Answer: I believe that one possible avenue to ensuring consistently effective Inspectors General is through early education for political appointees and Inspectors General alike as to the proper role and function of the Inspector General. Most new political appointees are drawn directly from the private sector, and have little familiarity with Inspectors General. These new officials, perhaps understandably, are apprehensive of an internal watchdog monitoring their activities. If these new appointees could be better educated at the very beginning of their tenure concerning the responsibilities and independence of the Inspector General, misunderstandings could be avoided. The new Secretary would be assured that a strong Inspector General is an asset, not a liability, and their working relationship would stand a better chance of succeeding. Similarly, Inspectors General could benefit from early training on matters such as their dual responsibilities for enforcement and prevention; their independence and how to safeguard it; and the role they can play in support of agency policy-making without compromising their independence. It might be appropriate for the PCIE/ECIE to institute such structured orientation for new Inspectors General, that would include pointers on independence and working cooperatively and effectively with agency management. Perhaps with such early education and communication, through more formal orientation sessions or otherwise, an Inspector General and a Secretary might dispel potential misconceptions about one another's roles. Both Inspectors General and agency managers would hopefully better appreciate Inspector General independence as the cornerstone of a productive and valuable relationship. Regarding coordination among the Federal Offices of Inspector General, I believe there is already significant interaction going on through the PCIE/ECIE. Through committees, task forces, and surveys OIG officials across the Government jointly study and discuss relevant issues. A case in point is the recent PCIE/ECIE Survey on S. 2167, the Inspector General Act Amendments of 1998. Pre-Hearing Questions of Senator Sam Brownback for Susan Gaffney, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1. Has this Administration, through the work of the National Performance Review, coordinated their reinvention recommendations and efforts with you in HUD? Did they consult you on their reinvention recommendations for HUD? Are you satisfied with the reinvention efforts within your agency? In the beginning of the Clinton Administration, under former Secretary Cisneros, there was quite a bit of coordination and collaboration on the "reinvention of HUD". In fact there were a number of instances where the Secretary requested that we perform audit work and make recommendations for program termination, consolidation and/or redesign. However, over the past 21 months, under Secretary Cuomo, collaboration and consultation on reinvention efforts has been for the most part non-existent and any recommendations we make are as a result of audit work and formal reports. As we have reported in our last two semiannual reports to the Congress reinvention, in the form of the Secretary's 2020 Management Reform plan, is behind schedule and in our opinion put the "cart before the horse." While conceptually we agreed with the plan, major staffing changes (downsizing, reassignments, early retirements, buy-outs, etc.) occurred before program, system and systemic management problems were addressed. 2. You testified about your struggle with the current HUD Secretary and the HUD senior staff to maintain the independence of the HUD Office of the Inspector General (OIG). How is the independence of the OIG in agency enforced? Who enforces it? How can Congress help the IG community ensure its independence? This is not an easy answer. Inspectors General are unique creatures to any branch of government. Nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate and responsible for reporting significant instances of fraud and waste of agency programs to both branches of government: not exactly a good news messenger. The law provides certain safeguards to maintain independence, such as separate appropriations and personnel appointment authority but nothing guarantees a harmonious relationship with an agency head and I have no idea how or who can enforce it. It seems to me that either the President can step in and remove the individual(s) or the Congress can hold oversight hearings and/or use appropriations as leverage to modify behavior. 3. We heard your testimony in contrast to the testimony of June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Both of you demonstrated how the role of the IG may vary from one agency to the next. In addition, some IG's are more aggressive than others. How can Congress and the Administration make the role of the IG consistent in every agency? Is there adequate coordination among agency OIGS? How can the PCIE/ECIE improve coordination in the IG community? 2 I do not believe the role of each IG has to be consistent in every agency. There is a need for flexibility and agencies, their missions and the people working there are all different. I can only speak for the IG side of the equation and the key ingredient is that the IG be qualified and able. I believe Ms. Brown testified that Secretary Shalala was very familiar with the IG concept because of her previous government experience at HUD back in the late 1970s. Secretary Cuomo's first experience with an IG was at HUD when he was Assistant Secretary. Administration officials coming to federal service for the first time may benefit from an orientation on the IG concept. This is something that the PCIE could do for the Administration and the IG Community. I do believe there is some coordination now between the IGs and common projects and issues are often pursued together. For example auditor/investigator training is an area where the PCIE is very effective. Enclosed please find my answers to the post hearing questions from Senator Sam Brownback pursuant to the Committee on Governmental Affairs hearing on September 9, 1998. These answers were developed after conversations with your staff and with staff from Senator Brownback's office. We appreciate the additional information we received during these conversations and the extension on responding your office granted us. This extension enabled us to include in our response the printed version of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency-Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency Annual Progress Report to the 1. How does the PCIE-ECIE coordinate the efforts of the Inspector General Both the PCIE and ECIE are chaired by the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget. Both also have Vice Chairs appointed from within the IG community. These Vice Chairs play a vital role in facilitating IG discussion on important cross-Government issues, in managing the operations of the councils, and in coordinating the activities of the PCIE-ECIE committees. The PCIE maintains six permanent committees, each of which have a representative from the ECIE. The PCIE committees are; Audit, Professional Development, Integrity, Investigations, Inspections, and Legislation. The bulk of PCIE-ECIE projects are run out of these committees. Through the councils, the IGs are able to cooperate on cross-Government projects that can lead to Government-wide improvements. Recent efforts in this area have included: . The PCIE-ECIE report "Implementing the Electronic Benefits Transfer System → A Report on the Current Status of Controls," provided recommendations for effective controls as the Federal electronics benefit transfer (EBT) program was being developed. Following the issuance of the report, the Federal EBT Task Force worked with the PCIE-ECIE to get their continuing feedback on EBT controls. A recent PCIE report entitled “Eligibility Verification Needed to Deter and Detect Fraud in Federal Government Benefit and Credit Programs” offers recommendations, based on the IGs' experience of the programs within their agencies, that could lead to greater assurance that the Federal Government is doing all it can to provide the right benefit to the right recipients. These recommendations have been considered in the development of future debt collection legislation. As the Committee is aware, the councils do not provide the IGs with "oversight." That would hamper the effectiveness and independence of the OIGS. The councils do, however, provide the IGs with feedback on how other IGs are handling certain issues, a way to set professional standards for the IG community, and a forum for IGs to reach agreement on how they will proceed in certain areas. An example of that kind of work is the survey the PCIE-ECIE did on the IG role |