairs. They are recognized as men of good repute and in good standing in the community in which they live. Furthermore, the company is in sound condition financially and there would be no need on those grounds to suspend the license.' The commission does not view the savings contracts as of such nature that the syndicate will be unable to perform them. If it performs them the purchaser will get what is promised. The investment contract is often an unprofitable one to the purchaser. It is so when he fails to make his payments. We do not inquire as to the limits of the right of the statute to supervise investment contracts of the general nature of the one before us. It is enough to say that the investment certificate does

not work a fraud upon purchasers within the meaning of the statute."

In State v. Welch, (N. D.) 172 N. W. 234, the court in holding certain securities to be "speculative" within the North Dakota Act, said: "The statute expressly declares that the term 'speculative securities,' as used therein, shall be taken to mean all stock certificates, shares, bonds, debentures, certificates of participation, contracts, contracts or bonds for the sale and conveyance of land on deferred payments or installment plan, or other instruments in this nature by whatsoever name known or called, into the par value of which the element of chance, speculative profit, or possible loss equal or predominate over the elements of reasonable certainty, safety, and investment, or the value of which materially depends on proposed or promised future promotion or development rather than on present tangible assets and conditions. The certificate which the relator sold for $100 is to be issued in the future. It is to be issued by a corporation to be organized in the future. The mines from which coal is to be sold are to be developed in the future. It seems too clear for argument that the transaction falls squarely within the terms of the statute. The value of the certificate which the relator sold is manifestly dependent upon the future promotion and development of the mines. It also seems entirely clear that reasonable men would be entirely justified in finding that the element of chance, speculative profit, or possible loss, equal or predominate over the elements of certainty, safety, and investment."

In United Grain Growers Case, [1918] 3 West W. Rep. 92, the Local Government Board of Sackatchewan refused to grant a certificate for the sale of debentures "secured by a floating charge upon all the assets of the company excepting uncalled capital stock." The reason given by the Board was that a specific charge might be created against the assets which would take priority over the floating charge.

In Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190❘ Pac. 601, 10 A. L. R. 879, the state charter board was required by mandamus to pass on the merits of the application of a business trust to sell certificates issued by it, the court saying: "Regardless of its corporate character, or even of the lack of it, the plaintiff is entitled to have its application considered by the state charter board upon its merits, and upon the theory that there is no personal or partnership liability of shareholders, the same as if the application had been made by any other person, company, or corporation. It devolves upon the board to inquire as to the solvency and responsibility of the plaintiff, the sufficiency of its assets, the trustworthiness of those representing and managing it, the fairness, honesty, and equity of its plan, the security afforded investors that its funds will not be dissipated or misappropriated, and if it is found to measure up to the statute in these and other respects, a permit may be issued to it."

The term "sale of stock" as used in a Blue Sky Law has been held to include an exchange for other stock, Edward v. Ioor, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620, and a contract to sell, Rex v. Malcolm, [1918] 2 West W. Rep. 1081.

The Michigan act being applicable only to "dealers," a sale by a stockholder of his own stock is held not to be within the act, Dows v. Schuh, 206 Mich. 133, 172 N. W. 418; Dursum v. Benedict, 209 Mich. 115, 176 N. W. 459; unless he engages in repeated and continuous sales, Edward v. Ioor, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620.

In two instances, also arising under the Michigan act, a corporation sought to defeat the claim for commissions of an agent selling its stock, on the ground that he had not complied with the act, and in each instance was held to be estopped to defend on that ground. De Hopp v. Peninsular L. Ins. Co., 193 Mich. 380, 159 N. W. 500; Lovering v. Duplex Power Car Co., 204 Mich. 658, 171 N. W. 374.

The foregoing cases, here briefly digested for the convenience of readers who may desire to make a full investigation of the subject, seem to comprise all the decisions thus far reported, and so far as the general policy of the legislation goes seem to establish at least a negative fact, that the administration of the Blue Sky Laws has not been such as to hamper unduly legitimate business or drive it to the courts for protection. While the cases afford no light as to the affirmative effect of those laws, the Supreme Court said in Merrick v. Halsey, supra, 242 U. S. 568, 37 S. Ct. 227, 61 U. S. (L. ed.) 498, decided in 1916: "Counsel, indeed, frankly concedes the evil of 'get-rich-quick' schemes and quotes the banking commissioner of the state of Kansas for the statement that the 'Blue Sky' law of that State had saved the people of the State $6,000,000 since its enactment and that between 1400 and 1500 companies had been investigated by the department and less than 400 of the number granted permits to sell securities in the State. Counsel also quotes the confidence of the commissioner in the efficacy of the law and that it will 'eventually result in the regulation and supervision of all kinds of companies in the same manner as banks are now regulated and supervised.' Against this statement, however, counsel cites the view expressed by the British Board of Trade of the inexpediency of an official investigation into the soundness, good faith, and prospects' of companies. Upon this difference in views we are not called upon to express an opinion for, as we have said, the judgment is for the State to make, and in the belief of evils and the necessity for their remedy and the manner of their remedy the State has determined that the business of dealing in securities shall have administrative supervision, and twenty-six States have expressed like judgments.'

The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has taken the matter up and has formulated a Uniform Blue Sky Law, and it is to be expected that in a few years it will be in general operation.

W. A. S.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN CANADA.

BY WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL Justice of the Supreme Court of Ontario.

ONTARIO

WITH the exception of the Providence of Quebec, Canada draws her jurisprudence in the main from England. The Common Law Courts in England had not the power to make declaratory judgments; and until 1852, the Court of Chancery was equally helpless, having no practice like the Scottish declarator (Grove v. Bastard, 2 Phil., (Eng.) 619; Ferrand v. Wilson, 4 Hare, (Eng.) 385, &c.). In 1852 was passed the Chancery Procedure