No trace of him was afterward discovered, though his friends made every effort to find him and ascertain the cause of his mysterious disappearance. A large reward was offered through the newspapers for information that would lead to his discovery, either dead or in life. The detective police were employed to search for him without results. No tidings have been received of him, and not the faintest trace of the cause or manner of his disappearance has been discovered. He gave no intimation to anyone of an intention to absent himself; and the latest declaration of his intentions was to the effect that he expected to leave Chicago, the day of his disappearance, to join his wife at Dubuque. He owed no debts amounting to any considerable sum, and had made payment of some small ones about the day of his disappearance. His valise, containing clothing and other articles commonly carried by travelers, was found at his hotel. His bill there was unpaid."

That appearances are deceptive, however, is forcibly illustrated by the case of Spahr v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 98 Minn. 471, 108 N. W. 4. In that case the court, refusing to presume death within seven years, stated the facts as follows: "The evidence tended to show that he [the absentee], was a clergyman of education and culture; that he was successful in his sacred calling and respected by his parishioners and friends; that he was thirty-one years old; that his family consisted of his wife and two daughters, of whom he was fond; that his domestic relations ordinarily were pleasant; that his credit was good; that on Sunday, April 3, 1898, he held services in his church, announced that there would be communion services at the church the following Friday, and requested all to be present; and, further, that on the next day, Monday, the plaintiff drove him to the station, and he requested her to meet him there on the following Thursday, which she did, but he did not return then, or at any other time, and that he has not communicated with his family; that when he left, the church was owing him twenty-four dollars, and he left forty dollars with his wife. This, however, is only one side of the shield. The evidence is practically conclusive that the insured was in fact a drunkard, a user of morphine, and a libertine. The plaintiff testified that for at least a year before he went away he was a hard drinker, frequently drunk, kept a keg of whiskey in the house and when drunk he abused her; that on April 12, 1898, or five days after the day appointed for his return, she commenced an action for a divorce on the ground that he was an habitual drunkard, and in her verified complaint she stated that for many years he had treated her in a cruel and inhuman manner, and that she was informed and believed that he left the state accompanied by a woman."

As illustrating the varied workings of the human mind and the contrary conclusions drawn from a given state of facts, it is interesting to note the weight and effect given by the courts to the growth and ease of communication existing in modern times. All are agreed that the extent to which the state of civilization prevails at the time and place of the disappearance may enter into the consideration of the inference to be drawn from unexplained absence. Thus in Smith v. Smith, 49 Ala. 156, it was said: "Considering the great length and breadth of this country, and the migratory character of the people, the presumption has less force here than in the country where the law on this subject originated; and in a majority of cases there is probably little doubt such presumptions are,

in fact, contrary to the truth. They should not, therefore, be permitted to be too easily or too readily established." In the majority of instances it is held that the ease of communication strengthens the presumption of death arising from continued unexplained absence. In other words it is said "if he had been alive we would have heard from him." On the other hand in at least one instance the contrary view was taken, the court saying in effect that if dead the fact would have been communicated. Modern Woodmen of America v. Gerdom, supra, wherein it was said: "The social aspects of our civilization have been almost revolutionized since the presumption based upon the fact of seven years' unexplained absence was adopted. The improbability that accident, injury, sickness or death could overtake John B. Gerdom without information of the fact reaching his family and friends is very great. He scarcely could fail to find assistance in case of need among members of his own fraternity. Hospital provision is now made almost everywhere for the relief of the sick and injured, and careful records of all cases are usually kept, including information concerning the patient himself and the cercumstances necessitating his detention. Police and other court records, records of coroners' inquests, records of burial, and other criminal, casualty and mortuary statistics, collected and preserved in every well populated state, make it difficult for any interested person to be ignorant of the facts to which they relate. The press gives daily attention to the publication throughout the country of news relating to accidents and crimes wherever they occur. The people generally are alert and well informed. Those of different sections of the country are intimate with each other, and the means of communication between even remote parts is easy, safe, and speedy. This being true, the presumption of death from absence cannot have the strong probability of fact as its basis which formerly supported it, and persons who for their own profit assume the burden of establishing in courts of justice that the death of an individual has occurred have little excuse for urging their own isolated ignorance of his fate or his whereabouts as the principal item of their proof."

Doubtless many cases involving this question will arise both in this country and abroad through disappearances of soldiers and sailors during the war. Generally speaking, it would seem that the doctrine of exposure to specific peril would apply, but other facts which might explain the absence on other grounds than death must be taken into account in such cases, such for instance as the possibility of capture by the enemy. Though the reasonable assumption would be that a continued unexplained absence after the war had ended and the prisoners had been released was due to death, such a presumption would not necessarily arise during the continuation of hostilities, and it has been so held in at least one instance, Corley v. Holloway, 22 S. C. 380, wherein it appeared that the absentee when last seen was going into battle, and the court on review of the circumstances assumed that he was captured rather than killed therein. The facts in the cases present a kaleidoscopic view of the emotions and motives of mankind but the limited space afforded here prevents more than a few illustrations being set out. To the curiously inclined. reference is made to the notes in 7 Ann. Cas. 573, 14 Ann. Cas. 242, Ann. Cas. 1916B 67 and Ann. Cas. 1917A 82, where the cases are collected, and to the article Death in 8 R. C. L. p. 700. MINOR BRONAUGH.

BIGAMY AND DIVORCE.

AN important point in the law of bigamy was decided in the Court of Criminal Appeal on the 14th Feb., when the considered judgment of the Court (Justices Bray, Avory, Shearman, Salter, and Greer) was delivered by Mr. Justice Avory. The appellants in Rex v. Wheat: Rex v. Stocks had been convicted at the Derbyshire Assizes, before Mr. Justice Sankey, the one of bigamy, and the other of aiding and abetting, and sentenced to one day's imprisonment. The question raised by the appeal was whether a mistaken belief on the part of the person charged with bigamy that he had been divorced was a good answer to the charge. The jury had found as a fact that Wheat, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, believed that he had been divorced. The only material evidence in support of such a belief consisted of a letter from the solicitors, whom Wheat (a somewhat illiterate person) had instructed to petition, in these terms: "We have your telegram, and hope to send you papers for signature in the course of a day or two." The court were of opinion (1) that there was no evidence on which the jury could find a belief in good faith and on reasonable grounds, and (2) that such a belief, if mistaken, would afford no defense to a charge of bigamy.

The present law is contained in the Offenses against the Person Act. 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100), s. 57, the material part of which runs: "Whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife . . . shall be guilty of felony . . . Provided that nothing in this section shall extend . . . to any person who, at the time of such second marraige, shall have been divorced from the bond of the first marriage." The section is copied from the former Consolidation Act (9 Geo. IV, c. 31), s. 22, which repealed (sect. 1) the original Act against bigamy (1 Jas. I, c. 11). In that Act, the exception as to divorce had been of any persons "that are or shall be at the time of such marriage divorced by any sentence had, or hereafter to be had, in the Ecclesiastical Court."

Before the Act of James I, bigamy had been a matter of ecclesiastical cognizance only. In its older and proper sense, bigamy meant only being twice married. According to the canonists it was bigamy for a man to marry two virgins successively, or to marry a widow. A clerk in minor orders bigamous in this sense, lost benefit of clergy. Bigamy, in our modern sense (the word only appears in the heading and marginal note to the section at present in force), was in 1604 suddenly created a capital felony, though benefit of clergy would attach from the first under 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, s. 9. The proviso in the act of James I, excepting persons divorced by sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court, demands a word of explanation. No Ecclesiastical Court in England at that time (or any other) could grant a sentence of divorce a vinculo matrimonii. It could only divorce a mensâ et thoro. The proviso thus in terms protected any person so divorced from the charge of felony. Such person was, however, precluded by Canon 107 of 1603, and by his own bond to the Ordinary, from going through the form of remarriage during the partner's lifetime under pain of ecclesiastical censure. The words "divorced from the bond of the first marriage" were introduced into the Act of George IV to remedy this construction. By the date of that Act (1828) a regular system of Parliamentary divorce a vinculo had grown up, which was thirty years later superseded by judicial dissolution under the Martimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85). Sect. 57 of this Act gives liberty to the parties to marry again, "as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death."

Much reliance was placed for the appellants on the decision of

the full court for Crown Cases Reserved in Reg. v. Tolson (60 L. T. Rep. 899; 23 Q. B. Div. 168). It was there held by nine judges, as against five, that a woman who had been deserted by her husband for more than five but less than seven years, but who, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, believed him to be dead, was not amenable to the charge of bigamy. Had the desertion in that case been for seven years or more, she would have been within the express proviso excepting from the section "any person marrying a second time whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years then last past, and shall not have been known by such person to be living within that time." The majority of the court held, however, that a bonâ fide belief on reasonable grounds in the death of the partner protected the self-supposed survivor from criminal liability. The maxim Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea was applied. Mr. Justice Cave's dictum that at common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which would make an act innocent was always a good defense is dissented from by the present court as carrying the maxim too far in its application to statutes. A broad difference between that case and the present one would seem to be that there the mistake was one of fact, while here it is one of law, or at least of mixed law and fact. In Rex. v. Earl Russell (85 L. T. Rep. 253; [1901] A. C. 446), tried before the House of Lords, it was not disputed that the defendant honestly believed his Nevada divorce to be valid, but it was recognized that this was no defense in law, the divorce being invalid according to English law. The only point argued and reported in that case was one of jurisdiction, but it is noteworthy that the present Mr. Justice Avory was of counsel for Lord Russell. A bonâ fide (but mistaken) belief in the validity in England of a foreign divorce, being a mistake in law, would not excuse, though its existence would manifestly affect the measure of guilt and of consequent punishment.

It is difficult to see how a different decision could have been reached in the case under discussion. No person, however illiterate, can have the slightest difficulty in ascertaining, in England at least, whether he has been divorced or not. It might be possible in some American States to have very serious doubts whether a person is married, and, if so, to what spouse. In view of the large crop of bigamy and divorce cases appearing as an aftermath of the war, we cannot regret that the stricter view has been upheld.-Law Times.

Cases of Interest

THREAT TO DISCHARGE JURY FOR TERM as COERCION WARRANTING REVERSAL IN CRIMINAL CASE.-It is reversible error, it seems, for the court in a criminal case to threaten to discharge the jury from service during the rest of the term, in case they fail to agree on a verdict in the case then on trial. It was so held in People v. Strzempkowski (Mich), 178 N. W. 771, reported and annotated in 10 A. L. R. 420, wherein the court said: "The instruction, in effect, informed the jury that if they did not agree upon a verdict they would be discharged from further service during the term. We may take judicial notice that such a procedure would cause humiliation to the members of the jury panel. While impressed from a reading of the record, as was the circuit judge, that the duty of the jury, under the proofs submitted, was plain, nevertheless a question of fact was presented for them to determine,

and it was their right to determine it without undue influence on the part of the trial court. There were no such admissions made by the respondent as justified the direction of a verdict, nor did the court so charge. Should we affirm this conviction, we must say that such an instruction would be without reversible error in every case in which a jury had deliberated for a considerable time without reaching an agreement. The rule, as stated in 38 Cyc. 1762, is, we think, the only safe one to follow: "The court may impress upon the jury the propriety and importance of coming to an agreement, and harmonizing their views, state the reasons therefor, and tell them it is their duty to try to agree, but should not give instructions having a tendency to coerce the jury into agreeing on a verdict. While the court may reasonably urge an agreement, its discretion does not extend to the limit of coercion." "

RIGHT OF SHERIFF TO APPEAL IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING. -In Edmundson v. Ramsey (Miss.) 84 So. 455, it was held that in a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus to compel the admission of the relator to bail, the sheriff who has the custody of the relator is a "party aggrieved" under the Mississippi statute and is entitled to appeal from a decree in favor of the relator. The court said. "Section 36, Code of 1906, § 11, Hemingway's Code, provides that 'any party aggrieved by the judgment on the trial of a habeas corpus shall have an appeal to the supreme court.' "So the question here to be decided is whether or not the sheriff is a party aggrieved by the judgment of the court. That he was a necessary party to the proceeding is beyond question. The prisoner was in his custody by virtue of the decree of the chancery court. It was his duty as sheriff to care for and maintain this prisoner, and to keep him in custody until further order of that court. By the petition in this case he was called upon to answer explaining why he had the relator incarcerated in jail. In his answer he justified this incarceration by exhibiting the decree of the chancery court. The circuit judge decided adversely to the contention of the sheriff, holding in effect that the sheriff had no right to keep this man in jail, because that part of the decree so ordering was in excess of the power of the chancery court, and therefore null and void, and this judgment ordered the sheriff to release the prisoner from his custody. When this judgment was entered, the sheriff was then in this predicament. He was first ordered by the chancery court, a court of equal dignity with that of the circuit or habeas corpus court, to hold this prisoner until further orders of the court. He was later ordered by the circuit judge, exercising the powers conferred upon him by statute in cases of this kind, to release this prisoner, because the order under which he was imprisoned was void. As the custodian of the prisoner with the two conflicting orders in his hands, he was certainly officially interested in knowing whether or not he was entitled to the custody of this prisoner, and in knowing whether or not the order of the chancery court was void. We think an understanding of the facts of the case, when considered in connection with the above statute, is sufficient to settle the question of the right of the sheriff to prosecute an appeal."

MEANING OF CONTRACT TO PAY IN "LIBERTY BONDS."-In Nelson v. Rhem (N. Car.), 102 S. E. 395, reported and annotated in 10 A. L. R. 832, it was held that a promise to pay a specified amount in Liberty Bonds means bonds at par, not at market value. The court said: "The contract of the defendant is to pay $42,500, 'payable one-half in cash and one-half in Liberty bonds,' and, if we were to adopt the construction of the plaintiff, we would strike out of the agreement of the parties the terms of payment, leaving an unqualified promise to pay $42,500, as this would be the effect if 'one-half in Liberty bonds,' means the market value of the bonds. The phrase 'one-half in Liberty

bonds' means nothing, if not bonds on their face promising to pay $21,250, one-half the purchase money, and we have no right to change the contract, in the absence of allegation or proof of fraud or mistake, nor can we assume that the parties have inserted meaningless terms in their agreement. In Smith v. Dunlap, 12 Ill. 189, the contract was to pay $131,480.52 in the indebtedness of the State of Illinois, and the court says of the construction of the contract: 'Where the promisor undertakes to pay a certain number of dollars in specific articles, such as grain, cattle, or other commodities, he must deliver the property on the day named in the contract, or he becomes absolutely bound to pay the sum stated in money. The sum expressed in the obligation indicates the true amount of the debt; and the other provision is inserted for the benefit of the debtor, and relates exclusively to the mode of payment. If he does not avail himself of the privilege of discharging the debt in property, the obligation becomes a naked promise to pay the amount in money. But where the promisor agrees to pay a certain sum in bank notes, or other evidences of indebtedness, which purport on their face to represent dollars, and can be counted as such, the sum is expressed to indicate the number of dollars of the notes or evidence to be paid, and not the amount of the debt or consideration. The obligation is in fact but a promise to deliver so many dollars, numerically, of the securities described. If the debtor fails to deliver them according to the terms of the contract, he is responsible only for their real, not their nominal value. Their cash value is the true amount of the debt to be discharged. And beyond the damages directly resulting from the breach of the contract, the creditor is not entitled to recover.'"

EXEMPTION STATUTE AS APPLICABLE TO EXECUTION FOR FINE OR COSTS IN CRIMINAL CASE.-In Endeman v. Alexander (Colo.) 187 Pac. 729, reported and annotated in 10 A. L. R. 767, it was held that a statute exempting property from sale under execution does not apply to executions for fines and costs in criminal proceedings, where the statute makes the property of every person convicted subject to lien to pay the fine and costs, and authorizes the levy of execution thereon for that purpose. The court said: "We are of the opinion that § 3628, Rev. Stat. 1908, exempting certain property from sale under execution, relates solely to civil actions, and that under the provisions of § 2009, Rev. Stat. 1908, relating to executions in criminal cases, all the property of one convicted is liable to seizure thereunder. . . . Section 2019, Rev. Stat. 1908, provides: 'The court shall have power, in all cases of conviction under this chapter, when any fine is inflicted, to order as a part of the judgment of the court, that the offender shall be committed to jail, there to remain until such fine and costs are fully paid, or otherwise legally discharged.' It was the evident purpose of this statute to provide a method of compelling one to pay fine and costs adjudged against him in a criminal case, irrespective of any exemptions. All doubts as to such purpose are removed by 2012, Rev. Stat. 1908, which provides: 'Whenever it shall be made satisfactorily to appear to the district court of any district, or to any judge thereof in vacation, after all legal means have been exhausted, that any person who is confined to jail, . . . for any fine or costs. . . hath no estate whatever wherewith to pay such fine and costs, or costs only, it shall be the duty of the said court or judge to discharge such person from further imprisonment for such fine and costs.' It will be observed that one imprisoned to enforce the payment of fine and costs under 2019, supra, is not to be released until: First, 'all legal means have been exhausted' to collect the same; and, second, until it is made satisfactorily to appear to the judge that the person so imprisoned 'hath no estate whatever wherewith to pay.' Is it conceivable that the policy of the criminal law is, first, to grant

to a convicted defendant the very liberal exemptions provided by § 3628, and then, under pressure of imprisonment, compel him to relinquish what the law has so generously exempted? We cannot give the statutes in question such a construction. No exemption having been provided in any act relating expressly to criminal law, and a method having been provided in our criminal statutes to compel a defendant, by imprisonment, to subject all his property to the payment of a judgment for fine and costs levied against him, we are of the opinion that the exemptions contended for by plaintiff in error do not exist."

WHEN TITLE PASSES TO GOODS SOLD UNDER "C. I. F." CONTRACT.-In Smith Co. v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, 110 Atl. 94, it was held that under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act to the effect that unless a different intention appears the property in goods sold does not pass until they reach destination, title passes on delivery of goods to a carrier under a c. i. f. contract requiring the seller to deliver at destination since the provision for insurance shows an intention that the title shall pass at the place of shipment. Said the court: "If the price had not included insurance, it might be well urged that, under rule 5 of 19 of our Sales Act, the goods were never delivered to the appellant; but, reading the contract as a whole, as it must be read,-with the item for insurance included in it, 'a different intention' on the part of the buyer is disclosed, and the learned court below correctly so held. If it was the intention of the parties to the contract that the property in the goods sold should not pass to the buyer until delivery to him at Philadelphia, what concern had he about their safe transportation to that port? By his acceptance of the offer made by the appellee, he admittedly agreed that he would pay a sum to the latter which would cover marine insurance on the shipment to him. Under the contention which he now makes, he had no interest in it until it reached him at Philadelphia. That he did not so intend, and that he must now be held to have understood that the delivery of the goods to the common carrier was a delivery to him, are clearly demonstrated by the court below in the following from its opinion directing judgment to be entered against him: 'It is difficult to understand why the buyer should be concerned in any stipulation regarding payment of insurance, either by himself or by the seller, if he had no property in the goods during transit, and consequently no interest in the subject of their insurance. On the other hand, if he intended that they should pass to him as soon as they were delivered to the steamship, the subject of insurance in transit would be vital to him. We think this reference to insurance in the contract of sales is controlling and significant of the intention of the parties. If delivery was intended to take place at the end of the voyage, the reference to insurance in any communication between the parties was as superfluous as a reference to their insurance before the sale, while in the seller's warehouse. matter what is to be inferred from the reference to freight, the inference from that to insurance must also have weight. The contract must be interpreted as a whole. Both provisions must be explained, interpreted, and given their due force. A provision for the payment of freight by the seller, or its inclusion in the price, might indicate an intention to deliver at the end of the voyage, or it might be a consideration affecting the price merely, and the cost and uncertainty of the freight charge might be a burden accepted by the seller to expedite the sale. On the other hand, the provision with regard to insurance was either fully intended, and reasonable because of the risk the buyer intended to assume, or, if he did not so intend, it was entirely meaningless and mere surplusage.'"

No

RIGHT TO ARREST INSANE PERSON WITHOUT WARRANT.-In Maxwell v. Maxwell (Iowa), 177 N. W. 541, it was held that to

justify the arrest of an insane person without warrant one must show not only that the person arrested was insane at the time, but also that to permit him to go at large imperiled his own safety or that of the public. In the course of an interesting opinion the court said: "Where one restrains another of his liberty, he must justify his conduct, and he must show a legal right in him to do so. Under our statute (Code 1897, § 5197) a private person may make an arrest for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence. See Snyder v. Thompson, 134 Iowa 725, 112 N. W. 239. When a private person arrests another without a warrant, the burden rests upon him to show that a crime was committed or attempted in his presence by the party charged. Where a public offense is committed or attempted in the presence of a private citizen, the public interest demands and the public good requires that the citizen be invested with the right to restrain the defendant of his liberty, but when called into court to answer for the arrest the burden rests upon him to show that a public offense was actually attempted or committed in his presence. The right of one to arrest and restrain another of his liberty on the ground of insanity is dependent upon the existence of the fact upon which the right is predicated. A citizen has not the right to arrest any member of society who may be deranged in his mind, and therefore, in order to justify his act when charged with wrongful arrest he must show not only that the defendant was insane at the time, but also that to permit him to go at large imperiled his own safety or the safety of the public. It is not sufficient to show that he was lacking in mental capacity, or had hallucinations, but it must go further and show that to permit him to go unrestrained imperiled his own safety or the safety of the public. It is not sufficient to show in cases of this kind that he had probable grounds for suspecting he was insanę, or probable reason for believing that his being at large would imperil the safety of the public. He must justify it by proving the fact upon which his right to restrain rested. As said by Judge Cooley in Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90: 'Whoever takes into his own hands so serious a responsibility as the confinement of a citizen upon his own judgment merely, assuming it to be necessary in self-defense, must show that, upon the evidence, danger from his being at large was not merely possible, but was probable. Many sane persons, under the influence of strong excitements, are subject to serious and perhaps dangerous fits of passion; but another could not be allowed, on this ground alone, to seize and imprison them, in anticipation that possibly the occasion for excitement might arise and the passion be manifested.' He further says: 'I concede that the right to restrain these unfortunate persons for their own benefit, or for the protection of others, is as clear as the right to restrain one who, in the delirium of fever, would break away from his attendants, or one who, with a contagious disease upon him, should attempt to enter a public assembly. But the first thing to be determined is whether there is insanity in fact.' This involves the necessity for restraint. One who arrests another and restrains him of his liberty, on the theory that he is incapable of rational self-control, assumes the burden of showing that fact and the imminent necessity for the restraint. This, we think, is the true rule, and the sane and safe rule in matters of this kind."

LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANY FOR TRANSMISSION OF FORGED MESSAGE.-A telegraph company receiving by telephone a message for transmission which purports to come from a banking institution, one of its customers, is not guilty of negligence, it seems, in failing to make an investigation, in the absence of suspicious circumstances, so as to charge it with liability in case the message proves to be forged. The court so held in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Citizens' Bank (Ark.) 223 S. W. 29, saying inter alia: "With regard to the duties of tele

graph companies in the case of a forged message, it is generally held that, in the absence of notice of facts or circumstances which would awaken inquiry and arouse suspicion in the mind of a person of ordinary prudence in a like situation, regarding the authority of the person who presents a message for transmission to send it, the exercise by a telegraph company of reasonable care to receive and transmit genuine and authorized messages only does not require it to investigate, or ascertain the identity or authority to send it of the person who tenders a message for transmission, whether it is in writing or spoken directly to the operator or is communicated to him by telephone. 26 R. C. L. p. 557, § 62. . . . When the plaintiffs proved the delivery of the message, the loss resulting from reliance and action on it, without negligence on their part, and that no message had been sent by either of them, they made out a case against the telegraph company, and the burden of proof was cast upon it to show that it was not guilty of negligence in the premises. The reason is that the means of showing that there was no negligence on the part of the telegraph company was within the exclusive possession of the company. To require the plaintiff to show negligence after having made out a prima facie case would, in many cases, enable the company to evade a just liability. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Short, 53 Ark. 434, 9 L. R. A. 744, 14 S. W. 649; Little Rock & Ft. S. Teleg. Co. v. Davis, 41 Ark. 79. Under a state of facts in all essential respects similar to the case at bar, the United States circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit, in Bank of Havelock v. Western U. Telg. Co., 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181, 72 C. C. A. 580, 141 Fed. 522, 5 Ann. Cas. 515, held that a verdict was properly directed in favor of the telegraph company. Judge Sanborn, in discussing the question said: "The great purpose of telegraphy is the quick transmission of messages from senders to addressees. In the conduct of this business, all other considerations are subordinate. The telephone furnishes the most speedy and convenient means of communicating these messages from the senders to the offices of the telegraph companies, and from these offices to the addressees of the messages. For this reason its use for this purpose has become general throughout the land. The persons who operate the telephones are not generally the business men or officers of corporations in whom the authority to send the telegrams is vested in the first instance, but young men and women to whom this authority is delegated by parol, frequently through several intermediaries: An inquiry and decision by telegraph operators of the identity and authority of those who speak the messages over the telephone are utterly incompatible with their rapid receipt and transmission, and a new duty to investigate and determine this authority before sending the messages, a duty which would be so deleterious to the prime object of the business of telegraphy,―ought not to be imposed without great hesitation. It is true that the use of new inventions often creates new rights and imposes new duties. But the duty was never imposed upon telegraph companies, before the use of telephones, to ascertain the genuineness of the signatures to written messages, and the authority of those who presented them to direct their transmission, and no reason occurs to us why a duty of this nature should now be imposed upon them in receiving messages by telephone.""

"It is rarely that things are wholly void and without force and effect as to all persons and for all purposes, and incapable of being made otherwise. Things are voidable which are valid and effectual until they are avoided by some act; while things are often said to be void which are without validity until confirmed."-Per Fuller, C. J., in Weeks v. Bridgman, 159 U. S. 547.

New Books

California Jurisprudence. A Complete Statement of the Law and Practice of the State of California. Edited by William M. McKinney. Vol. 1. Abandonment to Ancient Lights, Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco. 1921.

The title of this work shows how comprehensive is the scope and how vast is the undertaking the publishers have assumed. They must have had the magnitude of it clearly in mind, however, for they have turned to one of the most experienced and resourceful editors in the American legal field to execute it. We refer to Mr. William M. McKinney, who in his long career as editor of legal publications has had in charge such important works as Ruling Case Law, Federal Statutes Annotated, Annotated Cases, Encyclopædia of Pleading and Practice and McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York. The plan of the work before us is to state the law and practice of California. This means an exhaustive reading of all the reported cases of the California courts, the collecting of all points of law therein decided, and the classifying of such points under well known legal titles. The plan calls for more than a digest, however. Along with the statement of the rules of law as laid down by the California courts will go the reasoning of those courts. Every title will in addition contain the statutes which apply to it interwoven with the case law. The articles will be arranged alphabetically and written in ordinary text book form, the names of cases and statutory references being given in footnotes. The first article in volume 1 is Abandonment and the last Ancient Lights. Among other articles included in this volume are Accord and Satisfaction, Abduction, Agriculture, Alimony and Separate Maintenance, Accounts and Accounting, Adverse Possession, Actions, and Alteration of Instruments. There are over twenty articles in the volume and they have been written by law professors, practising lawyers and those engaged entirely in legal authorship. We note among other contributors to the volume at hand the names of Dean Maurice E. Harrison of the Hastings College of Law, and Dean William Carey Jones of the University of California School of Jurisprudence. The wealth of material obtained from the cases for the articles already written is surprising, and the result is a completeness in those articles which lawyers outside California anyway would probably not have thought possible.

The mechanical features leave nothing to be desired. The paper, print, binding and general appearance could not be improved upon. All in all the California bench and bar are to be congratulated that they have within the confines of their State a publishing company sufficiently enterprising and sufficiently alive to the needs of the profession to undertake so extensive a publication as the Bancroft-Whitney Company has initiated. Neighboring States which rely on California in a greater or less measure for the solving of legal problems will also profit materially by this new publication.

A Treatise on the Law of Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations. By James Schouler. Sixth Edition in Three Volumes, by Arthur W. Blakemore of the Boston Bar. Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, N. Y. 1921.

A short time ago in this column we noticed the publication of the first volume of this work. The second and third volumes are

now before us. Volume II deals with marriage, divorce and separation, alienation of affections, abandonment, breach of promise, criminal conversation, curtesy and dower. Volume III contains the full text of the divorce statutes of the different States and insular possessions, together with forms of divorce pleadings, marriage setlements and separation agreements.