against family pride; but there is, and always has been, such a ridiculous kind of vanity among men. "Statesmen know the evil and danger is too serious to be sported with." I am content they should be put into one hole, as you propose; but I have some fears that your watchmen on each side will not well agree. When a man can recollect the virtues of his ancestors, he certainly has abundantly more solid satisfaction than another who boasts that he sprang from those who were rich or noble, but never discovers the least degree of virtue or true worth of any kind. "Family popularity," if I mistake not, has its source in family pride. It is, by all means, sought after, that homage may be paid to the name of the title or estate, to supply the want in the possessor of any great or good quality whatsoever. There are individuals among men, who study the art of making themselves popular, for the purpose of getting into places of honor and emoluments, and, by these means, of gratifying hereafter the noble passion, " family pride." Others are so enchanted with the music of the sound, that they conceive it to be supreme felicity. This is, indeed, vanity of vanities! and if such deluded men ever come to their senses, they will find it to be vexation of spirit. When they reflect on their own folly and injustice, in having swallowed the breath of applause with avidity and great delight, for merit which they are conscious they never had; and that many, who have been the loudest in sounding their praises, had nothing in view but their own private and selfish interests, it will excite in them the feelings of shame, remorse, and self-contempt. The truly virtuous man and real patriot is satisfied with the approbation of the wise and discerning; he rejoices in the contemplation of the purity of his own intentions, and waits in humble hope for the plaudit of his final judge.

I shall not venture again to trespass on the benevolence of our confidential friend. You will not be sorry. It will afford you relief; for, in common civility, you must be at the trouble of reading one's epistles. I hope there will be a time when we may have "sweet communion together." In the interim, let me not lose the benefit of your valuable letters. Adieu.

Believe me, your sincere friend,
SAMUEL ADAMS.

The Vice-President of the United States.

THREE LETTERS

ΤΟ

ROGER SHERMAN,

ON THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

I.

RICHMOND HILL, (New York,) 17 July, 1789. DEAR SIR, I read over, with pleasure, your observations on the new federal constitution, and am glad to find an opportunity to communicate to you my opinion of some parts of them. It is by a free and amicable intercourse of sentiments, that the friends of our country may hope for such a unanimity of opinion and such a concert of exertions, as may sooner or later produce the blessings of good government.

You say, "it is by some objected that the executive is blended with the legislature, and that those powers ought to be entirely distinct and unconnected. But is not that a gross error in politics? The united wisdom and various interests of a nation should be combined in framing the laws by which all are to be governed and protected, though it should not be convenient to have them executed by the whole legislature. The supreme executive in Great Britain is one branch of the legislature, and has a negative on all the laws; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a republic; but the negative vested in the president by the new constitution on the acts of congress, and the consequent revision, may be very useful to prevent laws being passed without mature deliberation, and to preserve sta

24

bility in the administration of government; and the concurrence
of the senate in the appointment to office will strengthen the
hands of the executive, and secure the confidence of the people
much better than a select council, and will be less expensive.”

Is it, then, "an extreme not to be imitated by a republic,” to
make the supreme executive a branch of the legislature, and
give it a negative on all the laws? If you please, we will exa-
mine this position, and see whether it is well founded. (In the
first place, what is your definition of a republic? Mine is this:
A government whose sovereignty is vested in more than one person.
Governments are divided into despotisms, monarchies, and repub-
lics. A despotism is a government in which the three divisions of
power, the legislative, executive and judicial, are all vested in
one man. A monarchy is a government where the legislative
and executive are vested in one man, but the judicial in other
men. In all governments the sovereignty is vested in that man
or body of men who have the legislative power. In despotisms
and monarchies, therefore, the legislative authority being in one
man, the sovereignty is in one man. In republics, as the sove-
reignty, that is, the legislative, is always vested in more than
one, it may be vested in as many more as you please. In the
United States it might be vested in two persons, or in three mil-
lions, or in any other intermediate number; and in every such sup-
posable case the government would be a republic. In conform-
ity to these ideas, republics have been divided into three species,
monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical republics. Eng-
land is a republic, a monarchical republic it is true, but a re-
public still; because the sovereignty, which is the legislative
power, is vested in more than one man; it is equally divided,
indeed, between the one, the few, and the many, or in other
words, between the natural division of mankind in society,—the
monarchical, the aristocratical, and democratical. It is essential
to a monarchical republic, that the supreme executive should be a
branch of the legislature, and have a negative on all the laws.
I say essential, because if monarchy were not an essential part
of the sovereignty, the government would not be a monarchical
republic. Your position is therefore clearly and certainly an
error, because the practice of Great Britain in making the su-
preme executive a branch of the legislature, and giving it a
negative on all the laws, must be imitated by every monarchical
republic.

1

I will pause here, if you please; but if you will give me leave, I will write another letter or two upon this subject. Meantime I am, with unalterable friendship, yours.

II.

DEAR SIR,- In my letter of yesterday I think it was demonstrated that the English government is a republic, and that the regal negative upon the laws is essential to that republic. Because, without it, that government would not be what it is, a monarchical republic; and, consequently, could not preserve the balance of power between the executive and legislative powers, nor that other balance which is in the legislature,-between the one, the few, and the many; in which two balances the excellence of that form of government must consist.

Let us now inquire, whether the new constitution of the United States is or is not a monarchical republic, like that of Great Britain. The monarchical and the aristocratical power in our constitution, it is true, are not hereditary; but this makes no difference in the nature of the power, in the nature of the balance, or in the name of the species of government. It would make no difference in the power of a judge or justice, or general or admiral, whether his commission were for life or years. His authority during the time it lasted, would be the same whether it were for one year or twenty, or for life, or descendible to his eldest son. The people, the nation, in whom all power resides originally, may delegate their power for one year or for ten years; for years, or for life; or may delegate it in fee simple or fee tail, if I may so express myself; or during good behavior, or at will, or till further orders.

A nation might unanimously create a dictator or a despot, for one year or more, or for life, or for perpetuity with hereditary descent. In such a case, the dictator for one year would as really be a dictator for the time his power lasted, as the other would be whose power was perpetual and descendible. A nation in the same manner might create a simple monarchy for years, life, or perpetuity, and in either case the creature would be equally a simple monarch during the continuance of his power. So the people of England might create king, lords, and

commons, for a year, or for several years, or for life, and in any of these cases, their government would be a monarchical republic, or, if you will, a limited monarchy, during its continuance, as much as it is now, when the king and nobles are hereditary. They might make their house of commons hereditary too. What the consequence of this would be it is easy to foresee; but it would not in the first moment make any change in the legal power, nor in the name of the government.

Let us now consider what our constitution is, and see whether any other name can with propriety be given it, than that of a monarchical republic, or if you will, a limited monarchy. The duration of our president is neither perpetual nor for life; it is only for four years; but his power during those four years is much greater than that of an avoyer, a consul, a podestà, a doge, a stadtholder; nay, than a king of Poland; nay, than a king of Sparta. I know of no first magistrate in any republican government, excepting England and Neuchatel, who possesses a constitutional dignity, authority, and power comparable to his. The power of sending and receiving ambassadors, of raising and commanding armies and navies, of nominating and appointing and commissioning all officers, of managing the treasures, the internal and external affairs of the nation; nay, the whole executive power, coextensive with the legislative power, is vested in him, and he has the right, and his is the duty, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. These rights and duties, these prerogatives and dignities, are so transcendent that they must naturally and necessarily excite in the nation all the jealousy, envy, fears, apprehensions, and opposition, that are so constantly observed in England against the crown.1

That these powers are necessary, I readily admit. That the laws cannot be executed without them; that the lives, liberties, properties and characters of the citizens cannot be secure without their protection, is most clear. But it is equally certain, I think, that they ought to have been still greater, or much less. The limitations upon them in the cases of war, treaties, and appointments to office, and especially the limitation on the pre

1 M. de Tocqueville has taken a similar view of the President's powers:"Le président des États-Unis possède des prérogatives presque royales, dont il n'a pas l'occasion de se servir; et les droits dont jusqu'à présent il peut user sont très circonscrits; les lois lui permettent d'être fort, les circonstances le maintiennent foible." De la Démocratie en Amérique, vol. i. chap. 8.