The

interference by anyone (Weeks v. Medler, 20 Kan. 425). Secretary of the Treasury is somewhat similarly situated, having a pretty bad grouch on with respect to his fellow citizens generally (Mellon v. People, 59 Ill. App. 467). And the same may be said of the Secretary of the Interior (Fall v. Nation, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 160). As if all this were not bad enough, it turns out that the Attorney General is a woman-hater (Daugherty v. Lady, 73 S. W. 837). Look out for wholesale resignations, says the office boy!

DROPPING INTO THE DORIC.-In a recent number of Punch there is an amusing picture of a counsel endeavoring to ingratiate himself with the witness whom he is going to crossexamine by dropping into the Doric. There can be no doubt, however, says the Law Times, that recourse to this mode of winning the confidence of a stupid or sullen witness has proved highly successful in the past. Henry Cockburn, of the Scots Bar, afterwards raised to the Bench as Lord Cockburn and now remembered by his series of reminiscences which have long attained the rank of legal classics, was an adept at this. The story has come down to us that, after his friend Jeffrey, speaking in his mincing English, had in vain sought to get from an old countryman an opinion as to the mental capacity of one of the parties, Cockburn made an attempt and with greater success. Adopting his broadest Scotch, he said to the witness: "Hae ye your mull [i.e., snuff-box] wi' ye?" "Ou ay," answered the witness and reached out his mull. "Noo, hoo lang hae ye kent John Sampson?" asked Cockburn gracefully taking a pinch of snuff from the mull. "Ever since he was that height," came the answer. "An' dae ye think noo, atween you and me," said Cockburn insinuatingly, "that there's onything in the creature?" "I wadna lippen [trust] him wi' a calf," was the instant and satisfying rejoinder. Broad Scots such as John Clerk used almost habitually, and such as Cockburn could employ when it suited his purpose, is now never heard at the northern Bar. An anecdote of Clerk in this connection, not indeed, in examining a witness, but of a little encounter between him and Lord Eldon, is preserved, which indicates Clerk's addiction to the Doric and his readiness to justify himself when called in question on the subject of his pronunciation, Several times in the course of his speech at the Bar of the House of Lords Clerk pronounced the word "enough" as "enow." The Lord Chancellor dryly remarked: "Mr. Clerk, in England we sound the 'ough' as 'uff' not 'enow.' "Verra weel, ma Lord," continued the imperturbable advocate, "of this we have said 'enuff,' and I come, ma Lord, to the subdivision of the land in dispute. It was apportioned, ma Lord, into what in England would be called 'pluffland'-a 'pluffland' being as much land as a pluffman can pluff in one day." The Chancellor could not hold out against the witty repartee, and laughingly said: "Pray proceed, Mr. Clerk, I know 'enow' of Scotch to understand your argument."

A NEW FIELD FOR REFORMERS.-A correspondent from the South, being cognizant of our continued interest in reforms generally, and of our eagerness to reform the other fellow specially, sends us the subjoined suggestion of a field of reform which has not yet, as he says, attracted any attention. We give it in unexpurgated form as follows:

"Now that we have overthrown the 'demon rum' it is, in colloquial phrase, 'up to' us reformers to find some other object of attack for our reforming energies. All true reformers are always seeking an outlet for those energies.

"Some among us are prating of a crusade against tobacco. Now it must be admitted that tobacco is a most dangerous and

insidious enemy. It does not give its victims by their sensations, as alcohol does, prompt and unmistakable warning of its ravages. Alcohol is a noble, open and avowed adversary, compared with tobacco, which is crafty, subtle, never-tiring, incessant in its operations, and its victims do not realize their danger or condition until they reach a stage of complete helplessness, when they no longer have either sound mind or body, and are so permeated with the 'filthy weed' that their mental operations are abnormal, and are only fantastic distortions of tobacco, every physical organ and the whole nervous system, upon which åll health, physical or mental, must depend, becoming so completely tainted with tobacco as to subvert and destroy all natural functions. Such victims breathe, think, write, tobacco and become unnatural monsters 'unworthy the name of man.'

"But tobacco can wait. There is a more vital subject of reform, which comes closer to a greater number of individuals than any other possible subject. It is underclothing! There are millions of people suffering from preposterous underwear, where there are thousands who are injured by the 'demon rum' or tobacco. Nothing can come closer to us than this. It is literally next to us. And what is the vile stuff which we thus continually have next to us? Undoubtedly the great majority of the unfortunate human beings who seek to cover their nakedness, wear woolen underclothing, while a smaller number of wealthy persons cover themselves with silk. Nothing more filthy or degrading can well be imagined, and yet there has been spread through the world a propaganda in favor of these disgusting things which has obscured the mind and judgment to such an extent that the wearers positively take pride in their degradation and greatly glorify themselves for their use of silk and wool.

"What is silk? It is a product derived from the excrementitious matter of a nasty, fuzzy, repulsive caterpillar whose appearance inspires involuntary disgust in every cleanly, wellregulated mind, of a healthy sort. Can anything worse be imagined? We answer, No.

"And wool? It is the natural covering of a greasy inferior mammal, which, if not itself of a low moral nature, seems by its association with man to reduce him to the vilest of beings. This statement is made upon the authority of the celebrated Baron Touchstone as reported by W. Shakespeare in the wellknown case entitled 'As you like it,' to which we call particular attention. Wool is subjected to a variety of processes by which its supporters declare that it is deprived of its original nastiness, but that is not true. It always retains that nastiness,

and the untrained cuticle of a natural human revolts from its touch, but with custom becomes used to it, and the victim suffers physical and moral deterioration. (See Lesson 7 of Purinton's Efficiency Course, page 37.) It is quite like Vice, that

-monster of so frightful mien

As to be hated needs but to be seen;
But seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.'

"Prohibition of silk and wool is clearly the goal which we must strive to reach.

"But 'Stop,' says 'Slow,' 'what shall we have to replace them?' The asking of such a question shows the depth of ignorance to which the demoralized questioner has sunk. The answer is obvious. Clearly we should leave the animal field, and turn to the clean vegetable world, and immediately linen and cotton come to mind. Each is free from any of the disgusting features of the animal part of creation, so prominent in worms and sheep, and commends itself to the best instincts of all cultivated

beings; but experience has shown that linen is better adapted to use as underwear than cotton. Let us then bend all our energies, first, to entire prohibition of the filthy wool and silk, and, second, to the enforced use of linen for underwear. By so doing, both the bodily and mental welfare of mankind will be greatly promoted, and we, the reformers, will be provided with desirable occupation for a long, long time in struggling with the ingrained prejudices of the common run of humanity, created by centuries of ignorance and by the long-continued debåsing influence of indulgence in silk and wool."

Correspondence

RIDICULE OF THE CLERGY. AND THE BAR

To the Editor of LAW NOTES.

SIR: I have of late observed that first the Prohibitionists and then the Clergy have, through the Press, been making protest against the cartoonist and the movies holding up Prohibition and the Clergy to public ridicule. Whether or not this satire and ridicule is timely and deserved need not arrest our attention, as my purpose is merely to point out that this complaint has about it an air of ancient history and that that class of men "who stand upon a loftier moral plane than their fellow man" have in all ages shown the least sense of humor and have been most sensitive to ridicule and criticism.

The first outburst of anti-clerical criticism in Italy was in 1420 when a street ballad directed against Martin V had this refrain:

"Papa Martino, Signore di Piombino,

Conte de Urbino, non vale un quattrino."
(Pope Martin, Lord of Piombino,

Count of Urbino, not worth a quattrino (farthing).)

This so enraged the Pope that he put Florence under an interdict. This satirizing of the clergy was taken up by Luigi Pulci (born 1431) and by Ariosto (born 1474) and carried to an excess that makes the satiric jest of the cartoonist and movie comedian of today appear tame and lifeless; for as Symonds says: "Criticism, the modern Hercules, was already in its cradle, strangling serpents of sacerdotal authority: and as yet the Inquisition had not become a power of terror; the Council of Trent and Spanish tyranny had not turned Italians into trembling bigots or sleek hypocrites."

Great as was the work of Pulci and Ariosto, they were preceded by one who was far greater than either-Geoffrey Chaucer (born 1340, died 1400)-the first great English poet and first great English humorist. The creator of English rhymed verse and of English prose in his Canterbury Tales (circa 1380-1390) has most mercilessly held up to ridicule the pious wretch who is only a hypocrite and has also given us the following imperishable portrait of the good priest:

"A good man was there of religion,

And was a pooré parson of a town.

But rich he was of holy thoughts and work.

He was also a learnéd man, a clerk

That Christés Gospel truly wouldé preach;
And his parishioners devoutly teach."

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Chaucer was also the first great writer who found in the Bar a butt for his wit and humor-and he is so fresh and modern that his portrait of the "Man Lawe" is so true to life that it appears as though the poet had lately been attending the assizes of Boston or Philadelphia.

This ridicule of the lawyers is one of the most entertaining features of Rabelais' "Gargantua and Pantagruel," where he most mercilessly satirizes the Bar; as also did Shakespeare and Ben Jonson and others. The wit of Shakespeare however is bright and sparkling, like sunbeams upon the sea waves, as when "in that Inferno of human nature-King Lear" (Dowden) the Clown says: "Nothing-'tis like the breath of an unfee'd lawyer." Ben Jonson, however, assails the Bar like some huge Dinosaur crashing through the primeval forest-crushing everything before him, while he shouts with Gargantuan laughter. And so it has been through all literature until today; and the lawyer pretends to like it; for with true juridical philosophy he consoles himself with saying: "If it stings me it also stings the other fellow."

Of a truth-and it deserves special notice-there are no men who have so highly developed a sense of humor as lawyers, and who take more delight in seeing themselves and their calling made the butt of satire and ridicule. Indeed, the Bar as a Bar is never pharisaical. Pharisees are to be found among the legal profession as a matter of course, but when one is found it is to be observed that his phariseeism comes from his theological and not from his juridical habits of thought. Pascagoula, Miss.

CHAS. E. CHIDSEY.

Co OMMENT has been made frequently in Law NOTES with respect to the fact that the influence exercised by associations of the bar, even in matters concerning directly the administration of justice, is not as great as it should be. This is well illustrated by the fact that no result has yet been attained by the efforts of the American Bar Association to secure Congressional action on the bill to authorize the adoption by the federal judges of uniform rules of procedure at law similar to those now governing federal equity and admiralty procedure. There has been no unfavorable vote on the proposition; it has simply been crowded out through session after session. A special effort will be made during the present session to bring the bill to a vote, and it is to be hoped that it will meet with success. The merits of the measure and the acute need which it will fill have been pointed out so frequently in LAW NOTES as to leave little to be said. Every thoughtful lawyer recognizes the strong tendency toward nationalization. That tendency is not only political but commercial. Modern methods of communication have obliterated state lines for the purposes of commerce. In an increasing number of cases counsel from two or more states participate in the trial of cases in the federal courts, and under the existing system counsel from outside the jurisdiction where the court sits are at a distinct disadvantage in matters of practice. In addition to this, the

supposed benefit to a lawyer appearing in a federal court in his own jurisdiction is largely illusory. Exceptions to the uniformity of practice intended to be created by the "Conformity Act" are so numerous that a study of many cases is necessary to determine when the act applies and when it does not. Add to this the fact that the act has no application in equity cases and it is apparent that no lawyer can with safety go into a federal court relying on his knowledge of the state practice. The books are filled with instances of lawyers who have met with disaster as the result of doing so. A simple intelligible set of rules of federal procedure in actions at law, to which the practitioner could resort with confidence in every case, would do much to prevent embarrassment and error. The bar should in its own interest support at this time the efforts of the Bar Association to secure such a code.

Practice Rules Rather than Statutes.

Q

UITE apart from the need for uniform federal procedure, the bill referred to in the preceding paragraph should be enacted for the reason that the system of practice regulation thereby introduced is one which should become general. The fact that justice is slow and unduly expensive, is attributed by almost every investigator not to faults in our substantive law but to the system of procedure by which that law is administered. Some blame may attach to the judiciary for overtechnicality, but so long as it is the function of the judge to declare and not to make the law it is not to be wondered at that practice statutes are adhered to as rigidly as those which establish substantive law. It is essential that the substantive law should be fixed and certain, but no such necessity attaches to procedure. Flexibility, and discretion to resort to informal methods and meet special needs with special rules, make for both celerity of administration and the avoidance of injustice. The making of the rules of judicial procedure is a task for which the legislature is ill fitted. Legislative activities are many and diverse; the time of the legislative session is limited; the pressure of special interests and political considerations is incessant. On the other hand the judges live in an atmosphere of legal procedure; the experience of every judge is replete with illustrations of the operation of particular rules. They are in a position to call for the advice and co-operation of the bar. If an error is found or a reform suggested, the action of the bench thereon is sure to be prompt and intelligent, while the legislative response to similar suggestions is notoriously slow and unsatisfactory. And over and above these considerations stands one which is almost a matter of right, namely, the privilege of one department of government to make its rules of procedure unhampered by another co-ordinate department. Judicially formulated rules of legislative procedure would be resented promptly by the Congress which hesitates to grant to the judiciary the right to regulate its own practice, yet legislative procedure is elementary in its simplicity compared to that of judicial action. The crying need of the times is a reformed judicial procedure. Toward that end associations comprising a large proportion of the leaders of the bar are bending their energies. There is no hope that any inspired and perfect code will be formulated; the reformed procedure must be the result of growth, and the first step is to remove the binding rigidity of legislative enactment and substitute the flexibility of the rule making power of the courts.

Take Them at Their Word.

AN

N effort is just now being made by a small but clamorous minority to procure amnesty for the "conscientious objectors." The reason why such amnesty should not be granted, why this occasion to emphasize the fact that the privileges of citizenship connote the duties of citizenship should not be lost, are too obvious to need

recital. An all sufficient answer to the demand for clemency is found in the fact that these "objectors" knew and courted the penalty from which they now seek escape. In the case of Wells v. U. S., 257 Fed. 607, there was in evidence a circular issued by an anti-conscription league which contained the following characteristic utterance: "Better be imprisoned than to renounce your freedom of conscience." The "objectors" had their way; they did not renounce the freedom of what they were pleased to call conscience, and they were imprisoned. Now what is all the complaint about? They chose dishonor and its penalties; let them abide by their choice. Shall we in "preparation" for the next conflict make the choice of dishonor easier and cheaper? A man may, if he choose, make himself a martyr to his convictions, but when those convictions are such as to strike at the very foundations of society he should not expect society to relieve him from his self-sought martyrdom. Cheap notoriety, empty defiance of law, is the very life of most ultra radical agitation. Let it be established now that the notoriety of treason is not cheap; that defiance of a law passed to protect the nation from a foreign foe is not empty, but brings a penalty which no amount of clamor or sophistry can mitigate! The conscious objectors avowedly chose imprisonment rather than military service; let them be imprisoned, agreeably to the imprecations of their own mouths!

Naturalization.

N a recent case (In re Goldberg, 269 Fed. 392) United IN States District Judge Dyer of Missouri laid down a doctrine that is not only wholesome but most timely. In denying an application for naturalization he said: "While a candidate for naturalization is to be commended for having acquired material wealth, and for having lived a blameless life, during his period of residence here, nevertheless such a state of affairs does not relieve him in any way of the necessity of possessing a working knowledge of the form and general structure of our government, and of the responsibilities and duties, as well as the privileges of a citizen thereof. Lacking such qualifications, it is impossible for him to swear, either intelligently or conscientiously, that, as required by law, he is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, or that

he is well disposed to the good order and happiness of the

same.

Under our form of government, the people, theoretically, at least, make, interpret, and execute the laws. Accordingly, their reasonable intelligence and education are indispensable prerequisites to the preservation and transmission of civil liberty and republican institutions. The requirements of law cannot be held to have been met on a mere showing of the candidate that he is peaceable, industrious, of good character, and lawabiding." In these days of social unrest, of ultra radicalism threatening the foundations of the government, this is a rule that should be observed by every judge who

exercises the important function of granting naturalization. The man who is really conversant with the nature of American institutions, who is well disposed toward them, and who can conscientiously swear that he will uphold them, is fit to be an American citizen. His private life should of course give reasonable assurance that he will not become a criminal or a public charge. But it is the intelligent adherence to the principles of American government, so frequently ignored, which is the fundamental and indispensable qualification.

The Immigration Problem.

THE HE problem presented as a result of the lax immigration laws of the past was well set out in the opinion referred to in the preceding paragraph, Judge Dyer saying: "At the last session of Congress, figures were presented to the committee on immigration and naturalization of the House of Representatives, during its hearings on H. R. 10404, to the effect that at that time there were in round numbers about 11,000,000 adult aliens in the United States; that of these some 2,500,000 had filed their declarations of intention, leaving approximately 8,500,000 who had never taken any step whatsoever towards citizenship. It is quite apparent from these figures that the 'melting pot' has not melted. This was repeatedly emphasized during the World War. The line of racial cleavage was as distinctly drawn in this country then as in Europe. Very considerable portions of our population of foreign birth seemed concerned more with what was best for the lands of their nativity than with what was best for the country of their adoption. Cases such as Schurmann v. United States (C. C. A.) 264 Fed. 917, deal with this situation. This foreign element must either be lifted up to American standards, or America must eventually be reduced to their standards. We must become all-American, or, failing this, we will in time become all-alien." The contains, inter alia, a powerful argument against the parsituation thus presented is appalling in its magnitude. It ticipation by the United States in any "League of Nations" for until we shall become a nation with a distinctive national mind, any participation in international affairs must of necessity lead to domestic discord from the efforts of residents to influence governmental action in favor of the several lands where they were born, quite regardless of American interests. The stigma of hyphenated Americanism does not attach to the German-American only. Any man who needs a hyphen to describe his Americanism, who seeks to use the American government as a tool to serve the interests of the land of his birth, is an obstacle to the development of the American spirit and the realization of the destiny of the American people. No single remedy will reach this situation, but two preliminary steps are plainly indicated; the absolute stopping of immigration for a considerable period, and the drastic suppression of those who seek to transplant European feuds to American soil.

Naturalization of Japanese Serving in American Army.

A CASE, pending at the present writing in the Supreme

court of California, presents the interesting question. whether a Japanese, who served in the United States army during the late war and received an honorable discharge, is entitled to citizenship under the act of Congress of May

9, 1918, which, inter alia, gives the right of naturalization to "any alien" serving in the military or naval forces of the United States during the "present war" without proof of declaration of intention or of five years' residence. The holding of the California District Court of Appeal against the right to naturalization proceeds on the ground that the statute was designed to remove the requirements of declaration and residence only, and not to admit to citizenship an alien of a race not eligible thereto in the absence of the statute. As a matter of strict statutory construction there is much force in this provision. There is, however, great moral force in the argument presented by Mr. Albert Elliot of San Francisco as amicus curiæ, who said in concluding his argument: "Are we asking much when we petition this Court to construe liberally a statute passed by Congress during the exigency of a great war, and at a time when the Government needed soldiers and sailors for the defense of our country? Many aliens came voluntarily to our Colors and enlisted without a selfish thought for the great adventure. Some of them actually reached the fighting front and exposed their lives in our defense. They

wore our uniforms, carried our arms, manned our ships and fought under our Flag. We accepted them as soldiers and sailors and used them while the danger hovered over us like a black cloud. In a commendable spirit of gratitude and while the guns were still booming on the French front, Congress passed an Act which both in language and spirit held out to these aliens a kind of reward for their services to us-this inestimable privilege which we call American Citizenship. If allegiance be the essence of citizenship then these men regardless of race or color, gave proof of allegiance to our Government than which there could be no higher. If they were good enough to fly to our defense in time of trouble, and to wear our uniform and to carry our arms, then they were good enough for us to extend to them the right hand of American Citizenship.' As has been more than once pointed out (see, LAW NOTES, May 1916, for an extended discussion) the racial discrimination in our present naturalization laws is illogical and unjust. Since those laws have admitted to citizenship and unjust. Since those laws have admitted to citizenship many thousands who shirked the call to the national defense, we cannot but hope that they will be so construed as to admit this member of an excluded race who, though an alien, voluntarily performed the duty of a citizen.

A New Angle on Price Fixing.

FOR

OR years manufacturers have maintained a campaign to assert the right to fix the reselling price of their product. Failing to convince the courts that this asserted right was not an unlawful restraint of trade, agitation has been and still is rife for Congressional action to permit price fixing. The stock argument of course is that the manufacturer must be protected from ruinous underselling by retailers. This, it is claimed, reacts on the manufacturer, making it impossible to establish a market at a fair price after the temporary cutting of prices has fixed the low price in the public mind. Of course in such a discussion the interests of the ultimate consumer and his right to the best price which retail competition will produce are not taken into account. But now there arises a condition which should give these price fixing gentlemen pause. While neither courts nor legislatures have been amenable to their sophistry, sundry labor unions have seen the beauties of the argument, and have put it into practice

by fixing prices below which their employees shall not sell under penalty of a strike. The logic of this position is precisely that of the price fixing manufacturers. If competition leads the manufacturer to sell at a low price it reacts on the wage scale in precisely the same way that a low retail price reacts on the wholesale business. The same beautiful disregard of the consumer is, of course, present.. But to the manufacturers, limited in their sales by the establishment of prices which the public will not pay, it makes a great deal of difference whose ox is gored and legislation has been introduced in several states so to strengthen the anti-trust laws as to put an end to this exaction. It is to be hoped that this new development will put an eternal quietus on the price fixing movement, by convincing those responsible for it that if successful it will soon be carried one step further back and work not to their benefit but to that of the labor trust.

Duty of Depositor to Call for Pass Book.

T

is, of course, well settled that a depositor on receiving his balanced pass book and cancelled checks is bound to examine them within a reasonable time and report to the bank any errors which he finds. There has been decided recently a case said to be one of first impression (McCarty v. First Nat. Bank [Ala.] 85 So. 754) involving the question whether the depositor is under any duty to procure the pass book promptly from the bank after it has been balanced in order that he may examine it. It was held that in the absence of a rule or usage to the contrary the depositor is not bound to call for his balanced pass book, but may leave it at the bank till it suits his convenience to get it, and is not chargeable with any errors until the expiration of a reasonable time for examination after it is actually in his hands. The court said: "The theory upon which a depositor is required to examine his balanced pass book and his cancelled checks within a reasonable time and with due care after they are returned to him by the bank, and to report errors and irregularities, if any there fails to do so, the bank may rightly presume that previous be, with reasonable promptness to the bank, is that, if he payments of checks were properly made upon the authority approval, and that, so presuming, the bank may be of the depositor, and that they have his sanction and naturally induced to make similar payment of similarly forged or unauthorized checks in the future. But where the pass book and checks have not been actually returned to the depositor, and remain in the custody of the bank, the reason of the rule entirely fails, since there can be no presumption that the depositor has acquiesced in or approved an act or a course of dealing of which he has no actual notice or knowledge, and the bank cannot justly claim to have been misled by the conduct of the depositor." The decision seems to be sound in its reasoning and derives considerable support from another recent case (Citizens Bank v. Hinkle [Ark.]; 87 S. W. 679). The decision is one of considerable importance to bankers, and will doubtless lead to a general adoption of what seems to be the modern practice of mailing vouchers monthly to depositors.

Censorship of the "Movies."

THE clamor for motion picture censorship goes on, and occasionally a State is added to the list of those which require it. It goes without saying that literature, art, and