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FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

309 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. WASHINGTON, DC 20002
PHONE: (202) 547-8189 FAX: (202) 547-8190

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I am writing to advise you of the strong support of the more than 272, 000 members of the Fraternal Order
of Police for the proposed "Medicare Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Act," offered by you and Senator
Durbin.

Under the "Statutory Law Enforcement Authority for HHS-OIG Special Agents" provision in your bill,
HHS Special Agents designated by the Inspector General would be granted full statutory law enforcement
authority in connection with investigation within the lawful jurisdiction to the HHS Inspector General.
This provision would help ensure the safety of Special Agents and their witnesses under their protection.

Under the present system, agents operate under a patchwork of separate law enforcement authorities.
Presently, HIIS-OIG operates under 5 different blanket deputations. This arrangement is administratively
burdensome because the blanket deputations must be renewed each year. Some of the deputations require
renewal letters from every United States Attorney in each jurisdiction to be enforceable. At any given time
the United State Attorney's Office may elect not to sign off on the deputation, thus jeopardizing not only
the case in that jurisdiction, but compromising the safety of the investigating agent as well.

In addition to granting full statutory law enforcement authority, the Collins-Durbin Medicare Fraud
Prevention and Enforcement Act will provide felony penalties for those individuals who illegally secure
Medicare or Medicaid Beneficiary identification numbers or provider numbers, enabling another means by
which law enforcement officials can prosecute these offenders. Also, the permanent reinstatement of HHS-
OIG's ability to share in forfeited assets, in connection with joint investigations, would supplement annual
appropriations, to support the continued fight against Medicare and Medicaid fraud.

On behalf of Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, I want to cxtend my thanks for your leadership on
this issue. If there is anything I can do to assist you in the passage of this legislation, please do not hesitate
to contact me or Executive Director Jim Pasco at my Washington Office, (202) 547-8189.

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July 27, 1998

Honorable Susan Collins
United States Senator
Russell Building, Room 172
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madame Chairwoman:

On behalf of the over 14,000 members of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), I wish to express our overwhelming support for the proposed Collins-Durbin Medicare Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Act. FLEOA believes giving statutory authority to the criminal investigators/ special agents of the Health & Human Services' Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) would greatly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the HHS-OIG. Additionally, they can better serve the American Public.

FLEOA is a non-partisan professional association representing federal agents from the agencies listed on the left masthead. At our most recent national conference (April 17 to 19, 1998, in Oklahoma City, OK) FLEOA's national delegates voted unanimously to support full statutory authority for OIG criminal investigators/special agents. The criminal investigators/special agents of the HHS-OIG were granted blanket Special Deputy U.S. Marshal status several years ago. Their distinguished record for investigations, arrests, indictments, convictions and savings to the American Taxpayer is exceptional. The men and women on the front lines combating criminals taking advantage of the laws that pertain to HHS deserve special recognition. Year after year, FLEOA's National Awards Program is always finding itself selecting an HHS-OIG agent, due to their investigative excellence.

In closing, FLEOA wishes to express our strong support for this legislation, and our willingness to testify regarding our support on this issue. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at (212) 264-8400 or through FLEOA Corporate Service's Office at (516) 368-6117. Thank you.

Richard J. Gallo

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS D. BLAIR, VICE CHAIR, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to submit a statement as Vice Chair of the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) and the 10th anniversary of the IG Act Amendments of 1988. As requested, I will discuss three topics: (1) the importance of the relationship between IGs and agency heads in successfully achieving the goals and objectives of the federal government; (2) the ECIE members' views on changes to the IG Act as proposed in S. 2167; and (3) any other statutory changes to the IG Act or oversight issues that would be helpful to the IG community as it embarks on its next 20 years of operations.

The views presented in this statement reflect my views as informed by experiences as Vice Chair of the ECIE and may not necessarily represent the views of any particular ECIE IG nor the views of the Administration. However, to the extent feasible, comments are based on information provided by ECIE IGs in discussions, memorandums, surveys, and other documents.

I. IG AND AGENCY HEAD RELATIONS

During the past 2 decades, government agencies have been changing their operations in an effort to improve the services they provide to the public. The Administrations and the Congresses have initiated many of these changes. Greater emphasis has been placed on strategic planning, annual performance planning, performance measures, program results, and financial information. These changes, which have been initiated primarily through legislation, have a common purpose: To ensure that the public gets what it pays for.

A positive, constructive working relationship between an agency head and the agency's IG is crucial to achieving the agency's goals and objectives. Agency heads are responsible for prudently using the public's money to provide necessary governmental services to the American people. IGs, among other things, are charged with ensuring integrity and promoting the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their agencies' programs and operations. To ensure that IGs are able to accomplish their mission, the Congress granted them a substantial amount of independence and authority. The dual reporting responsibilities and the authority assigned produce a natural tension; however, it does not necessarily create an adversarial relationship between agency heads and their IGs. Clearly, the agency head and the IG would better serve the public's interest by working together to achieve the goals and objectives of their agencies.

A wise agency head will see the IG as a resource that can be useful in helping achieve agency goals and objectives. A less astute agency head may see the IG as an impediment to achieving the agency's goals and objectives. Based on discussions with IGs, the vast majority of agency heads have excellent working relationships with their IGs. However, it is the few extreme situations that gain the attention of the media and lead some to suspect that relationships between IGs and their agency heads are fundamentally problematic. Such is not the case.

IGs can be beneficial to agency heads in achieving their goals and objectives by (1) providing leadership, advice, and counsel during the development of new or revised programs and operations, (2) evaluating and reporting on programs and operations, (3) making recommendations to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and operations, (4) following up on recommendations made to ensure that they are effectively implemented, (5) identifying, reporting, and otherwise reducing fraud, waste, and abuse in programs and operations, and (6) keeping the agency head fully and currently informed regarding fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

Agency heads can best assist their IGs by (1) making it clear to all managers that they understand and appreciate the positive role of their IG, (2) setting a positive example for managers and staff to follow whenever they need to consider any audit finding or recommendation, and (3) letting their executive management team know that they will actively seek the advice and council of the IG on any significant issue that management team members and the IG cannot resolve independently. II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE IG ACT

Results achieved during the past 2 decades demonstrate the soundness of the IG Act. Most people would agree that the American people are better off by having IGs. However, the IG Act, as is the case with any other major legislation, may have

areas where experience over the years demonstrates that adjustments could be made.

Senator Susan Collins introduced the IG Act Amendments of 1998 (S. 2167). The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency's (PCIE's) Legislative Committee conducted a survey to determine IG views on the draft legislation. The comments of IGs are summarized in the joint statement submitted to this Committee by Eleanor Hill, PCIE Vice Chair, and Kenneth M. Mead, Chair, PCIE Legislative Committee. The PCIE Legislative Committee survey sought IG views on five proposed changes to the IG Act: term-limits, external reviews, annual reports, salary increases, and consolidation. Several general conclusions can be drawn from the survey results: Most PCIE and ECIE IGs agreed with four out of the five proposed changes. The one exception was the proposal to consolidate selected designated federal entity OIGs into selected establishment OIGs. Only two out of twenty-five ECIE IGs who responded to the survey concurred with the consolidation proposal.

Several reasons were offered by those IGs that opposed the consolidation clause of the proposed amendment to the IG Act. These IGs believe that consolidation of smaller OfGs is inconsistent with the original intention of the IG Act and will not necessarily enhance smaller OIG independence and effectiveness. They agree that available evidence suggests that oversight at consolidated agencies might be reduced if this provision is enacted into law.

III. OTHER PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGES AND ISSUES

Although some limited adjustments to the IG Act may be warranted, major legislative changes are not needed at this time. In the rare instances where issues and concerns have been identified, they often relate to the administrative skills and management styles of IGs and their agency heads, not to flaws in the IG Act. A number of individual ECIE IGs have raised specific issues for discussion including: (1) granting full law enforcement authority to additional OIGS, (2) extending the application of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act to additional OIGS, (3) requiring advance notice of removal of an IG, (4) clarifying that removal of an IG should only be for cause, (5) providing additional OIGs with line item budgetary authority, (6) standardizing some IGs salaries and seeking parity with others, and (7) defining "general supervision," as used in the IG Act, more clearly. These are simply ideas raised by some ECIE IGS. Neither the ECIE, as a council, nor the Administration have taken a position on these issues.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. If you, Members of the Committee, or your staffs would like additional information please let me know.

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