DEATH OF FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA.Thomas W. Bickett of Raleigh, North Carolina, for eight years attorney general of that state and later its governor, is dead.

COUNTY JUDGES OF ARKANSAS CONVENE.-The association of County Judges of Arkansas held its annual convention recently at the Pulaski county court house under the guidance of County Judge Perry Cook of Lake Village.

SAN MATEO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA.-C. N. Kirkbride of San Mateo was recently elected president of the San Mateo County Bar Association at the annual meeting held at Redwood City. The retiring president was George C. Ross.

PROMINENT WORCESTER, MASS., LAWYER DEAD.-Joseph K. Greene of Worcester, Massachusetts, is dead. He was graduated from Bowdoin College in 1877 and was a classmate of Admiral Peary.

RAMSEY COUNTY, MINNESOTA, HAS NEW PROBATE JUDGE.Howard Wheeler of St. Paul has been appointed Judge of the Ramsey County Probate Court to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge E. W. Bazille.

NEW JUSTICE OF DELAWARE SUPREME COURT APPOINTED.— Richard S. Rodney of New Castle has been appointed a justice. of the Supreme Court of Delaware to succeed the late Judge Thomas Bayard Heisel.

FEDERAL JUDGE IN BROOKLYN TO RESIGN.-United States District Judge Edwin L. Garvin of Brooklyn is to resign shortly and form a law partnership with his nephew Frederick R. Crane, son of Judge Frederick E. Crane of the New York Court of Appeals.

UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER IN ARKANSAS KILLED.-Judge James Coater of Little Rock, United States Commissioner and former Pulaski county judge, was killed in an automobile accident recently. He was born in England in 1843.

LABETTE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF KANSAS.-The annual banquet of the Labette County Bar Association, held at Parson, Kansas, in January, was addressed by Judge Silas Porter of the state Supreme Court.

WELL KNOWN BOSTON LAWYER PASSES AWAY.-Charles B. Southard, a well known Boston lawyer, died January 22. He was born at Darnariseotta, Maine, in 1847, and was graduated from, Tufts College, class of 1870.

COMMON PLEAS JUDGES OF OHIO ORGANIZE.-An organization of Common Pleas judges has been perfected in Ohio, Judge Robert H. Day of Canton being the first president. He is a brother of Mr. Justice Day of the United States Supreme Court.

FOMRER MASSACHUSETTS JUDGE DEAD.-Judge Henry Wardwell of Salem, Massachusetts, is dead. He was graduated from Dartmouth College in 1866 and was once a judge of the Massachusetts Superior Court.

DECEASE OF FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK.Thomas Carmody of Penn Yan, New York, attorney general of that state in 1910-1914, is dead. He was a graduate of Cornell University in the class of 1882.

MINNESOTA COUNTY ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION.-Reuben G. Thoreen of Stillwater was elected president of the Minnesota County Attorneys' Association of the state of Minnesota at its annual meeting held Jan. 21.

TENNESSEE LAWYER OF PROMINENCE DEAD.-George T. McCall, prominent lawyer and president of the Bank of Huntington, Huntington, Tennessee, is dead. He was a brother of the late John E. McCall.

CHANGE IN PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIARY.-Erwin Cummins district attorney of Washington County, Pennsylvania, has been appointed judge of the Common Pleas Court to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement in January of President Judge McIlvaine.

PEORIA BAR ASSOCIATION OF ILLINOIS.-At the annual Lincoln day dinner of the Peoria Bar Association Henry R. Rathbone of Chicago spoke on "The Last Day of Abraham Lincoln." Justice Floyd E. Thompson of the Illinois Supreme Court was another speaker.

DEATHS IN TEXAS.-Judge John C. Williams of Houston is dead at the age of 51. Other deaths reported from Texas include Judge H. N. Cornohan of Kaufman and former Chief Justice A. E. Prendergast of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION.-Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes has been invited to deliver the annual address before the American Bar Association when it meets next August at San Francisco. Lord Shaw of England will attend the convention.

FORMER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OF SEATTLE DEAD.-Robert C. Saunders, former United States Attorney at Seattle, died at St. Louis recently at the age of 57. He was a graduate of the University of Virginia, and for a time practiced law in St. Louis, and also Pine City, Minn.

UTAH BAR ASSOCIATION.-The first meeting in five years of the Utah Bar Association was held at Salt Lake City in January. E. M. Bagley, president of the association, presided. The guest of honor and principal speaker was Justice Charles P. McCarthy of Idaho.

ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF MAINE.-Supreme Court Justices Morrell and Philbrook of Maine were recently guests of honor at a dinner of the Androscoggin County Bar Association held at Lewiston, Maine. Judge Wing, president of the association, presided.

DEATH AMONG MEMBERS OF OREGON BAR.-Judge William S. Crowell of Medford, Oregon, is dead. He was a native of Ohio and was consul to Amoy, China, under President Cleveland. The death of another Oregon lawyer, Louis E. Sauvie of Portland, occurred February 1. He was a native of Paris, France.

NEW ATLANTA LAW FIRM.-A new law firm in Atlanta is that of Alexander & Meyerhardt, composed of Hooper Alexander, former United States attorney for the northern district of Georgia, and David J. Meyerhardt, formerly assistant United States attorney for the same district.

PHILADELPHIA COMMON PLEAS JUDGE DEAD.-F. Amedee Bregy, president judge of Common Pleas Court No. 1, Philadelphia, died in January. He served on the bench for nearly thirtyfive years. He was in the Civil War and was graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1866.

PROMINENT NEW YORK CITY LAWYERS FORM FIRM.-William D. Guthrie, William Travers Jerome, William Rand and Isidor Kressel, all of New York city, have formed the law firm of Guthrie, Jerome, Rand & Kressel. Howard Van Sinderen and Victor Morawetz will have offices in connection with the new firm.

At a recent meet

LANCASTER BAR ASSOCIATION OF NEBRASKA. ing of the Lancaster County Bar Association held at Lincoln, Nebraska, County Attorney Charles E. Matson, president of the association, presided, and Dwight McCarty of Emmettsburg, Iowa, delivered an address on "Accounting in the Law Office."

JUDICIAL CHANGES IN VIRGINIA.-Judge Jesse Felix West of the third Judicial Circuit of Virginia has been elected to succeed the late Judge Edward W. Saunders on the Supreme Court of Appeals of that state. He was born in Sussex County, Virginia, and was educated at the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia.

COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE MEET.—The Schenectady County Bar Association met at Schenectady Jan. 10 and elected as president Burrett B. Johnson. W. W. Wemple, the retiring president, presided at the meeting. At the annual meeting of the Albany County Bar Association held at Albany recently Patrick C. Dugan was elected president.

OHIO BAR ASSOCIATION.-The midwinter convention of the Ohio Bar Association was held at Akron in January. President C. E. McBride of Mansfield presided and speeches were made by Congressman Simeon D. Fess of Yellow Springs, Ohio, and Senator James T. Robinson of Arkansas. The summer meeting will be held at Cedar Point July 5-7.

JUDICIAL CHANGES IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT.-United States Circuit Judge Walter J. Smith of Council Bluffs, Iowa, is dead. He was born in 1862 and was appointed to the federal bench by President Taft in 1910. Previously he had served many years in Congress. His successor is United States Senator William S. Kenyon of Fort Dodge, Iowa.

VERMONT BAR ASSOCIATION.-The Vermont Bar Association at its recent meeting held at Montpelier elected Edwin W. Lawrence of Rutland, president; Frank E. Barber, of Brattleboro, and Frank C. Archibald, of Manchester, vice-presidents; George M. Hogan, of St. Albans, secretary and librarian, and Fred E. Gleason, of Montpelier, treasurer. William W. Reirden, of Barton, was elected a member of the board of managers for three years.

NEW YORK JURISTS WHO HAVE DIED RECENTLY.-Francis M. Scott of New York city, formerly a Supreme Court justice of the state of New York, died Feb. 5. He was at the time of his death chairman of the New York City Charter Revision Committee. He was born in 1848, and received his law degree at Columbia Law School in 1869. He retired from the Supreme Court bench in 1918 after twenty years of service. Judge Bartow S. Weeks of New York city died in Florida Feb. 3. At the time of his death he was a justice of the New York Supreme Court. He was 61 years of age, and was born at Round Hill, Conn.

SOUTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION.-C. J. Ramage of Saluda is the new president of the South Carolina Bar Association. He was elected at the recent meeting of the association held at Columbia. Vice presidents of the association were named as follows: Ed C. Mann, First circuit; R. A. Ellis, Second circuit; R. E. Dennis, Third circuit; Woods Dargan, Fourth circuit; Francis H. Weston, Fifth circuit; G. W. Ragsdale, Sixth circuit; W. S. Hall, Seventh circuit; W. H. Nicholson, Eighth circuit; W. H. Grimball, Ninth circuit; S. L. Prince, Tenth circuit; James O. Sheppard, Eleventh circuit; J. P. McNeil, Twelfth circuit; J. Robert Martin, Thirteenth circuit; Randolph Murdaugh, Fourteenth circuit. O. C. Blackman and William D. Dickey, both of Columbia, were named, respectively, secretary and treasurer.

English Notes*

GRAND JURIES.-By Order in Council made last month the Grand Juries (Suspension) Act 1917 came to an end, and during the present year and thereafter, if no steps are taken by Parliament, this obsolete method of wasting time and money will again form part of our criminal procedure. Since 1917 we have heard no suggestion of any miscarriage of justice due to the suspension of the functions of grand juries, but we have heard of the saving of much time and money due to their temporary disappearance. His Honor Judge Greenwell is reported to have said at Durham Quarter Sessions that the sole use of grand juries was to enable a guilty person to escape without a trial-a somewhat severe comment, and not very far from the truth. We know that the charge to the grand jury is not altogether distasteful to some of those who are called upon to preside at assizes and quarter sessions, but in these times when rigid economy in every department is essential the expense incurred, which runs into many thousands of pounds, and the inconvenience caused to grand jurors and witnesses are not justified by the retention of a system that has no practical advantage.-Law Times.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-PERPETUAL RENEWAL.-It is to be gathered from the recent decision of Lord Justice Younger (for Mr. Justice Astbury) in Gray v. Spyer (1921, 2 Ch. 549) that a perpetual right of renewal is repugnant to a tenancy from year to year, and if, as a matter of construction, a lease creates such a tenancy, the right of renewal must be rejected. It may be, as observed by the Lord Justice in the course of his judgment, that the Courts in England lean against construing a covenant to be for a perpetual renewal, unless it is perfectly clear that the covenant does so provide referring to Foa on Landlord and Tenant, 5th edit., p. 305, Baynham v. Guy's Hospital (3 Ves. 295, 298), and Moore v. Foley, (6 Ves. 232, 237). But in the case of Swineburne v. Milburn (52 L. T. Rep. 222; 9 App. Cas. 850) the Earl of Selborne, L. C. in the course of his judgment said: "I am not inclined to adopt the language which is to be found in some authorities to the effect that there is a sort of legal presumption against a right of perpetual renewal in cases of this kind; but those authorities certainly do impose upon anyone claiming such a right the burden of strict proof, and are strongly against inferring it from any equivocal expressions which may fairly be capable of being otherwise interpreted," and see Redman on Landlord and Tenant, p. 28, 7th edit. Incidentally it may be mentioned that in the opinion of the Lord Justice, and apparently of other judges, a claim for a declaration, not followed by any claim for consequential relief, is, as a rule, useless, and should be discouraged, although by Order XXV., r. 5 R. S. C., the court has full power to declare rights notwithstanding ancillary relief claimed.

THE PARLIAMENTARY OATH.-It may be of interest, having regard to the controversy which the form of the oath of allegiance, as set forth in the articles of the Irish Peace Treaty, has assumed to recall the fact that a Parliamentary oath is of comparatively recent origin. The British Parliaments of the middle ages asked no special oath from their members as a legal preliminary to the fulfilment of their duties. Professor Redlich thinks that a survey of the whole history of the Parliamentary oath in the British Parliament will convince anyone that the members' oath of allegiance does not arise out of any constitutional principle

*With credit to English legal periodicals.

inherent in the notion of Parliament, and that it has been mainly a political expedient for narrowing the circle of persons eligible for membership. The first oath imposed upon members of the English House of Commons was instituted in 1563 by Queen Elizabeth's Act of .Supremacy, and the oath was in fact first taken in 1566. The purport of the oath was that the member testified to his belief that the Sovereign of England was the only supreme governor of the realm both in ecclesiastical and temporal matters. In 1610 the statutes of allegiance and abjuration were added, and in 1678 there was the additional declaration against transubstantiation. Under William III. the old oath of allegiance was replaced by a simple declaration of allegiance to the King and Queen, but otherwise the requirement as to oaths remained in full operation till 1829, when Parliament decided upon Catholic Emancipation and the Repeal of the Test Act. In Ireland it may, as in contrast with the history of the oath in England, be said that from the first the institution of the Parliamentary oath was based not so much on the "narrowing of the circle of persons eligible for membership," as on the principle of securing the occupant of the Throne in his possession. The taking of the Parliamentary oath may accordingly be regarded in that country as instituted for the strengthening of the existing Constitution.

LEGAL PERIODICALS.-To the latest issue of the Law Library Journal, the American publication issued in conjunction with the "Index to Legal Periodicals," Miss Marian Brainerd contributes an extremely interesting historical sketch of American legal periodicals, beginning in 1808 with the American Law Journal and Miscellaneous Repertory. That magazine, which appeared at irregular intervals, was started by John E. Hall, a gentleman who conjoined the practice of the law with the tenure of the chair of rhetoric and literature at the University of Maryland. The American Law Journal, which did excellent pioneer work, went to sleep for some years and woke again as The Journal of Jurisprudence; but, as the learned contributor of the article pathetically remarks, it was short lived, being "killed by the frost of non-support." Others, however, took the place of the defunct journal, most of them modelling themselves on its lines and all gallantly endeavoring to stimulate interest in the discussion of legal topics. To-day there is no lack of American legal periodicals, that particular corner of the publishing field being described as "a mass of lovely bloom," a description which savours of enthusiasm like to that exhibited by the staid old conveyancer who was known to wax eloquent over "a brilliant deed." There are now, it seems, something like sixty legal journals issued in the United States. In this country, says the Law Times, we have always had a goodly number, but, naturally enough, not nearly so many as our kin beyond the sea can boast. We can, however, go farther back in point of time than they Lying before us at the moment of writing is a copy of "The Lawyer's Magazine or Attorney's and Solicitor's Universal Library for the year 1761, containing whatever is useful, instructive or entertaining in the theory or practice of the Laws of England. The whole illustrated with observations, notes, and references," printed by His Majesty's Law Printer for William Owen, near Temple Bar in Fleet street. We are not clear whether this was the first magazine of its kind, but it has had many successors, some of them still surviving, while others, having served their generation, have fallen asleep.

can.

THE STUDY OF THE CLASSICS AS PART OF A LEGAL EDUCATION.— In an extremely interesting presidential address to the Classical Association recently, Lord Milner, after disposing of the view long prevalent, that there was some necessary antagonism between

the study of the classics and what were known as "modern" subjects, went on to enforce once again, that in any scheme of a truly liberal education, the study of the language and literature of Greece and Rome must ever form an essential groundwork. "It was," he said, "incomparably the best, the shortest, and surest road of approach to all language and all literature, to a knowledge of the mind and character of man, or at least of civilized European man." Lord Milner was, of course, in these observations, directing his thought chiefly to the idea that the scientist will be better equipped for his life's work if he comes to it with his mind quickened and made alert by the study of those who in ancient Greek and Rome did so much for the building up of true culture. But his remarks have a value and importance not only for those who have made the pursuit of scientific achievement their chief aim. They apply with equal, if not greater, force to those who are concerned with the administration or practice of the law. There is ever the tendency on the part of the busy practical lawyer to concentrate overmuch on such works as the White Book or the Red Booka tendency which is much to be deprecated. Well nigh a century ago Thackeray entered the chambers of a pleader in Hare-court with the idea of reading for the Bar; but he had not been long there before his enthusiasm, if he ever had much, completely vanished, for, as he plaintively wrote: "This lawyer's preparatory education is one of the most cold-blooded prejudiced pieces of invention that ever a man was slave to. . . . A fellow should properly do and think of nothing else than law." Not every one, of course, has experienced quite the same feeling in regard to his legal studies, but the great novelist's remarks show how, with many, law and nothing but law is to be regarded. For those who entertain this notion it may be worthwhile recalling the words which Sir Walter Scott, who, we are proud to remember, was a distinguished member of the profession, put into the mouth of Counsellor Pleydell in the pages of "Guy Mannering": "A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may venture to call himself an architect." And surely, in the great classics of Greece and Rome he will find that width of knowledge and elasticity of mind which will prevent him degenerating into a mere mechanic.

"WAIVER" OF NOTICE TO QUIT.-The proposition was enunciated in Tayleur v. Wildin (18 L. T. Rep. 655; L. Rep. 3, Ex. 303) that to show a waiver of a notice to quit in the case of a yearly tenancy there must be some act or circumstance creating a new tenancy. The case was criticised in Lord Inchiquin v. Lyons (20 L. Rep. Ir. 477), it being pointed out that there is nothing unlawful in the parties to a contract of tenancy agreeing to withdraw a notice to quit served by one of them, or in the landlord and tenant arranging between themselves that the tenant shall continue to hold under the old tenancy. Nevertheless it was conceded that as between other parties it may be right to hold the old tenancy at an end. In Tayleur v. Wildin the question was whether a guaranty of rent continued. The objection taken successfully was that the tenancy, on payment of rent after notice to quit given, had come to an end, and another tenancy, the tenant being the same, had come into existence. Chief Baron Kelly said that though the point was one of difficulty, the objection taken must prevail. Since an unconditional notice to quit could be withdrawn only by mutual consent, the consent of both landlord and tenant that it should be so withdrawn effected a new agreement and the creation of a new tenancy taking effect from the expiration of the old tenancy. That case has been held to be good law in the recent case of Freeman v. Evans and Fletcher and Co. (125 L. T. Rep. 722; (1922) 1 Ch. 36), in

which the defense to an action by a superior landlord to recover possession for breach of covenant not to underlet was held not entitled to succeed on the ground that after notice to quit given by the mesne landlord of the premises to the second defendants on demanding an increased rent from them, in which demand they acquiesced and remained on, a new tenancy had been created. It was pointed out that in the case of a decision fifty-three years old dealing with the management of property, the law it embodied, whether right or wrong, must probably have been constantly acted upon. The case had been distinguished on a real ground for distinction, but not adversely criticised in Holme v. Brunskill (38 L. T. Rep. 838; 3 Q. B. Div. 495). The decisions of the Irish courts, though entitled to respect, were not binding upon the Court of Appeal, nor the disapproval expressed conclusive, and in England there had been no adverse judicial criticism of Tayleur v. Wildin. It might be added that the expressions "remaining on, on the former terms at an increased rent," and "waiver," which latter term it is to be noticed is now omitted in section 9 of 8 Edw. 7, c. 28, although included in the 59th section of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1883, may well have a legal effect differing from that considered to be implied by them when used colloquially.

GIFT BY HUSBAND TO WIFE.-It will be remembered that in Ramsey v. Margrett (70 L. T. Rep. 788; (1894) 2 Q. B. 18), it was decided that a receipt given by a husband to wife for the purchase money of furniture, agreed to be sold by him to her, did not form part of the transaction passing the property in the goods to the wife, but that the property had passed to her by the prior and independent bargain, and that consequently the receipt did not require registration under the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and that the wife was entitled to the goods as against the execution creditor. It was also incidentally held by two of the appeal judges, namely, Lord Esher, M.R., and Lord Justice Davey, that, as the furniture was in the house in which both husband and wife resided, the wife had sufficient possession of the goods to take the case out of the Act, for the situation of the goods being consistent with their being in the possession of either the husband or the wife, the law would attribute the possession to the wife who had the legal title. As pointed out by Lord Esher, after the Married Women's Property Act money and other personal property of a married woman did not pass to her husband. For that purpose the married woman and her husband were no longer in law one person, they were two persons, just as if they were two men. The principle of that case has been applied by a Divisional Court in the recent case of French v. Gething; Gething, claimant (151 L. T. Jour. 418; (1921) 3 K. B. 280). There, by a postnuptial deed, dated May 4, 1914, the defendant in consideration of natural affection gave to his wife the furniture and effects in his dwelling, for her absolute separate use. The deed was not registered under the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and the furniture remained in the house occupied by the husband and wife. In 1920 the plaintiff obtained judgment against the husband, and proceeded to levy execution at the house occupied by the husband and wife, and of which he was the rated occupier, but they were met by a claim on behalf of the wife to the furniture under the aforesaid deed of gift. It was held that Ramsey v. Margrett applied, and that the wife having the legal title had possession of the furniture, so as to take the case out of the Bills of Sale Act 1878. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Lush, in the course of his judgment, it is clear that the deed of gift was a Bill of Sale, but it is clear also that, although not registered, it conferred a title to the furniture on the wife. All that section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 does is to invalidate an unregistered bill of sale, or

render it inoperative, so far as execution creditors, and certain other classes of persons are concerned, if the goods affected by the document are, after seven days, in the possesion or apparent possession of the grantor. The section does not otherwise touch the validity of the deed, and, therefore, so far as the title to the goods was concerned, the wife made out her title. His Lordship considered that the difference in the facts in Ramsey v. Margrett was wholly immaterial, although that was a sale. A further point was decided in French v. Gething, namely, that the furniture was not in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband, within that part of section 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, which provides that "nothing in this Act contained shall give validity, as against creditors of the husband, to any gift by a husband to his wife of any property which, after such gift, shall continue to be in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband." The court also suggested that the foregoing provision of section 10 applied only in the case where a husband and wife were living together, on premises on which the husband carried on business.

Obiter Dicta

BIG BILL?-Edwards v. Tennis, 105 Misc. 609.

A SQUEALER.-Wisconsin Yearly Meeting of Freewill Baptists v. Babler, 115 Wis. 289.

DE MINIMIS.-In Rich v. Goldman, 90 N. Y. S. 364, the parties fought over the paltry sum of $100.

NO STANDING IN COURT.-In Outlaw v. Outlaw, 122 Md. 695, an action for a divorce, the bill was dismissed.

TOOK THE DARE.-In the case of In re Dasent, 2 N. Y. S. 609, the court dared Dasent to disobey a subpoena. And, as might be expected, he didn't.

ALMOST IS RIGHT.-"A locomotive in the roundhouse, a trolley car in the barn, an automobile in a garage, are almost as harmless as canary birds."-See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson (Fla.) 86 So. 629.

TRUE WHEN WRITTEN-IN THE YEAR 1 B. P.-"No man is presumed to have committed a crime the presumption is otherwise."-Per Smith, J., in Barden v. New York Central R. Co., 168 N. Y. Supp. 742.

THE CAUSE AND THE EFFECT.-The list of divorce cases awaiting trial in England, as published recently in the Law Times, contained two cases with rather significant titles, to wit: Row v. Row and Rule v. Rule.

BLUE JAYS? From Kentucky, the blue grass country, comes the report of a case recently decided there affecting "the Weare family, whose names are Jared, Jerome, Jahaza, Jaakim, Jaffa, Jacova, Jabus, and Jaza Weare." (See Glassock v. Weare, 234 S. W. 216). Some flock!

THE FIRST ACTION OF EJECTMENT.-"The first judgment on earth was upon summons and hearing. Where art thou, Adam? and Hast thou eaten, etc., preceded the ejectment of Adam and Eve from their beautiful inheritance, the Garden of Eden."-Per Coulter, J., in Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 91.

IT CAN'T BE DONE.-A correspondent writes: "I respectfully submit for your consideration the heading for Section 1953 of Pierce's Code of Washington. This should help fill up your 'Obiter Dicta' column." We pass this along to our readers just as it came to us no more, no less. However, at the request of any reader who has not access to Pierce's Code, we will be pleased to quote to him the heading of the section referred to.

AND TIMES DO NOT CHANGE!-In Phillips v. Oemulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 636, a case decided nearly fifty years ago, the court spoke thus of the defendant Phillips: "He should be commended for doing what, in honor and justice, he ought to have done, to wit: to put in writing the truth about the trade he had fairly made, though, without fault on the part of the seller, it had been of no profit at all to him. Such conduct approaches the rectitude of the man commended in Scripture, who 'sweareth to his own hurt,' and is all the more admirable in these times when such virtue is so rarely exhibited." (Italics ours.)

SO SAY WE ALL!-From the Congressional Record of February 9, 1922:

"Mr. Longworth.-In my judgment, the preparation of these very technical and difficult revenue and tariff bills would have been practically impossible had we not had the benefit of this drafting service.

"Mr. Walsh.-Before we had the legislative drafting service we used to pass income tax laws which permitted the issuance of blanks that the ordinary individual could understand. Since we have had the drafting service we have passed an income tax law that it takes a lawyer to understand, and blanks have been issued that no lawyer can understand."

A JUDICIAL HADES.-"In order to preclude all possibility of mischief of this character the framers of the Kansas constitution provided that the compensation of justices of the supreme court and of judges of the district courts should not be increased during their respective terms of office, prohibited the granting to them of fees and perquisites outside of or additional to salary, and forbade them to hold any other office of profit or trust under the state or under the United States. Beyond this, they were forbidden to practice their profession in any of the courts of the state during their continuance in office, so that, so far as remuneration for services beyond salary is concerned, there is written above the portal of the judicial office in Kansas the inscription which Dante read at the top of the gate of hell: 'Leave every hope, ye who enter!"-Per Burch, J., in Moore v. Nation, 80 Kan. 689.

LORD HALSBURY AND RESULTING TRUSTS.-The death of Lord Halsbury, ex-Lord Chancellor of England, has served to recall, as might be expected, many incidents of his long life at the bar and on the bench. Among those incidents are one or two which show that he, like Homer and other men, occasionally "nodded." The London Times asserts that he "was long under the belief that cheques for a less sum than £2 were illegal." This may or may not be true, but there can be no gainsaying the fact that his remarkable observation as to resulting trusts some years ago caused the profession generally to gasp with astonish

ment. In Smith v. Cooke, [1891] A. C. 297, he, as Lord Chancellor, gravely laid it down that "if it is intended to have a resulting trust, the ordinary and familiar mode of doing that is by saying so on the face of the instrument; and I cannot get out of the language of the instrument a resulting trust except by putting in words which are not there."

Correspondence

DISPUTED DOCUMENTS

To the Editor of LAW NOTES.

Sir: I am just in receipt of February Law NOTES and write at once to thank you for your pleasant reference to my pamphlet. I am sure that the attitude of your journal on this question of disputed documents during recent times has contributed to the interests of justice. There are literally thousands of lawyers who do not know that the old rules are not still in existence. Within a few months a high court judge in this state would not permit "reasons for an opinion" to be given on direct examination, indicating that on this subject he was at least twenty years behind time.

New York City.

IN RE GRAND JURIES

To the Editor of LAW NOTES.

ALBERT S. OSBORN.

Sir: The article in your January number on the abolition of Grand Juries is of especial interest to your readers in Western Canada. The system has never been in force here, and there has been no wish to have the same established. Charges are laid before a Magistrate who either tries them summarily in minor offenses or by consent in the more serious ones. In this class of cases, the accused can demand a preliminary hearing before the Magistrate. After hearing the evidence for the prosecution and any for the defense, if adduced at this stage, the accused is either discharged or sent up for trial before a higher Court. Copies of the depositions are forwarded to the Crown Prosecutor who lays a formal charge and the accused proceeds to trial. Juries here in criminal cases consist of six men, and in civil cases of six men or women. No woman can serve on the first class of cases until such time as the law is amended compelling all jurors to be locked up together. In civil cases she may file a notice that she does not care to serve, and she is then excused. CLIFFORD T. JONES. Calgary, Alberta.