element of skill that it made the game practically one of chance, but the reasons for such finding are not very convincing. No game of cards is a game of mere skill and in all four-handed games partners are cut for, and further elements of chance must exist in the fall of the cards and whether or not enough points are made to win. These seem to be the elements of chance relied upon by the courts, but, if Mr. Justice Hawkins is right and mere skill is essential, the fall of the cards is sufficient to make no game of cards lawful, or rather, if played for money, all games of cards are unlawful gaming. Good sense on the part of the authorities has generally brought about a sensible administration of the law. No one desires unlawful gaming in its true meaning permitted in this country, but no doubt juries will see that the law is not used for the purpose of the fanatical repression of an innocent pastime.

FORMAL READING OF BILL AT OPENING OF PARLIAMENT.-In the accounts of the opening of the Parliamentary session ceremonial observances which by their picturesque features impress the imagination, have been minutely described, but one formality which is of interest to the student of constitutional development as a relic of the time when the Executive was not under Parliamentary control, but antagonistic to the Houses of Parliament and claimed a power which transcended the law, has not been noticed. When the Houses of Lords and Commons are resumed in the afternoon subsequent to their adjournment after the delivery of the King's Speech, the main business is for the Lord Chancellor in the Lords and the Speaker in the Commons to report the King's Speech. In the House of Lords the speech is read by the Lord Chancellor, and in the House of Commons by the Speaker, who states that "for greater accuracy he has obtained a copy." But before this is done it is the practice in both Houses to read some Bill a first time pro formâ in order to assert their right of deliberating without reference to the immediate cause of summons by the Crown. This practice in the Lords is enjoined by Standing Order No. 2. In the Commons the same form is observed pursuant to ancient custom. In the Journals of the House of Commons of the 4th April 1571 it is recorded that immediately after the return of the House from the House of Lords, where Queen Elizabeth had signified her approval of the Speaker, "one Bill (according to the usual course) had its first reading." The Bill which has been utilized for this purpose for upwards of a century is "The Clandestine Outlawries Bill." It is in manuscript, and is preserved in a drawer of the table of the House of Commons. It is very questionable whether it has ever been read by anyone now living. Judgments of outlawry are in practice long obsolete. The last judgment of outlawry is said to have been obtained in 1859. In 1794 Mr. Sheridan raised a debate upon the first reading of this Bill-a mere formal proceeding. The Speaker decided that he was in order, but such a course is now prohibited by Standing Order No. 31. In the Commons, where the practice differs in this respect from the House of Lords, other business is frequently entered on before the reading of this Bill "for form's sake," such as the issue of new writs, the consideration of matters of privilege, and the usual sessional orders and resolutions. Such business, however, is invariably very closely connected with the management of affairs exclusively within the control of the House itself. The formal reading of one Bill always takes precedence of the reading from the Chair of a copy of the King's Speech declaring the causes of the summons of Parliament.

ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC CAREER FOR PRACTICE AT AMERICAN BAR. The intention of Mr. Davis, the retiring Ambassador of the United States at St. James', who, before he accepted that great

office, had filled with éclat the position of Solicitor-General for the American Commonwealth, to resume practice at the American Bar will recall to mind some instances in which great public careers have been changed for the life of a practicing lawyer in America. Thomas Addis Emmet, one of the leaders of the Irish insurrectionary movement in 1798, who, on graduation with distinction in Trinity College, Dublin, went to Edinburgh to pursue the study of medicine, and thence to London, where he was attached to Guy's Hospital, at the request of his father, on the death of his elder brother, changed his profession and was called to the Irish Bar, at which he had attained some eminence, when his career in Ireland was terminated by his participation in the revolutionary movement of that time. After four years' imprisonment he was liberated in June 1802. Having resided for upwards of two years in exile on the Continent, he embarked in the autumn of 1804 for America. He doubted for some time which profession he would pursue, that of medicine or law. His friends advised him to go to the American Bar, to which he was admitted, notwithstanding some opposition. His career was one of unbroken success. He was made Attorney-General of the State of New York in 1812, a few years after his admission to the Bar, a position, however, of which his tenure was short by reason of political turmoil. At his death in 1827, from an apoplectic seizure when conducting a case in court, he was the acknowledged leader of the American Bar. The courts were immediately adjourned. A magnificent marble monument, surmounted with his bust, was placed in the wall of the court in which he was attacked by fatal illness. An obelisk of white marble, 30 feet high erected by public subscription, marks Emmet's grave in New York. The obelisk bears inscriptions on three sides in English, Latin, and Irish. Yet another great public career was exchanged for the comparative quietude of the American Bar. "It is not generally understood," writes Dr. J. Hannis Taylor in his monumental Treatise on International Public Law, "that Captain Semmes, of the Alabama, who was the guiding and directing force. in the fitting out of the expedition whose destructive work resulted in the claims 'generally known as the Alabama Claims,' was one of the most astute and accomplished lawyers of his time." Dr. Hannis Taylor adds as a footnote, "After the close of the Civil War he [Semmes] practiced for many years at Mobile, where the author often took part with him in the trial of cases civil and criminal."

SEIZURE OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS BY GOVERNMENT.-The seizure by the Government, under their special powers, of a number of documents, including briefs held by counsel in connection with the defense of Sinn Fein prisoners-documents which were, however, eventually returned-in the office of a solicitor seems, even if regarded as justifiable by what Lord Chief Justice Cockburn once termed the law of necessity, in contravention of the observance of the principle recognized in cases, however serious may be the crimes with which the accused are charged, that communications with legal advisers are confidential. No one can be compelled to disclose to the court any communication between himself and his legal adviser which his legal adviser could not disclose without his permission, and no legal adviser is permitted, whether during or after the termination of his employment as such, unless with the client's express consent, to disclose any communication, oral or documentary, made to him as such legal adviser by or on behalf of his client. This principle does not extend to any such communications made in furtherance of any criminal purpose, since the furtherance of a criminal purpose can never be part of a legal adviser's business. As soon as a legal adviser knowingly takes part in preparing for a crime he ceases to act as a lawyer

and becomes a criminal-a conspirator or accessory as the case may be: (see Reg. v. Cox and Railton, 52 L. T. Rep. 25; 14 Q. B. Div. 153). The return of the seized documents demonstrates that the legal advisers of the persons to whose defense these documents related were not subject to an imputation of being guilty of conduct so serious and unprofessional. The fact, however, of the seizure of briefs held by prisoners' counsel with a view of obtaining information by the Crown for prosecutions constitutes in itself, if not justified by overwhelming evidence of its absolute necessity in the public interest, the very gravest violation of the principle that communications with legal advisers are confidential. In the insurrectionary movement in Ireland in 1798 the Government never seized documents in connection with the defense of men charged with offenses relative to that movement, although at that time a legal adviser was bribed to betray to the Government the cases of clients whom he was engaged to defend when on trial for their lives. Mr. Lecky pronounces this judgment on Mr. Leonard McNally, for whose conduct there is, so far as we are aware, no parallel in forensic history in these countries: "As confidential lawyer of the United Irishmen he had opportunities of information of the rarest kind. It is certain that he sometimes communicated to the Government the line of defense contemplated by his clients and other information which he can only have received in professional confidence, and briefs annotated by his hand will be found among the Government papers at Dublin."

THE SPEAKER'S CHAIR.-The London Times, in a description of the Speaker's chair, a facsimile of the Speaker's chair of the House of Commons at Westminster, which is to be presented to the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada in the new Parliament House which has been erected owing to the destruction by fire of the old Parliament House, reminds its readers that it was the custom, before the destruction of St. Stephen's Chapel by fire in 1834, at the end of a Parliament for the Speaker to carry off the great chair on which he sat, as a memento of his service to the House. It is perhaps of interest to state that before the destruction of the Canadian Parliament House, as before the destruction of St. Stephen's Chapel in England, the Speaker of the House of Commons at Ottawa had the privilege of taking away the chair of the House at the conclusion of the Parliament. The Speaker's chair in Canada, as in England, will no longer become the perquisite of the occupant of the chair because of its elaborate construction as a fixture and practically part and parcel of the chamber. The Times mentions that the chair in which the Speaker (Mr. Speaker Addington) of the first Parliament of the United Kingdom sat was, with two other Speaker's chairs, the perquisite of its occupant and preserved as an heirloom in his family. Mr. Speaker Addington was technically Speaker of three Houses of Commons, but he was practically Speaker of two Houses of Commons only. He was elected to the chair on the death of Mr. Speaker Cornwall in 1789. Parliament was dissolved in the following year, and the chair of the last House of Commons became his perquisite. Parliament was again dissolved in 1796, and Mr. Speaker Addington obtained another chair. Then on the coming into operation of the union between Great Britain and Ireland on January 1, 1801, although there was no dissolution, still a new Parliament, in which one hundred members from Ireland elected for the old Irish Parliament took their places, was convened with all the formalities of a new Parliament on opening by Royal Commission and the election of a Speaker. Mr. Speaker Addington was re-elected, and received a third chair as a perquisite of a Speaker of a Parliament which had not been dissolved, but which had been converted, without a new election, from a Parliament of Great Britain into a Parliament of the

United Kingdom, and which was convened and opened as a new Parliament on January 22, 1801. The obtaining of a chair filled in an official capacity as a perquisite and its preservation as an heirloom in the family of its occupant are not without parallel in judicial history. When, in 1880, Lord Coleridge, who had been Chief Justice of the old Court of Common Pleas, became Lord Chief Justice of England in succession to Sir Alexander Cockburn, he claimed as a perquisite, the old Court of Common Pleas being no longer in existence, the armchair in which the Chief Justices of the Common Pleas had sat when presiding, and in his will left special directions that it should be regarded as an heirloom. The chair of the Chief Justices of the Court of Common Pleas is now in the possession of the present Lord (Mr. Justice) Coleridge.

Obiter Dicta

A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR.-Coward v. State, 24 Tex. App. 590.

A BAD COUNTY.-Says the Index to the Maryland Session Laws for 1912: "Scrapes-see 'Queen Anne's Co.'"

BUT THIS WAS A FORD!-"The purchase of an automobile is not like the purchase of a sack of potatoes."-Per Dietrich, J., in Ford Motor Co. v. Benjamin E. Boone, Inc., 244 Fed. 335.

FAR FROM IT.-In State v. Frank (Ark.), 169 S. W. 333, the court says that it cannot be seriously contended that the word "repair" is sufficient "to embrace the business of laundering."

SPEAKING OF UNNECESSARY WORDS, ETC.-"Nor can numeral numbers . . . be the subject of a valid trade-mark.”—Per Munger, J., in Wolf Bros. & Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 165 Fed. 413.

FICKLE AS EVER.-According to the facts appearing in Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928, the plaintiff broke her agreement with the defendant and formed new contract relations with a rival concern.

VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY?—"The executory contract for future delivery of fish in barrels at Tacoma was not effective to vest any title to or right of property in fish which had not been caught."Per Hanford, J., in In re Alaska Fishing, etc., Co., 167 Fed. 875.

WELL, IT SEEMS TO BE MOVING TOLERABLY FAST.-"Doubtless there are people by whom the use of whiskey as a tonic is considered wrong. . . . But the world has not yet arrived at a consensus of opinion on these matters."-Per Grosscup, J., in Peck v. Tribune Co., 154 Fed. 330.

A SOUTH CAROLINA "BULL."-The courts seem somewhat slow at times, but they eventually get there. Thus, we find the South Carolina Supreme Court solemnly declaring: "Plainly, the insertion of the numerals 1475 and 2280 and the character XCIII., is a bull."-See McLendon v. Columbia, 101 S. Car. 48.

MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME.-The heart-rending plea "I did it for the wife and the kids," recently attributed to a ball player in disgrace, recalls the following story current in legal circles a few years ago: "I make whiskey," said the moonshiner, "to make shoes for my little children." The judge seemed touched, for he had children of his own. "I sympathize with you," he said,

"and I am going to send you to the Ohio Penitentiary, where you can follow the shoe business for two years."

A MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM.-In Gillespie v. J. C. Piles & Co., 178 Fed. 886, the following facts appeared: One Hough started in business in 1905 with a capital of $100 and a debt of $2000. Three years later he had accumulated a capital of $20,000 and debts amounting to $100,000, when he was adjudged a bankrupt. What disturbs us is the question whether it was the part of wisdom for his creditors to force him into bankruptcy. It is true that in three years' time he had multiplied his debts 50 times, but it is likewise true that he had multiplied his capital 200 times. At the same ratio of increase, three more years of business would have found him with 4 millions of capital and only 5 millions of indebtedness. Now, if his creditors had only given him time, wouldn't he eventually have become solvent?

A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE MAY BE A DANGEROUS THING.-A prominent lawyer particularly well known in criminal cases was trying a case before a local court, not so long ago. It was a case of simple assault, the defendant, a stout little woman, being accused of kicking her neighbor, a tall strapping lass, in the abdomen. This the plaintiff testified to, and the lawyer arose to crossexamine her. He inquired insinuatingly if the witness thought it possible to kick so high. "Now, Mrs.- do you think it possible for you to kick as high as that yourself?" he asked. "Come up here and I'll show you," was the wrathy response. The judge leaned over his desk. "Come, Mr.," said he, "everybody knows a woman can kick high." "It may be within your honor's knowledge," was the quick retort, "but I assure your honor it is not within mine."

THE RETORT PARSIMONIOUS.-The late Sir Algernon West, whose recent death at a great age has made a notable gap in the social life of London, was the author of one or two entertaining volumes of reminiscences in which he had a good deal to say of the many eminent lawyers with whom he was officially brought in contact or whom he met socially. For instance, says the Law Times, Sir Algernon preserved an amusing example of the caustic wit of Mr. Justice Maule, one of the noted judicial humorists of a past generation. The story, told at Sir Algernon's dinner table by Lord Herschell, who, while at the Bar, belonged to the Northern Circuit, turned on the parsimony of a former Bishop of Carlisle. His Grace was, it seems, famous for his bad dinners, food and drink. One day, while entertaining the Bar, the junior members, disgusted with their scanty food and wine, became rather noisy at their end of the table. The Bishop

remarked on this to Mr. Justice Maule, who quietly said: "Yes, my lord, it is apt to happen when men take a little wine on an empty stomach."

"WHO SHALL DECIDE WHEN DOCTORS DISAGREE?"-"One who is familiar with the delightful comedies of Molière cannot fail to remember his faculty to imbue in great degree farce and burlesque with the true spirit of refined comedy. In one instance he depicts with rare delicacy and humor the situation of two doctors; a Doctor Tant-mieux (so much the better), and a Doctor Tant-pis (so much the worse). Like unto a dialogue between hope on its feet and despair taking to its bed, these doctors were expected never to agree; nay, they never did nor could agree. The theater of this appeal presents a situation curious too, in that the appellant and the appellee cannot agree on anything or in any particular. They differ about the law, about the facts, on the opinion of this court in the instant case, on the language and effect of former decisions of this court, on the jurisdiction of this court, on the procedure governing its deliberations, and the scope

and extent of, and the limitations upon, its power to review and pronounce judgment."-Per Franklin, C. J., in Steinfeld v. Nielsen (Ariz.), 139 Pac. 893,

LONG ISLAND'S OWN CIRCUS.-The following items appeared in a recent single issue of a Long Island Newspaper:

The Riverhead band is planning to give a roller skating masquerade.

Brookhaven Town has voted to engage a motorcycle cop for the coming summer.

Hicksville has an 18-year-old youth, Keith Gorrell, who weighs 477 pounds.

An Arctic or Hudson seal, of unusual size, was seen basking in the sunlight, on an ice-flow in Peconic Bay, just off White Hill, Shelter Island, recently.

A. B. Cross of Southampton, has a freak egg which was laid by one of his hens. Breaking the shell of a large sized egg he discovered another perfect egg with shell inside, with about a quarter of an inch of space between the shells of the two eggs.

THE COMMON LAW.-The following remarks made by C. J. Ramage, of Saluda, S. C., before a local bar association, seem worthy of repetition here ex proprio vigore: "Gentlemen of the Bar Association, I rise to throw out a few thoughts on our old friend the Common Law. He has been made the butt of many jokes and witticisms-he has been blamed by lawyers when the case was lost; he has been gashed and bled by fool legislatures, but always like old mother nature he comes back at the appointed time, doing business at the same old stand. Some smart fledgling of the law will pass a bill as legislator that is intended to wipe out old man Common Law but when the wise Court comes to pass on the act, it has to call in the old safe pack horse to be again saddled to carry the pitiable little crippled statute along. No English speaking court can live without the Common Law ten minutes. It is the vital breath that fills our legal lungs. It covers up the ugly, gaping places left by the legislature in the sides of statutes with beautiful robes of modesty. It follows us from the cradle to the grave-it protected our fathers and it will protect our grandchildren.

The Common Law is a name that even is involved in mystery. It is generally understood to mean the law common to all of England in the early times. There was a law of Essex, a custom of Kent and another of Sussex in most cases diametrically opposite; but there were certain laws that were common to the realm and for this reason it was called the Common Law. That may be incorrect, but it is the explanation given by that learned commentator, Justice Stephens, in his Books on English Law. It may be said here also that all over Europe the Roman law was common to all and it was for a long time the Common Law so termed in the books, etc. It may have been that the Early Common Law acted on the same principle and got its name in the same way. But whatever may be its origin, we have it from the early Saxons. It is founded on immemorial usage and it goes back to a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. The foundation of the common law is reason-and as Old Lord Coke says when the reason faileth, the law also faileth-reason being the life of the law-when the law fails to be reason, says Coke, then and there it ceases to be the law. Alas! Sir Edward, this does not follow by any manner of means. Sweep over the vast array of law reports in our land and come back and see if you can still make that statement. These may not be the real law but poor mundane mortals have to recognize them as such. The Common Law is also a growing science-it expands and develops every day. In certain states they have what are called Codes that are supposed to contain all the law, but the

Common Law has to step in and help construe the Code. Who made the common law? The judges. Who interprets the common law? The judges. Who changes the common law? The judges and sometimes the legislatures. When will the common law cease to function? When Gabriel blows his trump. 'We may say with Hooker that his seat is in the bosom of God and all things do homage to him. Long may he live and prospera guide to the upright, but a delusion and a snare to the unjust and vicious."

SIR: Your editorial commending the Osborn plan of having attorneys who are drawing wills arrange that some of the words, besides the signatures, be in the handwriting of the testator (in your issue of March, 1921), has the unqualified endorsement of the undersigned, with his quarter of a century practical study and experience of and with forged and tampered wills.

Some years ago, undersigned suggested to Colonel Milton A. Nathan, prominent attorney, Chronicle bldg., San Francisco-and since that time to many others—that a mere ink-written signature to a will was not at all adequate to insure distribution of an estate of magnitude after decease of testator (for reasons fully recited at the time), and recommended that for all clients of importance for whom he made wills he should cause the client to write with a pen at least one sentence of the will, in repetition of some typewritten portion of the document. . . . Since that time, Colonel Nathan has prevailed upon all of his will-making clients to write out a sentence of at least ten words in all wills which he prepared in typewritten form.

Finally, Colonel Nathan was so taken with the idea-after trying it out on his own clients-that he got up a "bill" to be offered to the Legislature of California, by State Senator W. S. Scott, of this city, providing that no will bearing a signature only, without at least ten words of pen-writing by the testator, shall be admitted to probate if there be produced an earlier will bearing besides the signature of the testator at least ten pen-written words also done by him or her.

San Francisco, Cal.

CHAUNCEY M'GOVERN.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, of LAW NOTES, published monthly at Northport, L. I., N. Y., for Apr. 1, 1921.

State of New York) 88

County of Suffolk

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared M. B. Wailes, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the President of the Edward Thompson Co., the publishers of LAW NOTES, and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, embodied in section 443, Postal Laws and Regulations, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor. and business managers are:

are: none.

4. That the two paragraphs, next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him. M. B. Wailes, Prest. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 22d day of Mar., 1921. Geo. Babcock. Notary Public [SEAL). (My commission expires March 30th, 1921.)

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it deprives the Commission of much of its efficiency since business methods and conditions change rapidly and those desirous of obtaining an unfair commercial advantage are fertile in expedients. As was said in a dissenting opinion: "Methods of competition which would be unfair in one industry, under certain circumstances, might, when adopted in another industry, or even in the same industry under different circumstances, be entirely unobjectionable. Furthermore, an enumeration, however comprehensive, of existing methods of unfair competition must necessarily soon prove incomplete, as with new conditions constantly arising novel unfair methods would be devised and developed. In leaving to the Commission the determination of the question whether the method of competition pursued in a particular case was unfair, Congress followed the precedent which it had set a quarter of a century earlier, when by the Act to Regulate Commerce it conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission power to determine whether a preference or advantage given to a shipper or locality fell within the prohibition of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage." That this experiment, for such the Trade Commission must still be deemed, may have a fair chance of success, it is to be hoped that the limitations imposed by the decision in the Gratz case will be removed by an amendment of the Act.

Legislative Admission to the Bar.

THE HE Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (4 Fed. Stat. Ann. [2d Ed.] 575) was the result of a new theory of dealing with the evils of monopoly, its design being to substitute flexible supervision of commercial operations for a rigid prohibition of combinations. To that end the Commission was given power to prevent "unfair methods of competition in commerce." The design seems an admirable one from every viewpoint, protecting the public from unlawful restraints of competition, and at the same time protecting legitimate business combinations from the danger of criminal prosecution. It is, therefore, to be regretted that the first authoritative interpretation put on the act should be a substantial limitation on the powers of the Commission. In Federal Trade Com. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, in setting aside an order of the Commission which forbade a dealer to refuse to sell to persons who did not also purchase from him certain accessories to be used with the article purchased (a practice known as "full line forcing") the court said: "The words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include. They are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly." This would seem to indicate that only those practices which were regarded as unlawful when the act was passed may be prevented by the Commission. If such is the meaning of the decision

HE recent act of the New York Legislature authorizing the admission of Woodrow Wilson to the bar of that state, notwithstanding the fact that he has not practiced the profession in another state for a sufficient time. to entitle him to such admission, is a graceful and courteous concession by political opponents to a man retiring to the somewhat difficult and anomalous situation of an ex-Presi

dent. Under a Constitution forbidding in broad terms special legislation the invalidity of the enactment would be clear. See In re Adkins (W. Va.) 98 S. E. 888. However the Constitution of New York (Art. III, § 18) merely forbids special legislation on certain specified subpects and other subjects which in the judgment of the legislature may be provided for by general laws. But one of the inhibited subjects of special legislation is "granting to any private corporation, association or individual the right to any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise," and in the case of In re Branch, 70 N. J. L. 537, it was held that an act relieving registered clerks in law offices whose term of service began more than three years before the passage of the act from an examination required by the same act of other candidates for admission to the bar was invalid. The court said: "That this statute, therefore, is one granting a privilege or immunity, is not to be questioned. That it grants such privilege or immunity to those individuals alone who are included within its classification, cannot be questioned. Hence, as to all not within such classification, the privilege in question is an exclusive one, within the meaning of article 4, section 7, paragraph 11, of the state constitution, which prohibits the legislature from granting to any individual any exclusive privilege or immunity whatever." Moreover there is some question as to whether the courts are bound to observe such a legislative mandate. In Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. St. 527, in holding to be void a statute requiring the admission to the bar of a practitioner from another